A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES

Kenneth M. Setton, GENERAL EDITOR
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I  The First Hundred Years
II  The Later Crusades, 1189-1311
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Volume VI

THE IMPACT OF THE CRUSADES ON EUROPE
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KENNETH M. SETTON
GENERAL EDITOR

Volume VI
THE IMPACT OF THE CRUSADES ON EUROPE
EDITED BY
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AND
NORMAN P. ZACOUR

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LIBERANDAM MISSARUM
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Justissimum bellum
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FOREWORD

As I observed in the Foreword to the preceding volume, it has been a long, hard journey. There were times when I wondered whether we should ever reach the end but now, after many years, we have finally done so. From time to time we have had to institute changes in our initial plans. At least some of these changes have been for the better. In some cases, to be sure, we have been forced to yield to practicality or to one circumstance or another. Also we have unfortunately lost along the way several of our contributors and two of our fellow editors, Marshall W. Baldwin and Robert Lee Wolff, who labored with a steadfast devotion to the first and second volumes of this History of the Crusades. I am saddened by the thought that they will not hold this last volume in their hands. It is a pleasure, however, to express my indebtedness to Dr. Harry W. Hazard and to Professor Norman P. Zacou, who have made possible the appearance of these volumes. With the courage and determination of a true crusader Dr. Hazard has borne a heavy load. Furthermore, we are most grateful to Mary Hazard for her valiant help. I am glad at last to be able to express in print my thanks to Professor Hans Eberhard Mayer, who, despite his numerous responsibilities, agreed amicitiae gratia to prepare a bibliography for all six volumes. We are pleased to welcome into our midst one of the outstanding crusading historians of our time.

We are grateful to Dr. Susan Babbitt, who is now with the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, for her help with this volume as well as with Volume V. I am also pleased at long last to acknowledge our indebtedness to Mrs. Elizabeth A. Steinberg, assistant director of the University of Wisconsin Press, whose conscientious attention to detail has been of endless assistance to us. It is now more than thirty years ago (in 1935) that I sketched in the Foreword to Volume I what I might call the historical background to this work. There I dwelt upon the interest taken in it and the impetus given to it by Dana C. Munro, August C. Krey, Frederick Duncaif, and John L. LaMonte before any plans had really been made or a single word had been written. Without the enthusiasm of these scholars, however, all of whom left us many years ago, this work would never have come
into being. Therefore my fellow editors and I want once more to recall them to our readers and again to reader thanks to all four of them.

Kenneth M. Setton

The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey
March 21, 1968

It is now some days ago that the sad news came of the death of Dr. Harry W. Hazard. He left us on 5 February (1989). My comrades-in-arms for almost forty years, as we wended our way through the long history of the Crusades, he will be sorely missed. His death led me to reread the Foreword to the first edition of Volume I of this History of the Crusades (1955) outlining the part played so many years ago by Mmnr, LaMonc, Dunca£, and Krey in planning a work that was initially to be in three volumes but, as time went on, became four, then five, and finally six. As one after another the volumes have appeared, they seem to bear almost no relation to the original planning. Year after year changes had to be made. We would have second thoughts. Contributors died, withdrew from the project, or failed to write their chapters. "Hap" Hazard was more patient than I as the almost endless changes had to be made.

Despite months of illness, Hap Hazard spent much time on this last volume, but it would not have been finished within the current year except for the assistance of his wife, Mary Hazard. She has retyped the Bibliography and the Gazetteer, added all the page references to the index cards from which the printers set the type, and shared with us the proofreading of the entire volume. But now I fear we must agree with our old friend Shakespeare that "Hector is dead; there is no more to say!"

K. M. S.

Princeton
February 12, 1989
This is the last volume of _A History of the Crusades_. It marks an end neither to the conflict with Islam nor to the very idea of crusade as a mass movement divinely sanctioned. The crusading impulse remained a vital force in the West whether directed towards a holy war to win Jerusalem or, later, a defensive struggle against Turkish aggression. Bede had long since taught the West about Iahmael, the father of Islam, whose hand was raised against all men, and against whom the bands of all men were raised in turn. Islam, then, remained an enemy with whom peace was unthinkable, war a duty. The duty would be all the more pressing in coming centuries when, as the Turkish threat grew, the very future of Christian Europe seemed to hang in the balance. Like so much else in medieval Europe, the crusade demanded both legal definition and theological justification, to say nothing of financial and military organization, constant preaching, and propaganda. Three centuries of crusading fever accompanied by incredible hardships, massive sacrifices, legends of heroism, and propaganda of hatred, left for the future a heritage of profound consequence impossible to measure.

How sad that our colleague, Harry Hazard, was not allowed to hold this finished volume in his hands. But he was determined to see it through its final preparation. Hardly a page has not felt his touch. He was one of many who inspired the entire _History_ and for whom in turn it has become something of a monument. It was with some prescience that, just before his death, he recalled the comments of B. J. Gilbert: “By caring about and being moved by the persons and deeds of our ancestors, we give assurance—and are assured—of a sort of immortality.”

*Norman P. Zacour*

*Centre for Medieval Studies*
*University of Toronto*
*Toronto, Canada*
*August 15, 1989*

1 *Sports Illustrated*, XLIV (June 22, 1976), 76.
A NOTE
ON TRANSLITERATION
AND NOMENCLATURE

One of the obvious problems to be solved by the editors of such a work as this, intended both for general readers and for scholars in many different disciplines, is how to render the names of persons and places, and a few other terms, originating in languages and scripts unfamiliar to the English-speaking reader and, indeed, to most readers whose native languages are European. In the present volume, as in most of the entire work, these comprise principally Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Armenian, none of which was normally written in our Latin alphabet until its adoption by Turkey in 1928. The analogous problem of Byzantine Greek names and terms has been handled by using the familiar Latin equivalents, Anglicized Greek, or occasionally, Greek type, as has seemed appropriate in each instance, but a broader approach is desirable for the other languages under consideration.

The somewhat contradictory criteria applied are ease of recognition and readability on the one hand and scientific accuracy and consistency on the other. It has proved possible to reconcile these, and to standardize the great variety of forms in which identical names have been submitted to us by different contributors, through constant consultation with specialists in each language, research in the sources, and adherence to systems conforming to the requirements of each language.

Of these, Arabic presents the fewest difficulties, since the script in which it is written is admirably suited to the classical language. The basic system used, with minor variants, by all English-speaking scholars was restudied and found entirely satisfactory, with the slight modifications noted. The chief alternative system, in which every Arabic consonant is represented by a single Latin character (t for th, h for kh, d for dh, s for sh, g for gh) was rejected for several reasons, needless proliferation of diacritical marks to bother the eye and multiply
occasions for error, absence of strong countervailing arguments, and, most decisively, the natural tendency of non-specialists to adopt these spellings but omit the diacritical marks. The use of single letters in this manner leads to undesirable results, but the spellings adopted for the present work may be thus treated with confidence by any writer not requiring the discriminations which the remaining diacritical marks indicate.

The letters used for Arabic consonants, in the order of the Arabic alphabet, are these: 'a, a, å, å, h, h, k, d, rh, l, q, s, sh, s, Å, Å, gh, f, q, k, l, m, n, h, w, y. The vowels are å, å, å, lengthened as å, å, å, with the åf by-guiran-t-åx distinguished as å; initial å is omitted, but terminal macrons are retained. Diphthongs are åu and åä, not åw and åy, as being both philologically preferable and visually less misleading. The same considerations lead to the omission of å before a duplicated consonant (Nåd-å-din rather than Nåd-al-Din).

As in this example, hyphens are used to link words composing a single name (as also 'Abd-Ållåh), with weak initial vowels elided (as Åbd-Ålas). Normally ål- (meaning “the”) is not capitalized; åbn- is not when it means literally “son of,” but is otherwise (as åbn- Kålåd). Some readers may be disconcerted to find the prophet called “Åmmåmad” and his followers “Åalamå,” but this can readily be justified. These spellings are valid English proper names, derived from Arabic originals which would be correctly transliterated “Åhамmad” and “Ålühmin” or “Ålühmin.” The best criterion for deciding whether to use the Anglicized spellings or the accurate transliterations is the treatment accorded the third of this cluster of names, that of the religion “Ålam.” Where this is transliterated “Ålam,” with a macron over the å, it should be accompanied by “Ålüh” and “Åhåmmåd,” but where the macron is omitted, consistency and common sense require “Ålåmå” and “Åhåmmåd,” and it is the latter triad which have been considered appropriate in this work. All namesakes of the prophet, however, have had their names duly transliterated “Åhåmmåd,” to correspond with names of other Arabs who are not individually so familiar to westerners as to be better recognized in Anglicized forms.

All names of other Arabs, and of non-Arabs with Arabic names, have been systematically transliterated, with the single exception of ‘Ålah-å-din, whom it would have been pedantic to call that rather than Salådårn. For places held, in the crusading era or now, by Arabs, the Arabic names appear either in the text or in the gazetteer, where some additional ones are also included to broaden the usefulness of this feature.
Large numbers of names of persons and groups, however, customarily found in Arabicized spellings because they were written in Arabic script, have been restored to their underlying identity whenever this is ascertainable. For example, Arabic “Saljuq” misrepresents four of the six component phonemes: s is correct, q replaces Turkish e, for which Arabic script provides no equivalent, i is correct, j replaces the non-Arabic ch, a substitutes a non-Turkish long u for the original u, and q as distinguished from k is non-existent in Turkish; this quadruple rectification yields “Seljuk” as the name of the eponymous leader, and “Seljukid” — on the model of “Abbāsid and Timūrid — for the dynasty and the people.

It might be thought that as Turkish is now written in a well-conceived modified Latin alphabet, there would be no reason to alter this, and this presumption is substantially valid. For the same reasons as apply to Arabic, ch has been preferred above c, sh above s, and gh above g, with kh in a few instances given as a preferred alternate of k, from which it is not distinguished in modern Turkish. No long vowels have been indicated, as being functionless survivals. Two other changes have been made in the interest of the English-speaking reader, and should be remembered by those using map sheets and standard reference works: c (pronounced dj) has been changed to j, so that one is not visually led to imagine that the Turkish name for Tigris — Dijle/Dicle — rhymes with “tickle,” and what the eminent lexicographer H.C. Hony terms “that abomination the undotted i” has, after the model of The Encyclopaedia of Islam, been written i.

Spellings, modified as above indicated, have usually been founded on those of the Turkish edition, İslâm Ansiklopedisi, hampered by occasional inconsistencies within that work. All names of Turks appear thus emended, the Turkish equivalents of almost all places within or near modern Turkey appear in the gazetteer.

In addition to kh, Middle Turkish utilized a few other phonemes not common in modern Turkish: zh (modern j), dh, ng, and ã (modern e); the first three of these will be used as needed, while the last-mentioned may be assumed to underlie every medieval Turkish name now spelled with e. Placitive eyebrows may be raised at our exclusion of q, but this was in Middle Turkish only the alternate spelling used when the sound k was combined with b as instead of front vowels, and its elimination by the Turks is commendable.

Persian names have been transliterated like Arabic with certain modifications, chiefly use of the additional vowels e and o and replacing q and zh with ç and ç, so that Arabic “Adharbājān” becomes Persian “Āzerbājān,” more accurate as well as more recognizable. Omission
of the definite article from personal names was considered but eventually disapproved.

Armenian presented great difficulties: the absence of an authoritative reference source for spelling names, the lack of agreement on transliteration, and the sound-shift by which classical and eastern Armenian ć, ď, ĝ became western Armenian ț, ț, k and— incredible as it may seem to the unwary—vice versa; similar reciprocal interchanges involved ts and dz, and ch and j. The following alphabet represents western Armenian letters, with eastern variants in parentheses: a, p (b), k (g), t (d), e, z, ê, l, t, zh, î, l, kh, dz (ts), g (k), h, ta (dz), gh, j (ch), m, y, u, sh, o, ch, b (p), ch (j), r, s, v, d (t), r, ta, u or v, p, k, ș, ĝ. Many spellings are based on the Armenian texts in the Recueil des Histoires des croisades.

In standardizing names of groups, the correct root forms in the respective languages have been identified, with the ending “-id” for dynasties and their peoples but “-ite” for sects, and with plural either identical with singular (as Kirghiz) or plus “-a” (Khazar) or “-es” (Uzes). In cases where this sounded hopelessly awkward, it was abandoned (Muwallads, not Muwalladids or Muwalladists, and certainly not Almohads, which is, however, cross-referenced).

The use of place names is explained in the note preceding the gazetteer, but may be summarized by saying that in general the most familiar correct form is used in the text and maps, normally an English version of the name by which the place was known to Europeans during the crusades. Variant forms are given and identified in the gazetteer.

Harry W Hazard

[Princeton, New Jersey, 1962]
ABBREVIATIONS

AESP Archivum Scriptorum prasertim Vaticano Sanctae Librariae, Roma, 1930–.
ANS, NNM American Numismatic Society, Numismatic Notes and Monographs (New York, 1920–). 
AR, BSH Académie roumaine, Bullelina de la section historique.
BIB Bibliotheca bibilographica della Terra Santa e dell’Oriente franciscano, ed. Girolamo Gohovich et al. (3 vols., Quaracchi, 1906–1927).
CURC Columbus University Records of Civilisation: Sources and Studies (New York, 1915–).
IFO, DO Institut Français de Damas, Bibliothèque orientale.
MGH Monumenta Germaniae historica... 
Legum Legum, sect. IV: Constitutiones et acta publica imperii germanici et regionis, ed. Ludwig Weiland (6 vols., Hanover, 1896–).
Numis Chr Numismatic Chronicle (Royal Numismatic Society, British Museum, London, 1839–).
PAN Polska Akademia Nauk (Warsaw).
PC, Pontificis Pontificis commissio ad redactionem codicum variis canonicis orientaliis. Fontes (Vatican City, 1944–).
ABBREVIATIONS

PL  Patrologiae cursus completus: Series latina, ed. Jacques P Migne (221 vols.,


P.R.O.  Public Record Office (London).

RHC  Recueil des inscriptions des croisades (Academie des inscriptions et belles-

Arm.  Documents arméniens (2 vols., 1869–1906)

Louv  Les Annonces du Jerusalem (2 vols., 1841–1843)


Rev. num.  Revue numismatique (Paris, 1836–

RHFE  Revue historique des droits français et étrangers (Paris, 1855–

PHGB  Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. Martin Bouquet

RISI  Rerum italicarum scriptores . . ., ed. Lodovico A. Muratori (25 vols. in 28,
   in 100 fasc., Città di Castello and Bologna, 1900–1933).


Rolls Series  Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores: The Chronicles and
   Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages (251 vols., London,
   1858–1896).


TKS  Topkapı Sarayi, Istanbul (archives).

ZDMG  Zeitschrift des Deutschen Morgenländischen Geschichts (Leipzig and else-
   where, 1844– ).
Volume VI

THE IMPACT OF THE CRUSADES ON EUROPE
I
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
OF THE CRUSADE

The basic legal theory of the crusade is the moral theology of the just war. The crusade was the perfect example of the just war, *justissimum bellum*, and the idea of a just war was inevitably developed and refined in the course of the crusading period. Before the crusades the just war was best defined by its opposite, though a number of the fundamental concepts already existed in church decrees. At all times, the notion was closely bound up with that of martyrdom and of Christian asceticism. On many points the Christian system as a whole approximated to the Moslem teaching on *jihād.* The only explicit war aim was the “recovery” of the holy places and of Christian land.

The status of a man who is fighting against “the enemies of God” is the crux of crusading law. If, even when he is killed, he is not a martyr, he must be engaged simply in a good work, and the crusade became the highest and most efficacious of good works, and so of penances. Penance has always been important in canon law, and under the pressure of the crusade the related theology of indulgences developed even faster than the theory of the just war.

A. Origins of the Concept of “Holy War”

The idea of holy war in the west takes shape early with the conversion of the Arian Franks, and Merovingian history, at least as Gregory of Tours relates it, reflects the idea that Catholic faith is rewarded by military and political victory. The definition of martyrdom, inherited from the age before Constantine, was much more precise. True martyrdom, like baptism, wipes out sin. The martyr knows no pains,
no purgatory, needs no penance, but his act must be nothing more than a refusal to deny the Christian faith. He must not seek death or incur it rashly. For much of the crusading period the situation of the individual crusader was more exactly defined than the crusade itself.¹

When the Arabs began to colonize the Spanish and Italian mainlands and Sicily, they were not thought of as unique, and the war against them was not “signed with the cross” more than war against any other invader. In this situation, however, pope Leo IV (847–855) asserted that Christians who die for the truth of their faith, the safety of their country, and the defense of Christians are sure of a heavenly reward.² This, of course, means no more than is self-evident in Christian terms, that death incurred in the course of these good and praiseworthy acts is particularly meritorious. “The repose of eternal life shall embrace those who fall in the conflict of war, from duty to the Catholic religion and struggling vigorously against pagans and infidels,” wrote pope John VIII in 879, at a time of continual wars against the Arab colonizers of Italy.³ Death for the “Christian faith and commonwealth”, then, was a penance, and in pronouncing absolution, John made it conditional on penitence, foreshadowing theological development in a later period. He did so also in his many diatribes and exhortations against alliances of Christians with Moslems, requiring, for example, that prince Walfereus of Salerno “withdraw everyone from the fellowship of the pagans”. He exhorted bishops Ayo of Benevento and Landulf of Capua to secure the dissolution of these ungodly alliances (secessio impia) or unnatural alliance (infandum). The Neapolitan duke Sergius II, warned to withdraw from an alliance, was threatened with attack by the temporal defenders of the church, but was promised, if he obeyed, both papal favors and “great heavenly rewards”.⁴ Thus an influential man, merely for not helping the Moslems, was offered almost as much as those who might be killed. Archbishop Athanasius of Naples was finally excommunicated for his treaty arrangements with Moslems (881), in rather more sober language.⁵ John’s aim is clear — the elimination of Moslem invaders from Italy. The justification is stated in another of his letters, more emotional in tone: he denounced the Mos-

¹ Bruno Kreusch and Wilhelm Levison, ed., Gregorii apostolorum Francorum Liber Historiarum X (MGH, Hist. 1; Hanover, 1991), e.g., II, 37 (pp. 85–96), and III, preface (pp. 96–97)
² PIs., 115, ed. 657 (pp. 1, ad eusebium Franconii).
³ PIs., 126, ed. 816 (pp. 186, ad eusebium en regnum Eudovici comitissicrati)
⁴ Ibid., ed. 708, 717–718, 723, 728 (pp. 55, ad Guaimarium; 63, ad Landulfimum; 70 ad Sergueram; 72, ad Ascanium)
⁵ Ibid., ed. 930–931 (pp. 323, ad alfusius episcopus)
lems as “the sons of fornication” (though this may represent one of
the usual propaganda criticisms of Islamic sexual moral law), together
with those who, “under the name of Christians”, kill “the sheep of
the Lord”, some by the sword, some by famine, while carrying others
off as booty into captivity. John did little more than support a policy
of expelling the invaders with the strongest religious reasons he could
think of. The alternative fates that he referred to, death and captivity
devastation was a by-product, reflect more part of the Islamic law
of jihad, as applied to conquered Christians. He did not mention
that the Christians were also offered conversion to Islam, though this,
of course, can be assumed to have happened. Whether only those who
refused conversion were enslaved we do not know; the slave-labor mar-
ket seems to have flourished.

That period was formative of later law but produced nothing clear
or unambiguous. The same is true of the years immediately preceding
Urbeu II’s 1095 initiative, when the reconquest of Sicily was already
complete and the war in Spain reasonably successful, a tradition had
grown up which gave ecclesiastical encouragement to any effort to re-
cover European territory. Churches in Spain and Sicily were already
described as “recovered” or “recovered”. Europe was the last region to
have come (in part) under Arab domination, and it was taken for granted
that it should be recovered first, until the idea of the crusade sup-
vended. In Sicily and Spain the Christians fought campaigns blessed
by the church, but not dominated by religious purpose. Harald
Hardråde, count Roger of Hauteville, and Rodrigo Diaz of Vivar were
probably all believing Christians in their different ways, but none was
crusader. Europe approached the proclamation of the First Crusade
with some idea of holy war but also with a papal diplomatic tradition
which would be suspended by, but would survive, the crusades. Even
when the idea of a Levantine crusade was in the air, Gregory VII ex-
pected to have a working relationship with the Hamamdid an-Nasir
(1062–1066), to whom he wrote about the surviving local Latin hier-
archy in North Africa, wishing him honor in this world and life in
the next, in the bosom of Abraham. This was a wish which, though
it may have been inspired by an acquaintance with Jewish belief, was
equally appropriate for Moslems. He urged the Christian population to

6. Dent., cod. 723 (op. 62, ad Maghodonum); cod. 716 (op. 62, ad quorum
opus in regno Canari (in opa
constitutum).

7. Erich Chapuz, ed., Dam Regnum Gregorius VII. (MS CRALL, Episcopate selectum, II; Berlins,
1920–1921), IV, 28 (pp. 343–347); and see note 12 below.

8. Dennis Hay, Europe, the Emergence of an Islam, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1968).
accept trials with patience and to set a good example to non-Christians around them. 9

Urban II introduced a clearer legal and political situation. Whatever the confusion about Urban's exact words, all writers (some of whom were themselves among the new "crucesignati") recognized that the crusade proper was a new initiative. The initiative in crusading always remained with the papacy. Whenever initiative appeared elsewhere (as later it would do in the case of Frederick II), the papacy fought to regain it. The political theory therefore began as, and remained, a characteristically clerical concept of Christendom, and the theory common to all accounts of Urban's preaching is that of a defensive war by the Christian commonwealth. This is part of the history of propaganda, but it has major political and legal implications. From this date forward, the crusade was justified by long accounts of Arab aggression against Asia, Africa, and Europe in turn; the European reaction was now literally oriented to the "recovery" of the Holy Land. This was clerical lore. The wars of the Old Testament were thought to give further legal justification, in addition to their propaganda value. Politically, all crusades would continue to be regarded as defensive; legally, they were justified first as undertaken in defense of Christendom. The papacy purported to act on behalf of the Christian commonwealth.

The political concept amounted roughly to what would now be called "cultural imperialism". It is not only that Urban was believed to have appealed to a national sense, and especially to the French. 10 As soon as the "pilgrim" left the Latin world, and long before they met a Moslem, they came into conflict with cultures different from their own, and an inflexible "Latin" cultural intolerance remained with most of them throughout the crusading period. 11 Rejection of all but the Latin culture—and in Spain even the Latin, though not Roman, Mozarab rite was largely replaced—ensured that the crusade would never look like more than an alien colonization to Arab Christians as well as to Moslems. From the beginning, it was implicit in Urban's decision to preach the crusade at all, in his choice of Clermont, and in the way he was understood in the west, that the crusade in the east should be an expansion of western European society.

The key to both legal and political theory was the idea of "recovery". Guibert of Nogent says that Urban expected God, through the

9 Corpus Descriptorum Gregorianorum IV, III, 20 (pp. 388-387), 21 (pp. 387-388); cf. 1, 22 (pp. 38-389), and IV, 28 (pp. 345-347).
crusades, to "restore lost Jerusalem". In Robert of Rheims' account Urban called on the Franks to "repel aggression". In the Latin liturgy for the recovery of the Holy Sepulcher, as reported by John of Wurzburg, the Secreta refers to "the city of Jerusalem, plumbed out of the hand of the pagans,". It is necessary to labor this point in order to understand that from the beginning the notion that the Holy Land belonged of right to Christians underlay the legal concept of holy war. Palestine, which had been Arab for centuries, was conceived of as being as much Christian as were Spain and Sicily. The political fact that Spain, even more than Sicily, had a strong Latin population on which to build effective reconquest had no reflection in political theory. That cultural (and ethnographic) reality meant nothing as admirably illustrated in a Genoese account of the capture of Caesarea during the First Crusade. According to this, two Arabs came out of the besieged city and argued with the legate and the patriarch, asking why the Christians want to kill people who are made in the form of the Christian God, and take the Arabs' land, when this is contrary to the Christian religion (or "law"—lex). The patriarch answered that the city belonged to St. Peter, not to the Arabs who lived in it and whose ancestors ejected St. Peter; furthermore, whoever strives against the law of God ought to be killed; to kill him is not contrary to the law of God, who said "Vengeance is mine." Therefore, if the Arabs will give up the land of St. Peter, they may safely depart with their goods, but if they refuse, "the Lord will strike you with his sword and you will be justly slain." This "right" of killing in the crusade was important, and in due course would be elaborated scholastically.

It brings us back directly to the problem of the just war, at this date only a compounded phrase to cover a group of associated concepts: "defensive" war, war "for God" or against the "enemies of God", a "good" war as distinct from ordinary bad wars, war as penance, and war as a form of Christian ascetic life and a means of salvation particularly suited to anyone capable of fighting. The Latin for the crusade is, after all, "bellum sacrum". At this early stage the idea of the crusade as directing bad instincts to good ends was important. Fulcher's classic account describes the public crimes which the bishops and other authorities had failed to repress, such as the capturing and


13. Cassiodorus, Cassiodori Scolastici de institutione Christianae religionis, XV (RHC, Occ., V, 62-63); Rom. 12:19; Deut 32:35. The logic Adhemar was already dead, and no patriarch had yet been elected.
plundering of monks and clerics and nuns and their servants, and of pilgrims and merchants; his account condemns kidnappers, burners of houses, and all who consent to their cruelties, but claims that private wars and lawlessness will be brought to an end by unity in fighting the Turkish and Arab invaders of the east: "May those who used to fight against their brothers and their families now justly (rete) war against the barbarians." In practice this would not end savagery, but as well turn it against the external enemy. "Let hatreds cease among you" meant "hate the enemy"; the theme was prominent in what came to be accepted as Urban's argument, as tendered, for example, by William of Malmesbury and, in due course, by William of Tyre, and the best clerical tradition in the crusading state. In Monte Cassino the monks held that Urban enabled the lords to do penance by crusading, without having to admit publicly that they were doing so. The idea of the crusade as a penance naturally follows from its being a good work, literally a pilgrimage. We can illustrate the originality of this complex of attitudes by the fact that, once the idea of the crusade was enunciated, it was extended to older areas of conflict. The privilege (and often the opportunities for legal penance) were extended to the war in Spain, though not uninterruptedly or as fully as in the war in the east. As of 1100, we can define the just war as a defense, a restoration of rights, a resistance to aggression and cruelty, a substitute for wicked internecine warfare, a penance for rape and lawlessness, and finally, a Christian way of life.

Urban brought existing ideas together; they were not yet precisely defined, but all the ideas of the crusade that developed later were present in some form or other.

B. Indulgences and the Holy War

The systematization of canon law relating to the different aspects of holy war, including indulgences, is best studied in its final form in the decretal collections. We may glance in passing at Bernard of Clair-
vaux, whose surviving crusade sermons, and whose treatise on the knights of the Temple, naturally emphasize the "way of Christian life" but, as concerns the law, stress two points. He is careful to define the conditions of the papal offer of indulgence exactly, at a lower rhetorical level than usual — taking the cross and making contrite confession. He contributed, as did many who never went to the east, to the conception of irreconcilability and the attempt to separate two civilizations by a barrier of canon law. Christ is considered glorified in the death of the Moslem; the Christian in death is led into his reward. Again, "the profit of the death which (the soldier of Christ) inflicts is Christ, the profit of that which he receives is his own." Even Bernard thought that this needed a bit of explaining. "Not that even the Moslems (pagan) ought to be destroyed, if by any other means they could be held back from excessive aggression and violence against the faithful." Elsewhere, however, when he absolutely forbids any understanding with Moslems (no allegiance, no money payments, no tribute), Bernard sounds no less uncompromising than Cato, and writes, "either the religion or the people must be destroyed."[15]

A survey of the canons and papal bulls throughout the main period of the crusades reveals no specific justification of war, although this should have been the basic legal problem for church lawyers. The official documents that proclaim or support or enforce the crusade take for granted that such justification as Urban, and particularly the idea of "recovery", had lent the war was fully sufficient. The Moslems who are the targets of the warfare continue to be referred to as "attackers". Early in this period the crusade became a normal penance; for example, the Second Lateran Council (1139) decreed a year's service in Jerusalem or Spain for arson. The legal concept of holy war developed most quickly in terms not only of penance, but of the indulgences which the papal documents concede, and which became so popular at this time.[16]

Indulgences evolved from the old system of penitentialaries, with their tariffed penance, which, together with a process of redemptions, lasted into the eleventh century. Indulgences in consideration of some good or pious work first developed clearly in the course of this century, and did so more definitely in the twelfth. The ordinary indulgence substa-

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[15] De laude novar medicinae, ii, i, 422, cols. 934-925); ibid., i (col. 922), and Epistola, col. 452 (pp. 457, ad novissima feliciam) and col. 653 (pp. 468, ad Winoisdamer)
stituted a stated good work for so many "day" units of purgatorial pains which would previously have been remitted by penance. Throughout the crusading period, the plenary indulgence was confined to the crusade proper, and the first known unambiguous plenary indulgence (for all the pains of all sins committed, if confessed and repented) appears to have been that offered by Urban II himself at Clermont in 1095. Canon 2, as reported, conceded remission of all penance to whoever made the pilgrimage, not from pride and avarice but out of piety and in order to liberate the tomb of Christ. Indulgences were inextricably associated with social motivation, especially the purpose of fighting. Their use should not be seen as the act of private devotion that it subsequently became. They were essential to the law of the crusade, and constitute a useful legal and political criterion.

Examples illustrate the development of this practice and its underlying theory. The Second Lateran decree was by later standards as imprecise as Urban had been at Clermont (it actually uses as a definition the phrase "as decreed by our lord pope Urban"): "To those who set out for Jerusalem, to defend the Christian nation and war against the tyranny of the unbelievers, we concede remission of their sins." Much later, in 1181, it is interesting to see Alexander III associating the notions of defense and attack with the remission of sin. Thus in a bull to the master of the Temple, Arnold of Tigove, he writes of the duty of Templars to lay down their lives for their friends (John 15:13), adding "and you do not at all fear to protect them from the attacks of the pagans". He charges them "for the remission of sins, by the authority of God and the blessed Peter, prince of the apostles," to defend the church by attacking its enemies, and to rescue it where it is "under the tyranny of the pagans". 16 1181 was the year of Reginald of Châtillon's brutal breach of the truce; Arab power was growing, but crusading aggression against Egypt was still fresh in the memories of men. In a few years' time Jerusalem would fall, and Gregory VIII would call all Christians to penance, good works, and the (armed) pilgrimage to the Holy Land, the "labor" of its recovery, "to look not for profit or worldly glory, but for the will of God". He granted the indulgence, which is of course "plenary", to those who undertake the "journey" with a contrite heart and humble spirit, "and to those who depart in repentance for sins and in a true faith, we promise full in-

19 Ibid., p. 634.
dulgence of their offenses (crimina) and eternal life. They shall know that whether they survive or die, they shall have relaxation of the penance imposed, for all their sins of which they shall have made true confession. . . ." 21

After the comparative failure of the Third Crusade, Celestine III wrote in stronger terms. We shall see how, stage by stage, failure made the papacy increasingly intransigent. Celestine preferred the threat of excommunication to the mediation of the indulgence. He reverted to Urban’s old themes, while bringing them up to date and using the more legalistic phraseology of his own day. In condemning sin, he singled out private enmities and tournaments. By implication, the crusade offered meritorious enmity and a profitable tournament. Celestine did not claim that Jerusalem was Christian because Christians had been ruling it for nearly a century, but spoke of “the filthiness of the pagans in the taking of the Holy Land, which is the inheritance of the Lord”; he also said that they came “ruinously” and “violently”. Later be referred to “that tiny piece of the portion of the land of the Lord which is still held under the power of the Christians”. When, as so often in recruiting propaganda, the church is identified with the people of ancient Israel, it has in fact both a political and a legal implication. Politically, the church, (Latia) Christian society under papal guidance, has claimed the right to the “inheritance of the Lord” in the same way as the chosen people had a right to the promised land; and when Celestine approvingly quoted how one man overthrew a thousand, and “slaughtered something like an infinite multitude”, he was coming close to a justification of the slaughter of infinite multitudes in any situation, because any situation may be seen as reproducing events of the Old Testament. 22 This gave the war its legality.

It was at the end of Innocent III’s pontificate and during that of Honorius III that the definition of the “Holy Land” was extended to include Egypt; thus the legal concept of holy war and indulgence was stretched to cover what was originally no more than a strategic concept recommended by Richard I of England and actually attempted by the Fifth Crusade. 23 At the same time we reach the fullest expression of indulgence, but no more precise definition of holy war. For Innocent III it was still otiose to define closely the justification of the war. For example, he spoke of the “ungrateful slaves” and “disloyal

22. Ibid., Celestine III, p. 88 (no. 12: 1192).
23. Ibid., Honorius III, p. 332 (no. 146: 1277); Chroniques d’Hermann et de Bernald le Trésorier; cap. 31, ed. Louis de Cénis Leche (Paris, 1877), p. 336, if done in new hindsight. Cf. volume II of the present work, chapter XI.
servants" who refuse, "when the Lord of heaven and earth implores their help in recovering his own patrimony, which has been lost, not by his fault, but by theirs." Like his predecessors, he preferred to hover over the intermediate ground between political and legal theology. He argued from a familiar feudal situation: "Certainly, if some king in this world was thrown out of his kingdom by his enemies, and if his vassals did not venture their persons as well as their property for him, would he not, when he recovered his lost kingdom, condemn them as disloyal, and conceive unthought-of torments for them . . . ?" This unattractive picture of a worldly king became less attractive still when the pope drove home the comparison with the King of kings "as if ejected from the kingdom which he provided at the price of his blood". This is merely another variation on the theme of defense, but the picture of the enemy as a criminal or rebel was becoming clearer and acquiring a more obviously legal force. In the same bull, dated 1214, Innocent argued that the divine command to love one's neighbor requires men to fight to free their fellow-Christians "held among the unfaithful Moslems in the slave-yard of a fearful prison"; there are many thousands detained in "slavery or prison", he said. This is a variation on the theme of persecution, and it is still as much an exhortation as an attempt at legal justification. Even in this great age of canon law, the legal basis remained uncertain. The key ideas were still the "recovery" of land rightfully possessed, and the "defence" against the "attack" (possession of the Holy Land), and these were determined on theological grounds.

The classic form of the plenary crusading indulgence is to be found in Innocent's decree calling for a new crusade, promulgated during the Fourth Lateran Council. The indulgence is based on the power of binding and loosing which was conferred on the pope by God's mercy and by the authority of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul. What was granted was "full pardon (plena venia) of their sins", if "truly confessed with a contrite heart and mouth". It was granted to those who undertook this labor (the crusade) in their own persons and at their own expense; but the same "full pardon" was conceded to those who paid someone else's expenses, or who went at the expense of someone else. As had long now become the custom, the property of crusaders was to be under the protection of the church during their absence. In the same bull, he revoked the "remissions and indulgences" granted

24 [Footnote]
25 [Footnote]
for fighting against the Moors in Spain or against Albigensians in Languedoc, as only temporary. Subsequently it was enough that the indulgences should be announced "according to the statute of the [Fourth Lateran] general council".26

These problems of public war and private forgiveness are really quite simple, even in terms contemporary with the crusade. They were reduced to a few clear phrases by Thomas Aquinas, who had to deal with the objection that "he therefore who takes the cross according to the form of the papal letter, suffers no pain for his sins, and thus soars immediately aloft, having achieved the full remission of sins." Thomas had reservations: "Although indulgences are very valuable for the remission of pains, yet other works of satisfaction are more meritorious with regard to the essential reward, which is infinitely better than the discharging of temporal pains."27 Crusading presupposes death in the course of a good work, in Aquinas's thought here as much as in the preaching of Urban. The good confession, the contrite heart, the "good work" of a just war, these were the reasons to hope for the forgiveness of sin, and the indulgence was a pius reward for those who feared the penalties of sin rather than sin itself. The indulgence is here seen to depend wholly on the identification of the war as just. For this, Aquinas required proper authority, the just cause, and the tight intention. It does not surprise us that these conditions were believed without difficulty to be satisfied in the crusade, it was precisely these points that were supposed to characterize the crusade.

The evidence is insufficient, but it seems that the teaching was widely yet only superficially understood. The Chanson de Roland, even though there is a large clerical element in its composition, was certainly not written by a theologian, and it is essentially a work for a lay and courtly, but war-minded, public. In the Chanson, the warriors do not actually make a good confession before battle, but they are absolved by Turpin on their knees, and are given fighting itself as a penance.28 It is true that this passage promises that they will be holy martyrs if they die, but the absolution and penance, however lightly or uncertainly conceived, make it clear that "martyr" here has only a popular sense. True martyrdom was not claimed. Long before, an eighth-century pilgrim to the Holy Land from Wessex had spoken of being "martyred" for smuggling. This may have been a joke; but it was no joke in the cru-

27. Quaestiones super Sententias, II, viii, 2; Summa theologica, III, Supp., 252.
sading period. The *Gesta Francorum* ordinarily speaks of anyone who died on the crusade, for example of hunger, as martyred, but Albert of Aachen had heard that the clergy prayed for the souls of those who died at Dorylaim. There is not enough evidence for us to be sure how far the complex theology of martyrdom and indulgence penetrated to the soilders and camp-followers, or even, later, to the residents of the Latin states, or how far, indeed, they were really interested. The suggestion underlies many chronicles that death in a holy war had the popular sense of "martyrdom" that we find in *Roland*. Later chansons provide even less evidence. The farther we recede from the theologians and canonists, the less we find any clear theological concept at all.

For two centuries from the first preaching of the crusade to the growing realization that it was no longer practical politics, the system determined a part of public life, and to the extent that law affects the ordinary public crusading did so; indeed, its influence continued till very much later. The old, disused system of cased penance would not have been enough for effective recruitment; indulgences reached far more people, and provided a legal basis for propaganda; persuasion was based on a theology that must reach everyone. There was some scope for legal compulsion. Once a man had taken the cross, he must be forced to put his vows into effect. The First Lateran Council (1123) imposed an inquest on the lands of all those who did not put their vows into effect between the next Easter and the Easter following, and forbade them to attend church; later, excommunication was the normal form of sanction. William Marshal spent three years in the Holy Land in order to make good the crusade vow the young prince Henry—son of Henry II—had sworn before his death in 1183. From knights or sergeants to monarchs, laymen benefited in their different degrees from a tax levied to pay for soldiers. It was logical to extend the indulgence to those who financed other men's personal service, but such subventions soon opened the door to abuses which ultimately extended to the whole system of indulgences. The councils from Fourth Lateran in the early thirteenth century to Vienne a century later recognized the need for control, but established no effective method.

A good canonist or an experienced preacher could see the problem.

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30 Heide, *Histoire des conciles*, V.4, p. 635; V.2, pp. 1390 ff
31 *Histoire de Guillaume le Marschall*, ed. Paul Meyers (Paris, 1900), books 7277–7279
32 Heide, *Histoire des conciles*, V.2, pp. 1390 ff, V.1–2, pp. 643 ff
clearly, but could suggest no remedy beyond conscience, always the weakness of canon law. Gilbert of Tournai was only reviving condemnations of an earlier century when he attacked the financing of the crusade by exploiting the poor, but it was the whole public that was exploited; he also discussed the real legal abuse, which was the severity of sentences in the condemnation of those who, often for a good reason, failed to fulfill the crusading vow, when severity was used only to extort higher redemption money. These abuses, by common consent, made the whole business unpopular. In fact, it was a business, an often capricious system of tax collection which gave increasing prominence to redemption. Cash payments necessitated a return to the custom of partial indulgences ("proportionate" plenary indulgence), and there was no adequate means of assessment. In a study of legal theory one can do little more than emphasize the feebleness of the law which wholly failed to regulate the trade in indulgences or the scale of redemption.

Innocent’s declaration at the Fourth Lateran Council of a new crusade illustrates the law at its height. After giving instructions for the "passage" (passagium = "crossing" or "crusade"), it announces miscellaneous provisions almost haphazardly. Clerks may retain the profit of their benefices while they are away. Those people who have taken the cross will be excommunicated if they do not go. All prelates and others responsible for the cure of souls must preach the crusade. Those who cannot go should pay a soldier to go for three years. Those who supply ships or contribute to their construction receive an indulgence. All clerks are to give a twentieth of their ecclesiastical revenues for three years, the pope and the cardinals a tenth. While crusaders are away they will be exempt from taxation and from payments of interest. Pirates who pillage pilgrims are excommunicated. The usual prohibition of contraband (arms, iron, and so forth) is repeated in slightly strengthened form. No ship is to go to the east for four years, lest the enemy benefit; on the contrary, it should remain in the Christian reserve. Tournaments are prohibited for three years; wars for four. Then comes the plenary indulgence, in the form already quoted above, but those who, short of paying for a substitute, contribute to the costs, receive remission "according to the quality of the subvention and their devotional disposition". Here appears a scale of exact payment for an incalculable return, and such could lead to nothing but abuse. The

34. See above, note 25.
contrast between the careful provision for practical steps leading to military action, and the loose terms of the indulgence, illustrates at least the greater worldly than spiritual wisdom of the church.

C. The Full Theory of Holy War

We can best evaluate the theory by considering the case as it was argued by the distinguished Dominican scholar Humbert of Romans. He genuinely disliked war but understood the need to make a case to justify it. The case he made, while wholly circumscribed by the ordinary terms of his thinking and the contemporary commitment to the crusade, evolved from time to time an awareness of some of the real difficulties. He had the same clear picture of the unjust war that Urban stimulated in those who reported him. Instead of starting from a conception of the just war, he began by considering what makes war unjust. He said that there are three things: attacking the innocent—killing poor men and nameless farmers, ransacking hospitals and even lepersaries; fighting without reason; and fighting without authority. The war against Islam, on the contrary, was “just.” The Moslems were not innocent; they were “culpable in the highest degree against the whole of Christendom”; he elaborated this no further, and to Moslem “guilt” — no nameless farmers, no hospitals—we must come back. The war was reasonable because undertaken not out of pride, avarice, or vainglory, but in defense of the faith, and defense of mere property or persons would have been justification enough. Finally, it was undertaken on the authority of the church. It was therefore justissimum bellum, undertaken against the most culpable of enemies, for the highest reason, and on the highest authority.

Yet Humbert knew that crusaders were by no means all pious; there were those who carried their cross like the bad thief, as well as those who did so like the penitent thief. Moreover, Humbert was well aware that Christian practice was once very different, and that the change needed to be justified. Jesus told Peter to put up his sword, and the teaching of all the apostles and the fathers is against the use of force; he recalled the example of Maurice and his legion, who were beheaded rather than obey an unjust command, and of the innumerable martyrs. He developed a remarkable historical theory of the development of Christian practice to explain the change: “For the vine planted by the head of the household is brought to its proper growth by favor
of the dew and the rams and the warmth of heaven; but it is preserved by the sword, if by chance enemies want to root it out." The powerless and the powerful, he went on, must act in different ways, the former with humility, the latter with severity; every craftsman uses the tool he has, and not that which he has not. The early Christians used miracles, the sufferings of the saints, and holy doctrine, that it might be seen that faith grew by God's agency, not man's, but when it had grown, it became necessary to defend it by the sword. The church, which lacked the early gifts of miracles and tongues and the Holy Ghost, but had power, must use it. Humbert did not deprecate this historical development. Those who object to the shedding of blood by Christians "do see themselves want to be poor, as men were in the early church, but rich; they do not want to be, as (Christians) then were, lowly, but to be held in honor; they do not want to be destitute of sustenance, as Christians then were, but to live amid pleasures." This is consciously a theory of history: "accordent to the series of periods and the diversity of circumstances, the church has varying situations, as the growing boy passes through varying situations before he reaches old age. Thus the church was poor, but is now rich, and many things similar; in the same way, it makes use of arms now, but did not do so then." This is an interesting, a logical, and a frank argument; does it amount to a legal theory? Almost certainly, Humbert saw this as having legal force, though we might incline rather to allot it to political theory.

Humbert in any case saw a legal defect, and cautioned that the use of the sword was confined to lay people, as the hand is the only member that can wield a sword. Using the argument of the two swords, he elsewhere stressed the necessity of rational justification of a war. Force is justified against those who rebel against the authority of the church, he wrote, because the fear of God recalls them from evil; and the infection of heretical error must be cut out like a putrid member; but the Moslems, who will not even listen to the word of the church (bearing those who tell them about their errors), are worse than rebels, who at least listen, even if they do not obey; and worse than the heretics, because they destroy body as well as soul. Jews, he added, are in a different category; their conversion is foretold by Scripture, they strengthen faith in being seen to fulfill the Scripture, when it is properly interpreted; they do not attack in arms. The Moslems' conversion no Scripture has foretold; to see them does not encourage faith, but rather gives scandal to weaker minds; more than any other unbelievers, they come strongly in arms against us. He applied the parable of the marriage feast. The Jews are those who "would not come." The
idolators are those who “made light of it”. The Moslems are those who treated the king’s servants “shamefully and killed them.” “The king was angry, and he sent his troops and destroyed those murderers and burned their city.” Humbert said that “from this derives the authority to advance the army against them”; this, he believed, gives his exegesis legal force.

He added that the church not only provides the justifying authority, but also grants indulgences from “all sins”; by these the crusaders would be washed as clean as martyrs are by the shedding of their blood (a large claim which, however, clearly distinguishes martyrdom from indulgence, while claiming equal effectiveness for the latter). It will be noted that there is no suggestion that the indulgence is confined to remission of pains for which penance should otherwise have been done, as Catholic apologists have maintained, even when talking about remission a culpa et a pena. Those who are “completely absolved”, said Harebert, are “not only the dying, but the living who are good pilgrims, from all sins, great as well as small, hidden as well as open, carnal as well as spiritual, by day as well as by night, known as well as unknown.” This did, of course, presuppose penitence.

This is perhaps the fullest reasonable defense surviving of a canonical position which was difficult to reconcile with much Christian history and doctrine. It was a good deal closer, as we shall see in more detail, to the Moslem position. Humbert, within the limits of the method, allowed his imagination some play; he put the scholastic points for and against a proposition in a more literary form than usual, and his work gains from even this slight freedom from the classroom method. All justification of war in Christian terms is derived from the right of self-defense, and even in more sophisticated form the arguments used can still be reduced to that single issue; thus the “recovery” of the Holy Land is considered the defense of Christian land, the ill will of the enemies of God presupposes self-defense, and so on. If we come to the point of what confers the right to kill, the authority of the church, on which scholastics insist, is only part of the answer, and should rather be considered a condition. The “right” is conferred essentially by self-defense; by “reason” and by “custom” a man has the right to defend himself and his property, and still more his faith, which is his most important possession, and more important than his life on earth. Humbert often seems uneasy about these arguments, and per-

35 Matthew 22:1-7
36 De persecutione sancti crucis (Nuremberg?, 1490), caps. 2, 8; Opera trium partium, in Appendix ad fundamenta rerum expansionis ad imaginaria, ed. Edward Brown (London, 1690), cap. 13.
haps stresses the wickedness of the enemy as much to evade the emotional consequences of the crusaders' cruelty and inhumanity as to establish his legal justification. In the last resort, in spite of the array of scriptural authorities, canon law was based on common sense and not on revelation, in this unlike the Moslem jihād. However, although the right to defend the faith by force was seen as self-evident, this argument was at least implicitly reinforced by the right of the Christian faith, as revelation, to exercise God's dominion over the world. We shall consider this "war aforementioned later.

Some of these arguments are found more fully, but less reasonably and certainly less attractively, expressed a few generations later, in the period of total crusading failure. When Humbert wrote there seemed to be at least some chance of saving the Latin remnant of Syria. Humbert added something to the case for killing infidels which had been put so summarily by Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth century and taken for granted in many bulls and canons. It was argued in still fuller detail by the English Dominican Robert Holcot, who, when he died in 1349, had lived through a period of futile attempts by the papacy to revive the crusade seriously. Though there was talk of attacking the Arab countries, there was at this date no danger of attack by any Islamic power, but the question "whether it is lawful and praiseworthy for some Christian, when in order to attack he uses force, to kill some unbeliever such as a pagan" was not altogether unreal. Alexandria was sacked after Holcot wrote.

The arguments he cites against killing unbelievers, summarized, are: God desires not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted; the church prays for unbelievers, so they should not be killed; God is merciful and Jesus forbade Peter to use his sword, Aristotle told Alexander that he refused to shed blood because, whenever a creature kills another, the heavenly powers are moved to divine vengeance; God said, "Vengeance is mine"; it is forbidden to kill a bad Christian, although he is worse than a pagan who does not enjoy the restraint of Christian law; unbelief is not the unbelievers' fault, because God has not lifted the veil from their hearts; their error is irrevocable, because, even if they want to believe, the power of their rulers prevents them; an effect is good only if it is directed to a good end, but the

principal end is conversion, and conversion cannot be forced, because no one comes to God except by faith, but can only believe freely. The replies to these objections are: it is only the eternal death of the soul that God does not desire; the church prays for the sinner to become just, and, if he refuses, may cut him off; the sword is forbidden only without due authority, and Peter chose the wrong moment ("that was not the time"); Aristotle meant that he would not take pleasure in shedding blood, and true Christians, when they do so, take pleasure only in the end for which they do it; God's vengeance is sometimes effected through his servants; bad Christians are killed "every day"—thieves, traitors, heretics—and it is necessary only that there be just authority, rather than private decision; God will remove the veil from anyone who wants it removed; inexcusable error excuses only those who deserve no blame in incurring it; finally, the principal end is conversion, and extirpation only secondary. No one who believes will be killed. We can sum up all these arguments: it is a Moslem's fault that he is Moslem, and that fault is a capital offense. In that case, there would be no necessity to allow a Moslem prisoner to live if he refused to apostatize. This harsh attitude is only very slightly mitigated by the main body of the argument.

Although later Holcet distinguishes different types of pagani, he begins his main discussion on the assumption that he is speaking about those who rule the Holy Land—that is, the Moslems. The land was promised to Abraham and his seed, and Christians are the spiritual seed of Abraham; it is lawful to take up material arms against those who occupy our spiritual country unjustly, and thus to repel force by force. If they are killed in the course of being expelled, they are the cause of their own deaths; in the same way, a husband may kill an adulterer who does not run away from his house. Again, the outcome of what is vowed is always lawful if the thing vowed is lawful, and in this case the thing vowed is lawful according to the church militant. Again, any outcome indulged by the pope is lawful, and fighting against pagans is indulged from fault and pain (a culpa et a pena); and so such fighting is lawful and meritorious. A similar argument: the English church is taxed to subsidize the fighting, with the approval of the pope; therefore the and is approved by the rulers of the churches, to whom obedience is due.

The argument is prefixed by a number of definitions and distinctions. Thus, some unbelievers are subject to the church, and are associated with believers, as servants to their lords, and are ruled by them. Others are "rebels against the church, persecutors of the Christians, and insulters of Christian doctrine". This is really merely a distinction
between those under Christian and those under non-Christian governments. Then there are different ways of attacking the pagans; for example, if someone presumes to act without the authority of the church (an allusion to Frederick II?) he cannot kill justly. Thirdly, there are different kinds of pagans, those who have no religion “unless by chance the law of nature”; there are also Jews, Moslems, idolaters, and heretics, and these have different relations to the Christian religion. Heretics must be compelled to recant. Moslems kill anyone who preaches against Islam, but the life of Christ cannot be taught without disproving the religion of Mohammed (a characteristic self-deception); however, those Moslems who are bound to, and tolerated by, Christians cannot lawfully be attacked by arms, but must be granted peace according to the example set by Joshua, who enslaved the Gibeonites as hewers of wood and drawers of water A fortiori “pagans” may lawfully be offered protection, provided they live “ sine contumelia creatoris”, especially in the hope of their conversion; they cannot then lawfully be killed, though this applies only per accidens. As for those other unbelievers, insurgents against the church and persecutors of the faith, Christians may “attack them by force and arms, despoil them, kill them, and devastate their goods to the believers”.

Jews are in a different class; Holcot does not think it lawful to kill them, because the apostles announced their conversion at the last days, so all, at least, may not be destroyed. The Moslems and the Jews are not in the same case; the former persecute the Christians and turn them out of their own towns and places, the latter are ready everywhere to serve the Christians. The war against the Moslems is just, under the authority of the church, for many reasons: they occupy the land and other possessions that belong to the Christians (the justification “appears proved by reason and custom?”); again, it is divine law that by right all good things of this world belong to the just (omnia bona temporalia sunt justorum); again, as a corrupt member may be cut off from the body, so may the rebels and unbelievers be cut off from the mystical body of the redeemed human race; again, it is lawful to induce charity through terror; finally, such people—Moslems, but which?—act worse than beasts, but beasts may be killed for the public good, so also may evil sinners. (It is not clear whether Holcot would hold a good act by an unbeliever to be evil.) Some of Holcot’s arguments

38 The idea is an old one. Pope Alexander II (1061–1073), in writing about Jews who were not to be injured, forbade a Spanish bishop to destroy a synagogue: “Dispex munentis et Judaeorum et Saracenorum tarnen. In illo enim, qui Christianorum persecuetur et ex urbi-bus et prope civitas in absconditum, minus popravit; in vero ubique parum mundit serene” (ep. 101, in PL, 146, col. 1347).
sound silly to us, and probably sounded severe to some of his contemporaries; he often betrays ignorance of the realities of the crusade; all that he says is nasty. In an unadvised way, he elaborates Bernard of Clairvaux, but he does not innovate; he draws out what is already there. He is inferior to Humbert in intellectual power and in judgment. He takes up more thoroughly than Humbert the question of what right a Moslem has to live, and the conditions under which it is permissible to tolerate him. On these conditions there is a large canonical literature, which is the fullest expression of the legal apparatus of a “just war”, and a revelation of its political purposes. Unlike many political purposes, these were in fact ultimately achieved; in the areas that the Europeans conquered permanently, Islam died out.

D. Toleration and Trade

In the Islamic law of jihad the end of the process, or war aim, was understood to be the death, conversion, or submission of the “infidel” Crusade law to some extent resembled this, but usually, as in the scheme defended by Holcot, the submission of Moslems was barely accepted. Aquinas justified imposing force on unbelievers (where practicable) to prevent “blasphemies and evil influences”; and he defined blasphemy as, in effect, any theological error publicly expressed. Toleration had no absolute status in medieval Christendom as it had (within limits strictly defined) in medieval Islam, and that is why the Moslem communities to Europe were eventually exterminated; submission was only an interim war aim. The history of James I “the Conqueror” of Aragon-Catalonia is full of Moslem surrenders to the king, representing the civil power, on his guarantee of freedom of worship. This was no protection from the gradual operation of discrimination over the centuries, and canon law is our best guide to the pressures gradually exerted. The case of Moslems was generally assimilated to that of the Jews in the great collections of decreets, although a number of canons


specified Jews only. The main difference between the Islamic rules for Christians and Jews under Moslem rule and the Christian rules for Moslems and Jews under Christian rule lay in the original intention. The Islamic law, by introducing a special tax for dhimmis and excluding them from the army, created a barrier between the majority and its dependent minorities, but the Christian rules set out deliberately to isolate "unbelieving" communities from Christian society.

Before we leave the subject of the divisions enforced between Moslems and Christians, we should consider two canons of special interest of late date. One is from the Council of Vienne (1312), incorporated into the Clementines promulgated by John XXII in 1317, which makes a number of rash incidental assertions about matters of fact; for example, that the call to prayer "invokes and enjoins" the Prophet's name (which might be considered accurate), and, absurdly, that Moslems "adore" Mohammed in their mosques; legal conservatism combines with propaganda to the point of self-delusion. The call to prayer is in any case understood to be "an affront to the divine name and a reproach to the Christian faith", at least when it occurs in lands subject to Christian rulers where permitium cum Christianis habent Sarracens, glossed by the canonist John of Andover as "said to be in Aragon and various territories in Spain". The affront lay in the Christians' hearing this fragment of Moslem worship. The decree goes on to object to the public congregation of a multitude of Moslems, which generates "scandal seriously in the hearts of the faithful"; this happens when they go to "the place where a certain Moslem was formerly buried", to "venerate and worship him". This is so vague a description of the haßl that we might think it referred to the local cult of a holy man; but John understands it as the pilgrimage to Mecca, and expresses surprise that there should be doubt as to the identity of the "certain Moslem" as Mohammed. The offense is again the appearance of the multitude of Moslem worshippers before the Christian public. John assumes that Christian rulers tolerate non-Christian religious practice "on account of their avarice, that they may take tribute". They "tolerate and suffer them (Moslems) to be and remain in their areas; sometimes the rulers suffer them to be apart, that is, separated from the Christians; sometimes they suffer and tolerate them in the same city and the same quarter." It is the latter case, of course, which gives offense, and the offense is that non-Christian worship should be seen to happen at all.42

The other decretal was issued only a few years later, by John XXII in 1317. It completes a process only half achieved by the other. It is about "the business of attacking the faultless Agarenes, by whom the kingdom of Granada is held in insult to God"; apparently God, insulted (as we have just seen) by the public profession of Islam in a mixed quarter in a Christian city, was insulted again by Moslems who worked industriously to pay tribute from a small, subordinate, but separate kingdom. The decretal begins appropriately "The Lord is overflowing in mercy", copiosus in misericordia Domus. In response to a particular request by Peter, the infante of Castile, this decretal about the poor remnant of independent Islam in Granada has a general implication for the theology of the just war: "indeed," says Jesse-lin of Cassagne in his gloss, "the defense of the church is expected to be a responsibility of the rulers of the world, and the church should be protected by their power; for it is the will of God to stimulate temporal power against heretics and other unbelievers." The "insult to God" here is defined as an injury to divine religion, a "faculty of doing harm", which God permits on account of the sins of Christians; but the "insult" and the "injury" from which the church demanded protection was just the theological "error" of those who continued to be Moslems.43

This offense of Granada's brings us to the last theme in the legislation for holy war, the relation of Christians to places under Moslem rule. There are two separate questions: one is the trade relationship as governed by the canonical declarations of war contraband and regulated by formal agreements between European trading powers and the Moslem states; the other is the personal situation of those Christians who lived and worked in Islamic territory, but still within reach of canon law so long as they wished to remain in the Latin church.

The prohibition of carrying arms or war materials to Islamic countries was well established, repeated in a regular formula with little variation over centuries of warfare and projected warfare; it appears first in full form in the canons of Lateran III, and was later incorporated in Gregory IX's Decretals. Those who carry arms, iron, or lumber for making galleys to the Moslems are as bad as the enemy or worse; so are those who serve in command of Moslem galleys and private ships. They are all excommunicated, and Christian rulers and the consuls of trading cities are warned that the goods of such people should be

43 Religio gentis, In annis papae XXII ... vm. i. ibid. vols. 1214-1215.
confiscated, and that they should themselves, if taken, be enslaved. 44 A similar but fuller canon of Lateran IV, also incorporated in the Decretals, added anathemas against these “false and impious” Christians who do the things forbidden by the earlier canon, and also those who give advice and help in the use of “engines”, or in any other way; what this forbids is what we now call acting as foreign experts. It also required that sentences against offenders should be published in the maritime cities on Sundays and holy days; finally, the condition of pardon would be to transfer the gains made in dispensation to the service of the Holy Land. The glossa ordinaria condemns the same motivation that the original decrees attributed to such offenders; “led by blind cupidity,” it says, echoing Alexander III’s “harsh cupidity occupied their souls”; it argues that, because it is worse to help the enemy than to be the enemy, slavery is appropriate as punishment 45.

Elsewhere the glossator discusses the significance of repeated excommunications. It might seem that once a man is outside the church, he is outside, and repetition adds nothing; his answer is that the effect of the first excommunication is to put the offender outside, of later excommunications to keep him there, since each sentence requires its own proper satisfaction. He draws a parallel with the penalties for usury, where the restitution must be commensurate with the offense, here more so, because the offender, guilty of “attacking” the Christian faith, sees his confiscated gain spent entirely in its defense. 46 To the modern observer, there is an implication that the merchant or “foreign expert” seeks to serve the Moslem world not only from cupidity but by preference; ordinary Mediterranean trade attacked the Christian faith in the sense that it was incompatible with the intentions of the crusade, and with the theory underlying papal policy.

Two other decretales date back to the period of the Third Crusade. The first of these deals with cases of conscience arising out of trading with the enemy: it is legitimate to go to Alexandria to redeem fellow citizens from captivity, but not to take more goods from which the Moslems could benefit than are needed for ransom. A second point is that the existence of a truce between Moslems and Christians does not justify the renewal of prohibited trade with Alexandria, and merchants who swore that they would not go to Moslem countries with goods until there was peace are not excused excommunication if they

46 Ibid., xvii (cols. 777–778).
do so during the truce. The gloss adds that they are not absolved from their perjury either, adding that the excommunication is ipso nescia, and applies "in time of peace or truce". It carefully distinguishes truce from peace, the former being defined as "security of persons and property, conceded for a time". It also picks up the major ambiguity in the decretal; what if the articles to be used to ransom Christians are arms of iron? Some think that they are still exempt, but the glossator believes that this should first be referred to papal authority, not in principle, but in any particular case.47

The second of these decretals forbids any trade at all with the Moslems in time of war, either in person or through agents (per alios), in ships or by any other means, or any material help or advice. The gloss considers that it imposes a double excommunication. The decretal concludes, and the gloss repeats, that offenders will not only be excommunicated, but also be exposed to the anger of the living God.48 This seems to diminish a little the terror of excommunication alone.

A later decretal of Clement V issued during the period immediately following the expulsion in 1291 of European Christians from Syria-Palestine listed more goods: "iron, horses, arms, and other forbidden goods, and also foodstuffs and wares (mercenaria), to Alexandria and other places of the Moslems, in the land of Egypt." It increased the abuses of both the Moslems ("dreadful and faithless nation") and the offenders ("deviating into a crooked path...unmindful of their own reputation and forgetful of salvation"); it piled up the list of penalties—excommunication, enslavement, perpetual infamy, testamentary incapacity, and inability to hold public office, something of a diminuendo, although the rhetoric maintains a steady frenzied level.49 Church law naturally imparts motivation, and so tends always to read more emotionally than other kinds of law, but this law is stated emotionally by any standard. One point of making the prohibition "more absolute than absolute" was, of course, to make it inescapable to obtain a papal license to trade with Egypt, although sometimes this was withheld. We are not here concerned with the practice of the law, but the sale of expensive exemptions, amounting to a system of taxation, does affect our judgment of the theory.

In papal theory, perhaps only missionaries should have been allowed to live in Islamic territory, but some trade was allowed, even in theory.

47 Ibid., xi (cols. 773).
48 Ibid., xii (cols. 775); cf. ibid., x (cols. 774-775).
49 Extravagantes communia, V, x, 1 (cols. 1289-1290).
and exemptions were given, so that it was admitted that there were and might legitimately be Christian communities living in Moslem countries, primarily for trade, not necessarily excommunicate, needing spiritual services; at certain periods, of course, there were considerable numbers of enslaved prisoners. The only profit that the popes ostensibly accepted as desirable is missionary, but trade itself has advantages both ways; the popes simply tried to maintain on reserving to themselves the decision in each individual case, and gave licenses for trade limited by the number of ships and to a fixed period, for example, a year. Granted the seasonal problem of Mediterranean navigation, a year was not long in the export and import business. The sale of licencer was a taxed permission to commit an offense, which obviously reduced the whole crusading theory to absurdity.

There were, of course, many problems of conscience, for which we have some solutions by the Dominican Raymond of Pefiafort, consulted by the minister of the Friars Minor in Tunis in 1234. These are the cases. Those who claim license on the ground that their own immediate ecclesiastical superiors have not forbidden them to carry arms, iron, etcetera to the Moslems are to be excommunicated, because the decrees of the councils cover their case; the same applies to those who fight Christians. Should Spaniards who sell footwear and harness be counted as selling arms? Or those who sell rams and sheep? What about Pisan and Genoese who sell grain and legumes? These are excommunicated in times of war. Those who transport food produced by Moslems to other Moslems are excommunicated. People who bring arms for self-defense, but then sell them when they are in need, are excommunicated.

Those who sell Christians as slaves, especially if these are forced to become Moslems, are not excommunicated, but do commit mortal sin; this is also so when they steal Jews or Moslems (children presumably) and sell them as Christians. The reason why there was no excommunication for what many might think the worse offense is that this particular trade was not included specifically in the canons, and, as it was not war contraband, was not in dispensation. Later, in the fourteenth century, when Europeans had come to appreciate the Mamluk system, the trade in slaves came to be seen more as a kind of war contraband; the Egyptians then were said to be peaceful people, who would not carry on war if the Mamluks did not receive constant foreign recruitment. Asked about the baptism of Moslem children in the hope that they will die before they come to years of discretion, Pefiaforte makes an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply.

A more practical question was whether Christians may live with con-
verts from Christianity, especially if they are related, some being minors, some adults, and others their own children? Happily, the reply is yes, because of either "correction", the hope of putting them right, or "necessity", presumably material necessity. Cohabitation with a heretic (Moslem?) spouse is also permitted, if there is no contumelie creatoris; perhaps this means here, provided the Christian spouse does not take part (or perhaps is just not seen to take part) in Moslem (or Coptic?) worship.

What about those who have been given a period of crusading for a penance, but are infirm, or poor, or afraid? Give them another penance. What of those who are held back from keeping their vow by serious business? They should not involve themselves closely with others, and, when disengaged, should fulfill the vow. Are those who steal from Moslems bound to make restitution? They are so bound. Are those who bring grain, small pieces of wood, or the like excommunicated? Only if they do so in dispendium Terrae Sanctae, or to attack Christians. What about clergy who give scandal by acting as merchants? They are subject to the appropriate canonical penalties. Is ignorance about what trade is forbidden an excuse? No, because the prohibitions are public, but if the offenders are ignorant, and stop when they are informed, then they are not excommunicated. If a sailor has no other means of earning his living, and takes service on a ship that is carrying contraband, is he excommunicated? Yes, he can be absolved at discretion if he makes proper satisfaction. Many of these decisions bear witness to a sensible and occasionally humane application of a harsh law which was intended to erect a powerful barrier between Moslems and Christians, and appears to a considerable extent to have succeeded.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the extent to which the canons were modified by official license, or by being ignored, but the actual correspondence of the popes fills out an otherwise incomplete picture. There is not much evidence about the life of Latin communities in North Africa, but, as we should expect, the intentions of the later canons contrast with the pre-crusading situation of the eleventh century. At the earlier date, as we saw, when an indigenous hierarchy in the Roman province of Africa just survived, Gregory VII's diplomacy shows him concerned to reach an agreement with the Hamidid ruler. Something of this spirit remained alive at the papal court; when, later, the local Christian church had died out, the popes, in
cluding those, like Gregory IX or Nicholas IV, who were most anxious for the renewal of the crusade, were concerned to ensure that the Moslem rulers at least in North Africa and the west should accept Latin clergy sent to act as chaplains to the local Christian communities. These seem to have been, from an early date, friars, especially Franciscans. Even in Egypt they served Christian prisoners, among others, but it is not clear that this service was maintained consistently.

The trading communities were relatively stable. The treaties between the commercial states and Islamic rulers, of which many, from the twelfth century onward, are extant, are strictly businesslike; they do not infringe the canons, although as Pellaorte's case-decisions illustrate, individual members of the communities must often have done so. The treaties freely use Moslem terminology, adopting the style of the country ("in the name of God the Compassionate and Merciful"); they establish a firm consular basis for trading rights, often reciprocal, and some secure the right to maintain chapels. In this situation the popes intervened amicably enough. In writing to Moslem rulers, they used phrases like "your nobility" and "your magnificence"; Gregory IX wrote to 'Abd-al-Wahid II, the Mowahhid ruler of Morocco, "to the noble man Amiromolinus" (amir al-mu'minun, the commander of the faithful); we must assume that (as was often the case) this was thought to be a proper name. Several of these letters refer in more or less friendly fashion to Christians who are serving under Moslem rulers, even as soldiers. It is clear that in North Africa (as distinct from Egypt) this was not always taken to be in dispendium Terrae Sanctae, and was then legal so long as it was not done to fight against Christians.

In any case, not even the shadow of toleration extended to Egypt; Egypt was an enemy country and constantly singled out as such, on strategic principles which remained dominant till the Ottoman invasion. The earlier canons that forbade trade in dispendium did not specify the Moslems against whom they were directed, but one bull of Innocent III, of the same date as Lateran IV, singled out "the lands of the Moslems who inhabit the eastern regions". A gloss of Jesselin of Cassagnes explains the phrase "the lands of Egypt" (where it occurs in the 1317 canon about Granada): "in which Christ was born, namely

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in Bethlehem, brought up, in Nazareth, suffered and was buried, in Jerusalem... which because of the fators of our sins is in the hands of the unbelievers.” What looks like a geographical error may rather be a recognition of Mamluk rule over Palestine from Cairo. Pilgrimage, because it added to the revenue of the Mamluks, was also in dispensation, and so required dispensation, and Egypt was a normal route to Palestine. The North African states, though the object of several startling Christian attacks, never provoked the same vituperation as Mamluk Egypt. Even though we cannot confidently assert, we can reasonably suppose, that the popes would have been ready to reach some accommodation with Islamic powers, whenever expedient, as a matter of course, were it not for the question of Palestine. This, if true, implies that the conviction that Palestine rightfully belonged to the Christians had priority in Christian theory over the argument that the Moslem religion was in itself evil. The latter originated in propaganda, although the machinery of tolerated coexistence was legal, but the former was sincerely, however perversely in a modern view, believed itself to have the force of a right at law.

E. Political Theory

These legal systems have their political implications. No imaginable papal accommodation with the Moslems of North Africa would have survived any real chance of conquering them. Just as Christiandae were believed to have a prescriptive right to the Holy Land, they were considered to have a lesser but still valid right to all lands that they set out to “recover”. They did recover all of Spain and Sicily, and service in Spain was often (though not always) counted for purposes of penance or indulgence as equivalent to service in the east. This was law, and was simply a matter for papal decision ad hoc. They would have recovered any other territory of the Roman empire if they could. Behind the historical descriptions of Arab aggression in and after the seventh century lay the legal theory of “recovery”; after however long an interval, all ancient Rome was considered in some legal sense in alienably Christian. There was no territory within the reach of Christians which had not once been under Christian rule. If Iran had been

accessible, and conquered, what would have been the status of its Moslem inhabitants in Christian legal theory?

Beginning with Innocent IV there developed a theory of papal jurisdiction over non-Christians, and even over non-Christian states, which was soon elaborated into a theory of world monarchy by canonists busy with the task of extending papal authority. There was a steady growth in self-serving legal arguments that non-Christian states had to allow the entry of missionaries, that their Christian subjects came under direct papal authority—although it was never clear whether this was a political or only spiritual authority—and that this applied not only to those territories that had once been held by Christian rulers, but to any lands whatsoever.* Such discussions said nothing about subject Moslems in such states, or what might happen if such states fell into Christian hands, but there can be little doubt of the consequences. If the toleration of Moslems was only tactical, the "ultimate war aim" must inevitably have been the same as the commission to the apostles, the conversion of all unbelievers. The Jews, thanks to Romans 11:25–26, could count on being left till last, but Moslems would certainly have been reduced to submission, on the ground that non-Christians have no right to lordship and that they "persecuted" or "attacked" Christianity by existing at all (and no doubt would in any case have attacked Christendom often enough); once in submission they would have been subject to conversion, that is, compelled to listen to preaching, and to discrimination, until, as happened in Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and had happened in Italy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they had ceased to exist as Moslems. If we concede that "recovery" was the primary concept, then "conversion" (by war initially) was soon so firmly rooted as to become itself essential to the idea of the crusade. The political theory of the crusade was quite simply the infinite extension of Latin Christendom.

This is speculation, based on implication, but the close link between legal and political thought makes it reasonably certain. Can we speculate further? Uthred of Boldon, a monk of Durham and scholastic of the fourteenth century, was ceasured for discussing the possibility that Moslems, Jews, and pagans might be saved de communi lege; this was classed as error.** William Langland maintained that a "true man"

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* For further references to Innocent IV see Kedar, op. cit., pp. 159–161, and on toleration generally pp. 76 ff., 146 ff., and passim. See also Walter Ullianmann, Medieval Papalism, the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists (London, 1940), pp. 314–337. For an interesting discussion of the whole concept of a "just war" see Frederick H. Brunnell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Eng., and New York, 1975).

** M.D. (or, David) Knowles, "The Censured Opinions of Uthred of Boldon," Proce...
who follows the best law he knows, acts justly, and "lyuede as his lawe tahte and leyueth ther be no better", may be saved. This specifically relates to Saracens and Jews, in spite of Langland's acceptance of traditional libels against the Prophet. Aziz Aris has drawn attention to further examples, John Gower and Honoré Bonet. These opinions stand out because they were contrary to the usual opinions expressed by the lawyers. Granted the intimate connection among theology, law, and political intention, should we suppose that, if Moslems could be saved in their own "law", the compulsion to save them by conversion would disappear? Would the crusade have been confined to "recovery", perhaps only of the Holy Land? Wyclif went further, and opposed the crusade itself, but he did so because the crusade, both in practice and in theory, was an instrument of papal political expansion. This idea of his was not influential, although, as Southern has shown, the originality of John Wyclif's treatment of Islam cannot be questioned. Even according to the ideas aired by Uther and Langland, however, non-believers would be protected only by their ignorance of the true religion; thus the armed crusade must still have followed the missionaries. We must conclude that "recovery" came first, both legally and politically, but that "conversion" too was an unlimited political objective that would have compelled crusaders (in law) to continue in arms to the limits of the inhabited world; and, of course, Wyclif was right; this objective for Latin Christendom was a concept inseparable from papal ambition.

The history of Frederick II, in particular, sheds light upon the theory of the papal party. Frederick preserved the Sicilian Arabs in an existence separate from the rest of his subjects for his own purposes, exploiting rather than protecting them. In Sicily itself, Innocent III had been prepared to deal with them as legitimate subjects whose loyalty, when they were loyal, should be praised; they could be dealt with through the qanun almost like a tributary people or millet in Islamic

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law. Frederick, after destroying their independence, transferred them to Lucera on the mainland; he rated the life of a Moslem or a Jew at half the price of that of a Christian; he seems to have thought of them as in some sense having the same status as that of Christians in Islam, using the word *gesser* to denote a capitulation tax which he imposed and which represented the jizyah or poll tax which Christians and Jews paid in Islam. This must have been deliberate, but Frederick did not really assimilate his Lucera Arabs to the status of dhimmis in Islam, who are not required to fight; the people of Lucera, on the contrary, were required above all to provide troops who would be wholly dependent on the emperor's good will. From a Moslem or a modern point of view, pope Gregory IX was persecuting the Arabs when he insisted on their having to listen to the preaching of Dominicans, but his intention toward them was more charitable and disinterested than Frederick's; as Christians they would at least have been safer. 59

The objections raised by the papal party to Frederick's arrangements in Palestine are also instructive. His great offenses were permitting Moslem worship in the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat as-Sakhrah) and the Aqṣā mosque, forbidding Christians free access to those places, and allowing the public call to prayer, as well as allowing Moslems access to Bethlehem. All these horrors were simply the admission of Moslems to the use of holy places then conceived quite wrongly to be exclusively Christian, and to public worship of their own. One other episode, out of so many told of Frederick, deserves mention here. Matthew Paris says that in Acre he had Christian girls dance before Moslems who, "it is said," had sexual relations with them; nearer the source, the Latin patriarch Gerald said that the sultan al-Kāmil, knowing that Frederick lived in Moslem style, sent him singing girls, dancing girls, and jesters, whose reputation was infamous and unmentionable among Christians, and that Frederick behaved in Arab style, in drinking (sic) and dressing. With Matthew Paris the (imaginary) scandal is the prostitution of Christian girls, which would indeed be contrary to the canons, with the patriarch, it was the "Arab" way of living to which he objected; he would no doubt have argued that the offense was mixed attendance at a *convivium*. All these episodes in their different ways illustrate the principles underlying the clerical concept of the crusade. 60

It is time to look more closely at the inevitable comparison with the law of *jihād*, itself part of the basic structure of medieval Islamic policy. In outline the two laws are closely similar. A Moslem army offers unbelievers the opportunity to accept Islam, or, failing that, to accept the status of *dhimmis*; if they refuse both, they must fight, and, being defeated, may be enslaved or even killed. A slave who later becomes a Moslem is not necessarily freed, though it would be pious to free him. Comparing the crusade, we remember that it, too, was aimed at conversion, and that Moslems who surrendered on terms of submission were given an inferior status. Moslems captured in war (not on capitulation) would be enslaved, if not killed. The slave converted to Christianity would not automatically be freed, but it would be a pious act to free him. Obviously there is much common ground in the treatment of “infidels”. So is there in the rewards of holy war. The death of the Moslem in *jihād* ensures the status of martyr (*shahid*). The death of the crusader did not result automatically in martyrdom, because confession and absolution, absent in Islam, were necessary, but it was common to speak and think of anyone who died in the course of a crusade as a martyr. *Jihād* is more than war; it is also the struggle for one’s religion. The crusade, qualified as a good work, a penance, and a pilgrimage, and it was rewarded by indulgences which certainly remitted “pains and guilt”. Some of them seem to imply more than later Catholic theology would allow.

The Christian or Jewish *dhimmis* was in a better situation than a conquered Moslem, in that his position was strictly regulated by a law known in advance and not dependent on the details of a capitulation; it was guaranteed by the Koran itself. It was a status of dependence, however, strictly not even second-class citizenship, but something altogether less than citizenship. The dhimmis’s life and property were guaranteed by the Moslem army, but he had to pay special taxes, and had to distinguish himself from Moslems by dress, and by not riding a horse or carrying weapons. As a witness he was inferior in status; his law of personal status and doctrine was determined by his bishop. The conquered Moslem had similarly to be distinguished by dress, and was inferior as a witness. Because he was unbaptized, he was not subject to canon law, and so was free to follow his own law of personal status. Some details, though similar, are not precisely the same in the two cases; Christian monarchs assumed the duty of protecting conquered Moslems on their capitulation, but these had to pay the ordinary or extraordinary taxes attached to the land they held, and those who surrendered, or negotiated a truce on terms allowing subordinate Moslem rule (of which the longest-lasting example was Granada), had to
pay an exorbitant tribute. The two laws resembled each other in limiting strictly any public celebration of the religion of the other, and the erection of places of worship. On the other hand, Christians under Islamic rule were not subjected to compulsory preaching of the dominant religion, as happened in the reverse case. Jihad might be declared against Moslem heretics and rebels, so that if, as the popes claimed, Moslems “judaized” in declaring pork unclean, the popes themselves “islamized” in declaring a crusade against heretics (such as the Albigenians) or against those who rebelled against their authority (the most distinguished of whom was the emperor Frederick I). Differences of detail are fewer than points of resemblance, and in any case do not obscure the close similarity of general outline. 61

Besides the uncanny resemblances in many details, there is an overall consonance between Moslem and Christian ideas of holy war. The idea of jihad as spiritual struggle is much to the fore of the minds of modern Moslem theologians, and in the modern world Christians speak loosely of any good endeavor of any magnitude as a “crusade.” The concept of jihad has not loosened quite to the same extent in Islam, but it is certainly used to define what Christians still call a “just war”. It is as a theology of just war that the two ideas come closest. Even the requirement of using right means (modus debitus) which developed rubet later in Christendom, and the idea of double effect which permits the accidental death of the innocent, are parallel to Islamic rules. We have seen that the crusade from its inception was considered the just war par excellence, the war which would end all other kinds of war, though in fact in time it led on to an infinite number of “just wars” and crusades for this and that alleged good end. Here we return to the starting point. Both jihad and crusade were designed to lead to that state of perfect peace where the world is under the rule of true religion, and the conversion of a barely tolerated remnant is imminent.

It is extremely unlikely that there was an actual Islamic influence on the Christian canons. There is no vestige or echo of specific knowledge of the Islamic law of jihad in any medieval writing; still less are there specific references to it, translations, questions, or discussions. In writing theology and even history there is no recalcitrance about the use of Moslem sources, and this silence makes it certain that there was no explicit influence of Moslem jurisprudence. References do occur.

often, of course, to the "religion of violence"; generalizations are based on traditional distortions of early Islamic history, and tendentious reading of Robert of Ketton’s paraphrase of the Koran, undertaken for Peter the Venerable, stressed the commands to fight unbelievers. This crude idea of jihad was quite unrelated to the crusade. We might say that an unacknowledged influence of Muslim jurisprudence, not even perceived by those who received it, is not impossible, but it is an unnecessarily complex assumption. The natural explanation is that those who start from the same position and go in the same direction are apt to follow much the same path. Granted the duty of converting the world, and granted that there is no objection to the use of force, at least within legally determined limits, the detailed rules seem to develop inevitably in parallel. There was of course no fundamental difference between the Christian and Moslem positions on the use of force. Christians began by not using force at all, and Humbert’s theory that different stages of development require and justify different means, whether or not it is a sound theory in theology or law, is certainly good history. The real difference was that the Christian position did not require toleration, in the way that Islam is predetermined by the Koran to accept the "Peoples of the Book". Although there is something similar in the status of Jews, under Romans 11, the fact that nothing guarantees the status of Moslems—tolerated, as Holcot said, only as Gibbonite hewers of wood and drawers of water—made a political objective of total conformity possible. The proof is that Christians and Jews have survived under Islam, but not Moslems under Christian rule before the modern colonisational period; in Christendom, Jews have survived, and Moslems have not. The position of the latter was always insecure despite the reasonable terms on which so many of their cities surrendered.

In minor ways uniformity might be broken by license, by the purchase of privilege. It is ironic that in the days of effective crusading people paid the church in order not to go on "pilgrimage"; when a crusade was no longer a practical possibility, they paid for license to break the boycott, to go on pilgrimage, or to travel to Alexandria to trade. As excommunication followed excommunication and was ignored until it suited better to give way, it might seem that the weapon was cheapened beyond usefulness, but, though this may be true of the conflict between the papacy and the secular state, excommunication as the typical ecclesiastical sanction was not diminished; on the contrary, the suppression of heresy became more widespread. The fact is that excommunication was the natural mode of thought of Europeans, unquestioned till relatively late, and surviving into the seventeenth cen-
tury (and vestigially much later). In the Middle Ages, those who would not keep the rules, either of recovery of the Holy Land, or of frigid relations with unbelievers, were excommunicated; above all, the unbelievers themselves began by being excommunicate. This was the justification for taking “spiritual” action against persons outside the church: to preserve Christians from contact with them. There was no secret or mystery about this. The crusade is the characteristic, even quintessential, expression of a conformist society.

The very idea of the crusade was clerical, but in that, perhaps, it differed less from jihād, which was the act and thought of the whole community, than might at first appear. Laymen’s crusading was a series of practical wars, with little beyond a “them and us” ideology, modified by recurrent common sense, and occasionally by a little good fellowship across the barrier. The crusading ideal was quite different, a clerical intention for laymen to practise, but, though it was sometimes more, sometimes less remote from what was actually happening, laymen acquiesced, at least in the theory. Seen from the point of view of the Christian and European body politic, the crusade becomes only one aspect of the characteristic tendency of the Middle Ages, the concerted determination of the articulate classes — effectively the clerics — to establish a society so fully united as to express itself naturally in total orthodoxy. Nor is there any evidence that the bulk of the population objected to this aim; objectors seem untypical, and most of them were clerical in any case. Some degree of orthodoxy is the expression of any normal society; the peculiarity of the Middle Ages was the preponderance of clerical and theological articulate leadership.

A crusade was different from was against Moslems, as such a war was understood before Clermont, precisely in being more clerical and more theological. It was different in emphasis, and in the stronger papal initiative, expressed partly by a simple philosophy of history, but more by papal decrees elaborated in a growing collection of canons, commentaries, and theological questions. Thus the crusade must be understood as existing by virtue of its own definition; it only added a complex interpretation — at once legal and sentimental — to an already existing activity. In its turn, the papal leadership had an actual effect on events, the crusades were successfully recruited, and this recruitment, though often at a very low level, continued without break. A complex though ramshackle financial system was created. Thus the existence of such a theory had helped to give a nominal body politic, “Christendom”, some effective reality. The crusade was a function of

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62 See chapter IV on hussites by Fred A. Coud, Jr., below.
“Christendom” and an important element in every approach to a papal theocracy. Strictly speaking, the crusade has no political theory of its own, but only plays an important part in the political theory of the papalists.

Moreover, the theory helped greatly to form persistent and influential European attitudes. The overall effect of the law of the crusade, including the law governing the treatment of conquered Moslems, was the political one of scaling Europe off. The relations between the Moslem world and Europe (with, in due course, America) have been uneasy up to the present day. There has been mutual respect, occasional contempt, frequent hatred, and almost constant incomprehension. We can trace this back on the European side as far as the Arab invasions of Europe through an unbroken series of misunderstandings, but, in that story, the effect of the crusading period must be considered decisive. Unmodified crusading opinions can still occasionally be heard from a few Christians, but many Moslems believe that crusade still informs the whole western attitude, and, inverted, it has certainly come to influence extreme interpretation of Islamic law.

W. M. Watt, basing his view very fairly on the evidence of contemporary Moslem historians, and especially on Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), holds that the crusades were no more important to the Arabs of their time than the wars of India’s Northwest Frontier to Englishmen of the imperialist age. Yet, if so, the Arabs were fatally wrong; there is a clear continuous line from the crusades to the aggressive imperialism of the western European powers in the Levant and North Africa in the nineteenth century. The paternalism of the church within Europe grew into the paternalism of Europe throughout the world. Even at the height of its intolerance Europe sent experts, communicate but active wanderers, into the Islamic world; these are lost to history because of the effective cultural barrier which a clerical society closed behind them. The political achievement of the age was an integrated society supported by laws of exclusion; law carries no guarantee that its provisions will be put into effect, but it is likely at least over a long period to express the wishes and beliefs of a people. Crusading Europe, which retained a capacity to develop within itself, was one of the most efficiently closed societies to have flourished under civilized conditions.

II
CRUSADE PROPAGANDA

A. The Preaching

In 1095 Europeans were already familiar with the constituent notions of the crusade. When Urban II preached at Clermont, the Christian expansion in Spain and Sicily that had been characteristic of the third quarter of the century was well within living memory, and much of it was contemporary history even to the younger men. In spite of that, the propaganda for the eastern crusade seems to have introduced a new note of almost hysterical aggression. There had been two earlier stages. The idea of meritorious fighting against the enemies of God had been characteristic of the wars between Catholics and Arians; directed specifically against Moslems, in a somewhat imprecise form, it dated back to the ninth century, to the attacks on Rome and the settlements in southern Italy. Then European morale had only just sufficed: "lest the Arabs should behave too insolently too long, and say 'Where is their God?' God turned the hearts of the Christians, so that their desire to fight was stronger than their old desire to run away."

Then with the increasing momentum of European aggression against the Arabs in the course of the eleventh century, there was a revolutionary change of tone. The companions of count Roger, like the first captors of Barbagia, were adventurers come to exploit the relative weakness of Arab Sicily and the Spain of the taifas; though the Cantar del Cid and the Heimskringla Saga were written later, they seem to reflect very well the spirit of the Varangian, "scourge of the Saracens", and of the Cid, who, "born in a lucky hour", made his living from the booty of the Moors. These men were successful professionals who made aggression into big business. The recovery of morale was complete. It is equally and immediately obvious that they were not religious enthusiasts, and that war was in the air.

1 Littré and de Crucem, Antiquité, II, 46 (MAGH, 36, III, 297).
What propaganda turned such men into crusaders? The Gibbonian—and, indeed, medieval—dissension with the crusaders' greed for land and booty has created a picture of them as rogues cynically exploiting religious sentiment to their profit. For us the interesting question is the reverse. How did the rogues come to be imbued with either the appearance or the reality of religious motivation? This is a fruitful perspective from which to examine again Urban's reported preaching at Clermont. Though Gregory VII had canvassed the idea, it is evident that he did not conceive it in just the same way as did his successor. He was more concerned about papal rights in reconquered territory, more willing to envisage "coexistence" in North Africa. He seems to have thought more in terms of papal functions than of an embattled Christian Commonwealth. That a reconquered area was "restored" to Christendom was a legal concept at this stage not yet emotionally charged. In Urban's preaching we find new notions, more especially new sentiments, that correspond to ideas immediately and thenceforward in general use. From this point of view it matters more what Urban was understood to have said than what he actually did say. We shall say little to distinguish the propagandist from the consumer of propaganda, because the one is usually, and simultaneously, the other. We are concerned only to identify the main lines of persuasion and self-persuasion which thenceforward men of all types accepted in defining their official motivation.

It is tolerably certain that Urban stressed the idea of the recovery of Christian lands, although this has reached us in a form likely to have appealed primarily to the more literate, and even the literary-minded, history was a branch of literature, and the appeal to history was strictly mythical, and myth-creating. However, it was allied with an idea easily assimilated by the feeblest-minded and the most ignorant: the notion of persecution, of the wave of attacks against Christendom, comes out very strongly in the "Letter of the emperor Alexis" faithfully reproduced in Robert of Rheims' version of Clermont; and in some form or another it is in all the accounts of the period. The legal and historical notion that Christian lands, which by hypothesis included the Holy Land, were to be "restored", and saved from a ruthless persecutor, acquired great new emotional force. Like all powerful


ideas, it could appeal simultaneously at all levels; on the one hand there was the reasoned catalogue of alleged history; on the other the simple image of a raping and murdering Turk.

William of Malmesbury, an admirable historian, is the first to state (ventriloquizing Urban) the historical argument fully: the enemies of God (or persecutors) inhabit one third of the world, Asia, as natives, and have come to inhabit another third, Africa; in the last third, Europe, the Christians are oppressed, and have now for three hundred years been subjugated in Spain and the Balearics. He also attributed to Urban the theory of national character determined by physique, and physique determined by climate.\(^5\) This was supposed not only to inspire and reassure the Frenchmen of the temperate zone, but also to explain why the Turks fired their arrows from a distance, refusing to close with their enemy. It was written, of course, a generation after the event, and knowledge of Turkish tactics is clearly anticipated. Its historical perspective and historical geography probably represent long reflection upon the original propaganda, but the essence of the argument, the destiny of the Europeans to oppose the alien attack, is contained in other versions.

Guibert of Nogent's version, written like Malmesbury's after long reflection, also like Malmesbury's contains its historical disquisition, but is more scripturalized (the kings of Egypt, North Africa, and Ethiopia cut off from the Christian world); it reflects the liturgical theme of the restoration of Christian land, and even the Roman concept of an age-old struggle between east and west. Christianity was sown in the east, but the westerners, who received it last, were destined to recover Jerusalem.\(^6\)

Robert of Rheims contrasts the French, "beloved and elect by God", phrase by phrase with the "nation of the kingdom of the Persians, a cursed nation, a foreign nation absolutely alien to God".\(^7\) The praise of the French seems to be one of the most primitive elements in the crusading movement. Robert appeals also to the example of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious. We can class these arguments under the heading of the historical vocation of the west, which merges naturally with the theme of repelling persecution. These are two aspects of a single line of appeal, and they are reinforced by Old Testament references which tend to assimilate the crusade to biblical situations.

The religious motivation, whether to bring sin and struggle in the

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5. De gestis regum, ed. William Stubbs (Rolls Seriaria, 90), II, 393 ff
west to an end, or to achieve the pilgrimage *par excellence* in some kind of "martyrdom", constitutes the other main line of appeal. Let us again take Malmesbury's version, as representing a late stage of compilation: the "profit" of martyrdom (not necessarily death in battle) replaces the "wretched exile" of this life, and puts to practical advantage the gifts of valor which interminable war dissipates. Guibert stresses this less, but retains it. The sources agree that the idea of pilgrimage as an escape from the "exile" of this life was one of Urban's themes.

It was Fulcher of Chartres who most emphasized the substitution of holy war for the petty wars and their attendant musées in Europe, and be even saw this as Urban's principal motive. Differently expressed, this was Gibbon's explanation: the diversion of the energy of the knightly class into more profitable channels. Fulcher showed a consistent horror of war, and, as with other authors, later reflection presumably affected his memories of Clermont, an occasion which left so powerful a general impression, but so little exact recollection in his hearers. The crusade was also presented as the ideal penance, and it was even seen as a chance for important men who had committed great crimes to atone without public humiliation. This last point is somewhat grotesque, but in many accounts we find the same association of ideas — unnatural interminable strife in the Christian world, the "exile" of this life, the excellence of pilgrimage, penance, and "martyrdom". Propaganda here blended with theology of crusading which made holy war a superlatively good work. It offered, not the certainty of heaven, but at least a version of the good life attractive to the adventurous.

Does this explain the reception the preaching encountered? Urban's exact degree of emphasis, his shades of meaning, even the weight of emotional content, we cannot assess through sources which are all recollected in tranquility and inevitably reinterpreted. Still, do the main themes justify the outburst of near-hysteria which those writers who themselves did not go on the crusade describe in such detail? One point we may take literally: when we read in Baudri of Dol that the preaching was passed down from the pope to the bishops and from them to the community, where ultimately every individual became his own preacher, we can see the process of propaganda as at once hierarchic and unre-
 sponsible. Self-inflation explains the broken marriages, shattered families, and desertions from monastic vows that he and Guibert describe. The joy with which the deserted wives and parents saw their happiness broken is a gauge of hysteria; so are the mass movements—so moving to postarity—of children asking, “Is this Jerusalem?”; so are the general pictures of men of different origins and speech congregating and set in motion like a disturbed ants’ nest.  

Albert of Aachen likewise speaks of the deserted towns and castles, the empty fields and husbandless homes.

We need not ask if these accounts are exaggerated; hysterical accounts and accounts of hysteria alike need explanation. It is not clear how far the pope was responsible. Nor can we blame Peter the Hermit, whose story Albert of Aachen particularly emphasizes without explaining it, and who, as reported, seems to be a figure of myth.  

His complex history of pilgrimages and visions, his appearance as a type of the conventional ascetic, his part in the eastward movement of rogues, fanatics, and adventurers who made up the proto-crusades—all this declines finally into his fictional appearance in the Antioche and Jerusalem poems, ribald, cunning, unscrupulously ambitious, idealistic, a sort of apotheosis of the common man. The great lords, their motives equally confused, are nevertheless more easily intelligible.

The effect of propaganda which we do not know at first hand can be judged only from the recollections of those who went on the great pilgrimage. Of these the simplest and most sympathetic to the modern taste are certainly those of the author of the Gesta Francorum. His opening words speak of a movement of evangelical simplicity; the Lord calls on men to take up the cross—and this is conceived in terms of the gospel instruction, not of later crusading technicalities—and there is a “powerful movement” (moticus valde) across France. The pope, the hierarchy, and priests start to preach subtiliter that those who want to save their souls must undertake the pilgrimage; soon the Gauls have left their homes and set off for the east.  

This last remark was an understatement, if the other accounts which we have mentioned were
at all accurate. Fulcher is clerical, stressing the council of Clermont, which the Gesta does not even mention, and he is courtly, impressed by the participation of the rich lords.  

Raymond of Aguilers, also courtly, also clerical, though ordained after he set out, totally ignores the background of the First Crusade, but explains his own story briefly. He concentrates on the events the army experienced, writing consciously to correct misrepresentations by those who did not stick it out. He clearly dissociates himself from the general state of Europe; his notorious partnership for Peter Bartholomew, the discoverer of the "holy lance", should in no way discredit his witness to army attitudes.  

Though the writers who themselves took part in the events they described tend to emphasize the crusade itself, rather than its inception, their reactions are entirely consistent with the alleged main lines of Urban's preaching. This is perhaps only to say that the propaganda was clear and was effective.

This is seen most clearly in their pride in being Franks and in their sense of martyrdom when facing death on pilgrimage. These points, whether they dictate or follow the official propaganda, correspond to the two key notions—the appeal to the west, and the call to a better life—reduced to their essentials. They have been modified, and almost suggest an oral tradition distinct from the writers' accounts. In the Gesta, martyrdom has an accidental quality which is wholly convincing. If we accept the identification of the author as a knight undistinguished in rank, he represents the presumptive target of the pope's preaching. Did it reach the target? There is a matter-of-factness in the frequent reference to the army, not only as "pilgrims" (which appears in all the accounts), but still more as "receiving martyrdom", almost a euphemism for "being killed"—"many of our men received a happy martyrdom in the course of the siege," "that day more than a thousand of our cavalry and infantry were martyred." (Conversely, Moslems are said to die "body and soul"). The poor who died of hunger were said to be dressed in heaven in martyrs' robes, although they had not died violently. In fact, when the author of the Gesta is reflecting, he considers every death of a "pilgrim" a kind of martyrdom, and, when he is not, he refers almost automatically to a battle casualty as a martyrdom. Is this a measure of success in propaganda? The idea implied is that a crusader had put himself in danger and so, if he died as a result, died for Christ; that is, was martyred. Yet this was not ortho-

15. Fulcheri Con neurotrans luptis Harensemissa, 1, 1-4, 6 (pp. 119-120, 153-163)  
dox, and we must assume that the pope did not teach it; the “martyrdom” of which the Gesta speaks is clearly not a theological concept. It is almost folkloric.

Practising good works as a penance was not, of course, a new idea, but as part of crusade theory it developed quickly. The indulgence was a successful experiment in the history of church discipline, and constituted a powerful inducement. In this case official theology had a widespread practical impact; we might even say that popular needs produced a radically new theology. In general, lines of argument were very persistent, but their emotional coloring fluctuated greatly. It was always obvious that the crusading movement responded to moments of crisis in Palestine. Each separate “crusade” was differentiated by its own distinct preaching. A man—or a woman—might go on the pilgrimage at any time, and it was largely the intensity of propaganda that distinguished one “crusade” from another. We think of different crusades often in terms of their leaders, who themselves merely responded, and hence contributed, to a particular movement or wave of propagandas.

It is clear that crusading and “pilgrimage” became a normal part of the political and social scene; we should not underestimate this habit of mind. Eventually it came to be taken for granted, so that there was a diminishing response to successive crises. Bruno of Asti, bishop of Segni, preached the crusade at a council in 1106, in order to revive flagging ardor. In only ten years all the excitement had faded. He was supporting Bohemond I of Antioch, whose own contribution to the propaganda is unclear, but who certainly held not worldly incentives while himself positing as an epic hero.18 The crusade would for long have a steady appeal to merchant and soldier adventurers for sound economic and psychological reasons, as well as to religious enthusiasts. Its appeal to rulers, and perhaps to the general public, varied and ultimately waned pari passu with the evidence for its viability. Yet it is likely that as long as hope of crusading success lasted, it was fortified, even for the most worldly, by the conviction of God’s support.

It is clear that Bernard of Clairvaux’s characteristic and habitual bluff could not ensure the same enthusiasm for a war against the Arabs as it could for a project at home. His homiletic for the Second Crusade is poorly preserved, perhaps because its recruits did not succeed in the field, but we are by no means ignorant of it. It seems to have been

dominated by a sense of outrage at physical "pollution" of the holy places and at doctrinal "persecution", as when Moslems (he supposes) say that Jesus was a deceiver because he falsely claimed to be God. This, he believes, must rouse the faithful man to fight and gain glory in victory or profit in death. There is a clear brutality in his approach. Christ is glorified in the death of the Moslem; there must be no entering into treaties with Moslems, either for money or for tribute (such as lordships?) until either their religion or their nation be destroyed. Bernard says that both swords of the faithful must be thrust into the bruts of the enemies of God, and by "both swords" he means the temporal and the spiritual; in his imagery he thirsts for blood 19

In general the Cistercian attitude, represented also by Eugenius III himself and by Godfrey, the bishop of Langres, to whose preaching Odo of Deuil refers, seems to have lain heavily on the loss of Edessa in 1144, basically repeating Urban's "crisis of Christendom" propaganda. It seems that there was an unexpected enthusiasm when Bernard preached in the presence of the King and of some nobles to whom pope Eugenius had sent crosses. The crowds demanded so many more crosses that the preacher had to tear up his own clothes. 20 There is certainly nothing new in the substance of Bernard's propaganda, and any new development must be found in the style; there is a grim sensitivity to the danger presumed to result from a Moslem victory, and a holy pleasure in the duty to retaliate.

The persisting themes of crusade propaganda are seen clearly in a letter of archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury to his suffragans in 1163. There was again devotion of propaganda, like authority, from pope to metropolitan, and metropolitan to suffragans, and down through the hierarchy to the soldiers. Recruits were picked up as the message went down the line: Baldwin himself went to the war. The need was pressing: "Because of our sins, the enemies of the cross of Christ have become so strong that they have tried in their pride and perversion to destroy the Holy Land, the inheritance and patrimony of the Crucified, on which the Lord’s feet stood, and in accordance with the complaint of the lamentation of the prophet, 'there is none to support her.'" Again he puts it in a phrase: "Thus does our mother Jerusalem call to you." Nothing could better illustrate the pristine pilgrim quality, the simple pietry toward the earthly scene of the life of Jesus, which still survived in the bitterness of war. In the assumption of the church

19 PL. 162, cols. 651-653, 924-925.
to ancient Israel we recognize another recurrent theme, specifically linking the Old Testament to the crusade, both of them seen as parts of the long history of war between east and west. There is a sincere feeling of outrage and crisis: "The nations come to the inheritance of the Lord and pollute his temple. . . . The tribe of them together say in their heart: 'We will silence the name of Christ on the earth, we will take away his place and nation, come, and in a great multitude we will scatter the small number of Christian people.'" An attack so conceived would elicit an immediate will to resist; nothing could seem more just, more simply defensive.

It can be argued that when the fruits of a successful aggression are endangered, as when the Frankish colony in Palestine was threatened by Saladin, it arouses more acutely bellicose reactions than the simple instinct of self-defense in the case of an initial attack. Certainly the west was to hold on determinedly to its acquisitions in Palestine for many generations yet, with the ever-delusory hope of restoring a viable state, despite the intermittent but effective pressure of the Moslems. The Levantine colony had been a familiar political fact for a century; it was not merely a dream of religious enthusiasts. Side by side, therefore, with the old propaganda, we note an increasing professionalism. This was not confined to the colonists in the east, as any study of the impact of Richard I of England upon the Palestine war must remind us, and the preaching of Baldwin himself illustrates this point.

The Itinerary through Wales of Gerald of Wales is an agreeable stream of gossip, which makes it difficult for us to remember that the party was traveling to preach the Third Crusade in terms suited to a desperate crisis. We may attribute this contrast to the personality of Gerald, but he was not alone, and a closer look at the preaching—such mention as this receives—shows how the new conventional appeal of the crusade reached certain types of men in particular, among whom we can include the archbishop, but not the writer. Gerald's brief references show the effect of propaganda on one who saw no reason to apply it to himself. Other writers, too, even the chroniclers of the period, reflect only an afterglow of the old inspiration. Gerald is entirely businesslike: "About three thousand men were signed with the cross" to the course of this Welsh propaganda campaign, "well skilled in the use of arrows and lances, and versed in military matters; impatient to attack the enemies of the faith; profitably and happily engaged for the service of Christ, if the expedition of the holy cross had been forwarded with an alacrity equal to the diligence and devotion with which the.

forces were collected." Gerald criticizes the authorities for failing to make good use of the recruits they were offered; all the same, he considers that a recruiting job has been well done, and he certainly describes a professional army in good morale.

It is different when he goes on to speak of Baldwin's arrival at Acre. The archbishop had been among the first to take the cross, "having heard of the insults offered to our Savior and his holy cross". As Gerald puts it, Baldwin, arrived in Palestine, found the troops attacked as well as attacking, "dispirited by the defection of the princes, and thrown into a state of desolation and despair", tormented by lack of supplies and by hunger, sick from the climate; the archbishop could only relieve them by charity, and set an example of a good death. We can deduce that by this time the familiar theme of "insults to the Savior" would appeal only to the ascetic and unworldly, such as Baldwin. Crusading should be managed like any other business operation. The attitude of the troops in the field was apathetic, and their affairs were ill-managed. There is now a cold assessment of a practical proposition, perhaps in Baldwin's mind as well as in Gerald's. The crusade, still seen as a good work, was also now a logistical job, to be done properly.22

We can study the professionalism of the preaching itself in a number of documents of this period and of the succeeding century. First we may take the brevis ordinacio de predicacione sancte crucis facienda, attributed to Philip of Oxford and dated to about 1216. What immediately strikes us is the persistence of the theme of the crusade as a way (or seen the best way) of the Christian life, conceived, of course, as a pilgrimage. There is a series of short theological arguments, scholastic in method, expressly intended for amplification in the pulpit, to exemplify the need for suffering in this life.

It is only at the very end that we come to passages which take actual crusading situations into account - pieces of propaganda, but at least in a relevant setting - and at the same time suggest some emotional and rhetorical persuasion, with a reiterated surge and surge ego. Even these passages look as if they have been chosen at random, but for that reason they are more likely to belong to the preacher's personal repertory. They still lack pithy application. Of three knights, brothers, fighting the Albigensians, two fear to die, but the third says (in the vernacular) that a day's penance (that is, death in battle) is a cheap

way to God. A captured knight is suspended from the wall of a besieged place; his friends stop bombarding it for fear of hitting him; he tells them to go on hurling stones, and the stones cut the rope that holds him; he falls and escapes—moral, do not lack faith. A knight wounded four times thinks of Christ’s five wounds and goes again into the battle, to die of his fifth. Another knight tells his horse, which has often carried him into battle, that this is the first time it has carried him into eternal life. Lastly, another knight says in French: “A horseman would sooner lose the use of his feet than his head.” These stones are so unconvincing because they are meant only as bare reminders to the preacher. This is the end of our text, and clearly is meant to lead to the taking of the cross by the lastemen around him. It is difficult to judge the quality of rhetoric that reaches us so incomplete. It is possible to believe that what does not seem particularly apposite or forceful to us seemed so once. It is not possible to believe that so much theology appealed to the soldiers, and much of it must be a clerical exercise. The essential note is that the crusade was a normal component of Christian life. The way of the cross was a way of suffering; there is no mention here, as in Bernard, of the suffering inflicted.

A much more comprehensive example of homiletic method is given by Humbert of Romans, which combines a number of currents. Important for any study of legal theory of the crusade, his *Tractatus solemnis de predicacione* is important also as propaganda. It has all the virtues of systematic scholasticism; it is clear and incisive, if not exhaustive. It begins by explaining to the preacher how he will find the matter he needs in this book, how the well-informed will be able to complete their information, and how the emotive preacher who lacks rational matter will find it. The preacher is advised to undertake periodic calls, "invitaciones," to his hearers, followed by hymn-singing—*Veni Sancte Spiritus, Vestita Regis, and such. Humbert’s sermons are direct and emotional, at once varied and repetitive, their appeal obvious. He emphasizes the "history of Islamic aggression", the story of the rise and expansion of Islam, in much the terms that Malmesbury had attributed to Urban; other writers had used more or less the same passage, for example, Joachim of Flora.21 We have seen that the

23 Quem setti mort scriptorum numerum... (SOL., SE, II–III, Como, 1079).
24. *Tractatus solemnis de predicacione* (Nurnberg, 1490) (folio unnumbered), "Invitaciones": cap. 3.
A general theme still had a very wide appeal. From this Humbert passes on to a warm condemnation of unjust war, and to a scholastic definition of the just war with an emotional content that we can only term propaganda; thus, unjust war attacks the innocent, but the crusade attacks guilty men, the Saracens; the argument continues in the same vein throughout. The stress on the "guilt" of Moslems was bound to encourage savage methods of war. The picture of Saracen aggression and Christian just resistance constitutes the theme commune of the whole work of preaching the crusade; it picks up from Urban not only the historical argument, but also the idea that the holy war is substituted for unholy, internecine, irresponsible war.

Humbert returns often to the history of the Moslem onslaught on the world, sometimes with a new emphasis; thus Saracens are worse than Jews, who procured the crucifixion and would not believe in the Crucified, but who did not bear arms against the worshipers of the cross; the Romans were responsible for the crucifixion, but turned to adoring the cross and did much to subjugate the world to the Crucified; but the Moslems, although they agree with the Christians in so much belief, reject the mystery of the cross, and have conquered much of the world—Asia, Africa, and even Europe as far as parts of Gaul, as we see in the history of Charles (the Great). The European aggression, which looking back from the twentieth century we see as a swing of the pendulum, is here presented as divine vindication of true religion; success vindicates and failure does not vitiate it, from Constantine, in hoc signo, by way of Charlemagne and Turpin to Godfrey of Bouillon and the capture of Jerusalem, and the continuing conflict thereafter. He stresses the many "martyred" Christians and the "innumerable Moslems they killed" in the glorious climax of the capture of Jerusalem in the First Crusade.

Humbert recommends to the preacher that the different kinds of crusade service should be seen in a practical, even worldly order, and should be raised before the public in that order. Service of the body—military service—comes first; next, service by property (de propriis rebus; the preacher is warned to take particular care over gifts); third comes verbal, or spiritual service, as by prayer. The debt that man owes of his body is explained by scholastic theological reasons, one of which is illustrated by practical terms apposite to the supposed audience: it is owed tanguam in feudum. We are astonished that there were not more such applications of theology to situations which the ultimate audience of these appeals might be expected to experience. Prayer for the army of the faithful is commended primarily as a useful aid to toward victory. The preacher is advised to pass direct, after each aggres-
sive passage, into an exhortation to take up the cross and follow Christ, to become a "pilgrim of the Crucified". No doubt it was well-calculated propaganda that stressed the immediate dignity of taking the cross; although this was a public penance for public sins, as Humbert says, it was also an immediate and no doubt gratifying drama with quasi-liturgical significance. It is in this connection that the preacher is recommended to bring up the theocratic idea: the church confers the cross because the church by right wields both the material and the spiritual sword. Humbert has earlier said that the evil crusader is like the bad thief whose cross does not lead to heaven. For any papalist, the example of Frederick II contrasted with that set by Louis IX. Ecclesiastical leadership was the essence of the crusading idea, and this propaganda is here for the church, narrowly conceived, rather than for Christendom in the more general sense of populus Dei; it was for the papacy against secular authority.

This theme is not wholly devoid of appeal to the non-churchman, or at least to the less powerful. Humbert proceeds directly to contrast the Lord who demands willing service with those lords who compel their men to follow them. Constantly Humbert reverts to the mystique of the holy war of the past, and adds to it the mystique of the Holy Land. The piety of Moslems in their own pilgrimage—the hajj misunderstood, supposed to be to the tomb of Mohammad the Prophet, and yet recognized as an enviable devotion—is seen as a sport to Christians whose devotion should equal and then exceed it. The major problems of theology are taken in the preacher's stride. How could God allow the rise of Mohammad? This is answered scholastically. First, it brings about a "manifestation of the faithful of Christ", as when we recognize loyal knights by their fighting strongly for the king; second, there is "good exercise": God does not want idle followers. Third, "ease of salvation": crusading gives unequaled opportunities to save one's soul. All these arguments are systematized.

Humbert's Opus tripartitum summarized the more important points of the De predicatone (as he rates them): the seven motives for fighting—zeal for the divine name, zeal for the Christian religion, love for one's brethren, devotion to the Holy Land, the spiritual advantages of war, the example set by the ancients, and the graces granted by the church (indulgences and the like). The Opus tripartitum, Humbert's work in preparation for the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, will be considered again later. Here we should note the motives for not crusading which the Opus summarizes from the De predicatone: the seduction

26 De predicatone, cap. 3; Quarto monarch, caps. 4, 8, opening of cap. 6, caps. 9, 14, 15
of sin, excessive fear of bodily suffering, the bad advice of men, the
bad example of others, excessive love of one's own country, excessive
love of one's own people, a pretended inability (on grounds of weak-
ness, or lack of means, or unfinished business), or, finally, deficiency
of faith.

A final list is of the qualities necessary for a preacher of the cru-
sader: sanctity of life (to be worthy of his subject), the signs of penance
(unfitting that he who lacks these should all day invite others to the
cross and death), the assumption of the cross (to do what he recom-
mends others to do, lest he be like the scribes and pharisees), discre-
tion in action (the calculation of great transactions in taxation, ab-
solutions, and dispensations requires absolute exactness), a careful
solitude (to preach effectively), a circumspect judgment (since there
are so many doubtful questions involved in the business), the offerings
of prayers (necessary in the least of matters, the more so in great
ones), a moderate zeal (because excess of zeal has very questionable
results), and, lastly, the necessary knowledge of what relates to the
business (this was Humbert's special contribution, the provision of
homiletic material; his lack of originality did not save him from the
vanity of authorship). As in all contemporary scholastic writing, more
is packed into Humbert's work than we can do justice to. It is inter-
esting for its inclusion of so much of the crusade propaganda that
had preceded it, and for the scholastic bias which it gives to this fa-
miliar material. There are long lists of suitable biblical texts, many of
them not immediately relevant to the theme. It is not easy to believe
that the scholastic approach made effective propaganda for purposes
of recruitment.

To sum up, there are certainly differences of emphasis between the
propaganda associated with Urban II and that of a hundred years and
more later; we must explain them changes not only in the crusading
scene, but in the recruiting as well. The themes that are constant are
the misery and sinfulness of this life, and the long story of holy war,
from Moses and Joshua and David, through the Maccabees and, oddly,
the Acts of the Apostles, to Constantine and Charlemagne, Urban and
Godfrey, a sacred history perpetually renewed, for example by Louis
IX. The history of Arab expansion was told in parallel, perhaps an
easy in justifying the new European aggression. Urban was starting
a new enterprise, and it is at least certain that his preaching was emo-
tive. So was Bernard's. In later treatises (De predicamenta) the periodic

27. Opus tridentinum in Appendicis ad sacram blueprintiam orationis expugnationem et regendorum ed
Edward Brown (London, 1880), II, 103 ff., and De predicamenta, esp. 28.
hymn-singing and calls to arms provided emotional interludes in what must often have seemed dry matter. By this time a wide background of anti-Islamic polemic had created assumptions which must be understood to underlie everything that was said.

B. The Polemic Framework

The regular sequence of homiletic themes was supported by a set of ideas sometimes clearly stated, sometimes only hinted at. These ideas delineated the enemy as repulsive; they constituted a body of learned and popular lore which identified the Arab and Moslem world as hostile, dangerous, and harmful. Such an identification was obviously conducive to a condition of protracted warfare, and most of all if this were presented as a "just war", of which holy war is in fact the prototype.

The theme of the Arab attack upon "Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe" was supported by current accounts of the life of the Prophet Mohammed and the rise of Islam. Behind these lie accusations that violence is an essential part of the religion of Islam, which seemed no inconsistency to crusaders employed in religious violence. Also behind the propaganda for the crusade as an ascetic way of life lies a theory that Islam reverses Christian moral concepts (particularly sexual). These are the main constituents of the "Christian version" of what Islam was, and it proved so powerful a body of ideas as to survive even into our own time. These ideas sealed off the mental world of Islam, really so close to the Christian, and effectively prevented contact, except in certain limited fields of immediate utility to Europe. Roughly, the development of these ideas coincides with the period of the crusades, but it is possible to write the history of either with very little reference to the other. We should not see the polemic as a crude and deliberate effort of propaganda called into being by the crusading need. Still less can we simply consider the crusades as the product of

these ideas; more plausibly, we may recognize the two as jointly representative of a common impulse, but even that is an incomplete analysis. We have to see the European concept of Islam throughout the relevant period as conditioned by all the contemporary movements of thought, of which it was itself an adaptive constituent.

The content of anti-Islamic polemic remained largely unchanged in its main lines from its first appearance in the west in the ninth century, in Spain, where it derived from the resentment of Christian minorities submerged in an age of Moorish rule. The form and expression of the polemic, however, developed pari passu with the methods of theological, philosophical, and historical thinking of succeeding centuries. Writers struggled with absurd ingenuity to retain their inherited ideas in the face of increasing experience of Islam as it actually was. This complex of notions should be seen as one compartment, a rather small and unobtrusive one, in the whole developing structure of European thought. Once that has been said, the importance of those ideas as propaganda can be seen more clearly. The Christian misconception of Islam was fitted into the main body of knowledge and opinion in which European society found expression, in such a way as to typify the enemy as the reverse of the ideal Christian society—not, of course, actual Christian society. In this way propaganda sprang naturally out of the whole attitude of European society; it did not depend on any single ephemeral intellectual fashion.

This attitude to Islam was largely pseudo-historical in character; there was also a great deal of theological analysis, but it was pegged to the "history", tied directly to the sermonizing about Arab aggression, seizure of the Holy Land, and so on. It is equally true to say that the "history" was created to justify the theology. The mental process (not, of course, the ostensible argument) seems to have been this: Christian ity is a religion of love, Islam is opposed to Christianity, therefore Islam is the religion of cruelty, therefore Mohammed was cruel and claimed divine justification for it, as suitable circumstances arose. A parallel process begins from the proposition that Christianity is a reli-


30 Dannal, Islam and the West, pp. 223-270.
gion of chastity. This process is again repeated with the idea "truth" ("therefore Islam is the religion of deception"), and so on. The polemic technique, of course, is the exact converse of the mental process.

It starts with the "history" of the revelation of Islam as a deception (as "unchaste," as "violent"), and works back.

Misrepresentations of the life of Mohammed and the rise of Islam fall into three classes. The first group of ideas is so fantastic that we are reduced to guessing what the sources were, and we are even uncertain that there was any source in reality at all. The early poems about Mohammed (Embrico, Walter, du Pont), and tales repeated in a large number of accounts by otherwise serious writers about the circumstances of his life and death, are both absurd and brutal, at once offensive and fantastic. The idea of a dove or bull trained to impersonate a heavenly messenger may derive respectively from Christian symbolism and Jewish superstition of the golden calf. The origin of the stories about Mohammed's death may be some dim awareness of the "apostasy of the Arabs" at the death of the Prophet; more likely, there was a deliberate effort to contrast with Jesus. Several accounts say that Mohammed foretold that he would rise on the third day; of course this is all invention. Another example of the image of Islam as a "false Christianity" is a widespread and persistent belief that the pilgrimage—the existence of which was very generally known—was to the tomb of the Prophet. There was some knowledge of the Ka'bah and of the relative importance of Mecca and Medina, but this was rare and incomplete at best. This type of attack is important only in that it occurred frequently and was an unrestrained expression of hate. 31

The second group of misrepresentations is almost as far from reality. This revolves around a wicked Christian monk who, in a con-

stantly repeated story occurring in many contexts and a number of versions, is the evil genius of a "Mohammed" conceived as rather simple. At its most absurd the Prophet himself is a rebellious cardinal of the Roman church. In every case this man contrives the content of the revelation. The source of this legend was probably the Arabic story—also legendary—of the monk Bahura, who recognized the future prophet in the young Mohammed. Christian legend distorted him into the evil genius—monk, heresiarch, cardinal—called Nicholas, or, more often, Sergius, who taught or trained a false prophet, and to the medieval the Arabic Bahura legend was a half-admission of the truth of their own absurd story; the original was not Bahura, but the bad, mad monk of their invention. It is fatal easy to read any original as the perversion of its own perversion, and both versions were legendary.

Then, thirdly, we come to deal with arguments which represent the subtlest kind of deformation—unfair exaggeration and misinterpretation of admitted facts, rather than wild invention. In this category we have the more accurate accounts of the life of Mohammed, where the Arabic and Moslem sources are obvious and reasonably close. Here every divergence between Moslem and Christian sources is taken as a Moslem deviation, and so as evidence of ill intent. The guiding influence was the Risalah of the pseudonymous al-Kindi, a tenth-century work of oriental Christian polemic against Islam which purports simply to apply the moral criteria of Christian faith to the known facts of Mohammed’s life. This manages to twist a plain story into a chronique scandaleuse, using the technique of the gossip column and giving a free rein to malice. Nevertheless, the material it used, or abused, was authentic, and it was enormously influential, constantly recopied in summarized form in the Middle Ages; it determined the main lines of Christian attitudes almost into modern times, and has been naturally and bitterly resented by Moslems. In our own days, Christians have had to put up with similar treatment by unbelievers in Christ, and the motive of the critic in the one case, as in the other, is likely to be merely to register dissent from the religion so treated, with propaganda intent. Some of the Christian writers concerned were familiar

32. For Bahura see Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1908), s.v., and rev. ed. (Leiden, 1940), 45.

with irreproachably authentic Moslem sources, with a biographer like Ibn-Isḥāq, and the traditionalists al-Bukhārī and Muslim. It is difficult to decide whether the defamation of the truth was deliberate, but certainly it was done in order to justify the Christian inheritance of allegations about Mohammed. As more accurate information gradually became available, it tended to drive the more absurd accusations out of circulation, at any rate in learned circles, but where a fact resembled a slander it was regarded as confirming it, not as correcting it. In the case of Peter Pascual, this was a conscious argument. By setting out the two stories one after the other, he reckoned to show the priority of the “Christian” version. This is the same process we have already noted, but here it is seen at its most deliberate.

Except that venom gave emotional force to hatred of Moslems, the attacks on Mohammed are really preliminary to the attacks upon the religion that he preached. We have seen that the polemic technique was to invent (or select) a story about Mohammed in order to link to it some aspect of moral teaching in which Islam and Christianity allegedly differ. The attack on Moslem teaching does not seem at any time to have been related to the perception of actual Islamic practice. We can trace written Arabic sources; we can never trace, nor would our texts by themselves allow us to suspect, that direct experience of Moslem life which we know that many Christians in fact had. This may be why the polemic was related so specifically to the original revelation and its historical circumstances; the distant past was beyond the reach of the historical techniques available. No common ground for argument was recognized, although, of course, it existed in abundance. Both Moslems and Christians accepted that everything must stand or fall by the Koran, but most Christians used only Robert of Ketton’s inaccurate paraphrase, and no test or interpretation was accepted in common.

This is a situation obviously favorable to the manufacture of propa-


35 Pascual, Sōbri... undergoes, 1, 9, 12, and 15, in general.
ganda, and it is here that it is most clearly demonstrated that men see what they determine to see. Just as in matters of moral discipline Christians interpreted the divergences of Moslem law from Christian as license—without comparison of the actual permitted practice of the two societies—so even more unfairly they assessed the Koran in ways they would never have dared to use, or dreamed of using, to assess the Bible. For example, it was attacked as disordered, as though any prophecy could read like a scholastic treatise. Several of the Old Testament prophets read more strangely, but the point, of course, was that it was assumed that the Koran could not be the eternal word of God, and must therefore be treated as, and shown to be, an imitation. This is why Christian, and so a lesser extent Jewish, influence on Mohammed was supposed to be so important. Only in our own century have Christians begun to recognize originality in the Koran.

Most modern non-Moslem scholars have assumed, from the fact of Jewish relations with the early Moslem community, that there was a formative Jewish influence on the Koran, much more important than the more distant Christian influence. Medieval Christians took the opposite position. Whether they arrived at the theology from their historical error, or derived their history from an error in theological analysis, they conceived Islam with its positive Christology to be in the intellectual sense, if not the legal, a Christian heresy, and so they came naturally to credit the notion of there having been a Christian source of Moslem revelation. If Islam be conceived as a development from Judaism, it must, for a Christian, seem an improvement, but when it is viewed as a heresy, it must seem, not an approximation to Christianity, but a sad falling away. Even today Moslems are often hurt that Christianity does not award Islam the honorable place that Islam awards to Christianity, but in fact Islam awards Jesus honor, and Christians only toleration. This explains the vilification of Mohammed, who, for Moslems, is the bearer of the word of God, the Koran, as Mary is the bearer of the word in the Christian faith (and Mary is heartily praised in the Koran). This was precisely the trouble for western writers, who could regard praise of Jesus, expressed in terms of doctrinal deviation, only as “smearing the lip of the cup with honey, and after with deadly poison”, an offense against that strict orthodoxy which was a medieval preoccupation. Christians in Europe were not interested in toleration and were not grateful for the toleration of Christians in the Arab world; not to acknowledge the Christian right to rule was itself, in medieval eyes, to persecute Christianity.

36. Kîmârî, Peter the Great; p. 206.
Thus the Islamic revelation was rejected in toto, an ever-continuing cause of war, perpetually renewed.

The relationship between this quasi-historical, quasi-theological polemic and the state of war comes out clearly if we examine one of its most classical expressions, the summary of his own more lengthy polemic with which Riccoldo of Monte Croce ends his Liber peregrinationum (to Baghdad). 37 This attack immediately follows one of the most glowing testimonials to the practice of virtue by Moslems that the Middle Ages produced, and we should bear this in mind when we study Riccoldo's confused attacks on the "confusion" of Islam. In these passages he says that Islam, lex sarracenorum — religion was always conceived as a law, the rules for obeying God — is larga, confusa, occulta, mendacissima, irrationabilis, et violesta. At least three of these adjectives describe his own analysis. Thus, under larga, he argues that the philosophers, and above all Christ, say that the way is narrow; how then can the witness, "there is no god but God and Mohammed is his messenger", have saving power? Anyway (he goes on) such a proposition is self-evident of anything, as for example, "there is no horse...". Riccoldo's absurd position here is, of course, capable of being demonstrated most clearly in a language that does not lack the article: to say "there is no horse but a horse" or "the horse" immediately shows the fallacy in the argument. Under confusa he complains that nothing in the Koran is stated under clear headings, like scholastic categories presumably; can he have persuaded himself that it is so in the Bible, in either the New Testament or the Old? He exemplifies "confusion" from the Koran, with the complaint that in it, when God forbids something, he adds, "if you do it, God is compassionate and merciful and knows that you are weak." Does forgiveness imply inconsistency? Few today would accept this as fair criticism, and, as there is talk of confusion, we note that this point would have been appropriate, if anywhere, as laxity, under the heading larga.

Under occulta Riccoldo attacks dishonest means supposedly used by Moslems to circumvent the laws against adultery and usury; it would be easy enough to make similar criticisms of canonical evasions in the Catholic church. Under mendacissima he attacks chiefly passages in the Koran that are inconsistent with the text of the Bible. The first point to which Riccoldo objects as irrationabilis is the law of triple divorce; if an objection is to be made, it would again seem more appropriate

37 In Peregri nationem mundi servorum, ed. J. C. M. Lowend (Leipzig, 1844), pp. 105 ff., as Historiog. Based on a poor manuscript, this should be corrected by MS. Berlin Staatbibliothek lat. 47446 entitled Liber peregrinationum and corrected by the author himself. See Enrico Panella, Pregiogarum, in Historiog. disquisitiones, n.s., XVII (1864).
under the heading large. He claims that learned Moslems deride the Koran in secret; it is hardly credible that this is asserted at first hand, and his sources are probably the Jacobites and Nestorians with whom he was for a time friendly. Under the same heading he goes on to explain that Islam claims to correct our biblical stories, which, if he were as logical as he claims, he would have put with his attacks on the truth of the Koran (mendacissima) because of its inconsistency, in detail, with the Bible. Under violence he stresses that it is “most certain” that Islam will last only as long as the victory of the sword lasts. This brings him back to the life of Mohammed, and thence he wanders into subjects other than violence. Lastly, he claims that the Moslems are easily convinced and confused in debate; to this improbable claim we shall return.

Why is this attack on the unmethodical so unmethodical? It is difficult to suggest a reason, beyond the intellectual agitation induced by the subject. The fact is that Riccoldo objects to most things that he attributes to Islam, under all the epithets he lists. His perpetual inconsistencies are in fact characteristic of his approach, which can never use one single standard to judge the two religions, but which sees the same thing in Islam as a fault and in Christianity as innocent. This side of his work resembles the worst propaganda. With its considerable apparatus of learning, it pretends to show “rationally”, as was said then, or “scientifically”, as we should say today, that Islam is in every respect the opposite of, and so an unrelenting threat to, the entire Christian structure. He typifies the polemic literature by his refusal to recognize anything good or true in the teaching of Islam (even the praise of Jesus and Mary is grudging), and in its vilification of Mohammed and his religion interchangeably. His total rejection of Moslem religion reflects in the intellectual sphere the total war that was the usual papal policy for the world. What makes this truly poignant is the contrast with Riccoldo’s very honest praise of the virtues and even the religious practice of the learned Moslems he encountered. He sometimes even exaggerates these, in order to condemn Christian faults, but his account seems truthful.

Much more questionable is his unambiguous claim to have debated theology successfully with Moslems. It is self-evident that Moslems could not have accepted many of his arguments as even relevant, since much that he says is a misinterpretation of an Islamic position. For

38 Ibid., pp. 135-141; cf. also the main argument of the Libellus contra secundum (note 34 above).
example, he makes great play with the blessing, "may God pray for Mohammed". He takes this literally and so attacks its theology. No Moslem would ever accept that the Arabic idiom here could actually bear the sense in which Riccoldo attacks it; therefore Riccoldo knew it only in written form and had never discussed it with Moslems.40

More to the point, a public debate which involved blasphemy against the Koran (considered the uncreated word of God) and cruelly sacrilegious and scurrilous attacks on Mohammed could lead only to "voluntary martyrdom" on the Cordova model, as in one case which survives in detail, of a Franciscan who mistook bad history for faith, and to a number of others known to us in more or less detail.41 Much is pathetic in this impersonal cultural arrogance. The story of Raymond Lull, who deliberately angered Moslem mobs by attacking Mohammed, and whom the North African authorities twice saved from himself, illustrates the best that might happen in such circumstances.42 Surviving accounts of debates between Jews and Christians show that each side dreamed its own fantasies of success.43 An anecdote of William of Rubruck suggests the inconclusive nature of such discussions in neutral surroundings.44 The belief that what a man himself finds so convincing must convince the world reminds us of the delusion that right must prevail in battle.

How was anti-Islamic polemic in the crusading period linked with the crusade? The polemic is not conterminous with active crusading. Naturally, it coincides with a relationship, sometimes close, sometimes distant, between Moslems and Christians, and so it coincides very generally with jihad. As long as the two religions existed side by side they experienced a magnetic repulsion which first took a bitter form on the Christian side, at that time materially the inferior and losing side. All the existing material — much of it, we may confidently speculate, in the form of unbroken oral tradition — was used widely and actively from the time of the First Crusade onward. Propaganda thus developed became conventional. For example, Innocent III in the course of a bull

43 Daniel, Islam, p. 184, and Index s. v. "scrupulosity".
which is simultaneously a recruiting exhortation, a legal pronouncement of indulgence (as all such documents were), and a declaration of an intention to undertake war, summarizes the usual polemic against Mohammed in a few phrases.  

The crusades gave a sense of historical importance to those who took part in them, and they aroused interest in Islam which would otherwise have lain dormant. The most unformed polemic came from Spain, from areas where Christians had gained possession. In that sense it is an achievement of the reconquest, and neither a cause nor a consequence of the crusades proper, but material originating in Palestine agreed with what came from Spain, although as information it was inferior in quality. We cannot really divide the European inheritance in this respect. There is no doubt that this polemic served both to fill out and to support the purely recruiting themes with which we began this study.

C. Lay Attitudes

We can sum up all this polemic propaganda as designed to show that the Moslems were and had always been implacable enemies, proponents of a form of religion devised to supplant and destroy Christianity. There was (in theory) no possibility of reconciliation. Moreover, every possible legal step was taken to cut Christians off from Moslems, whether in territory under Christian rule, or in territory under Moslem rule. The authorship of most of the propaganda, and all the intellectual propaganda, was clerical. Of course, the clergy was not a homogeneous body; it covered a vast range of different degrees of power, interests, skills, abilities, and cultural levels. The more intelligent propaganda (however pernicious) was the work of clerics of a higher order of ability and learning and spontaneous interest in the idea of "Christendom". There was certainly a sense of solidarity among Christians, but this was so rarely put to the test that we cannot say how far it existed outside the range of the theorists of Christendom. Crusading was an essential part of the papal, theological, and canonical movement, almost as much so as the Gregorian reform which had immediately preceded it, or the investiture controversy which coincided

with its early stages; the notion of Christendom which it both pre-supposed and reinforced was taken up by the scholastics. "Although the abandonment of Christendom to the Moslems must greatly touch all Christians," said Humbert, "it touches the clerical and priestly estate more, for it is they who see more clearly... because of their greater gift of intellect; and it concerns them more, because of the responsibility they have for Christendom." 46

This idea of Christendom was much later than the idea of Islam. Islam was conceived as a negation set up against the church, but in one sense the opposite is true. The idea of Christendom, as at the time understood, was largely set up by the polemics who attacked the Moslems; indeed, their "Christendom" extended in practice no further than the Latin west than western rule, including rule over oriental Christians considered as unreliable allies. With this theoretic picture, which is not just clerical, but papalist and scholastic, the actual interests and practice of laymen did not always coincide, and the effect of the propaganda upon them is not always discernible. The laymen, whether lords, merchants, or poor men, with the clerics dependent on them, had their own likes and dislikes, and to some extent their own propaganda.

Those who had to deal with Moslems in practice found it quite easy to treat them as human beings; this natural fact is no doubt why it seemed necessary to the canonists to set up great barriers between Moslems and Christians living beside each other in countries under Moslem or under Christian rule. Travelers, merchants, and all whose profession was not deliberately to provoke Moslems to anger, found that they got on with them well enough, and sometimes even very well, when not prevented by suspicion on both sides, arising mostly from the perpetual hostilities. The intention of the crusade propagandists was naturally to prevent this and to represent Moslems as impossible to deal with. Some of the polemic written for knighthly consumption, however, even when written by clerics, at least those dependent on aristocratic patronage, was much less analytic.

We saw above that, before the crusades proper, discussion of war against Moslems lacked real hostility. The chronicles of the capture of Sicily, though committed to a church interest, show themselves more interested in personal stories (even of Arabs) and in the sequence of events, than in any attitude toward Moslems as such. In Spain, in the Cantar del Cid, there is absolutely no hostility to Islam at all. The Moslem gentleman (I use the word deliberately; it is his noble charac-

46 Opus tripartitum, in Appendix: Bredt, ed. Bonn, p. 129
ter that matters) who is manipulated by the Cid serves him loyally, admits
duly much as the "hackeys of imperialism" have been said to serve
their masters in our own time, but quite acceptably when judged by
the standards of chivalry. The villains of the poem are Christians; it
speaks for a new aristocracy against an old one, and its leading ideas
are honor and booty and luck. It is far from the thought of the crusade.
The Moors figure sometimes as noble enemies, but more often as the
victims of the Cid's frank brigandage, and, whatever the victims felt
about it, the Cid and his companions exploited them without malice.47
At least during the period of the tarfas, slaves and singing and dancing
girls were evidently amenities of a common culture; when the other
side won, the daughter of the house might become her conqueror's
singing girl, if he preferred her to her ransom. Similarly, we cannot
speak of crusading hatred where Arab vassals helped, as was the style
of the day, to educate the sons of their Christian overlords.48 Not in
difference to religion, but a phase of confessional indifference, of often
callous toleration, seems at first to have accompanied a Christian vic-
tory. Susceptibility to the clerical propaganda which exploited the more
malicious Mozarab traditions (while suppressing Mozarab culture) came
later, and the earlier lay attitude left no permanent mark.

Did propaganda follow, rather than precede, the crusade also in the
case of the chansons de geste, which as first sight looks more different
from that of the Cantar del Cid than it does on analysis? Certainly
they represent something more permanent to the European imagina-
tion, an unreal but perennially popular convention that, throughout
the four centuries that it survived in active form, imparted steady en-
tertainment rather like the Wild West stories of the nineteenth century
or the science fiction of the twentieth. Whether or not these poems
were often based on monastic records, as Bédier has argued, most of
them were meant to appeal to knightly listeners and all who admired
chivalry.49 Noble birth is important in all this literature. When the French
king buys a fine Arab slave-boy, he watches him—"Demandat mei si
ere de halte gent", and when he learns that he is indeed noble, with
powerful parents, treats him well. When count William is able to throw
off the disguise in which he has penetrated into Arab Nîmes, and been

47 Maximilien Pidal, ed., Cantar de mio Cid, esp. vv. 126–128, 132, 25–26
48 Edouard P. A. Dozy, Recherches sur l'histoire et la littérature de l'Espagne pendant la
moyen-âge, 3rd ed. (Paris and Leyden, 1881); Maximilien Pidal, La Espagne del Cid, 3rd rev ed.
(Madrid, 1967), and cf. his Poëmes arabo y poesía antropos (Madrid, 1941); Remarques, Les
Invasions des Sarrasins en Provence (Paris, 1839); Daniel, Arabs and Medieval Europe, chap. 4; and
see also note 62, below.
La Chanson de Geste (Geneva, 1955).
treated contemptuously as a merchant or peasant, he calls out: "Felon paien, toz vou confonde Deus! / Tant m'avez hui escharmi et gabé / Et marcheant et vilan apelé; / Ge ne sui mie marcheant..." Both sides understand this clearly. For an Arab knight, as for a Frank, "base-ness" is as bad a fate as death: "a votre volenté / Volentiers m'i rendrai, se jou au seurté / Que jou n'i soive ocs et menés a vilté." The daughters (or wives) of the sultans or emirs, the ladies who change sides and marry the Christian heroes in so many of the poems, are all noble; they may change their religion, but they cannot, of course, change their class. "Burl" was necessary for any love-making: "deus pucelles de molt haut parenté"; so was wealth: "Achetanz fu ses oncle, qui en grant richez"—four castles and as many cities. The fathers (or husbands) command large estates, even empires. An obvious example of a general trend is Roland's roll-call of the enemy, king and kings' sons and dukes, besides the "amuranle" and "almaçur"; in its careful statements of properties, Climbervin owns half Saragozea, Valdabron a lord of four hundred galleys.38

Roland, perhaps the earliest and best, certainly the best-known of the poems, is also among the most bellicose—Turpin at least seems to be an authentic crusader, though a crusading attitude is strictly confined to him; and yet in Roland, almost more than in any other poem, the Arab world is presented as a close analogue of European society. In most of the poems, Saracens are not only recognized as "barons", but are made out themselves to discriminate between Christians in point of birth and conduct. King Galafre in the Couronnement de Louis offers William of Orange siefs and honors because of his birth—"Cortes lignages est molt de halte gen"—and of his prowess—"De tes preoets oï parler sovent". The poems assume that chess and backgammon, like love-making, are common to the two worlds; but sometimes also sup-

pose that feasting with wine is too. This mistake is best considered as the product, not so much of ignorance, as of indifference to facts, combined with a set purpose to regard the Arab world as just like home.

We meet more and more gallant Saracens until with the passage of time an imaginary Arab world merges with an almost equally unreal Christian one. The son of the sultan and the Countess of Ponthieu, admittedly brought up as a Christian, was "predestin et bons chevaliers et hardus et courtois et larges et debonnaires et ne me sont orgellieux", surely a summary of chivalric ideals. His sister remained in Egypt, "grew in very great beauty", and married a valiant Turk, and their grandson was "Saladin, qui tant eut droit pruice que nul plus". So in the end the most chivalrous of all was a Moelem. There is plenty of generalized abuse of "pagans", but, as in the *Cantar del Cid*, the only villains were Christians — in the chansons, they are defectors, a Canelon, an Isoré, a Macaire. This was not peace propaganda; it took the war for granted, and treated it like a very dangerous sport; but it was not crusade propaganda either.

The mass of the internal evidence indicates that this literature was meant simply to entertain. What we usually regard as the lowest and silliest point that propaganda reaches, the absurd theology of Mahom, Tervagan, Apollus, and the rest of the idols, can equally well be taken


52 Le Feuille du Comte de Pavie, ed. Charles Brunsch (Paris, 1926), XXX (pp. 756-758), XXXI (pp. 780-783); Saladin, ed. Larry S. Crisp (Poesies littéraires francoises, 185; Genova, 1973), I, p. 31, of XXX, 20, and explicit; cf. Brunoes du Guiher, L’Aventurier Civilement with L’Ordre de Châleture, ed. George F. Nest (Flammes, 1832), manuscript of wholly fictional Arab prince in Aventurier, lisse 2965, 6022, 6029, etc.

as evidence of a deliberate frivolity. The number of different idols seems to increase with the passage of time, and then to tail off again, but this attitude does not correlate with any other observable change in the attitude to Islam. Sometimes the idols play more part in the story, but as far as we can tell only for the sake of the plot. Have we been guilty of anachronism and of condescension, assuming that the poets were ignorant and small-minded, when the fault lay in our own ability to interpret? The system of idols is effectively confused to this one body of literature; I do not take much account of sparse references in chronicles to idols in mosques, which may have been thoughtless reflections of the literature. It is possible for two communities to live side by side and largely in ignorance of each other, but even the most ingenious explanation of the origins of the names of the idols does not tell us why anyone wanted to invent the system of idols at all.

The poets probably thought of Islam as somehow a continuation of the religious system of ancient Rome, and of that they knew nothing save the names of some gods. The question remains, why elaborate so complex a system? If we reply, propaganda, why an attractive system of jeweled splendor? Above all, why reject the official propaganda system? The authors may have been ignorant of Moslem, but not, surely, of what other Christians knew and thought. It is not just that they ignore what the academic polemicists and theologians were saying, but, with very few exceptions in so vast a literature, they ignore the abusive folklore of Mohammed which penetrated everywhere else.

To me it seems likely that they chose and knowingly adhered to a certain convention which suited the story they wanted to tell and which in fact largely determined the plot, and that they deliberately decided to take not the slightest notice of what the preachers were saying. It is possible to argue that these poems, far from being war propaganda, constitute a rejection of serious propaganda, made possible, while avoiding any suggestion of crypto-heresy, by adopting an absurd convention, but one unfavorable to Islam. In Arsac, king Marsile will not desert Mohammed to save his life, out of contempt for how Christians practise their religion. 54 The poet speaks neutrally, almost ambiguously. These poems rarely come so near to satire as this, but all remain isolated from official propaganda.

Y. and C. Pellat very acutely established the absolute division among three types of polemic against Islam. One is true polemic, academic

“pure and applied” theology: either direct crusade propaganda, or its theoretic foundation. Another is the legendary, “folkloric” life of Mohammed. The third is the elaboratory convention of the *chansons de geste* and related *romans*. This division is absolute in the sense that the three categories are logically distinct. In practice they overlap, but in different ways. The legends very occasionally wander into the *chansons*, where they seem odd and out of place, but they strongly influence the academics, who were always hoping that something in the “Christian” version of events would turn out to be true, or could be made to such. As we have seen, the legends have a distant relation to the facts as we know them from Islamic sources, sometimes so distant as to require clairvoyance to recognize, but still a relation.

We have already considered the importance of the legends in polemic, but not their character as a literary genre. One of the earliest western writers on Islam, Guibert of Nogent, calls the legends *piebela opinio*, which we can reasonably translate as “folklore”, and he tells us that he has not seen them written down. He seems not to vouch for anything that he repeats, but, after making a rather crude joke, he precedes from it, and adds that it is not true, as some people think, that Mohammed claimed to be God. As who think? This can hardly refer to the *chansons de geste*, because a manipulated idol is not a man claiming to be God; not is it one of the usual legends, not does Guibert refer to it as such. It may just be that a comparison with Christ is at the back of every Christian’s mind, but this text does emphasize how amorphous, how prose-like, and sometimes untraceable this material is, penetrating sermons, chronicles, and collections, wherever the anecdotal form is appropriate. Embrico in his *Vita Mahometi* puts it to propagandistic use maliciously and tendentiously, but Walter of Compègne, in his *Otia de Machomete*, is more ironic, as Cambier and Lepace point out, and Alexandre de Pont’s paraphrase elaborates a bawdy, feudal background. Legends might be used to stir up crusading sentiment, but might just as likely be repeated solely to divert.


57. Cambier, “Quand Guibert de Compiègne composait les *Otia de Machomete*?” *Latomus,*
The legends vary greatly, but they have in common, as I have shown, some relation to facts, however perverted, and some polemic purpose, however frivolous. Bahira-Sergius in its first form is Moslem, in its latest (cardinal) purely west European. Disgusting tales of pigs and dogs and drunkenness seem gratuitous, but probably relate to Moslem religious teaching. The magnetic tomb was picked up from Hallenstic legend, but it is a backhanded compliment to the impact of Mohammed on the European imagination that it came to be associated with him in particular. Even here there is a distant authenticity in that it tended to be believed because the importance of the hajj was dimly apprehended. Such stories, mixed with the more authentic if equally perverted tales of the pseudo-Kindi and others, reached everywhere—except the chansons de geste. This can only be because the chansons could not repeat the legends and at the same time maintain the system of idols which is fundamental to their only serious purpose—as we shall now see—itself interwoven with the fabric of pure entertainment.

The legends were perversions of fact, but the idols were pure fantasy, although the Arab society in which the poets imagined them was made to resemble the European even more closely than it really did. It is clear that the legends can only be propaganda, and its consequence, but the motivation of the chansons is less obvious. A clue is in the recurring references to Arab wealth, though they are never as frank as the Cantar del Cid about booty. Some of the most striking descriptions of the idols gleaming in gold and precious stones are in the Chanson d’Antioche ("Tous fu d’or et d’argent, moult luist et reflambie") and the Conquête de Jérusalem, where the royal pavilion is lighted "De l’or qui raiust, des perres de cristal". We might blame the vulgar sensuality of the ribald Tatfura, but we first find the theme in Roland, and the grandest accounts come in poems of the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries devoted to chivalry. The recurrent scene of the smashing of idols is a hardly disguised some of loot. Wealth is emphasized in other ways. A Christian is offered great wealth to become a Moslem. The Moslem country is rich, as some contemporary travelers said.


and there is an idea that Moslems claim that, though God may rule in heaven, "Mahom" rules this world and makes the vegetation grow—recollections of a fertility cult?" In the chansons de geste it is success that is important, in war especially, and is even a great moral and religious issue. Love is important, but it is interwoven with the war interest. Women, for the vulgar, are boot y—"Ne dis pas entre un vo vo garçons livrée"—but the knight, too, who wins the sultan's daughter gains by marriage a title to his new estates that lends legality to conquest. Even Orable, surely no mere sex object, holds the hereditary title to Orange. Moslem countries were for plunder, and success was the judgment of God evinced through ordeal by battle; we must believe in the God who helps us, "En tel Dieu doit on crouer, qui un gent volt aider." In real life, Christians

59 Chansons d'Antioche, ed. Paris, v. 41, line 1088; ed. Duquesne-Quicke, line 4187 (various) Conquête de Jerusalem, ed. Nippon, vi. 18, and 6465 Chanson de Roland, ed. Bédier, line 3492 Examples (by no means exhaustive) from other poems Le Chevalier Chevalier, ed. Patrick Henry (Paris, 1893), lines 1513–1514, line 3477, ed. Sven A. Andolf (Upplands, 1946, xxv lines 725–726; Guérin, ed. Ousso, line 8733; Averroès de Narbonne, ed. Louis Delaporte (Paris, 1887), lines 1124–1125; Fleury, ed. Auguste Kroeber and Gustave Servois (Paris, 1860), line 3155–3184, where the ideals are brought into the narrative and destroyed in one passage; a rather fuller version in Chanson d'Aguesseau, ed. Brunel, lends up in a distribution of broken bits among the knights, lines 183–186, especially lines 3450–3452. Still more elaborate, in Antioche, ed. Harnois, the manipulation is driven out of the ideals one after the other (lines 64–67). There is a good example in the same poem of riches offered as a reward for conversion to Islam: "Step to and make of richesse deo. / Drop good denote molin et n pas", ibid., lines 1341–1342; of Ave d'Aubin, ed. Ousso, lines 1640–1642. Again, many more examples might be cited, though conversion to Christianity was also rewarded materially. Many examples also of Moslem wealth, Jesus apart, e.g., La Chavelerie Fisien, ed. Auguste L. Tarabichi (Paris, 1923), "A Copals sunt riche l'art de Damas," where are "Acroporn, riches des cartes antiques", lines 90, 98. Travelers, e.g., Gerardi de Strasburg an Arnold et Liebke, Chronique Strasbourgeoise (M H, 55, 56; 233–34). Rambaló, Ancreuza, in Peregrinaciones, ed. Simon, ed. Laurens, and Roemöe, "L mężczy., ACO, 11, 271 276; Simon Sommura, in SOP, III. Aceh de Varona L aber peregrinaciones, ed. Rühöke, 820, 779 (1693). Moslem rulers: examples in Antioche, line 1040; Couronnement du Louet, and 1393; Goupiel, line 8701, 8701–8702; Couronnement de Guillaume, line 2118: Couronnement de Courtois en Cygne, line 4602; Allermuir, ed. Grasleu and Montalier, lines 1416–1417; and Prise d'Orange, line 672; ed. Y and C Peltin, L'Idée de Druw.

60. Wotruba: Chansons d'Antioche, and 1899; ed. Chansons d'Antioche, vi, 15, line 985, "Des belles Antioches, tue fait le damier;" Duquesne-Quicke, and 6413. Ave, in the aperopomps poem, is best of this (lines 1379–1380) but saved by Guies (there worth) research were no doubt safe enough, but distinguished betwene captives and daybly Moslem lords in these poems, e.g., Mougin d'Aguesseau, lines 3330–3342, and the account of Ponselin's daughter (La Fille, vi, 359–360) another version in Le Histoire de Humbert de Sabonnes, ed. L. Napoleon Bocu (Valenceca, 1841), xiv, 657–658, "Les dons de Ponselin qui Jesus rendit / Pour l'envoy d'Espera," God Conquête de Jerusalem, vi, 15, line 3543. For the "good" who fail see the Trouvair court. MS. Arscel 6362 and Bibl. munoscopia, Montalegre sur-Not, 192. The association of the heroes with the estate is never even clearly put but lines on Années de Chantre, lines 26–27 (the estate is all Spain). Bellissant daughter of Charlemagne as Omael, ed. F Chamasd and Heart Michelau (Paris, 1859), rewards the hero's conversion with his hand and large estates, but this way round is rare. Orable in Prise d'Orange, and 1400, makes her family estates in Orange clear.
did not apostatize en masse at a Moslem victory; during the period of the chansons, only the Levant was an area of military failure, but defeat there brought a theological problem of Providence which troubled the theologians themselves. In fiction alone could Christians be sure of winning in the end, and the basis of all the plots is providential victory; the different classes of poems—the light adventure (such as Prise d'Orange), the serious individual adventure (Simon de Poulle), the fate-laden war (Aliscamps), and the magic fantasy (Huon de Bordeaux)—all share this characteristic. It is here that the convention of idolatry proves its worth as literature. The thing is put to the test. The soudan or amirant or king vows offerings to the gods, but in the event they let him down. A scene in which the idols are destroyed is popular; triumph over the idols is the true climax of many poems, rather than the battle itself, which leads up to it, or the baptism of the best Saracen, which often follows. Can we call this propaganda? It is not even its effect, because the system of testing idolatry by ordeal is quite independent, in matter, of clerical argument or legendary polemic; it is unlike them because it is a reflection of actual war against Moslems, and in origin a spontaneous reaction. It extrapolates some facts of war and sets them in fantasy. If this is propaganda, it is in a very subtle sense. The poems are like Portant pour la Syrie or Tipperary, but are much more elaborate, and they never stop being entertaining as well as encouraging.\(^{61}\)

There was some overlap of interests between poets and clerics, chiefly in the rewriting of history. An obscure skirmish in the Pyrenees, the Arab invasions of southern France, the sacking of the Roman suburbs, these, treated episodically or as epic, were set in a new perspective, dramatized and romanticized. The poets created an imaginary world with a complex history of its own (not unlike strange worlds in some mid-twentieth-century fictional sagas) in which not the events of history, but the impact that they made, is remembered.\(^{62}\) If the history

61 *Prise d'Orange, Simon de Poulle, and Aliscamps, Huon de Bordeaux*, ed. F. Garraud and Charles L. de Groux, Livre de France (Paris, 1900); music charged by Charlemagne on pp. 70-71, but the whole plot—including Chanoine—is magic. Usually the more serious the fighting (e.g., *Chansons d'Aliscamps*), the more serious the religious conflict between gods, but without bitterness between knightly opponents. For other general views consult William W. Comfort, "The Literary Role of the Saracen in the French Epic," *Modern Language Association of America: Publications*, ix (1940), 623-639; Jean Frappier, *Les Chansons de geste de cycle Guillaume d'Orange* (Paris 1955 and 1965); C. Mordard Jones, "The Conventional Saracen of the Song of Curie," *Speculum*, xvii (1942), 201-225.

62 For the invasions of southern France, especially the Guillaume cycle, but Couronnement de Louis joints Pieressus and La Destruction de Rome, ed. Gustave Guesdon, Romans, ii (1873), as outstanding for the Rome legend, adding Rambeau de Paris (ixth.), La Chevalerie Osier de Danemarche, ed. Joseph Barrias (Paris, 1842). Attacks delivered or threatened against Paris,
in *Roland* is absurd, the Christianized Spain of the sequel, *Anseis de Cartage*, is more so, and yet quite logical—and in its way, of course, prophetic. That fantasy of Frankish exhibitionism, the *Voyage de Charlesmagne en Orient*, takes us through a nonexistent country inhabited by Turks and Persians to Byzantium; as a tourist, Charles visits Jerusalem, where there seem to be no Moslems, so he promiscuously devotes the patriarch to fight them in Spain. At the same time, clerics accepted the victories of poetry as fact. According to Robert of Rheims, Urban thought that Charles magne and Louis had “destroyed the kingdom of the pagans [Turks]”. Where? In the east? Or in Spain? Later, Christian Jerusalem, in *Simon de Fosille*, is embattled against Babylon (Mesopotamia, not Egyptian, Babylon), in the same general pattern, again under Charlemagne. The second crusade cycle rewrote later history as it “ought” to have been, with the conquest of Arabia, and especially Mecca, with the crossing of the Red Sea into Fairyland, now the Sudan. We do not have to suppose that anyone was deceived, or any deceit intended; these were fantasies, not meant to persuade anyone to fight, though they may sometimes have had that effect; they were meant in fun.63

The poems encouraged people to fight in another way also inconsistent with the official propaganda. Prowess is on the whole a Pelagian virtue. Christians in the poems are defeated only because outnumbered, and are victorious only against odds, without miraculous

intervention. The authors seem to forget that victory is supposed to vindicate God, not their heroes’ prowess, and this essential point tends to disappear from sight also in the case of the almost endless individual combats that the listeners seem to have loved. Adventure is a constant theme, perhaps increasingly important. The early-thirteenth-century romance L’Escoufle (by Jean Renart) is introduced by a war against the Saracens which, though only an episode, amounts to about one seventh of the whole. Two major episodes in the career of Guy of Warwick (early mid-century) are in the service of the emperor of Constantinople against the sultan of Turkey, and in the service of King Tria-
omor of Alexandria against the giant Amorant. How could propaganda against Islam for its sexuality and violence appeal to a public that wanted to hear of violence in endless detail, varied only by episodes of love? Of course crusaders were deep in “sexuality” and “violence” from the beginning, and the secular literature suggests nothing much else. The troubadours are stylish and worldly, and when they went crusading, their motives were not more than moderately pious. A poem of Marcabru’s (mid-twelfth-century) makes interesting use of the crusading theme. A girl whose lover has gone to the holy war complains to Jesus that through him she sorrow grows, for the Saracen attack on him is his ruin. “The best of all the world go to serve you,” she says, but the motive hardly reflects the preaching; it is not the cross, but duty—in the form of honor—and adventure that attract the men from home. We may suspect that church invective against Moslem lust was directed against the Christian laity in the first place, and that invective against Moslem violence was sometimes aimed at professionals for whom any war would do as well as a crusade.

The impact of events on professionals tends to bear this out. Most of the propaganda in the English chronicles of Richard I is directed against his European enemies, in relation to Arabs, the only obvious concern is for his reputation—the justification of his killing the prisoners, his renunciation of the pilgrimage, his personal standing with Saladin. The courtly chivalry who followed him must have conceived the


heroes of the *chansons* in his image. The troubadour Guèclem Faudit, a townsman who had gambled his fortune away, wrote, probably in sincere sorrow at the death of a patron, that “*Saracens, Turks, Pagans, and Persians*” feared Richard more than anyone born of a mother, it was unlikely that after his death any prince could recover the Sepulcher — “*Hoc est maus non ai esperansa que i am / Reys ni princes que cobrar lo saubes*”; and similarly William Marshal said that the king’s unexpected death prevented Richard from gaining “the lordship of Saracens and Christians and all the men of the world”. In his own way as professional as Richard, Frederick II was successful in a crusade which was unacceptable to the papacy because it was not under papal leadership, nor informed by hatred of Islam. The propaganda had become integral to the crusade itself for papalists.66

The theme of success or failure was naturally perennial in "real life". The Second Crusade was an anticlimax. While the Latin states were still untouched, William of Tyre was oppressed by a sense of their failure. The accidental death of Frederick I at the outset of the Third Crusade seemed a wanton disaster at the hands of inscrutable Providence.67 The Damietta crusade of 1218–1221 seemed for a brief moment to promise success. The structure of the army, directed by the legate Pelagius, as unqualified by experience as he was unsuited by temperament, parodied the structure of Christendom; and from the total failure of this crusade, after its momentary vision of an Islam destroyed, date prophecies of the end of Islam which were popular with all classes, right up to the fall of Acre, a prophetic myth that parallels the historical myth of Charlemagne. This was the self-propaganda of the whole community, giving itself to fantasy as there was less and less solid food to feed on. Yet in the recollections of Philip of Novara, who spent much of his life in the coastal remnant of the Latin states, there is no hint of danger and no whiff of crusade.68 The threads are very tangled.

From the canons, repeated and reinforced, from instructions to confessors, from the tirades of an indignant poet, it is clear that neither law nor propaganda could stop Christians from mixing with


Moslems in the trading cities of the Arabs in the Mediterranean area. That the evidence is negative in a success of the propaganda; we have no personal records of consuls or merchants of the period. We know more about good relations from Moslem than from Christian sources; Usamah Ibn-Munqidh and Ibn-Jubair are obvious examples. Louis IX was the church's perfect crusader, but his devoted biographer, Joinville, is surprisingly little influenced by the official line and is a rare European witness to an attitude unsympathetic to Louis: he took the Arabs as he found them.10

If propaganda does indeed reflect as much as create the feelings of the society that produces it, it will be subject to different distortions in different sections of the community. Louis's failure was associated with the "crusade" of the Pastoureaux, an autobiographical inscription which disseminated the idea that the clergy had betrayed the king and the crusade; the rich in their turn formed the idea that the revolt had itself been fomented by the Arabs. Both fantasies exemplify the natural recoil of official propaganda; the hysteria induced by a Peter the Hermit or a Fulk of Neuilly, or in the Children's Crusade, could easily degenerate into wild suspicions. Fournier's Inquisition suspected the lepers of conspiring with Arab monarchs, so that sober churchmen too were capable of paranoia under communal pressure.11 The church wanted an official war in due feudal order, but its dogmatic and pastoral theology had no appeal for feudal leaders, except Louis. They stopped crusading except where it looked profitable. More precisely, they required feasible projects and, in terms of modern business, we can classify some fourteenth-century theories (which we shall consider shortly) as feasibility studies. The papal inflation of the crusading notion into an Albigensian Crusade or a crusade against the emperor was acceptable as relating to political reality.

If in fact the chansons de geste excluded the official line deliberately, that does not mean that the knightly class consciously rejected ecclesiastical teaching, but that it did not think in scholastic categories.

10 See chapter I, above.

11 Usamah Ibn-Munqidh, Memoirs of an Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades, tr Philip K. Hitti (CUIG, 1897; New York, 1937), and Ibn-Jubair, Travels, tr. Ronald J. C. Broadhurst (London, 1933) (also RHC, v, 445-456, where extracts have been translated into French); John of Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. Natalie de Wailly (Paris, 1868); Le Visa de St. Louis, ed. Nani L. Carbone (Sherbrooke, Quebec, 1977); cf Daniel Aram and Medieval Europe, pp. 183, 222-223.

Moreover, we can overdo this; there was an overlap of attitudes, as of interests. Saladin first appears in western chronicles as the usual Arab scourge. Then two events appealed to the imagination of the west, the ransoming of poor captives at the fall of Jerusalem by Saladin and his brother al-‘Adil, and the beheading of the oath-breaking Reginald of Châtillon after Hattin; to refuse to accept him as a guest when king Guy gave him water was in accordance with the knightly code. Not only did Joscelin remember this; at a moment of stress he expected Arabs to be bound by the rule of behavior he understood it to imply. In legend Saladin became a courtly hero, as we have seen, and Europe’s most honored visitor, but this myth carried the clergy along with it, and clerics told satirical tales in which Saladin’s disgust castigated the sins of Europe. Other ideas were shared by different groups; thus the idea that Islam was a continuation of paganism is common—in very different forms admittedly—to the canonists and the chansons de geste.

Certainly orthodox propaganda was a vehicle to express Europeans’ pride in themselves and contempt for others; the church was only the chief proponent and the chief instrument of a cultural ethnocentrism in which all took part. One of the best examples of a propagandist was James of Viterbo, French-born, well educated, representative of the higher clergy in the Latin state, and also of models of thought of the early thirteenth century. He was prepared in theory, but not in practice, to attribute the loss of Jerusalem and other “Christian” lands to original sin, rather than to particular sins. His analysis of the peoples of Palestine is intelligent as well as antipathetic. It is more and more off the mark as it gets more remote from the Latins. He repeats the “sectarian” Christian attack on Mohammed and Islam, but this version of it may represent a local eastern variation of material more familiar in Spain, and occasional comments mark some fragment of actual knowledge floating in a sea of legend. Above all, he leaves us with the unmistakable impression, valid for all the crusading movement, of total Latin intolerance, an actual inability to put up with any part or parcel of alien culture, even—or especially—in the situation of a precarious colony surrounded by enemies. He speaks for a


73 For the commentaries see above, chapter 1. As far as the chansons are concerned, the inclusion among the supposed idols of Apollo (later formally assimilated as Apollon) and Jupiter confirm the existence of continuity between antiquity and Islam, the one of the worst pain should not be dismissed as meaningless. Cf. Roger Bousquet, Opus magnum, ed. John H. Bridges (Oxford, 1897), III, part 2, supra. 56–62, pp. 53–62.
whole community, but he does so in the accents of its most articulate class.  

There was indeed overall menly, and this articulate class controlled the propaganda. Within the Christian community the churchmen were always addressing their charges, never the Moslem enemy directly, nor did they write for neutrals. The only Moslems who were converted were those who were so unlucky as to live under Christian rule, and the only neutrals known in the west were the Mongols, for whose conversion there was a short-lived hope, encouraged by some interesting missions. We have already seen that the idea of a public debate was merely another fantasy. What was the purpose of the propaganda against the Moslem religion? W. M. Watt suggests that it represents the “dark side” of the Christian attitude, psychologically a projection of the sins, especially sexual sins, of the Christians upon an Islamic scapegoat. The present writer has always maintained that it both sprang out of and served to fortify the sense of Christian European solidarity, of which the war itself was one expression and the acceptance in theory of a severe sexual morality another.

Western Christendom wanted to establish its sense of identity. The constant preoccupation with orthodoxy, the crusades against heretics, and the development of the Inquisition all bear witness to the extent to which uniformity was desired by the people who made up the society as a whole. This was not affected by division within society, or by antекlericalism within the bounds of orthodoxy. They felt it to be a precondition of their solidarity. To establish that a whole religion, society, etc. was in every respect the reverse or denial of European society was immensely helpful in creating a mental as well as a physical frontier. It was the best war propaganda in that it made the enemy the proper recipients of treatment unworthy of humanity in ordinary conditions. The evil alleged of Islam made the rules of the crusade, of the “just war,” emotionally acceptable. All war is more effective if it is fought with hatred and if the humanity of the enemy is minimized. In this sense the latter needed and accepted that clerical propaganda which did not otherwise come naturally to them.

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D. The Age of Doubt

We come finally to the phase in which propaganda is met by counter-propaganda, arguments not only for, but also against, the crusade. These bear the marks of failure and doubt; they reveal the increasing strength of secular interests and are produced by new social developments no longer compatible with a doctrine of the crusade composed in an earlier age. The accumulation of failures affected even the theologians, and those who wanted to renew the war were faced with the classical dilemma of providential theory. In a holy war our victory is the vindication of God, but our failure must be the chastisement of our sins. Why is God now vindicated, now chastising our sins? Many agonized over this problem, to judge by the frequency with which the stock solutions are stated, up to the very end of the period of Ottoman expansion (when it became the turn of the Moslems to experience this cycle of despair).

We might date the new age of doubt from 1291 and the fall of Acre, last of the mainland territorial possessions of the Latin in Palestine. An alternative date might be 1274; the Second Council of Lyons was intended to reunite Christendom for a crusade and was a moment of useful self-questioning. Again, we might find our arbitrary date a few years earlier still, with the final failure of Louis IX at Tunis in 1270. Like the Damietta crusade of 1218, Louis’s first crusade in 1249 had raised great hopes which it had quickly disappointed. The fall of Ayyubid Cairo was no sooner rumored than Europe learned that this pliable king and model crusader was a defeated prisoner. Edward (I) of England, crusading at about the same time, and little thought for the kingdom of Jerusalem that was not defensive. The watershed in crusade propaganda can plausibly be said to have come when Joinville refused to join Louis’s second venture, in spite of his veneration for the king and the seriousness with which he took crusading ideals. In a well-known passage he describes how Louis pressed him to take the cross again, and how he replied that the king’s sergeants had oppressed and impoverished his people, and that “if I wished to do God’s will, I should stay here, to help and defend my people.” He considered that the king should do the same: it was a mortal sin that anyone should advise him to go, because at the time the country was at peace, both within and with its neighbors; yet, if the king went, it must deteriorate. Joinville maintained that, if the king had not gone, he might, in
spite of his weakness, have lived longer and continued his good work for the country. Nothing could be more explicit than this assertion that God requires charity to begin at home; and nothing could be farther from the position of the crusade propagandists.

We may compare Humbert’s preparatory work for Lyons, which was at once backward- and forward-looking; the arguments are old, his awareness of the opposition is new. He considers seven categories, first accusing objectors in general terms as “given to idleness, running away from all exertions for Christ”; there used to be an English idiomatic use of the word “slackers” which Humbert’s bracing tone exactly reflects. The first particular objection that he considers is that the shedding of blood is incompatible with the Christian religion; this is based on a number of obvious New Testament texts (John 18:11, Acts 5:41, Romans 12:19, 1 Peter 2:23 and 3:9), but omitting the most obvious of all, Matthew 5:38 ff. He replies that the early church had no power with which to fight, but had miracles and the gifts of the Holy Ghost instead; in his own day, however, the church only had power, and must use what it had. It was obvious that Christians must resist the infidels; who would be so silly (sansrair) as to say otherwise? The texts cited are explained by their special circumstances; he also quoted Luke 22:36 (but not 38), adding that this is glossed to mean that Christians may sometimes use the sword, a matter not for any individual but for the church itself to decide.

The second objection is the reverse of the first: that a crusade causes the shedding of Christian blood and the death of Christians. There are innumerable casualties, “sometimes from illness, sometimes in war, sometimes from too little or too much to eat (ex excessu)—and not only ordinary people, but kings and princes, and persons really useful to Christendom”. He replies that people who put such arguments forward “have eyes only for what concerns their own or recent times”; they would see things very differently if they read ancient histories, about all the Arabs killed by Charles Martel or massacred in the time of Godfrey of Bouillon at the capture of Jerusalem; Charlemagne too (he thought) had killed many Arabs in the course of liberating Spain. He felt confident that a final accounting would prove that over the ages many more Moslems had been killed than Christians. He fairly pointed out that if Christians had not opposed Moslems, the Moslems who formerly inhabited Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain would have destroyed the property and lives of numberless Christians, as they did when they attacked Genoa by sea from North Africa. Anyway, Chris-

77 Vie de St. Louis, ed. Carbet, pars. 734-737.
tions are called to people heaven, not this world. Humbert does not consider the point that ancient victories were irrelevant to modern defeats, and so evades the conflict between the crudely providential view of history and the contemporary realism.

The third objection that he considers is the adverse conditions for the crusade. His choice of objections is more realistic than his replies to them. Christians in the east are few among many enemies; they are in a strange land, while their opponents are in their own (a curious admission, and seemingly inconsistent with the theory of a Christian right to the Holy Land). We are unused, he goes on, to the climate, but they are used to it; we are unused to the food, they are used to it; they know dangerous tracks and hidden routes, we do not; we are often in want, they have plenty. "As, therefore, in war, wisdom is necessary above all, it seems Christians should never attempt this kind of war." Humbert's answer is that the Moslems have the advantage in terms of worldly wisdom, but as for divine wisdom, Christians have it, and once again he brings up the numbers of Moslems successfully massacred in the past. To this third objection is connected the fourth, that, though we may well defend ourselves when the Moslems attack us, it would be better not actually to invade their lands, and even likely to prove harmful to us to do so. Humbert's answer here is that the Moslems so hate the Christians that they will let no chance to harm them pass; as they do not need to be provoked, the thing to do is to wear them out by invading their countries first. This he defends by theological argument, that it is sinful to maintain peace with the wicked. The reasons for attacking are three: to exhaust the Moslems, to introduce the worship of God into their countries, and to avoid sharing, by toleration, the guilt of their crimes. This is to give a legal answer to a pragmatic objection.

The next objection was that if Moslem nations must be extirpated, why not Jews, and also Moslem living in Christian territory, and also Tatars and barbaric nations? The conversion of the Jews, he replies, is promised (Romans 11:26) and even the Moslems under Christian rule need not be despised of ("whether they like it or not, they can be forced to listen to preaching"); the Tatars and others do not bother us, and their conversion too is promised ("all languages should serve the Lord Jesus Christ", Daniel 7:14, adapted). Even as propaganda, Humbert's argument here is careless. Why should this last text not refer to Moslems as much as to "barbarians"? Both objection and answer here must always have seemed quibbles, and neither can be quite serious.

The sixth objection is that crusading serves no useful purpose; it only arouses the resentment of the Moslems. This cuts much closer
to the bone, but Humbert sees a triple advantage in attack: the enemies of the Christian faith are attacked before they can themselves attack, they are thrown into disarray, and they are frightened; these “temporal” advantages are normal practice in war. There are also the “spiritual” or clerical advantages; the honor of God, the salvation of Christians, the extension of the church (“as concerns worship”), that is, the area in which the Latin rite obtains. Moslems and Greeks under Latin rule, he claims, live happily, cultivating their lands and paying tribute, and can be converted gradually. His last objection resembles his second; it is that the misfortunes of the Christians suggest that God does not want them to go against the Moslems. There was the success of Saladin, the fortuitous death of Frederick I in a small stream, the capture of Louis IX at Mansurah and his death at Tunis, and the dispersal by bad weather of his fleet returning to Europe. This popular theology is easy for the theologian to refute to his own satisfaction; such people do not understand God’s ways (the facta divina), it is not in this world that God gives his rewards. A stream of biblical quotations from the Old Testament shows how God willed the defeat of Israel.

We need not doubt that Humbert was stating actual criticisms of the crusade that were familiar to him, and doing so quite fairly. Does he answer them effectively? Obviously not, according to modern ideas, and, though we must beware of anachronism, his scholastic range of argument does not touch the more practical objections even as he himself presents them. Often, when Humbert makes an effort to meet a practical point by appealing to ordinary knightly experience, he slides off into theology. Wholly idealistic, Humbert is nevertheless not wholly impractical. He wants a large permanent army to reinforce the surviving Christian centers in the east. The soldiers must be more than mercenaries, and carefully chosen, but he realizes that they will need large stipends to maintain them at war. He proposes gracefully to leave the lanky to make their own financial offer, while he waxes at once poetical and businesslike about the possible sources of clerical contribution. He argues that the anti-Islamic polemic which we have discussed above is really important; before the Second Council [of Lyons] assembles, it will be necessary to state the facts about Islam concisely, so that people may understand the enemy; as it is, clerics, as well as laymen, suppose “that Moslems reckon that Mohammed is their God, which is however false”. The advice of the wise, he continues, not only the learned but the lanky, and especially the nobility, should be obtained, and put into succinct reports; and prelates and magnates should be sent to all countries to enlist support, especially from the other magnates. Many arguments may persuade them, says Humbert, and he takes
us back over the old familiar ground: feudal obligation to God; the examples of the Old Testament; the examples of Christian history; the need of penance; duty; nobility; shame. We must admit that in all this there has been some attempt to understand lay motivation, but there is little in the bag of tricks that was not already there. 74

Another example from the material relating to the Second Council of Lyons is Gilbert of Tournai’s Collectio de scandaﬁs. 78 Its brief references to the crusade are a check on Hucbaut’s more conventional approach. Gilbert naturally accepts in principle the necessity of destroying Moslem power, on the old theme of “restoration” – “our inheritance has been turned over to strangers” (Lamentations 5:2). In a sense his remarks are particularly traditional; he makes use of the correspondence of Peter of Blois, and also that of James of Vitry, but a radical strain is more in evidence. Of the three points to which he draws attention, one is the exploitation of the poor and of the church in order to fund the crusade; Christ, he says, cannot be liberated by the affection of Christians. Assessors unjustly manipulate the law governing the release of various categories of crusaders from their vows; this recoils on the heads of those who preach the crusade, and who have to put up with violent criticism. Preachers who collect funds for the crusade must not be motivated by the thought of gain. It is the crusade administration, rather than the propaganda, that Gilbert criticizes; of course, he makes it clear that he supports the crusade itself, and there is no arrêter-pas-ni in this. He describes the behavior of the rulers and the knightly class, of the citizens, merchants, and workers of different kinds; the ruling class fails to do justice and exploits those subject to it; merchants disregard the church and operate frauds; the rest are dishonest and do not go to church. Gilbert is like Joinville in his insistence on first putting things right at home. Neither of them really falls into any of Hucbaut’s classes of objectors.

Of about the same date is the work of Rutebeuf, whose editor attributes the formative influence on him to Hucbaut. Rutebeuf’s crusade polemic poetry is well within the general scope of Hucbaut’s definitions, though sufficient variations suggest an individual assessment, and Rutebeuf cites objections to the crusade which, like Hucbaut’s, are more convincing than their refutation. The early Complaisante d’Outrem er is the least interesting of these poems; it does seem to reflect the exam tradition as Hucbaut’s own preoccupation with the al-

74 Opera tripartita, in Appendix...
most legendary sequence of former crusades. His *Desputizons dou Croise et dou Descroizie* is dated in the late 1260's. The non-crusader in this debate says that the adventure is ruinous; it has reduced many to beggary; the clergy set a bad example; he would defend his country from the sultan, but will not go to hunt him out, and will do wrong to no man; and “if God is anywhere in the world, he is in France, there is no doubt”. Warned to think of eternity, he is suddenly converted; this does not spring inevitably out of the sense of the poem, but seems rather a device to bring it to an end.

Rutebeuf's *Nouvelle Complainte d'Ouistremer* is more lively than his other crusading poems, although its satirical passages contribute no surprise. The appeals to particular kings and nobles nicely combine the courtly with the pious. A long passage castigates the young squires who, instead of crusading, rob maidens of their honor, prelates on fat palfreys who preach abstinence to the poor, and clergy who live and dress well on the patrimony of the Crucified, could afford to support troops at the war. Knights at their cups threaten the sultan—“Quant la teste est bien avenuo”—but next day are off hunting hares and duck; the rich townsman buy cheap and sell dear, charge usury, and trick people, and their children spend their wealth at the brothel and the tavern while the poor starve. Rutebeuf is much taken with the theme of a golden past, and, imperceptive of the irony which no modern reader can miss, recommends to his contemporaries, as models, not only Godfrey but Bohemond and Tancred. Of course, by 1270 there were no principalities for ambitious crusaders to seize, and so no Bohemond.

It is interesting to compare the contemporary view of someone actually caught up in the war; as one would expect, it is more concerned with practical problems than is anything written at the same time in Europe. Fidenzio of Padua was a Franciscan whose work was dedicated to pope Nicholas IV and, he says, explicitly commissioned by Gregory X at the Second Council of Lyons, apparently because his knowledge of the country might produce practical proposals. Probably Nicholas, if not also Gregory (who, after all, knew the situation at first hand), thought that existing proposals, originating in the west, lacked the necessary field knowledge, and Fidenzio is indeed more practical than Humbert. He lays down three basic requirements—first, forces, second, what he calls “eminence of goodness”, which means, when examined in detail, sound morale, and finally, single leadership. Under the first

80 Oeuvres complètes de Rutebeuf, ed. Edmond Pascal and Julia Hamin (Paris, 1929), 1, 440 ff; 469 ff, 492 ff (line 251).
heading Fidentzio often adds, after his recommendations, "and the Saracens do this also"; his military advice (and he was not a fighting priest) is largely based on his observation of Moslem success. He naturally recommends that there should be large forces, and that they should be not only well armed but professionally skilled. One aspect of morale he considers under this heading: the soldiers must be men of spirit and initiative, fortis animo. He considers tactics (under the heading of sagacitas) in the context of weaknesses he has observed. He stresses the importance of fortifications and strong points, both defensively and when in enemy territory; he rates effective intelligence next in importance, and again reminds the reader that the sultan has good spies; he demands caution, unity, and careful planning. His analysis is down to earth.

In his chapters on the need for "goodness" among Christians, commending charity, chastity, humility, mutual loyalty and compassion, unity, sobriety, legality, patience, avoidance of cupidity, and prayer, he seems to be assessing the defects he observes in terms of their opposing virtues. His "legality" is interesting; it is important especially "among those who are brought together in a single society and for the accomplishment of a single work"; it is both negative, as not injuring fellow countrymen, and positive, as serving them. Then he deals with main lines of strategy, recommending two armies, one by sea to attack Egypt, one by land (in order to split the enemy) to attack at one of a number of Syrian alternatives. He inserts a chapter on the idea of the just war, claiming the right to rule Egypt and the Holy Land "as far as the Euphrates". Much of this is new, and, insofar as it is a practical assessment of the situation, it is realistic propaganda. If it demands far more than would ever be possible, this is well devised to counteract the new opposition to crusading, the variations on the theme that it cannot be done.80

The period roughly from the Second Council of Lyon in 1274 to the death of Philip IV of France in 1314 was decisive in the history of crusade propaganda, because it was then that the serious intention disappeared. We are here concerned to see how the propaganda affected and was affected by the change in intention. The Genoese Galvano da Levanto serves to link the undeterred zeal of Fidentzio with the new secular approach, which he himself, however, did not share. Galvano's own attitude is unoriginal, but illustrates the practical search for leadership. Fidentzio's "mutual loyalty and compassion" is reflected in Galvano's "brotherly loyalty and compassion", and so is a sense of

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urgency. "Lest the Christian religion succumb, it must everywhere defend itself... have its eye always on victory." Amid much that is old-fashioned, he looks for a leader who will give new life to the old ideal; he hopes to persuade him on grounds of principle that it is sufficiently to his advantage to do so.\textsuperscript{22}

Most writers agreed that Acre fell because of the divided command, and that is one reason why afterward success was seen as depending on effective leadership. A distinct strand of thought stresses the sins of the people of Acre; according to Giovanni Villani, who reflects Florentine traditions, no Christian city contained "more sinners, men and women, guilty of every wickedness". John of Ypres, writing nearer the time, and himself a source of Villani's, contrasts the morals of the people with the imagined virtues of the first crusaders; he knows a good deal, though not accurate in detail, of the troubles of the succession of the Mamluk sultanate in the family of Kalavon, and so is able to point to divisions among the Moslems which were unknown to Fidenzio, in order to show that their sins, too, received punishment.\textsuperscript{23} We shall return to the theme of Christian wickedness, which naturally is less significant for the history of events than for the history of theological propaganda.

If Fidenzio had been conscious of the need for unity of leadership, sound morale, and strategy, it was because he knew the actual situation, and the same realism occurs in other supporters of renewed fighting. Villani writes of the loss to Italian trade that resulted from the disappearance of Christian rule from the Syrian coast, but this was more a Florentine view.\textsuperscript{24} Venice suffered less, but Venetian writers, as long as the crusade remained a serious proposition, would be keen that the armada should be carried by Venetian ships. Petrarca of Lucca, writing retrospectively of the fall of the last coastal cities, gives two reasons in explanation, the first the "diversity of wills of the lords", who could not agree in the government or defense of Acre; the second, the stupidity of the crusaders recruited through the preaching set in train by Nicholas IV after the fall of Tripoli. They came to Acre in disorderly style, and attacked some Arab merchants, robbed them, and killed some, arousing the anger of the sultan.\textsuperscript{25} Here are both the

\textsuperscript{22} Liber sancti paschali xxvii. xciii. xxxvii. xxxix. xi, ed. Kohler, in ROL, VI (1894), 343-369.
\textsuperscript{24} Cronica di Giovanni Villani, pp. 355-356.
\textsuperscript{25} Historia ecclesiastica, in R.C.S., XL, col. 1796.
criticism of disunity and the mercantile wish that the enemy should not be provoked. Ptolemy, rather than Marino Sanudo, seems to speak for the maritime tradition.

Sanudo wrote the most monumental of all works of crusading propaganda, and his enthusiasm for a point of view essentially ecclesiastical does not chafe altogether harmoniously with the Venetian trading interest; his notion of a fleet-carried army to conquer Egypt would have been good business, if it had not already too often been shown to be impracticable. He is naturally well informed about Egypt's commercial needs but, like so many others, overestimates its vulnerability. After his death, the sack of Alexandria in 1365 would show that real damage could be done to Egypt, without weakening it enough to make possible a Christian conquest. For the rest, his advice is practical enough, if we grant the main strategy. Like Fidenzio, Sanudo wants to see a restoration of morale by means of a moral reformation, and he too looks to a king who should be a new Godfrey, but unlike the army and people in a single rule. He offers the same advice as Fidenzio in point of tactics and effective imitation of successful Arab methods of warfare. In addition to his faith in both economic and armed war, he depends heavily on the hope of reformation, the expulsion of irreligious men and heretics, and a model state financed from the lands recaptured—once more, a repetition of the First Crusade as it was remembered by this time. His history of the crusaders is among the most thorough. He shows how Palestine has always been exposed to conquest, beginning with the Jews and running through all those who succeeded them—Greeks, Romans, Arabs, and Latins. He detours via Charlemagne, then gives the history from Godfrey to the Second Council of Lyons and the end of the kingdom of Acre. The legendary quality of these accounts is emphasized by their relative neglect of recent events. This is a good example of the revival of ancient propaganda in a new situation. Sanudo, having spent a lifetime thinking about the crusade, naturally did not ask whether it was necessary at all; when he refers to the preaching of a crusade, he thinks of the kinds of skilled men to recruit, not the arguments to persuade them. He too is both propagandist and propaganda victim. His advocacy of the strategy of invading Egypt, and of the tactics of establishing fortified places on the coast, was finally outmoded some twenty years after his death, when the
papal legate, Peter Thomas, failed to persuade the army to stay in Alexandria longer than was necessary to loot and murder.

Another theme had by this time been worked into the historical legend, the story of the Mongols, seen at the time, and always afterward remembered, as a great opportunity for Christendom missed. A sentence of John Sarrasian's from Damietta in 1247 illustrates the delusion of an immediate hope: "dissembler ils que Ethelstyn, a tout son est de Tartarins, seroit en l'aide au roya de France". 87 Some travelers wrote clear accounts of the Far East, the mid-century envoys John of Pian del Carpine and William of Rubruck in particular, with other clerics; there is an echo also of some of the mechanics and others who were captured by the Mongols or went to work for them and returned to Europe. John's work was reprinted by Vincent of Beauvais, and Roger Bacon gave some publicity to Rubruck's splendid book, but these authentic sources were largely ignored; Europeans exaggerated the chance that had been missed, and even continued to imagine that it still existed—this delusion survives in Sanudo. 88 At the time they underrated the lasting consequences of the Mamluk victory at Ain Jalut in 1260. In the second half of the thirteenth century Mongol society was better and more accurately documented in Europe than was the Arab world with which there had been hostile contact for so long. It is difficult to define exactly the effect of the "Tartar" myth. Certainly it gave Europe an idea of a world beyond Islam, and the idea that existing conditions could be upset; it contributed to the unsettled state of mind which was increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional propaganda.

The propaganda worked itself out, exhausted by its own logic. Its greatest inherent weakness, so long as people thought in terms of holy war, was the providential problem. Riccoldo of Monte Croce arrived in Baghdad only to find evidence of the sack of Acre, where his journey had started, and of the death of his brother Dominicans, the equivalent of his family. Personal distress led him to a theological problem which he brought God—in a somewhat literary exercise—to dispel by special revelation. It was now nearly seven hundred years, he said, that Islam had flourished, and some people thought that its momentum must slow down and weaken; but, on the contrary, it was growing stronger. He demanded that God should answer him oracularly. He set the Koran on the altar before the image of Jesus and his mother,

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88 John of Pian del Carpine and William of Rubruck as Sinners and sinners, vol. I. Vincent of Beauvais Speculum, ed. Dominique Léonard (Ottawa, 1679), vol. V of Editions mémorables, and other editions, lib. xxx, 2 ff., alternation with Simun of Tarsus from cap. 36. Also Sanoa, II, 1, 3 (p. 35), II, 4, 28 (pp. 92-95), and cf. III, e., 1-9 (pp. 234-244).
and indignantly prayed, "Read, read"); "it seems to me that thou didst not want to read." In Mosul, Riccoldo bought a copy of Gregory the Great's *On the Morals of Job*, part of the loot from Acre, feeling as if he were redeeming a prisoner. He finally found his "revelation" in the work of Gregory. He read, "God speaks once"; and he realized that he must accept what he already knew as answer enough, that a Christian accepts suffering and worldly failure as normal. Here he has gone beyond the always-revived argument that worldly failure is a punishment for sin, with its delusive corollary that a revival of virtue must produce military victory. Riccoldo finally saw that success and failure have nothing to do with religion, but this made nonsense of all the most effective crusading propaganda. It is not clear that Riccoldo realized how radical he was being here. He must have realized that his praise of Moslems for practising virtues (which we considered above) was not really compatible with contemporary scholastic opinion, although he never for a moment slackened his firm hold on orthodoxy. He has learned the weakness in the historical argument of which crusade propaganda made so much. "You see that the Christians often made plans against the Moslems, and almost every design of theirs turned to their harm. For what pope, or emperor, or king made plans or arrangements over a long period against the sultan of Babylon (Cairo), against the successor of Mohammed, and was not overtaken by death or else cheated in his plan or his dispositions?" 99 This was the crux of the providential discussion.

Although the First Crusade had not been what its later admirers supposed, it had indeed offered worldly success, but this was only a memory, and Riccoldo's sense that providence was against the crusade might appeal more to the contemporaries of Philip the Fair. Although the old belief, that Christians have a right to the Holy Land, survived defiantly in Sanudo and others, the idea of not attacking the Moslems so long as they did not attack the Christians, acceptance, indeed, of a permanent cease-fire, was becoming increasingly attractive.

We may take one more example of the secular approach to the crusade in the early fourteenth century, the greatest of them, the *De recuperatione* (1306–1308) of Pierre Dubois. The first part of this work, conceived as advice to all Christendom, was dedicated to Edward 1 of England, because of his known concern for the Holy Land. Approaching the problem from the European end, Dubois looks at the reverse side of the theology of the crusade by discussing the unjust

wars of Europe which lead only to damnation. Peace and reform are the means of the crusade, or the crusade the way to peace and reform, it is not clear which. This, of course, had been Urban's own theme, but Dubois gives the papacy only a minor role. His ideas are based on the establishment of royal authority (suppression of the rebellion of great lords becomes a crusade theme in his work), and he has little sympathy with the Italian cities which acknowledge no lord. Arbitration becomes a means of promoting French authority and suzerainty. In the second part of this work, addressed to Dubois's own king, Philip IV, it becomes clearer still that the crusade, once set in train by reform, is intended to create an eastern empire for France, a project finally begun by Napoleon nearly five centuries later.

The secularity of the general scheme is shown by the reforms it proposes: only a little more than a quarter century after the orthodox Second Council of Lyons, Dubois would achieve the purposes of the crusade by very different means, including the secularization of much church property and the limitation of papal authority. Dubois would put an end to the constant flow of excommunications of recalcitrants: "It is much better to punish them in time than in eternity." Crusading is no longer an ascetical; indeed, Dubois was keen on the marriage of the clergy. He sees, of course, the need for sound financial support, and proposes to begin by using the resources of the Temple and the Hospitall. His is not the old familiar concept of the crusade at all, despite the traditional language ("ardor salutis Terre Sancte"), which he uses to introduce his quite new project for colonization obliquely. Those who, instead of crusading, make war on other Catholics, and all who give them any help, will be punished; "When the war is over, the survivors, of whatever age, rank, or sex, shall be perpetually exiled from their lands and possessions, of which they shall be deprived, with whatever descendents they may have, and they shall be sent to populate the Holy Land; if they obey and freely mean to take themselves to the Holy Land, they shall be given their necessary expenses for their journey out of their confiscated property." On arrival, they were to be given lands next to the enemy. This Botany Bay concept marks the beginning of the long-cherished European intention to plant colonies in the Near East, which until recently dominated the politics of the eastern Mediterranean, and those who question any continuity between the crusading concept proper and the colonial age must at least recognize a clear link in Dubois.

His intention to populate the east with Europeans was probably stimulated by the remembered weakness of the Franks of the old Latin states, isolated amid an alien population whether Moslem or Chris-
tian Arab. Dubois thought out rough principles for apportioning land to the settlers, and rather more detailed ideas for the organization of a local militia. After a discussion of the best routes and methods for attack, he considers "those things that are required for the well-being of the colonists [habitationes]; he foresees first the need for confessors speaking the language of each settler, and doctors of body as well as soul must be ready for them before they arrive. He talks of his system of education, principally in "the languages of the Arabs and other dialects of the world", and medicine and surgery (for men and horses), to which he attaches great importance. A proper supply of interpreters must be available well in advance, and they must understand the local people—they must be, as the modern editor says, dragomans. Women were to have an important part, although considered "inferior"; girls were to obtain influence through their medical powers and knowledge, were to marry priests, who bit by bit would bring all Christians into the Roman rite, or else to marry Moslems, whom they would convert to both Christianity and monogamy. This neatly reverses an idea of Riccio's that captive men would breed enemies to Christendom. Among the advantages that would accrue would be the purchase of articles normally dear in Europe but cheap in the Levant; this ignores the economics of the Italian ports.

Dubois envisages this colonization as taking place in a world divided politically but in other ways united. "There is hardly a sane man, I think, who in these last days would credibly suppose that (as concerns temporal things) there could be one sole monarch of all the world, whom all would obey as their leader, because, if that were attempted, there would be endless wars, rebellions, and dissensions; nor would there be anyone who could settle them, because of the multitude of peoples, the remoteness and variety of places, and the natural inclination of men to disagree." He adds that those commonly called world rulers in the past had only been rulers of large areas, and then concludes: "But it is likely that there could be a single prince and monarch in spiritual things, who should be spiritually effective in all directions, east, west, south, and north; which I do not see could happen unless provision be made for learning languages, in the way I have written above, or better." This spiritual power is not the pope; Dubois seems to intend a French cultural hegemony based on a colonial Latin east.90

90 De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae, ed. Angelo Diotti (Turin: medievale di interesse dionese, 1. Florence, 1977), pp. 617, 625-626 (111, c), 628-630 (111, 112), 140-144, (xxvii, 46), 130-134 (xxvii, 57-xxvii, 60), 138-139 (xxvii, 67-xxvii, 69), 189-192 (xxx, 111-112), 200-201 (xxvii, 122-xxvii, 123), 209-211 (xxx, 139-142). For all this period see Ant. S. Astya, The Cro-
I have dealt with Riccoldo and Dubois at some length because in their different ways they mark the end of the traditional crusade propaganda—Riccoldo its logical conclusion, Dubois the new concept that replaced it. Dubois’s frank colonialism was new, but not, of course, the school of Arabic that he planned as part of it; something like it had been papal policy as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, though probably not a new project then; and it was a favorite scheme of Raymond Lull’s. Lull, too, was an original but, though widely read and long famed, in fact without the direct influence he longed for. His ideas of the crusade were conventional, or easily paralleled in contemporary writers. He too demanded a single war-leader, the ballator. His determination to preach in North Africa was finally fatal, in spite of the determination of the Moslem authorities not to martyr him. For polemics, he recommended the “al-Kindi” Rishlah, whether in Vincent of Beauvais’s shortened version, or the original in the Cluylac manuscripts, which were widely distributed; but his peculiar contribution to religious controversy, which he put into practice in North Africa, was insistently to attempt to prove the Trinity by “necessary reasons”. He is an interesting backwater of cultural history, though his enormous output makes him an important figure in Catalan literature.

One type of propaganda characteristic of the fourteenth century is argument supporting the papal prohibitions of trade with Mamluk Egypt and Syria. The underlying conviction that Egypt would be crucially weakened by cutting off its supplies of wood and of slaves was a miscalculation; it was a fact that Egypt needed to import these commodities, not that the supply could be effectively cut off by a simple boycott by European carriers in the Mediterranean, even if there had been no evasion of the papal prohibitions by Christian merchants, and, indeed, by papal license. So too for exports. Lull, for example, believed that a six-year boycott of the spice trade would ruin the Mamluk state. The argument was overstated, but not foolish. On paper, economic warfare looked promising, but Marino Sanudo is certainly unpre-

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92 Lull, Librer de fier, lib. 1 and 5, ed. Gourges, Ramanus Luth, Vincent de Beauvais, Speculum historiale, xxiii, 40, in Bibliotheca romana, vol. V. For the present writer’s views on Lull’s “necessary reasons” see Islam and the West, pp. 177-198.
sentative of the great city of which he was a native in believing that the more profitable future lay with a hypothetical crusade rather than direct trade. Sanudo gave economic reasons, but he also emphasized the supposed abuse of slaves, in order to arouse sexual moral repulsion. For the rest, the argument about slaves was ad terrorem; if the trade succeeded, the Mamluks constituted an alarming threat; if it failed, the peaceful Egyptians would themselves be vulnerable to threats. The vulnerability of Egypt was current if disputed doctrine in the fourteenth century (it proved true only of the landward threat from the east), and it resulted not only in the pillage of Alexandria but in distracting attention from the early stages of the Ottoman advance. Propaganda was a conservative force.

One of the most emotive presentations of the anti-Egyptian theme was by William Adam, a European “expert” in eastern affairs, missionary, and traveler in the east, a Dominican who was very briefly named to the Armenian archbishopric of Sultaniyet. He says that slaves are needed for the army because the Egyptians themselves are given over to carnality. The slaves supply both needs. There is a distinctly calum- nious passage where he describes how suitable boys are prepared for market—presumably by Christian merchants; the passage is ridiculous and rather nasty. The propaganda here has nothing in it of observed fact about life in Cairo; it is a propaganda picture in the worst sense, constructed out of Christian doctrines about Moslems—propaganda. In fact, out of propaganda. He goes on indignantly to tell the story of a Genoese, Segurano Salvago, who used to strengthen “the persecutors of our faith” and took part in the slave trade. He was generally “called the sultan’s brother”, because the sultan had addressed him in letters as “brother and friend”, a stately courtesy horrifying to the polemicist. Segurano “was so much a Moslem that he allowed the afore-mentioned sin against nature to be perpetrated on his ships” and, what was apparently more horrifying still, flew the sultan’s flag “as I saw with my own eyes”. In these crimes he was aided by his relations and by “many other Genoese.” This sort of propaganda is unbalanced and without sense of proportion and it left the maritime cities unmoved. The sultan in question is Muhammad an-Nāṣir, whom the Franciscan Giovanni Vitodurani praised for his severe but true justice in the protection of Latins in Cairo.

The last crusading propagandists of importance were Peter Thomas,
papal legate, archbishop of Cyprus, and Latin patriarch of Constantinople, and his pupil and hagiographer, Philip of Mézières, sometime chancellor of the kingdom of Cyprus. It was Peter Thomas who vainly urged the conquerors of Alexandria not to withdraw, but we do not know the details of his preaching. He proclaimed "the mystery of the cross" and "the destruction of the Saracens" in quasi-biblical rhetoric. The legendary history of St. Thomas the Apostle seems to have inspired him to dream of the conversion of the east from Islam, schism, and heresy.

Mézières planned to found a Militia Passions, a special force which was in line with the ideas of Lull; it would unite the nations and estates in a good life. When the disaster of Nicopolis happened, Mézières attributed it to those familiar, but not irrelevant, excuses, disunity and sin. He was himself aware in old age that the world had lost interest in all that he had cared for most. His Songe du vieil pilâtre rambles, but is full of ideas; in it he concedes to the Mamluk state the virtues of peace, justice, benevolence, public order, and public charities. He advises the young Charles VI of France to send an educated squire or envoy to the sultan, in order to protect the local Christians in a peaceful way. He still wished for a crusade, but had greatly mellowed; that there may be something beyond the propagandist in such a case is a lesson to remember.

In general, Europe had not ceased to wish to impose its ways on the rest of the world, but was seeking new methods. There was continuing sentiment for a crusade, however, which Shakespeare reflected accurately, and a purely clerical propaganda survived, and followed lines already laid down; it is interesting that Pius II, the last pope seriously to hope to see a crusade assemble, should himself have written a polemic piece against Islam in the manner of the Middle Ages. Roughly contemporary with Pius, Benedetto Aretino Accolti, a distinguished Florentine public servant and stylist, rewrote the history of the First Crusade (with an epilogue leading up to Saladin's capture of Jerusalem) in the manner of Livy. The historical memory is perhaps the most persistent survival of traditional propaganda.

98 Pius II, Epistolae ad Mortuos, in VVII, Mortuorum. Aenorum (Rome, 1550), Ascoli, De bufa a Christiana genti (Florence, 1623).
Gradually crusading faded into pilgrimage in the older sense of the term, and, though sacrilegious attacks on Islam by Franciscan zealot missionaries continued to produce "martyrdoms", the most part of a secure and inexpensive trip to Jerusalem was the height of Christian hope; resentment at delays, insults, sickness, and an inclement climate took the place of bellicosity. It is interesting that the theoretical tone of pilgrim accounts is long a continuation of crusading propaganda.

Thus crusading propaganda petered out when its main themes became irrelevant or were seen to be untrue, and new ideas replaced it. The crusade, which had begun by being the type of the Christian way of life, gave way to new forms of religion. It had never been anything but an ecclesiastical product; whatever the motives of crusaders, the official clerical line was always the only official line and the only articulate one that we know to have existed. Of course, there is plenty of evidence for its having been exploited in private interests or simply ignored. Among the most orthodox, traditional attitudes survived as long as the crusading idea survived, and the idea survived long after all practical enthusiasm for it had waned, and when it had nothing of political value to offer. If traditional historical propaganda was restated in the style of the day by Accolti, Tasso's La Gerusalemme liberata witnessed to the continuing appeal of the theme still later. In this way survived the expression of a papal policy long outdated. As a sentiment it would have some future value in the defense of eastern Europe and the central Mediterranean from Ottoman attack, and it would merge inextricably into the propaganda of secular colonialism; the official French line in the invasion of Algiers in 1830 still spoke of "Christendom". It remains true that as long as papal leadership of western Europe in the name of "Christendom" had been a practical political project, crusading themes had been a natural expression of the unity and morale of the west. There had been an implicit "colonialism", in the modern sense, in the "cultural imperialism" of papal pronouncements even more than in the actual practice of the colonies, which were more or less well adapted to their environment.

"Cultural imperialism" played its biggest part in the European refusal to accept the basic facts about Islam, and in a total rejection of the idea of toleration. These had long-lasting effects. Conquered
Moslems were allowed to survive, as such, only for a time, and the invidious treatment of Moslems was made possible largely by the unattractive light in which the clergy set the doctrine and the history of Islam. It is no doubt true that the laity were not much moved by theological considerations, and would have behaved as well or as badly if there had never been any propaganda at all. Yet they accepted the need for absolute orthodoxy and cultural unity in Europe, so that the part of the Mediterranean world that was Arabic in speech, and largely Moslem in religion—not, in any case, Latin, even where it was Christian—was quite unacceptable in terms of contemporary European culture. These attitudes, the product of a powerful and consistent body of propaganda, remained still powerful in the nineteenth century, when they fed the propaganda of imperialism, and they actually survive today.

Even the direct preaching cannot have been ineffective. It is not realistic to suppose that there was a total dichotomy between the official and the actual motivation. How far did the two diverge? Insofar as crusaders went to the east to forward their careers, they were doubtless mixed in motive; no one has ever found it difficult to combine the conviction of righteousness with a desire for advancement. In the Marxist sense, it is hardly possible to have feudal colonialism, and in that sense the only colonialists were the marlune cities, whose interest was purely mercantile. They needed no propaganda beyond their interests; yet, even in the periods of difficulty and failure, when their interests clashed increasingly with official doctrine, they produced literature favorable to the crusade. At all times men were willing enough to follow their interests against the church, and often, it is likely, accepted the general principles of orthodox belief without taking excommunications seriously. On the other hand, when they could combine perfect orthodoxy with a course of action that suited their interests, there was no reason why they should not draw comfort and strength from the official line. The crusade became a part of European life for those who never went crusading; the whole system of indulgences was closely involved in this. Without the crusade, kings would have lacked one acceptable means of taxing the church. To some extent, the idea became a mark of those who supported the papacy, but the monarchies also derived benefit from it. There was therefore little inclination to question the orthodox opinion. Any divergence of motive from propaganda is a tendency rather than an absolute distinction.

The Mediterranean continued divided into three main linguistic and cultural areas, and the propaganda has obscured the personal exchanges that there were among them, and particularly between Moslems and
The Greek area contracted when the Turkish culture intruded, but the propaganda barrier was maintained unbroken. In spite of it, there is enough evidence to convince us that men passed from a Latin into an Arabic culture and often passed back again, even in the Middle Ages, not only in Spain, but in the east also. From the earlier seventeenth century onward—beginning with Don Quixote—we can call a considerable literature of people who returned from Barbary captivity; printers seem to have carried a stock of stereotype woodcuts to illustrate their stories. There is even a small literature of converts to Islam writing in Latin. There is no literature of either sort from the period of the crusade. Constantine the African was, perhaps, a North African convert; in any case he antedates the crusade, and says nothing of himself. Was his successor, Afflaci, “al-Falaki”? Peter (of) Alfonso was an Arabic-speaking Jew, and he, and other Jews for that matter, converts or not, may have traveled in England. Many Arabs lived in Europe, not by their own choice, and were gradually forced to become Christians. Many Latins lived on friendly terms with Arabs in Sicily and Syria, we know that best from Arabic sources. Many merchants lived and worked in Egypt, Africa, and Syria; there were also mercenary soldiers and chaplains. Only a few late accounts from travelers make up for the lack of personal accounts by European residents in the Arab world. Thus certainly was the Pyrrhic victory of the propaganda.

We must see crusade propaganda as essentially negative. It cut off whatever relationships might otherwise have been possible. At its worst it gave religious sanction to inhumanity which made it possible to say, for example, of Germans, “slaughter them mercilessly as if they were Saracens”. At best it only gave an added conviction of righteousness which boosted morale more in success than in failure. A pride in the linked achievements of various armed forces throughout history, from the ancient Jews onward, presupposed continuing success; the dangerous conviction that a holy war offered the opportunity for a whole-hearted rejection of the good things of the world often resulted in self-deception. In the last resort, all propaganda is merely the expression of hostility. The original enthusiasm which had created


102 Constantine II’s letter to Peter the Damosc, PL 173, ed. 1834 (and his successor John Afflaci, possibly al-Falaki, but he was apparently not an asceticist); Peter (of) Alfonso, PL 157, cols. 671-706

103 Suger, Vie de Saint YI de Creus, pp. 222-223.
so strong a motive force and made the worst rogues in all classes call
themselves an army of God was steadily eroded, but, while it lasted,
it encouraged the delusion that God ensures the victory of the true
believer, and from it seems to derive the tone of most modern war
propaganda.
THE EPIC CYCLE OF THE CRUSADES

"The Epic Cycle of the Crusades" is the name commonly given to two different cycles, composed in different centuries but related in subject matter, and both written in Old French dodecaasyllabic verse. The first was apparently begun toward the end of the twelfth century by a versifier named Grandier of Donini, who rewrote and amalgamated three previously independent poems, Le Chanson d'Antioche, Les Chérifs (the Captives), and La Conquête de Jérusalem, which dealt with the First Crusade. Grandier's compilation was later prefaced with an account of the fictitious youthful exploits of Godfrey of Bouillon and the story of his mythical grandfather, the swan-knight; at a later date (the middle of the thirteenth century) a sequel was added which carried the narrative from the end of the First Crusade down to the emergence of Saladino. The second cycle, composed, or at least begun, during the 1350's, comprises three separate poems, Le Chevalier au Cygne et Godefroy de Bouillon, Baudouin de Sebourn, and Le Bâtard de Bouillon.

The construction of an epic cycle over the years by different authors, usually belonging to different generations, but sometimes known to each other, conforms to a paradigm of which the best-known examples...
are the cycles of Charlemagne, William of Orange, and Doon of Mayence. At the center of a soon-proliferating cycle stands a martial figure whose prowess in many a combat has charmed a public never weary of hearing tales about prestigious heroes who fight and slay innumerable foes. At the beginning of the fourteenth century this avid interest was crystallized in the literary and iconographic cult of the “nine worthies” (three Jews: Joshua, David, and Judas Maccabaeus; three pagans: Hector, Alexander, and Caesar; three Christians: Arthur, Charlemagne, and Godfrey of Bouillon). The epic hero is not allowed to remain in splendid isolation; he may be the brightest star within his family constellation, but the deeds of his father, grandfather, brothers, sons, nephews, and grandsons are likewise memorable and so must be praised in epic song. Just as Charlemagne’s father Pepin and his nephew Roland are the protagonists of various chansons de geste, just so Godfrey of Bouillon’s ancestors, brother, cousin, and their descendents were celebrated in epics built around their persons and deeds, real or imaginary.

Superhuman strength and supernatural happenings endow the epic hero with a radiance that marks him as a man above other men, one of God’s elect. When his fury is aroused he can with one mighty blow of his sword cleave an opponent and his steed in two, that is to say into four parts, two human and two equine. Miracles accompany him on his way, heavenly warriors battle at his side, his prayers stay the sun in its course so that the enemy may be pursued and annihilated, and archangels bear his soul to paradise, while devils precipitate slain Saracens into the nethermost regions of hell. How much of all this a medieval audience believed is somewhat beside the point. People of those days were certainly pleased with such tales, and being entertained were not unduly skeptical. Also, one of the fondest beliefs of the nobility was being catered to: blood will tell. Ancestors of a knight must of necessity have been brave and strong, qualities due to be possessed also by his relatives and descendents. Worth noticing in the explanation seemingly given in all seriousness for Eustace of Boulogne’s failure to measure up to the worldly success of his brothers Godfrey and Baldwin: when he was an infant, during his mother’s absence one day he had been suckled by a woman of low standing.

The ascription of a supernatural origin to Godfrey’s family may perhaps be accounted for by many a nobleman’s desire that his lineage should not be traced back to the common people. It is worth remembering that the Liégeois, who ruled over Cyprus and Jerusalem, claimed to be descended from the fairy Melusine. The legend of the
Troyan origin of the Franks encouraged French and English feudal families to half believe that their forefathers, in the distant past, had come from the mysterious race.\footnote{A French chronicle of the Fourth Crusade records that, when Peter of Bracieux, a Picard baron, was asked what right foreigners had to capture land, he replied: “Don’t you know that these lands belonged to our ancestors, the Trojans?” See Robert of Clun, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. Philippe Lemon (Paris, 1954), cap. cxx.}

When compared with William of Tyre’s *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* and its Old French sequels, the two epic cycles of the crusades have scant historical value, though they do not lack cultural significance. For three centuries, from the twelfth through the fourteenth, they fascinated the French-speaking and French-reading population of central and northern France, thus helping to nourish a lively interest in the Frankish past and in the crusades. A history of the crusades, therefore, should pay some attention to them.

To facilitate access to the first epic cycle I have deemed it advisable to give, for each of its three parts, a résumé of its contents, followed in each case by a few comments. The division into *chants* (cantos) of *Antioche* and *Jérusalem* is, of course, the invention of modern French editors, but as a means of reference it is a serviceable one.

A. The First Cycle: Godfrey of Bouillon

SECTION I: THE SWAN-CHILDREN\footnote{Another version of the same children *La Naissance du Chevalier au Cygne*, ed. Henry A. Todd (Baltimore, 1889) calls the king Latinore, his wife Elisane.}
laces. The children to whom they belong are transformed into swans; for several years they are fed by Elias, the seventh child, who has retained his human shape. Meanwhile Matabrune has one of the necklaces melted down by a silversmith. Young Elias succeeds in saving the life of his mother Beatrice, condemned after fifteen years' imprisonment to the stake. The swan-children, except the one whose necklace has been melted down, resume their human appearance and are christened Orient, Orton, Zacharias, John, and Rosette. Elias, whose father has abducted in his favor, besieges Matabrune in her castle of Malbruant. She is finally captured and burned at the stake. At the injunction of an angel Elias sets forth in a boat drawn by his brother the swan, after receiving from his mother the gift of a magic horn. On his way he slays Agolant, the dead Matabrune's brother. He enters the Rhine and reaches Nijmegen.

SECTION 2: THE SWAN-KNIGHT*

Duke Rainier of Saxony is laying claim before emperor Otto to the lands of the widowed duchess of Bouillon, who still lacks a champion willing to defend her rights and those of her young daughter Beatrice. The swan-knight proffers his services and succeeds in slaying Rainier, whose hostages are put to death. The Saxons seek revenge by sacking the castle of Florent, a nephew of the emperor. The swan-knight marries Beatrice, but cautions her never to ask him who he is nor whence he came, otherwise she will lose him forever. The vengeful Saxons kill Gelien, another nephew of the emperor, but the swan-knight rescues his wife from their hands. To them is born a girl, Ida, the future mother of duke Godfrey, count Eustace, and king Baldwin. The Saxons, still unsatisfied, besiege Bouillon but are finally routed by the emperor, whom the swan-knight has called to his aid. On the seventh annivesary of her wedding Beatrice can no longer restrain her curiosity. The swan-knight takes sorrowful leave of his wife and daughter and departs in a swan-drawn boat which has suddenly come for him. As a farewel token, he entrusts his born to Beatrice, recommending that she take good care of it. This she fails to do. One day at the hour of noon the ducal hall bursts into flames and, amid the general confusion, a swan is seen flying away with the neglected horn. Increasing in beauty every day, Ida reaches the age of fourteen.

SECTION 3: GODFREY OF BOUILLON

Emperor Otto holds court at Cambrai. A newcomer, young count Eustace of Boulogne, waits upon him at table with such pleasing grace that Otto grants him a boon. Eustace asks for the hand of Ida of Bouillon, whose mother Beatrice does not oppose the match and retire to a nunnery. Within two and a half years Ida gives birth to three sons, Eustace, Godfrey, and Baldwin. She wants on suckling all three, for fear that another woman’s milk might prove injurious to them. One day during Ida’s absence one of the babies is given the breast by a nurse. On discovering this, the frantic mother shakes the infant till he regurgitates the debasing fluid, but alas!, in later days Eustace was never to equal his two brothers. At seventeen years of age Godfrey, having received knighthood at the hands of his father, is sent to the court of emperor Otto. He champions the rights of the orphaned daughter of a castellan against her cousin, whom he slays in judicial combat. Godfrey becomes duke of Bouillon.

The scene suddenly shifts to Mecca, where a great concourse of Saracen potentates and dignitaries is assembled. The spirits of the rejoicing Moslems are dampened when Galabre, mother of Corbanan (Kerboghe), prophesies that dire things are in store for the paynim world. She names Godfrey and his brothers as the leaders of an army that will conquer Syria and Palestine. Her nephew Cornumaran, son of Corabadus and lord of Jerusalem, decides to travel to France and discover for himself whether this Godfrey is the formidable adversary his soothsaying aunt proclaims him to be. He crosses the sea disguised as a Palmer, with two razor-sharp knives hidden beneath his cloak. The abbot of Saint Trond recognizes Cornumaran, whom he has seen on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and warns Godfrey that he is in danger of being assassinated. Godfrey sends for all his friends and retainers. Cornumaran is greatly impressed by their number. He is told that within five years Godfrey will have conquered the Holy Land. Cornumaran replies that he will ready his kingdom to meet the Christian onslaught.

Comments: It is usually assumed that the three sections of part one came into being as separate poems and were later soldered together by a remanent named Renaud. The legendary tales they embody were already known to William of Tyre, since in his Historia (IX, 6) he refers to the swan-knight and to countess Ida’s prophecy that her three

sons would grow up to become a duke (Godfrey), a king (Baldwin), and a count (Eustace). It should be noted here that through some curious transference the legend of the swan-knight became detached from the Godfrey epic cycle to fasten on the central figure of an entirely different cycle, that of Garin "le Lorrain", Wagner's Lohengrin (= Loherenc Garn). 6

B. The First Cycle: The First Crusade

SECTION I: THE TAKING OF ANTIOCH

I: Graniidor of Douai will tell how the Christian host conquered Jerusalem. The liberation of the Holy Land was prophesied by Jesus on the cross. Peter the Hermit was praying at the tomb of the Redeemer in Jerusalem when God appeared to him, commanding him to return to the lands of Christendom and announce that the time had come to free his city. Sixty thousand men assemble at Peter's behest, among them Harpin of Bourges, Richard of Caumont, John of Aisne, Baldwin of Beauvais, and his brother Ernoul. Peter and his followers begin the siege of Nicaea. Soliman (Kilij-Arslan), the lord of that city, has just received reinforcements, led by Corbaran (Kerbogha), from the sultan of Persia. The Christians are defeated on the slopes of Mount Civetot, the above-named knights being taken prisoner along with Fulcher of Meulan, Richard of Favia, the bishop of Forez, and the abbot of Béziers. Peter, who has escaped capture, betakes himself to Rome and then to France. The pope preaches a general crusade at Clermont in Auvergne. II: Godfrey of Bouillon takes command of the Christian host. Bohemond and Tancred join up with him at Constantinople. The crusaders have difficulties with the Greek emperor, which are smoothed away by Estatin the Nameless (Tatricus) and Guy the seneschal. Soliman's army is defeated and Nicaea surrenders to Estatin. III: The crusaders resume their forward march. Bohemond and his men, who had outdistanced the main army, suffer a setback. Tancred and Baldwin quarrel about the possession of Tarsus. Tancred enters Mamistra and


Choros (Corycys?). Baldwin accepts an invitation from the Old Man of the Mountain to go to Rolais (Edessa) and marry his daughter. Godfrey forces his way into Arrais (Arta). Thanks to Enguerrand of Saint Pol, the crusaders are able to seize two towers guarding the bridge over the river Far (Orontes). Emir Garson (Yaghî-Sîyan) prepares to defend Antioch.

IV: The crusaders encircle the city. Gontier of Aire gains possession of amir Fabur’s steed. After several skirmishes, the besiegers erect a wooden tower. Dead Turks are dug up in a cemetery and decapitated, and their heads are catapulted into the city. The crusaders suffer from a shortage of food. Again the Turks attempt a sortie, again they are repulsed. At the height of the fray Godfrey cleaves one of his opponents in twain. Rainbant Creton slaughters some two hundred Sarracens who had sought refuge under the bridge over the Far. V: The Ta’furs or riffraff of the army meet the bodies of the fallen Turks and eat the human flesh. When negotiations for a truce break down, the enraged Garson orders Reginald Porquet, a recently captured Christian knight, to be hanged. Sansadine (Shams-ad-Daulah), son of Garson, is sent with a request for help to the sultan of Persia. Hardly has he arrived at the Persian court when Soliman of Nicaea shows up with a few battered stragglers. Corbaran takes command of the forces which will march to the rescue of Antioch. He is accompanied by Brohadas, one of the sultan’s sons. Corbaran refuses to pay any heed to the warnings of his mother Calabre. VI: On his way to Antioch, Corbaran is unsuccessful in his attempt to storm Rolais. Meanwhile the crusaders repulse a sortie of the besieged during which the young son of emir Dacian (Firtûz) falls into their hands. They send him back to his anxious father, who promises them his support. At this point Count Stephen of Blois, having learned of Corbaran’s approach, withdraws for greater security to Alexandria. Emir Dacian informs Bohemond that he will admit the Christians into Antioch. Bohemond demands of the other leaders that they yield their share of the city to him, but Raymond of Saint Gilles refuses to forgo his rights. Dacian slays his wife, who had become suspicious of his doings, and then lowers a rope ladder fastened to a merlon. Thirty-five knights scale the walls before the ladder collapses, but they are able to open one of the gates and let the rest of the army in. Antioch, with the exception of the citadel, is taken after two days of street fighting.

VII: Corbaran and his troops arrive in view of Antioch. He writes confidently to caliph Califas and to the sultan of Persia, but again his mother Calabre informs him that he cannot hope to prevail against the soldiers of Christ. The Franks, whose turn it is to be besieged, are
tormented by the lack of food. Count Stephen of Blois advises the
Greek emperor not to help the beleaguered crusaders. Peter the Proven-
cal (Peter Bartholomew) reveals that Saint Andrew has twice appeared
to him in his sleep and has designated to him the exact place where
is hidden the spear with which Jesus was struck on the cross. Amid
general rejoicing the Holy Lance is unearthed. A fire destroys part of
Antioch. Corbaran turns down an offer to decide the issue by means
of champions chosen by both sides. Emir Amidbeh, who has spied on
the Christians, reports back to Corbaran. VIII: The bishop of Le Puy
cannot find a knight willing to carry the Holy Lance into battle: Robert
of Flanders, Robert of Normandy, Godfrey of Bouillon, Tancred,
Bohemond, and Hugh of Vermandois decline each in his turn an honor
which would keep them from the front ranks. Raymond of Saint Gilles
consents to stay inside the city to prevent Garson from breaking out
of the citadel. As the Christian leaders ride out of Antioch emir Amid-
beh at last uses each one to Corbaran. The battle begins. Among the first
to fall are Reginald of Tou and Odo of Beauvais. The crusaders lay
about them with lance, pike, and sword. Corbaran is knocked off his
horse by Robert of Normandy and Brohadis is slain by Godfrey. The
poet indulges in a lengthy enumeration of Christian and Moslem war-
riors, adducing as his authority Richard the Pilgrim, The Red Lion
(Turkish: Kızıl Arslan), Soltman, and Sansadouine succumb under the
blows of Robert of Normandy, Godfrey, and Hugh of Vermandois.
Several saints are seen fighting on the Christian side. The paynims are
routed, but only after Godfrey has had a narrow escape. The defend-
ers of the citadel surrender.

SECTION 2: CORBARAN’S CAPTIVES

After his defeat at Antioch Corbaran flees to Sarmasane (Kerman-
shah), where he returns to the bereaved sultan of Persia the body of
his son Brohadis. Accused of treachery, Corbaran agrees to be put
to death if any Christian chosen by him cannot defeat any two Sar-
cens selected by the sultan, thus failing to prove his contention that
the Christians are better fighters than the Moslems. On the advice of
his mother Calabre he calls upon the Christian knights he has held
prisoner since the battle of Civirot. Richard of Caumont consents,
in exchange for his freedom and that of his companions, to do battle
with Goliath of Nicaea and Sorgale of Mecca. He slays both. Goli-
ath's son and Sorgale's nephew attempt with their followers to murder Corbaran and Richard of Caumont, but they are defeated by Richard and his companions. Corbaran and his newly found friends are crossing the land of king Abraham when a dragon pounces on Ernoul of Beaufaun and proceeds to devour him. His brother Baldwin finally pushes his sword through the heart of the monster. Corbaran is filled with admiration and can hardly restrain himself from becoming a Christian. His nephew, son of queen Flore, is carried off by a wolf. Harpin of Bourges, another of the Christian knights once held captive by Corbaran, gives chase, only to see a huge ape wrest the child from the wolf and clamber with it into a tree. Before he at last rescues the boy, Harpin has to beat off four lions. Then he is unable to prevent five highwaymen from kidnapping the young prince, but Corbaran, who has finally arrived on the scene, manages to obtain the release of his nephew. With Corbaran's approval, the Christian knights ride toward Jerusalem. On the way they join up with the other crusaders.

SECTION 3: THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

1: Godfrey of Bouillon, several other leaders, and ten thousand knights leave the main part of the army at La Mahomeric and ride close to the holy city. While they are foraging in the valley of Jehoshaphat, they are attacked by Cornumaran and fifty thousand Saracens. At this critical juncture they are joined by Richard of Caumont, Harpin of Bourges, and the other knights formerly held captive by Corbaran. A call is sent out for help, but the Turks are driven back into Jerusalem before the arrival of the rest of the crusaders. That night Tancred and Bohemond raid Caesarea and on their way back are attacked by the emir of Ascalon. Fortunately for them several saints enter the fray on their behalf. The following day the whole army resumes its advance and reaches the top of La Montjoie, a hill from which the holy city is plainly visible. II: Godfrey and the other leaders agree on the various sectors they will occupy facing Jerusalem. King Corbadas, watching the besiegers from a high tower, is dismayed when he sees Godfrey transfix three kites with a single arrow. That night Cornumaran sallies forth with ten thousand men, but Harpin of Bourges and his companions drive them back into the city. Exhorted by the king of the Tatars and the bishop of Marturana, the crusaders prepare a general assault.

9 La Conquête de Jérusalem, ed. Higoux.
III. The king of the Tafurs is wounded, Pagan of Beauvais and Contier of Aire are slain, and a rain of Greek fire forces the besiegers to retreat. Bohemond surprises an enemy column on its way to Acre. The Saracens send out carrier pigeons asking for assistance. These are intercepted by the Christians, who modify the terms of the messages.

IV. A general assault is again attempted, but hostilities are soon suspended to allow for an exchange of prisoners. Cornumarant sets out to get help from the sultan of Persia. Baldwin of Edessa follows in hot pursuit, but is surrounded by Saracens and driven to take refuge in a marsh. His armor proves insufficient protection against the leeches, and to add to his discomfort, the Turks set fire to the dry reeds. Cornumarant receives a promise of aid from the sultan of Persia.

V. The besiegers are told when and how to assault Jerusalem. They attack between the Gates of St. Stephen and David, but are unsuccessful on the first day. On the following day, a Friday, Thomas of Marle has himself hoisted up to the battlements on the spears of thirty of his men and manages to open one of the gates. The crusaders pour into the city. Corbaram surrenders the Tower of David. Godfrey is chosen as ruler of the new kingdom but refuses to wear a crown. Most of the Christian lords are about to return to their native lands when they receive news that Cornumarant is advancing on Jerusalem at the head of a huge army.

VI: Corbadas and his son meet in Barbais. While foraging in the valley of Jehoshaphat, Cornumarant is taken prisoner. Raymond of Saint Gilles falls into the hands of the Turks. Cornadas tells the sultan of Persia that his son is held captive within Jerusalem. Cornumarant is exchanged for Raymond. Before he is freed he is made to witness a parade of the Christian garrison in which Godfrey has the same men file by over and over again. The sultan's army approaches Jerusalem.

VII: On the caliph's advice, the Saracens display their treasures. Eager for booty, Peter the Hermit and his followers rush forth. He is taken prisoner. Threatened with death, Peter agrees to become a Moslem. The sultan sends an envoy to Godfrey ordering him to surrender Jerusalem and abjure the Christian faith. Wishing to impress the messenger, Godfrey repeats his previous stratagem of having the same men file by several times. To cap this show of strength, he cleaves a Turk in two. After failing to take the city by storm, the paynims withdraw to Ramla. While praying in the Temple Godfrey is reassured by several signs that God's help will be forthcoming. Hugh of Vermandois and the other chieftains arrive in Jerusalem. The crusaders ride forth in the direction of Ramla. As their battalions draw near, Peter the Hermit names the leaders to the sultan: Godfrey, Robert of Normandy,
Hugh of Vermadin, Bohemond, Tancred, Rotrou of Perche, Stephen of Albermarle (Blots?), and the "king" of the Tafurs. VIII: The sultan of Persia exhorts his thirteen remaining sons to avenge the death of their brother Bohadad. The poet lists the many and sundry peoples comprising the sultan's army. The battle starts with Godfrey slaying Sinagon, the sultan's eldest son. There follows a series of jousts. Bohemond kills king Corbadas, and Lucabel, the king's brother, is slain by Tancred. Baldwin of Edessa lays low Corumarant. Saint George and Saint Maurice are seen fighting the infidels. Peter the Hermit regains his freedom and promptly dispatches Sangun, another of the sultan's sons. The paynims are routed. The bishop of Marturana's prayer is answered when the sun is stopped in its course and the light of day prolonged. During the pursuit, Baldwin of Edessa and Raimbaut Cristolet are cut off from the other knights, but are finally rescued. The sultan enters a boat at Acre and sails away to safety. Enguerrand of Saint Pol is solemnly buried. Funeral honors are also bestowed on Coreumarant, the brave enemy whose heart, when cut out from his body, fills a helmet.

Comments: Part two of Cycle 1 is apparently the work of a versifier named Grainor of Douai, who amalgated the compositions of three earlier poets, no one of which survives in its original form. The first of these, written by a certain Richard le Pilgrim (Richard the Pilgrim), who may have taken part in the First Crusade, told of the taking of Antioch (La Chanson d'Antioche); the second (Les Chiffres), which in its present form contains a statement that it was composed at the request of Raymond of Antioch, narrated the fictitious adventures of six followers of Peter the Hermit who through their boldness and resourcefulness supposedly won the friendship of their captor Corbaran (Kerbogha); while the third related the siege and storming of Jerusalem (La Conquête de Jérusalem). In lalte 1 of section 1 Grainor of Douai names himself and implies that his song has for subject the First Crusade in its entirety:

Sirs, pray be still and end your clusters,
If you wish to hear a noble song.
Never has a jongleur recited a better one;
It tells of the holy city, as worthy of reverence,
In which God allowed his body to beوارمودد and hurried,
To be struck with a lance and nailed to the cross
Jerusalem it is called by its right name.
Those newly fledged penitents who sang this song
Leave out its opening part.
But Grainord of Douai has no mind to do likewise,  
He who has rewritten all his verses.
Now you will hear of Jerusalem  
And of those who went to adore the Sepulcher.  
How they assembled their arms,  
In France, in Berry, in neighboring Anjou,  
And in many other places,  
And in many others I know not by name;  
Of such a pilgrimage you never heard tell.  
For God they suffered many hardships;  
And thirst, and cold, and fear, and sleep;  
Our Lord could not help but reward them  
And call their souls to him on high.

The beginning of Granirô's long narrative (about twenty thousand lines), with its emphasis on the six followers of Peter the Hermit taken prisoner by Kerbogha, is evidently borrowed from Les Chevifs; what follows is mostly based on Richard le Pèlerin's Chanson d'Antioche; the lifting of the siege of Antioch brought about by the battle the crusaders won on June 28, 1098, is followed by a very lengthy segment drawn from Les Chevifs; when the final section, which deals with the siege of Jerusalem, is reached, there is no clear indication as to the moment Granirô ceases using the Chevifs and starts to paraphrase the Conquête de Jérusalem. Although Granirô wrote in rhymed alexandrines, it is entirely possible that one or more of his predecessors composed in a different meter and was satisfied with assonance. Any historian of the First Crusade interested in assessing the factual value of Granirô's work should always remember that his "Song of Jerusalem" represents an extensive remanent of three poems which have not survived in their original form, undertaken in order to fuse their contents and thereby create the impression of a unified narrative. He should also bear in mind that Granirô's compilation has not been published as transcribed in the manuscripts, but was arbitrarily carved up in three different editions (1848, 1868, 1877) by two different editors (Paulin Paris, Célestin Hippeau).

Richard le Pèlerin must have written his Chanson d'Antioche not long after the First Crusade, if he is to be identified, as seems very likely, with the author of a song of Antioch who is taken to task by the chronicler Lambert of Andrés for not having included in his poem any mention of Arnold of Gruner (d. 1138), presumably because that worthy had turned down the poet's request for a pair of shoes. The contents of Richard's poem can be reconstructed, at least in summary fashion, by comparing Granirô's récits merso with the other accounts
which derive from Richard: the Latin one by Albert of Aachen, the extant fragment from Gregory Bechada’s Provençal Canso d’Antoche, and the Spanish Gran conquista de Ultramar. Such a comparison shows that Grandor does not seem to have made any radical changes in Richard’s narrative except in cantos VI and VII of his Antoche, for which Robert the Monk is the main source.10

The Chétifs may have been composed in Syria. According to a statement which appears in Grandor’s revised version of the poem (Hippeau, II, 213), its author wrote at the request of Raymond, prince of Antioch (d. 1149), and was rewarded with a canonry at Saint Peter’s in that city. Amour Hatem claims that since the Chétifs manifests such intimate knowledge of Syria, its land, and its people, only a native of that country or a long-time resident could possibly be its author. Roger Goosen, though somewhat skeptical of all the local color which Hatem professes to find in the Chétifs, has nevertheless strengthened the case for a “Syrian” origin of the poem by pointing out that the themes, situations, and inspiration (struggles with wild animals, service of a Christian under a Saracen, desire to reconcile hostile peoples living side by side, and so forth) resemble similar material found in Digenes Akritas and other Byzantine epics. Urban T. Holmes and Claude Cahen, who also find themselves in general agreement with Hatem, believe that the adventures ascribed to Harpin of Bonges and his companions might well reflect the experiences of Bohemond I of Antioch and his cousin Richard of the Principate while they were prisoners of the Saracens.11

La Conquête de Jérusalem is the title that Hippeau chose for section 3 of Grandor of Douai’s account of the First Crusade when he decided to publish it independently from the other two sections. Section 3, as is the case for the other two sections of part two, represents a revised version of older material, which at one time probably constituted an independent poem, though it may also have started as a sequel tacked on to Richard le Pèlerin’s Antoche. The unrevise Jérusalem, still recognizable in the Gran conquista de Ultramar, was his-


torically more accurate than its *risacimento*, which suffers from the injection of incidents and episodes similar to those found in *Antioche* and presumably borrowed from Richard le Pélerin (or even possibly by Grandor from his own version of *Antioche*). Anouar Hatem has attempted to prove that the older *Jérusalem* was, like the original Chrétiens, written in the Latin Orient, but Suzanne Duparc-Quoc's counter-claim that it was composed in northern France is based on more impressive evidence.12

C. The First Cycle: The Kings of Jerusalem

Raymond of Saint Gilles, Bohemond, Tancred, Harpino of Bourges, John of Ais, the king of the Tatars, the bishop of Foros, and the abbot of Fécamp promise Godfrey that they will stay with him in the Holy Land. Corbaran receives baptism at the hands of the bishop of Marthuram, and his sister Florie (also called Matroine) becomes the wife of Godfrey. Meanwhile the siege of Acre has begun. Tancred obtains possession of Caesarea. He joins with the arm Dodekin (Tughtigin). The resistance of Acre ends when the besiegers start catapulting beehives onto the battlements. Godfrey angers Heraclius, the patriarch of Jerusalem, by asking for relics to send his mother, countess Ida. The irate prelate does not hesitate to poison the king. Heraclius conspires with Tancred to place Bohemond on the throne, but cannot prevent Baldwin of Edessa from taking his brother's place. Heraclius dines in prison and is succeeded by Henry, archbishop of Tyre. Death also claims John of Ais and Harpin of Bourges. Baldwin is taken prisoner. In order to guarantee the payment of his ransom to the sultan of Perma, he surrenders his younger daughter Beatrice (Yvette) as a hostage. When later she returns home, the reveals that she has been ravished by Blugadas, king of Aleppo, and becomes a sister of charity at the hospital at Acre. The elder daughter, Ida, had married Amalric of Auxerre, who succeeds Baldwin on the latter's death. Amalric is king of Jerusalem for only three years. His posthumous son Baldwin inherits the crown. The widowed Ida marries Baldwin of Sebourc (Le Bourg), a cousin of Hugh of Vermandois. With his own hand Baldwin of Sebourc kills the infamous Blugadas. At this point of the narrative Saladin makes his appearance. Son of king Eufrarion of Alexandria,

he becomes master of all Egypt through the assassination of his overlord the Amalric. At first, he makes little headway against young King Baldwin, who is ably assisted by three powerful lords, Baldwin of Falkenberg, count of Ramla, his brother Balian, count of Tripoli, and Reginald of Chatillon, castellan of Kerak. Unfortunately the young king is stricken with leprosy and cannot prevent Reginald from violating a truce both sides had promised to respect. Saladin besieges Kerak. King Baldwin manages to raise the siege and renew the truce. Soon afterward he dies without having named a successor.  

In the closing lines of part two of Cycle I reference is made to another poem in which the taking of Acre will be recounted, as well as the founding of the military orders. Part three does contain an account of the siege and capture of Acre, but nothing is said of the first appearance of either the Knights Templar or the Knights Hospitaller. As may be gathered from the summary given above, part three of Cycle I presents a very fanciful, yet not entirely unhistorical, recital of what took place in the Holy Land between the battle of Ascalon and the death of Baldwin IV. Godfrey of Bouillon's marriage to the fictitious Florie and the conversion of her supposed brother Corbaran are, of course, examples of unbridled fantasy. The drastic pruning down of the family tree of the kings of Jerusalem is worth noting: Godfrey's two immediate successors, his brother Baldwin I and his cousin Baldwin II, are telescoped into just one Baldwin; Baldwin II's son-in-law Fulk of Anjou and the latter's two sons, Baldwin III and Amalric, are replaced by the still more composite Amalric of Auverre. Despite his disappearance from the roster of kings, Baldwin of Le Bourg is reborn as Baldwin of Seboure, who will become the second husband of Ida, the supposed widow of Amalric of Auverre. Baldwin II's eldest daughter, Melisende, and his youngest, Yvette, are now named Ida and Beatrice. Although it is historically true that Yvette was as a small child for a time a hostage in the hands of the Saracens, it is unlikely that she was sexually molested by them during her captivity, but it is indeed a fact that the later became a nun, abbess of Bethany. One may safely assume that patriarch Heraclius, who in the 1180's had for mistress the notorious Pasque de Rivati (Madame la Patriarchesse) and was rumored to have instigated the poisoning of William of Tyre, was the prototype of the nonhistorical patriarch Heraclius stated to have

13. For a detailed summary and analysis of part three of Cycle I see Émilie Rey, "Les Poèmes français relatifs à la première croisade: de poème de 1136 et son souche," Romanica, IV (1829), 431-668.
been the contemporary and poisoner of Godfrey of Bouillon. Finally, young king Baldwin IV's leprosy and Reginald of Kerak's misdeeds correspond to the historical accounts.

D. The First Cycle: An Evaluation

Cycle I, as a whole, is difficult to assess. Quite apart from the fact that it runs to well over thirty thousand lines, it suffers from having been edited piecemeal and in incomplete form. The editor of the Chétyfs did not attempt to give the complete text of that poem, and part three (The Kings of Jerusalem) lies buried in the manuscript; it is a very late addition to Cycle I. It is different in spirit from the first two parts, which do evidence a certain amount of structural unity. Whereas part three is essentially a rhymed chronicle, however distorted its chronology and presentation of facts, parts one and two are epic in character; they celebrate the heroic deeds of one man, be he the swan-knight or his grandson Godfrey of Bouillon. It should also be noted that part one leads straight into part two. The prophecies foreshadowing the exploits of Godfrey and his brothers during the First Crusade are echoed in part two by reminders of the deeds of their supposed ancestor, the swan-knight. Cor厢nanant, the alleged leader of the Saracens during the siege of Jerusalem by the Christians, has already appeared as Godfrey's chief antagonist in part one. In addition, there is hardly any change of ethos between the two parts, at least from a medieval point of view. In part one first the swan-knight, then his grandson Godfrey, fight to protect damsels and ladies in distress; they are the staunch champions of rightful causes, and miraculous occurrences accompany their progress through life. The same struggle in behalf of a cause which enlists divine assistance is found in part two, only here it is Christ to whom Godfrey and his companions seek to restore his inheritance. Yet it must be admitted that part two cannot compare with the Chanson de Roland when it comes to capturing the religious fervor and the indomitable spirit which animated the crusaders in their struggle with the Moslem world.
E. The Second Cycle

Cycle II, as already stated, belongs to the middle of the fourteenth century and comprises three different poems: *Le Chevalier au Cygne et Godefroi de Bouillon* (a title I shall shorten to *Godefroi de Bouillon*), *Baudouin de Sebourc*, and the *Bâtard de Bouillon*. As will be seen by the following comments, these three poems, without ceasing to be epics, are visibly influenced by other types of literature such as the Arthurian romance and the fabliau.

The author of *Godefroi de Bouillon* (35,180 alexandrines) has completely recast and rephrased parts one and two of Cycle I. He almost never preserves a line of one of the older epics (e.g., GB 1609 = *Jerusalem* 142, GB 16112 = 784). His account of the swan-knight and the early exploits or *enfances* of Godfrey is considerably shorter than that of his Cycle I predecessors, but, when Cornumaraunt appears on the scene, the *Godefroi* poet must have felt that the story as he understood it—a romance located in the Orient—had at last begun, for from then on he becomes prolific, prone to additions and embroiderings instead of his former relatively restrained self. His fancy is especially unimpeded when he describes (vv. 13832–15963) Godfrey’scourting of the Saracen princess Florie, which he imagines as taking place at the very time the crusaders are advancing on Jerusalem! The climactic episode of the poem, the poisoning of Godfrey by patriarch Heracles (vv. 27512–28537), is narrated with a certain amount of dramatic skill. Tancred is made to appear as the accomplice, however reluctant, of the murderer, and we are told that the day will come when Godfrey’s mother, countess Ida of Boulogne, will exact a terrible revenge for the death of her son. On a number of occasions the *Godefroi* poet has borrowed details from William of Tyre, or more probably from the Old French translation of William’s Latin text.¹⁴

*Baudouin de Sebourc* (about 23,000 alexandrines) is concerned with the *enfances* of the third ruler of the Frankish kingdom of Jerusalem, Baldwin II. The fourth son of Roger, the swan-knight’s sister, Baldwin is brought up by the castellan of Sebourc in complete ignorance of his illustrious parentage. He becomes a much-traveled knight-errant, shuttling back and forth between the west and the east with surprising alacrity, the hero of many a preposterous adventure. At long last he learns that he is related to Godfrey of Bouillon and Baldwin and is in the line of succession to the throne of Jerusalem. He then settles down to what history expects of him by accepting the lordship ofEdessa.

¹⁴ Dupain-Quercy lists some thirty such borrowings, *Le Cycle*, pp. 110–113
from his cousin Baldwin I. When Baudouin de Seboure ends, Cycle II has not progressed chronologically beyond the point which marks the close of Godesfroi de Bouillon: Baldwin I is still planning to attack the five Saracen rulers of Mecca, brothers who go by the names of Esclamart, Hector, Barbrun, Saroienc, and Tailléfer. 15

The Bîard de Bouillon (6,546 alexandrines) opens with Baldwin I's campaign against the five kings of Mecca, his excursion to the shores of the Red Sea, and a sojourn of five years in the land of Fécie, where his hosts are king Arthur and Morgan le Fay. After Baldwin's return to Jerusalem the narrative focuses on still another Baldwin, who happens to be the illegitimate son of the king and the Saracen princess Sinamonde. The Bastard of Bouillon is the "hero" of a series of episodes which at best might be termed unfortunate. Still in his teens, he quarrels with a cousin and bashes in his skull with a chessboard; not long afterward he stabs to death his half-brother Ourrly; he then proceeds to marry a Saracen girl against her wishes, when she becomes unfaithful, he allows her to be burned at the stake, and so on. The narrative shifts back to Baldwin I, only to recount his death. Tancred is dispatched to Boulogne to offer the crown to Eustace, the brother of the deceased monarch. Apprised of his arrival, countess Ide has Tancred summarily hanged. The poem closes with the ominous statement that the violent deaths of Godfrey and Tancred will so divide their respective partisans that eventually they will be unable to stem the onrushing tide of Saladin's armies. Did the Second Cycle end at this point, or did it, like the First Cycle, reach the end of the twelfth century? If we agree with those scholars who have recently given their close attention to Cycle II, we must assume that the fifteenth-century romance Saladin represents a proliferation of a lost fourteenth-century poem which continued and completed the narrative undertaken in the Bîard de Bouillon. 16

15 See Edmund René Labandre, Études sur Baudouin de Seboure, chevalier des guerres Légende poétique de Baudouin Ier du Bouy, roi de Jerusalem (Penna, 1940).
16 See Cook and Cunt, Le Damoiselle cycle.
Western Europe never wholly succumbed to those disruptive forces which threatened it with a moneyless economy. At the end of the eleventh century money was a common, but not a cheap, commodity. In the succeeding centuries the supply of money increased and money consequently cheapened; credit instruments were developed and banking practices established. During the first two crusades the scarcity of money made it rise in value as the crusaders competed with one another to obtain it by selling their goods. In the thirteenth century the

The primary sources for this chapter are too scattered to permit of a comprehensive bibliography. Many chronicles of the crusades as well as a number of others have proved useful. Charms of value have been found in many curricula and collections, both published and unpublished. Papal and royal letters and accounts have been among the most valuable sources and will be cited in the notes.


1. Auguste C. Key, The First Crusade (Princeton, 1921), pp. 17-19. Further the armies caused a scarcity of goods wherever they went, and the crusaders paid high prices in money which was slowly bought.
availability of more money and credit made both saving and borrowing easier. Though the situation changed thus during the crusading era, it is well to emphasize at the beginning that the crusades were always financed. When Urban II issued his call for the First Crusade, he recognized specifically that his crusaders would have to collect the money necessary for their expenses. Then and later there were some who took the vows but could not themselves find the money to pay the costs of their journey. In the financing of the crusades Innocent III saw the key to their success or failure: “If the money be not wanting, the men will not be wanting.”

Like the palaeans who had made the pilgrimage to the Holy Land for so many centuries, the crusaders were individually responsible for carrying out their vow. How could the individual crusader finance his journey? He might look first to his current income, but it will be shown later in this chapter that few crusaders had sufficient cash income both to pay their obligations at home and to support themselves decently on a crusade. If one was wealthy enough to support himself from current income, then he had to arrange to resupply himself with money as he needed it. The Holy Land lay beyond a long and dangerous passage by land or sea, and the receipt of money from home was correspondingly uncertain. On Louis IX’s first crusade a shipment of money to the king was lost at sea, though at least one nobleman planned to send home to resupply himself. From the middle of the twelfth century, it is true, the Templars provided facilities for the transfer of crusaders’ funds, and merchants came to provide similar services by lending money in the east to be repaid in the west.

Many crusaders, however, may have hoped to support themselves with plunder. The mob led by Peter the Hermit and others like it undertook to support themselves by robbing fellow Christians in Hungary and Greece. The Jews were robbed as well as murdered by some of the crusaders. More justifiable was the booty won from the Moslems. On the First Crusade the booty of the Moslem armies defeated at Doryleum and at Antioch, as well as the tribute and ransom of those who had the misfortune to dwell in the path of the crusaders from Antioch to Jerusalem, all enriched the Christians. Stephen of Blois wrote home from Antioch that he had made silver and gold than when he left.


France. Later crusaders also benefitted by the spoils of their conquests. King Richard I of England profited enormously by his capture of Cyprus, and later in Palestine he did not scorn to capture a rich caravan. He and King Philip II Augustus of France divided the spoils of Acre, and from his share of the captives alone Philip hoped to obtain ransoms worth 100,000 bezants. The capture of Damietta in 1216 and again in 1249 provided the crusading armies with quantities of precious goods, but they probably lost as much at Mansurah as they gained at Damietta.

The prudent crusader planned to finance his journey before he departed, to take great bags and chests of money with him. He could use his savings, if he had any. It has been suggested that Count Robert II of Flanders may have financed his participation in the First Crusade from his treasury. Stephen of Blois went on two crusades without paying any heed to his financial arrangements, and he may have had sufficient savings. Theobald III of Champagne, a century later, had saved a great treasure for the Fourth Crusade, which he bequeathed to it on his premature death. And the countless legacies and gifts that were made to the crusades from the end of the twelfth century on represent increased savings. Some crusaders may have saved the whole of the cost of their journey, but two general considerations render it doubtful. First, the scarcity of money early in the crusading era militated against savings per se. Second, when money became more plentiful, social attitudes which had been engendered earlier continued to inhibit savings, since a chivalric society regarded money rather as a means of consumption than as a means of investment. A gentleman did not save money; he spent it. A large expenditure, such as a crusade, had to be made from his capital, whether chattels or lands. While thus second consideration perhaps did not apply to the "little people", the bourgeoisie and the free peasants, one may suppose that the chevaliers, who were the crusaders par excellence, used what savings they might have had but that they generally found them insufficient.

From the First Crusade to the last the alienation of property by crusaders reveals the failure of booty, current income, and savings to support their expeditions. A man who had a family or expected to return from the Holy Land would hesitate to dispose of the source of his and his family’s livelihood, and so may be presumed that men sold their lands only as a last resort. But the examples are too numerous to name more than a few. For the First Crusade Godfrey of Bouillon sold his county of Verdun and other lands to Bishop Richer, while for the Crusade of 1101 viscount Odo Arpin of Bourges sold his city and county to King Philip I of France. Richard the Lionhearted sold the homage of the king of Scotland, which his father had just recently won, and swore he would sell London if he could find a buyer. Fifty years later the count of Mâcon, John de Braine, sold his fief to King Louis IX. Throughout the period less prominent men sold what they could of their lands, burgage tenements, and estates. As Ambrose wrote of the Third Crusade,

And none to sell his inheritance
Delayed the holy pilgrimage.

Though sales of chattels can rarely be documented from the records, the chroniclers leave no doubt that crusaders also disposed of their stock and other valuables as well. For example, Simon of Montfort sold his wood of Leicester for 1,000 pounds to finance his crusade in 1240.

Crusaders preferred not to sell their property outright. Count John of Mâcon sold his fief subject to the provision of a life pension for...
himself and his wife Aliz. A lesser English crusader made a gift of land to a religious house in return for which the canons promised to make regular payments to his wife while he was gone on the crusade. For the First Crusade duke Godfrey of Lower Lorraine sold his castle of Bouillon to bishop Obert of Liège for 1,500 pounds with the right to redeem it if he returned, and duke Robert II of Normandy pawned his duchy to his brother king William Rufus of England for 10,000 marks which William took from the churchmen of England. In 1239 Baldwin II of Courtenay, the Latin emperor of Constantinople, in his dire need, pledged his county of Namur to Louis IX for 50,000 livres of Paris; he was also to pledge to Venetian merchants his empire's holiest relic, the Crown of Thorns, and even his son and heir, Philip. There are but a few famous instances of the loans by which crusaders perhaps most commonly financed their journeys. They borrowed from kings and princes, from monasteries and bishops, from lay lords and merchants, from whoever had money to lend.

The terms of the loans vary. Some were interest-free, like the 70,000 livres of Tours lord Edward of England (the future king Edward I) borrowed from Louis IX in 1269. A recognized form, however, gave the lender the use of the pledged land for a period of years, the income comprising his repayment. Under this vis gage the lender took a certain amount of risk. The more common form of loan, consequently, was the mort gage, which provided for the lender to have the usufruct of the land as interest, the borrower to repay the principal, usually before he got his property back. From the patristic period on, the church had condemned the taking of interest on money loans as usury. The vis gage was not held to be usurious, since the lender was expected to regain essentially the principal of his loan. The papacy permitted clerical crusaders to pledge their benefices under these terms. Mortgages, on the other hand, fell under the condemnation of pope Eu-

genius III, and under Alexander III the papacy undertook to enforce its laws against usury. Law-abiding clergy, especially the monasteries, which found mortgages profitable investments, gave up the business, but other Christians continued to ignore or evade the prohibition of usury. The merchants of southern France and, above all, of Italy were commonly known as moneylenders. In the thirteenth century their business extended throughout Europe, and even in the Holy Land itself they made loans to needy crusaders. In addition, the Jews provided a source of money at interest, though their role in credit transactions must not be exaggerated.

The privileges of popes and princes for the crusaders reveal the great importance of credit arrangements in financing the crusades. From the First Crusade on the popes took not only the persons of the crusaders and their families but also their property under papal protection. Crusaders who found it difficult to secure the return of pledged lands were able thus to call upon the church for help. Since at the beginning of the crusades a man could not alienate his real property without the consent of his wife and heirs, nor, if it were a fief, without the consent of his lord, and since such consent was not always forthcoming for crusaders who had to borrow money for their pilgrimages, Eugenius III in 1145 conceded to crusaders the privilege of pledging lands, even fiefs, without the consent of relatives or lords, if the latter were not themselves willing to lend the money needed.

At the same time Eugenius granted crusaders a moratorium on repayment of debts and sought to free them from the payment of interest on loans while they were under the cross. In 1188 Philip Augustus issued a long and detailed ordinance on crusaders' debts that gave royal authority to the "crusaders' term", as it was called, in France. Innocent III went further and ordered that crusaders should not only have a moratorium on payment of the principal of the debts but be immune from interest, creditors who took interest from crusaders should be forced to make restitution. These privileges led to the abuse of the crusade as a means of avoiding creditors, and from the middle of the thirteenth century contracts commonly included a clause renouncing the crusaders' privilege. From the point of view of the crusader, whose responsibility it was to find the wherewithal for his costly expedition, respite of debts and especially prohibition of usury doubt-

21 Ibid., pp. 73-86.
less seemed only just. From the point of view of the creditors, these
privileges represented a real—and usually involuntary—financial con-
tribution to the crusades.

Finally, family and friends must often have aided the crusaders. The
nature of the transactions did not require written documents to record
them, and few examples can be cited. John, lord of Joinville, in de-
scribing his departure on the crusade, tells of a gift of “a great quan-
tity of fair jewels to myself and the nine knights I had with me” made
by the abbot of Saint Urbain.23 The kings of England from Henry
II to Henry III made considerable gifts to various crusaders. Henry
III alone gave 500 marks to Philip d’Aubigny, one of his councilors,
and more to his half-brother, Guy de Lusignan, besides a number of
smaller sums to others.24 One can have little doubt that many crusad-
ers obtained much of their money through similar acts of generosity.
Again, the social dimension of the crusades is apparent. Although the
crusaders took their vows as individuals and were individually respon-
sible for fulfilling them, the crusades were corporate, or at least col-
cective, enterprises. As crusaders joined together to fight under the leader-
ship of feudal lords, communal officers, national sovereigns, and the
church, so they also organized their finances, thus transcending the
individual.

From the beginning feudalism offered a device for the command
and for the financing of crusades. The crusader who held his land of
another crusader must almost automatically have followed his lord on
the expedition to the Holy Land. The lord, for his part, desired to take
a suitable messie with him to lend him dignity and power, and he would
be willing to accept the company, not only of his vassals, but also of
other men in a sort of temporary vassalage for the purposes of the
crusade. In return the man might reasonably expect the lord to pay
at least part of his expenses. On the First Crusade Bohemond took
his followers into his service (ad Boemundi famulum) and presum-
ably paid their way.25 At Acre both Philip Augustus and Richard took

this Guy de Lusignan see Harold S.utherland, The Lusignans in England, 1247-1254 (Albu-
querque, 1950), pp. 36-37.
1, 135, where Bohemond is stated to have “raised sufficient money to pay for the expenses of
all that came with him”; and Frederic denonvill, The First Crusade, Jerusalem to Compara-
nicopolis, in volume 1 of the present work, p. 271, “it is not likely that he undertook to provide
for any followers, except those in his personal following.”
cruisers into their pay. When Philip left, he gave the command of a body of French crusaders to Duke Hugh III of Burgundy along with money to pay them. Of Richard’s army it has been said, “At times he was financing not only members of his own household force but mendicant pilgrims, crusaders of all social ranks whose funds had been exhausted, and apparently also knights to whom he wanted to show favors, to say nothing of the ordinary soldier of fortune whose custom it was to fight for pay.”

The relationship between the lord and his companions might be very loose: Geoffrey of Villehardouin condemned certain liegemen of Count Baldwin of Flanders because they accepted 500 pounds from the count and then went to the Holy Land by a different way. On the other hand, Emperor Henry VI in 1195 published an offer to crusaders which approximated mercenary service: to 1,500 knights and the same number of sergeants he promised wages and maintenance if they would enlist in the ports of southern Italy with the masters of a fleet he was sending to the Holy Land for a year; the crusaders would have to obey the imperial commanders, to whom would also revert the annuities of any deceased men. Henry’s army, which left little mark, may have consisted both of voluntary but poor crusaders and of mercenary soldiers. On the Fifth Crusade a large part of the army at Damietta was in the pay of the papal legate Pelagius, and many were frankly mercenaries. The line between the mercenary and the true crusader in the company of his lord may sometimes have been drawn fine, but it existed in the minds of the men. In 1249 Joinville was proud that he set out with a decent company of his own, but in Cyprus he was glad to accept the king’s pay, and he certainly did not regard himself as a mercenary. In his household accounts King Louis distinguished between “pay of knights at wages” and “gifts and annuities of knights serving by the year without wages.”

The communal organization of the “lesser men,” the middle classes, revealed itself in their crusaders, which took now the character of a huge partnership, now that of a trading company, and now that of a state enterprise. Although the Italians were the most famed participants, they were not the only middle-class crusaders. From the first, expeditions of northern mariners made their way by the Strait of Gi-

27. Villehardouin, Le Comte de Constantinople, I, 36-37
28. MGH, Legenda, I (1237), 198.
29. Oliver (Schoenstatt), Die Schriften, ed. Hermann Hengsweck, Bibliothek des historischen Veritas at Stuttgart, CCLII (Teubner, 1894), 238-251, 246
braltar to the Holy Land: men of the British Isles, the Low Countries, Germany, even Scandinavia. The expedition which took Lisbon may be taken as typical of such crusades, although it was largely diverted from its original destination. The crusaders came from both sides of the North Sea and the English Channel, in large part the sailors of those seas, men neither of the chivalry nor of the peasantry. Like a commune, they elected their leaders and made policies in council and assembly. The booty won at Lisbon was shared among the members of the expedition, and presumably the other financial arrangements were similarly collective. 31

The crusaders from the Italian cities organized their sacred expeditions like trading ventures. To participate in the First Crusade the Genoese nobles and merchants formed a compagnia on the model of their earlier expeditions against the Moors. The ships were provided and outfitted by subscription; each man who subscribed or went on the crusade had a certain financial interest in the profits or losses. When the expedition ended after the capture of Caesarea, the booty was divided according to the shares held by the members in the compagnia. 13 The success of this expedition led the Genoese to finance others of a similar character over the succeeding centuries.

In Venice the state was stronger than in Genoa, as may be seen in the Venetian participation in the Fourth Crusade. Villehardouin describes the process by which the Venetians made their bargain with the French crusaders: First, the French envoys spoke to the doge and his council, who, after deliberation, made their offer to the French on the part of the Venetian state. When the envoys accepted the offer, the doge, Enrico Dandolo, had still to persuade the grand council and, finally, to sway the commons at an assembly in Saint Mark's. All Venetians shared in the costs and profits of the expedition as citizens of the state, and all were encouraged by the doge to think of themselves as sharing in the merits of the crusade. The corporative principle could hardly be more completely embodied.

Unlike the centralized Venetian republic, most of the states of medieval Europe were loosely organized principalities. Medieval princes took the cross not as princes but as individuals. The crusade of Robert of Normandy, like the conquest of England by his father William I, was not that of the duchy but of the duke. Not even Louis IX of France

33 Villehardouin, La Croisade de Constantinople, 1, 22-31
could encourage or shame any very large part of his people to follow
him on the crusade, much less command them. Yet by the collection
of taxes to support the crusades, princes called upon their subjects as
sovereignt of their states. Lords who levied the taille, or tallage, upon
their subjects and took aides from their vassals could use these taxes
toward financing a crusade if the occasion were accepted as lawful by
their people. For his crusade in 1146 Louis VII imposed upon some
of his subjects taxes which were probably aides and tallies. Count
Theobald V of Blois in 1190 apparently levied a taille for his crusade.
During the thirteenth century aides for going on the crusade were taken
by three kings of France, counts of Champagne, counts of Nevers, a
count of Ponthieu, and a viscount of Limoges. The collection of the
taille for the crusade had also become customary in France by the reign
of Louis IX. 34 In England the crusade was not generally recognized
as an occasion for aids and tallages, but they were sometimes asked
for crusaders. 35 Outside France and England the available evidence
is slight. When emperor Frederick II taxed the kingdom of Sicily in
1227-1228 and again in 1231 for his crusade, the basis of the collecta
was the fief. 36 In 1166 the nobles of the kingdom of Jerusalem granted
king Amalric an aide of a tenth of their moveable if they did not serve
in his host. In several respects, however, this levy was more like the
genral tax taken in France and England at the same time than the
older feudal aide. 37

In 1163 pope Alexander III issued a plea to the princes of western
Europe for aid to the Holy Land. In response king Louis VII of France
promised to give each year for five years a penny in the pound of his
revenues and personal property, and the king asked his subjects lay
and clerical, great and small, to contribute at the same rate (about 0.4
percent). The levy apparently did not extend to the lands of the great
vassals of France unless they chose to accept it, for Henry II imposed
it, with the consent of his council, in his continental possessions as
well as in England and at a somewhat higher rate (two pennies the
first year and one thereafter). As provided in Henry’s ordinance for
his French lands, each man assessed himself under oath and deposited

34. For aides and taille see Landais, La Condition paroissiale, pp. 61-78; Bibl. nat., MS.
Mommsen 92, f. 9. The use of 1146 is vaguely described by the chroniclers; see the opposing inter-
pretations of Last, Tambour de Normandie, pp. 3-2, and Mitchell, Crusader, p. 134. Constantine,
"The Financing of the Crusades," pp. 64-70, has the most recent discussion of the subject.
150, 179.
37. William of Tyre, XIX, 13 (RSCC, Occ., I, 903); cf. John L. LaRiviere, Feudal Monarchy
his tax in a chest in his parish church. The parish priest and two parishioners had keys to the chest and were responsible for the delivery of the monies to the bishop. The bishops were to bring the money together as they and the king would decide. The sanctions for the collection were ecclesiastical: for fraud, excommunication; for scrupulousness, remission of one third of unjoined penance. A "first crude experiment" in compulsory almsgiving, the levy of 1166 begins the history of general taxation for financing the crusades.14

The peril of the Holy Land again evoked an extraordinary levy in 1183, when King Baldwin IV with the consent of a general council imposed a tax on the kingdom of Jerusalem. It was levied at the rate of one bezant on a hundred of moveables and debts (and income of mercenary soldiers) and of two bezants on a hundred of the revenues of churches, monasteries, barons, and their vassals. The poor were to pay a hearth tax of one bezant or what they could; the vassals were to be taxed by their lords at the same rate. Four men were chosen in each civitas of the realm to assess and collect the tax, but the taxpayer might declare under oath that he was over-assessed and pay according to his own declaration.15 Altogether the levy showed considerable development beyond that of 1166.

The kings of England and France followed the new model in levying another crusade tax on their subjects in 1185. The unit of one hundred was employed, and the annual rate was roughly the same as in Jerusalem, but the levy was taken for three years and so was the heaviest thus far collected. The sanctions remained ecclesiastical, and the tax was still administered by the clergy, though the bishops were replaced as collectors by a Templar and a Hospitalier appointed in each diocese. The exemptions of goods necessary to the taxpayer's profession presaged the Saladin Tithe.16

In January 1188 the two kings, Henry II and Philip Augustus, took the cross together. On the urging of the papacy, they provided for the levy of another tax upon all their subjects, clerical and lay, who did not take the cross; this was the famed Saladin Tithe.17 The most striking feature of the tax was its rate, a tenth for one year of the value of income and moveables, excluding the necessities of the taxpayer's

38 Lunt, Histories of Normandy, pp. 2-3.
39 Williams of Tyre, XXII, 31 (REG, Orc., I, 1120-1122); LaMonte, Latin Kingdom, pp 188-189.
41 See the accounts of Mitchell, Normandy, pp. 82-94, 119-122, 369-371; Lunt, Histories of Normandy, pp. 6-8; Castellani, Philipp II Augustus, II, 52-74; Benderly, La Condition Juridique, pp. 73-75; Revett, "The Saladin Tithe," English Historical Review, XXXI (1916), 447-450.
profession such as the arms and horse of a knight or the books of a clerk. The novel severity of the tithe occasioned loud complaint, so much in France that Philip had to promise, for himself and his successors, never to levy such a tax again.

The administration of the tax was regulated by the two monarchs separately, and the ordinances enacted by them in their councils differ greatly. In Henry’s dominions, on both sides of the Channel, the parish remained the unit of administration as theretofore, but a more elaborate machinery was established. Each taxpayer assessed himself again, but he paid his tax before committees composed of the parish priest, the rural dean, and the clerk of the baron on the local level, and of a Templar, a Hospitaler, and clerk of the bishop and king on the diocesan level. If the collectors questioned a man’s payment, a sworn jury of four or six men of the parish was called to assess him. Philip’s ordinance reflected the less centralized government of feudal France as compared with the governments of the Angevin dominions. Each seigneur having haute justice was to collect the tithes of his lay tenants. If he were a crusader, he would keep them, and a crusader who was the heir of his father or mother would have their tithes. Churchmen had to collect the tithes of their tenants and subordinates “and give them to whom they ought to give them”. The sanctions of the collection were, first, a provision that crusaders might seize the tithes of those who refused to pay them, and second, that clergy and laity, including knights, should pay under oath and under threat of excommunication. But no royal enforcement like that of Henry was provided. Another much longer ordinance regulating the debts of crusaders reflects the relative importance of the two forms of finance in the minds of the French chevaleres.

As Philip Augustus promised, neither he nor any of his successors appear to have collected another crusade tax like the Saladin Tithe. Philip and John of England, meeting in Paris in June 1201, acceded to a request of pope Innocent III to give a fortieth of their revenues for one year for the approaching Fourth Crusade, and they asked their subjects to do likewise. The method of collection in France is not known. In England the fortieth was asked as a charity, but those who refused to pay were ordered to give the king their reasons. The collection was made by counties rather than dioceses, and the sheriffs were responsible for escorting the collectors with their money and records to the

42. A general collection was ordained by the papal legate in France during the Fifth Crusade (Hist. nat., MS. Mssures 123, folio. 140-142), but apparently that parish was more of almogiving than tax-collecting.
New Temple at London. In this use of secular machinery, the English collection was tantamount to a tax. Both kings reserved the right to send the money to the Holy Land as they saw fit, and John ordered that it be given only to Hospitallers, Templars, and crusaders of the lands where it was collected. Philip in his ordinance specifically denied any right of distrust by the papacy, and John protested an attempt by bishop Odo of Paris to collect the fourth in Normandy on papal authority. General taxation by the pope and the princes acting together had fallen a soul of political jealousies, which in another generation would prove fatal to this source of financial support for the crusade. 43

In the empire hardly an echo is heard of the Saladin Tribe on the departure of Frederick Barbarossa for the Holy Land. 44 The first general tax known to have been levied in the empire was decreed by Philip of Swabia, who was king of Germany but not emperor. In a great council of the realms held in 1207, Philip ordered a general "almageving" for the Holy Land to be paid for five years. Freemen were asked to give as divine grace inspired them, but in the country six pence should be paid on each plow and in the towns two pence on each house. The collection may be called a tax on the non-noble lower classes but not on the freemen or nobles. The bishops were made responsible for the appointment of collectors, the nobles for enforcing the collection. The king sent messengers to collect the whole and to use it for the Holy Land. 45 Since those were troubled times in the empire and Philip was killed the next year, the universality and effectiveness of his tax are questionable.

At the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 Innocent III called upon princes and towns to give financial aid to the Holy Land. In 1221, apparently in belated response to this request, the newly crowned emperor Frederick II levied a tax in his kingdom of Sicily for his planned crusade; from the clergy he took a twentieth of their temporal income (the pope had already collected a twentieth of ecclesiastical income) and from the laity a tenth, while the merchants also paid a twentieth of their lucro of the preceding year. 46 At the same time a papal legate,

45 MGH, Leges, II, 213-224.
46 Richaud of Saint Germaine, Chroniques, pp. 95, 97-99.
the future Gregory IX, bore the requests of the pope and the emperor for aid to the Holy Land to the cities of northern Italy. In consequence, Siena promised to collect six soldi for every hearth, while Florence promised twenty soldi for every knight’s hearth, ten for every foot soldier’s hearth. Milan agreed to send twenty knights fully equipped and supplied for one year; Bologna, Brescia, Mantua, and Treviso each ten; and others fewer.\footnote{Registri dei cardinali Ugolino d’Orsini e Consacranti degli Umbri, vol. Cesare Levi (Rome, 1908), pp. 7, 11–12, 19–24.}

In the spring of 1222 John of Brenne, regent of Jerusalem, came to England to secure aid for the Holy Land. King Henry III was a minor, but his regents called together a council of the magnates which authorized a general poll tax to be paid on November 1. The tax was levied at the rate of three marks for earls, one mark for barons, one shilling for knights, and one penny for freeholders or landless persons with chattels worth half a mark. The money was to be collected in each village by a Templar and a Hospitaller with the aid of the sheriff. Opposition to the tax appears to have necessitated another writ on November 24 which extended it to all cultivators of the land and ordered the sheriffs to restrain the taxpayers. The yield was evidently small, and arrears were ordered collected as late as January 1224.\footnote{Mitchell, taxation, pp. 19–20, 33–36, 134–139}

The papacy, nonetheless, favored the poll tax. Pope Honorius III in April 1223 sent an encyclical throughout western Christendom in which he asked the princes to ordain in their dominions a tax similar to those of 1207 in Germany and 1222 in England.\footnote{MGH, Epistolae sacrae XII, 1, nos. 224–226.} The pope asked that every household should pay one penny of Tona or its equivalent each month for three years. The collection was left up to the princes, and no ruler is known to have taken heed of the papal request. Again, in 1235 Gregory IX asked every Christian who had not taken the cross to give a penny a week to support the crusade.\footnote{Registri del Gregorio IX, II, no. 2664.} Forty years later, Gregory X still sought to have the princes of Europe levy a universal tax for the crusade he planned.\footnote{Hermann Finke, Konziliarstudien zur Geschichte des 13. Jahrhunderts (Münster, 1891), p. 115.} He asked at least a penny a year from every person without exemption. But again the lords appear not to have consented to the levy. Such taxes as the princes of the late thirteenth century might raise, they used for purposes other than the crusades. When princes did lead crusades, they expected to have their expeditions financed largely by the clergy.
The crusade appertained peculiarly to the church. Like the lady, individual clerics took the cross and led companies of crusaders, helped other crusaders with gifts and loans, and paid the taxes levied by their princes. But it is rather as a corporation that the church had its unique place in financing the crusades. The privileges of crusaders reveal the early concern of the church with the problem, and it evolved other, more positive methods of supporting its great enterprises.

Through the military orders of warrior monks, the church provided directly for the defense of the Holy Land. The most important of these orders were the Knights of the Temple and the Brothers of the Hospital of St. John, although for a time the Teutonic Knights added their strength and resources to the common task. The orders formed permanent corps of crusaders stationed in the east with reserves in Europe. Each created an elaborate organization with houses of various ranks throughout Europe as well as Outremer. In the west these houses acted as recruiting stations and managed the resources of the orders locally. Early in the thirteenth century James of Vitry wrote of the orders, "They have been prodigiously increased by vast possessions both on this side of and beyond the sea, for they own villages, cities and towns. ..."[52] The records more than bear out his statement. Each house of the orders, as James went on to say, sent "a certain sum every year for the defense of the Holy Land to their grand master", whose seat was in the east. The sum sent by preceptories of the Hospital seems normally to have been a third of their revenues, paid twice a year before the regular spring and autumn passages to the east.[53] The financial organization of the orders not only supplied their own needs, but also permitted them, especially the Templars,[54] to act as bankers for the crusades. Their part in the collection of the general taxes of 1185 and 1188 has already been noted, and they also received clerical taxes in 1201 and 1215. Their regular passages offered facilities for other crusaders to resupply themselves. Deposits with houses in the west could be withdrawn in the east, and money could also be borrowed from them in the Holy Land to be repaid in Europe. They preferred to deal in coin and apparently did not develop credit operations beyond transfers. Yet they remained the crusade bankers par excellence, serving the papacy and princes as well as lesser men, while their own resources gave them a prime place in the defense of the Holy Land.

Around the military orders from an early date grew up confraternities, in which laymen bound themselves together to support the orders financially and otherwise. Although members of the confraternities might eventually take the vows of the orders, the corporation continued as a separate supporting body. The confraternities of the military orders perhaps provided a model for other confraternities which were actually independent crusade fraternities not associated with the older orders. The organization of a confraternity at Châteaudun, confirmed by Pope Innocent IV in 1247, may be taken as an example: its members took the cross not as individuals but as a group, and they were not held to the ordinary regulations governing performance of crusade vows. They might go to the Holy Land individually, or as a group they might send money or warriors paid from the common purse. These confraternities represented an adaptation for the laity of the older military orders, unlike them in being part-time activities of the members, like them in being permanent corporations organized to support the crusade.

Ultimately the financial support of the military orders and the confraternities derived from the alms and legacies of the faithful. By his gift to one of the orders any Christian could share in the great enterprise and in the spiritual rewards promised to crusaders. As early as 1101 Pope Paschal II joined with the patriarch of Jerusalem, Dambert of Pisa, in offering an indefinite remission of penance to those who gave aid to the Hospital. Innocent II in 1131 promised remission of one seventh of enjoined penance to those who gave of their goods to the Hospital, and the same privilege was soon extended to the Temple. Confraternities also received indulgences and could pass on some of their rewards to those who supported them. Great gifts as well as innumerable small ones were made: in 1134 Alfonso I of Aragon bequeathed a third of his kingdom to the two military orders and the Holy Sepulcher; Béla of Hungary, Byzantine heir-apparent and "duke", in 1163-1169 gave 10,000 gold bezants to the Hospital; and Henry II of England sent 30,000 marks sterling to the Templars and the Hospitalers for the defense of Tyre in 1188. Until the Third Crusade the Hospital and the Temple were the usual recipients of alms and legacies for the Holy Land. Later, gifts were received by the Teutonic Knights, the kings and patriarchs of Jerusalem, and others. Other crusaders

doubtless received alms for which the givers were granted spiritual benefits by local clergy, who certainly administered legacies for the crusade along with those for other pious purposes.

The church also developed monetary redemption of vows as a means of financing the crusades. In order that the Holy Land should suffer no loss through the inability of a crusader to fulfill his vow himself, the church early permitted him to send a substitute, both of them being entitled to the crusade indulgence. At first, redemption of vows for money, though similar to substitution in theory, was opposed by a significant body of opinion in the church. A decretal of Alexander III, incorporated in the canon law, provided for redemption by lifetime support of a pauper. On the other hand, as early as 1101 four crusaders gave lands to the Hospital in redemption of their vows. At the departure of the French army on the Second Crusade, bishops Godfrey of Langres and Arnulf of Lusignan redeemed the vows of sick and dying crusaders for money. The crusaders received their full indulgence, but they were expected to give as much money as it would have cost them to make the crusade. The money was presumably used in aid of the Holy Land by the clergy who received it; much of it probably went to the military orders with the alms and legacies they received.

The loss of Jerusalem in 1187 led the church to make greater use of its penitential system for financing the crusade. Gregory VIII, followed by Clement III, offered larger indulgences to those who gave alms for the Holy Land. The pope left the execution of his mandate to the bishops, who should grant remission of sins according to the "quality of the person and the quantity of the salvation" and disburse the money to needy crusaders. When archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury preached the crusade, for example, he granted an old man remission of half his enjoined penance in return for a tenth of his estate. In 1198 the famous preacher Fulco of Neueil undertook to preach the crusade in France, and he collected much money in alms. What Fulco collected he deposited in the abbey of Cluny, whence some of the money was sent to the Holy Land for the repair of the walls of Acre and Tyre, part was distributed to poor crusaders to de-

fray the cost of equipment and transportation, and the remainder went to pay the Venetians for the fleet they prepared for the expedition. 60

To make the collection of alms for the crusade permanent and easy, Innocent III in 1199 ordered a chest placed in every church throughout Latin Christendom, wherein the faithful might deposit their gifts to share in the remission of sins. The chests should have three locks, like those for the general taxes, the keys to be held one by the bishop, one by the priest, one by a layman. The bishops were ordered to associate with themselves a Templar and a Hospitaller as well as laymen to distribute the alms to worthy but poor crusaders who would promise to remain in the service of the cross a year or more and bring back letters attesting their stay in the Holy Land. 64 Although later popes changed these orders on disbursement of alms, the chests became fixtures in the churches of Europe.

The sale of legacies and redemptions also increased during the Third and Fourth Crusades. Crusaders came to be expected to provide legacies for the fulfillment of their vows in the event of their premature death. Compacts were made, like that between Richard and Philip on the Third Crusade, that on the death of one crusader, another should receive his property and carry out the crusade for both. 63 For his crusade Richard was empowered by the pope to redeem the vows of crusaders whom he wanted to stay in England. Although Celestine III preferred substitution by men to redemption by money, Innocent III established the two systems as equal in the law of the church. The dispensation of vows was left to local prelates, but Innocent expected them to be very strict, as he was himself in the cases on which he acted. Celestine had permitted confessors to impose the vow of the cross as penance; the next step was direct absolution upon payment of money for the crusade, and thus also Innocent established as a form of redemption. 62 Innocent’s successors added other monies derived from the penitential system of the church: ill-gotten gains, penalties for offenses such as blasphemy, and indistinct legacies. By ill-gotten gains were meant the monies which were restored by or confiscated from usurers or thieves and which could not be restored to their victims.


63 IV, 206, 1135-1136; 215, 745-746, 1136-1137, 1185; 206, 493; Lunt, Papal Revenue, II, no. 356.
In 1237 and 1238 Louis IX of France and Theobald IV of Navarre and Champagne, with papal permission, gave to the aid of the Latin empire of Constantinople monies taken from Jewish usurers. Louis said that his predecessors had used such monies for the crusade, but thenceforth the papacy undertook to collect and control them. Indis- trict legacies were those made for pious purposes not clearly specified, and these the papacy permitted to be assigned to the crusade. The income of suppressed religious orders, of some vacant benefices, and of some tithes held illegally by laymen was also ordered given for the crusade. 64

The thirteenth-century popes concerned themselves largely with regularizing the collection and disbursement of these crusade monies. Under Gregory IX local prelates continued to collect the monies, but they were sometimes given the assistance of, sometimes frankly superseded by, papal legates. In any case, the collectors were ordered to deposit the monies with God-fearing men, report the amounts to the pope, and disburse them only by papal mandate. Thus the pope could make gifts to promising crusaders either in a specific amount or as the whole or part of the collections of an area. Crusaders exerted great pressure to obtain these monies in their own lands or neighborhoods, and the pope made numerous grants of collections in advance. To safeguard such grants, Gregory ordered the collectors to give a crusader only a third of his grant on collection, the remainder to be reserved till he had embarked or actually arrived in the east. 65 Gregory also began the diversion of these crusade monies from the Holy Land, in which he was followed by his successors. Eventually, Urban IV ordered a collector to deliver crusade monies, along with other papal revenues, to merchants for transfer to the papal camera. Boniface VIII repeated the instruction, and thenceforth papal collectors treated these funds like any others. 66

Pope Alexander III had inspired the general levy of 1165, and from this beginning the papacy in cooperation with lay rulers had progressed in crusade taxation to the Saladin Tithe. Although the popes appealed thereafter for further general taxes upon lay and cleric alike, the results were disappointing. Taxation of the clergy without the consent of

64 Registres de Grégoire IX, II, nos. 3689, 4209, 4601, 4641, Matthew Paris, Chronicke Mai- jores, IV, 364–365; Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, p. 116; Furnell, Papal Cradcal Policy, pp. 142–144
66 Lust, Papal Revenues, introduction, 1, 123.
the princes was out of the question, but the clergy were rich beyond compare. From the beginning the clergy had been taxed for the crusades, and probably the largest amount of financial support had come from their treasuries and revenues. For the First Crusade William Rufus had taxed the clergy of England for the money to send Robert of Normandy to the Holy Land, and bishop Olibert of Liège had taken from his clergy the money to give Godfrey of Bouillon for his journey. In 1099 archbishop Anselm of Milan withheld a customary revenue of his clergy to support the Lombard crusade of that year. King Géza II of Hungary levied a tax upon his churchmen to bribe Conrad III to make a peaceful passage through his lands on the Second Crusade. But general taxation of the Latin clergy by the popes appears only in 1188 when Clement III issued an encyclical commanding the bishops to give aid to the Holy Land and to induce or force their subordinates to contribute. In England and France this separate clerical tax was apparently merged in the general Saladin Taxe; but the letter was also sent to the clergy of Genoa, and a papal legate in Poland "imposed a tenth upon the bishops and all the clergy for the recovery of the Holy Land." Thus originated papal taxation of the clergy for the crusade.

Innocent III built upon this foundation when in 1199 he levied a fortieth of the ecclesiastical income of every clerk in Latin Christendom. He directed the archbishops and bishops to deal with the tax in provincial synods and then in diocesan synods to order all the clergy to assess themselves and pay the tax within three months. The bishops should collect the money in a safe place and notify the pope of the amount. The Cistertian, Prémontrésiens, Grandmontine, and Car-

67 Odoario Vitalis, Historia ecclesiastica, KY. 16; Chroniclee S. Hubert, in MGH, SS. VIII, 515; Landulfo da S. Paolo, Historia Mediolannensi, in RASS, V-1, p. 9; The Hungarian Illustrated Chronicle, ed. Decai Derozsényi (New York, 1970), facsimile 420
69 The fortieth is commonly regarded as the first papal tax for the crusades; see Edgar H. McNeal, "The Fourth Crusade," in volume II of the present work, pp. 156-157, and Joseph R. Strayer, "The Political Crises of the Thirteenth Century," ibid., II, 346. See also Grotius, Historiae ruris, pp. 18-20, who did not know the letter to Genoa and dismissed the Polish evidence as a priori gravamina. Alfonso Prosoponome, Contributo agli studi sulle cronache ecclesiastiche e delle crociate (Rome, 1869), p. 135; however, cited the Polish evidence as "La prima notizia di una tassa ecclesiastica per le crociate.	" Giuseppe Martini, "Innocenzo III ed il finanziamento delle crociate," Archivio storico R. descriptio nove omnia in patria positum, LXXVII (1944), 314, refers to the letters to Canterbury and Genoa, but does not consider the Polish evidence; he concluded that Innocent III fully taxed the clergy but that Clement III's letters held the "premissa fondamentale."" Taking all the evidence together, Clement's tax appears to be as well documented as can be expected for the period, and must take precedence over Innocent's.
thusian orders were exempted from the fortieth, but by special mandates the first two were commanded to pay a fiftieth of their income, which they were to assess and collect themselves. Although Innocent promised to treat the tax as a gift and granted an indulgence of one fourth of enjoined penance to those who paid it faithfully, the clergy protested vigorously, and in England much of the tax remained unpaid six or seven years later. After the Fourth Crusade, which the fortieth was intended to support, was diverted against the papal will, the pope seems to have sent the money to the Holy Land for use by the military orders, the patriarch, Albert, and the king of Jerusalem, Aimery of Luxunum. Meanwhile Innocent’s own attention was diverted by the Albigensian heresy, against which he proclaimed a crusade, and in 1209 he laid upon the clergy in southern France another tax, which his legates collected. In 1208 a similar levy had been ordered collected in Lombardy by papal “visitors”. Like the fortieth, these lesser taxes were laid by the pope on his own authority and strengthened further the system of papal taxation of the clergy, while they also established a precedent for diversion of clerical taxes from the Holy Land.70

In 1215 Innocent convened at Rome a general council of the church, the Fourth Lateran, to provide for the succor of the Holy Land. A long canon of the council was devoted to the organization, regulation, and financing of the proposed expedition. While princes and towns were asked to give aid to the Holy Land, the core of Innocent’s financial program for this papal crusade was taxation of the clergy. Promising a tenth from himself and from the cardinals, the pope laid a twentieth on the clergy for three years.71

When Innocent died in 1216, the execution of his plans fell to his successor, Honorius III. In each province of Germany, Hungary, and Spain, Honorius appointed as collectors of the tax the local masters of the Temple and the Hospital with two dignitaries of the metropolitan chapter; they in turn were commissioned to appoint as subcollectors in each diocese two or more clerks with a member of each military order. Presumably like the fortieth, the monies were to be held by the military orders until disbursed by papal mandate. Accusations of Roman misappropriation of crusade monies were rife, however, and to avoid further scandal, Honorius determined upon a major revision of his predecessor’s plans. In February 1217 he made each bishop respon-

71 Manuel, Concilium, XXIII, 1868–1869.
sible for the twentieth in his diocese; rendering only an account to the pope, he should send the money directly to the crusading army. The clergy exempt from episcopal authority were directed to collect the tax themselves. Decentralization, however, created other administrative problems. Toward the end of 1218, therefore, Honorius sent papal collectors directly to Spain, Germany, and Hungary, and eventually to northern Italy and to Britain; in France, where King Philip II had demanded half the collections for the Albigensian crusade, two bishops and the abbot of Citeaux were appointed to collect and divide the tax. Although the ordinances continued to be chiefly responsible, the papal commissioners could enforce and hasten the collection, and they had powers to deal with the exempt religious. Further, as the pope saw the need, he could direct his commissioners to give money to specified crusaders; to deposit it with the Templars, who transferred certain amounts to the east on papal order; or occasionally to send or bring it to Rome. 72

The tax presented many other problems. The canons of the Lateran Council called for a twentieth of all “ecclesiastical revenues”, a phrase which concealed grave difficulties of definition. The clergy, however, were left to assess themselves under threat of spiritual penalties, and there can be little doubt that undervaluation was common. Exemptions from the tax filled the papal registers. Besides the orders exempted from the fortieth, many other groups and individuals received exemptions for poverty, debts, or charitable function. Collections tended to be slow and uncertain. The twentieth was still being collected normally in 1221, six years after the Lateran Council. The pope had to empower many legates and prelates to absolve from papal excommunication the clergy who defaulted at the stated terms or attempted to defraud. Even of the collectors appointed directly by the pope, one proved seriously untrustworthy and others disobeyed papal orders. Disbursement was complicated because powerful crusaders received grants of the tax in their lands. Honorius complained that many magnates took the cross, took the twentieth, but neglected to go on the crusade. 73

If the problems attendant on the administration of the twentieth were great, so were the collections. Thenceforth papal taxation became a common feature of the life of the clergy of the west, although diversion from its original purpose of supporting the crusade in the Holy Land also became common. Honorius III had diverted monies from the twentieth to the support of the Albigensian Crusade, and in 1226


73 Regesta Honorii III, passim.
he authorized a tenth for five years from the clergy of France for the same purpose. Gregory IX levied a tenth in 1229, not for the Holy Land, but for his war against the emperor. When he sought a thirtieth for the Holy Land in 1238, he seems to have been unsuccessful, perhaps because the next year he proclaimed a crusade against Frederick and demanded clerical taxes for it. Innocent IV convened a general council at Lyons in 1245, and the canon for the crusade, very nearly the same as that of 1215, included the levy of another twentieth for three years from all the clergy. In France and England this twentieth was superseded by a tenth which the pope granted to the kings as crusaders, and elsewhere the twentieth was directed to the “crusade” against Frederick. Although Innocent and his successors continued to tax the clergy chiefly for other purposes, Urban IV in 1262 collected for the Holy Land a hundredth for five years (the equivalent of a twentieth for one year), and Clement IV levied a tenth for three years from the French clergy when Louis IX took the cross a second time in 1267. With these taxes, the papacy improved and further centralized the administration of clerical taxation. 74

The pontificate of Gregory X proved the climax in papal taxation of the clergy for the crusade. Although Gregory found little enthusiasm in Europe for another crusade, he nearly succeeded in organizing another great expedition before his death intervened. Like Innocent III and Innocent IV he called together another general council in 1274, and the constitutions of the council for the crusade reveal his indebtedness to his predecessors. Essentially like theirs, his financial program centered on a tenth to be collected from all the clergy for six years. Gregory’s administration of the tax, most impressive in its plan and thoroughness, completed the work of his predecessors. Declarationes dubitationum in negotio decimæ were issued to define the bases of assessment. New assessments were made and in England at least proved to be much higher than earlier ones. All the lands subject to the papacy were divided into twenty-six collectorships, over each of which the pope appointed a general collector, who in turn appointed sub-collectors without reference to the ordinaries. Though originally no exemptions were to be allowed, the pressure became too great, and the pope permitted the usual exceptions at the discretion of the collectors. The bitter complaints of the clergy and surviving accounts of the tax reveal the efficiency of the system and the large sums of money

74. The history of these clerical taxes of the thirteenth century is told most completely in Gottlob, Kreuzzugsverwaltung, but his research has been summarized and completed by later studies. Cf Austin P. Evans, “The Allemanian Crusade,” in volume II of the present work, p. 516; Strayer, “Political Crusades,” ibid., pp. 340-352, 355-357, 361, 364, 371.
collected. After Gregory's death the money was largely diverted from the Holy Land. Although papal taxation of the clergy long continued, it ceased in the main to be used in support of the crusade to the Holy Land.\footnote{On the Ninth of 1274 see Godbole, {\em Kommunikationen}, pp. 94–106, 253–269; Trowop, {\em Crusade, Criticism of the Crusade}, pp. 236–246; Last, {\em Valuation of Normandy}, pp. 165–176, 253–259; Last, {\em Financial Relations}, pp. 311–346; {\em Estimation documentaire italienne sur le milieu XIII et XIV} by C. De La Pierre (Vesuani City, 1932); Ludovico Gotta, {\em Riferimento di Gregorio X} (Rome, 1859), chap. vi. For the history of crusade taxation after Gregory X see Ernst Hennig, {\em Die politischen Zwecken aus Deutschlands im Zeitlichen des europaischen Papsttums und weder von dergleichen Schmetter} (Halle, 1909); Bocquet, {\em Le Caudanier paralipoménis}, p. 77; Paul Rostin, {\em Expéditions et personnes des Scavilliens au Trois Samone en temps des croisades} (Paris, 1863), pp. 391–401}

Throughout the earlier Middle Ages devout western Christians made pilgrimages to the Holy Land. The pilgrimage unquestionably mothered the crusade; those who took the vow and wore the cross were called pilgrims, their routes to the Holy Land were the pilgrimage ways, and they benefitted by the experience of the earlier pilgrims in organizing their expeditions. Yet, if the pilgrimage was mother to the crusade, the child had a lusty father in the chivalry of medieval Europe. A crusade was an armed expedition to reconquer the Holy Land for Christians, and only men with the ability and arms to fight God's battles could be effective crusaders. The simple palmer, though he accompanied the crusading armies, had not the skill or equipment of the warrior-pilgrim who may be called a crusader. As a pilgrim, each crusader was obliged by his vow to find the means to accomplish it, and the financial basis of the crusade was the individual effort made by the crusader to finance his pilgrimage. On the other hand, the crusader's journey cost more than the palmer's: every warrior had equipment to maintain; the knight, a horse and attendants. The greater needs of crusaders gave rise to collective or corporative financing. This formed the superstructure of the vessel that carried the crusaders over the Mediterranean while individual financing made the bottom.

The First Crusade comprised several groups: the peasant mob of Peter the Hermit and others like them, the companies of knights from France and Norman Sicily, the marine expeditions from Italy and the north. Except for these last, all the evidence points to individual preparation for the crusade. At most the feudal contingents of the princes may have been feudally financed. But lesser men as well as Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Normandy alienated their property. The pilgrims plundered the Jews in the Rhineland and the Hungarians and Greeks on their route of march. The eastern emperor Alexius Comnenus gave them rich gifts, while booty was a prime source of con-
continuing finance. It may be supposed that crusaders received alms like the pilgrims, perhaps went as substitutes for others, but none of the later financial organization of the penitential system yet existed. Only the mariners are known to have used corporate methods of financing their expeditions. Following in the pilgrim's pattern, the crusader of 1096 generally provided for his financial support privately and individually.

During the first half of the twelfth century methods of financing crusades remained essentially the same as at the beginning. Each crusader, like the viscount of Bourges, sold his lands or saved or borrowed or plundered the money he needed to achieve his vow. However, the clergy were already being taxed to support others on the crusade. And the military orders were organized and began to accumulate the endowments which enabled them to become a standing army of crusaders in the Holy Land.

The second great expedition revealed considerable development in crusade finance, at least among the French participants. Louis VII taxed his subjects for his crusade. In his army bishops redeemed crusading vows for money, and there can be little doubt of the prevalence of substitution. The king, and very likely others, employed the financial facilities of the Templars to transport and borrow money. The wealth of both the Temple and the Hospital shows the growth of alms and legacies for the crusade. For this crusade Eugenius III issued his bull *Quantum praedecessores*, setting forth the privileges of crusaders. In all these ways social financing of the crusade had grown since the initial conquest of the land beyond the sea, yet the overwhelming impression remains that each crusader financed his own *peregrinatio* individually.

Moslem victories evoked a new response among western Christians to the problem of financing the crusades. This was universal taxation, which reached its peak with the Saladin Tithe of 1188. Presumably this tax in large part financed the Third Crusade; it was said to have yielded 70,000 pounds sterling in England alone. But Henry II obtained 60,000 pounds at the same time from the Jews, and Richard I raised substantial sums in addition. The great wealth of Richard gave him a larger command than just the men of his own dominions and perhaps made possible such success as the expedition achieved. The military orders played an increasingly important role, largely supported by the papal development of the collection of alms, legacies, and redemptions of vows. Yet one cannot gainsay the primary importance of individual financing. Many crusaders pledged or sold their prop-

property to pay their way. The ordinances of Philip Augustus for the crusade laid much greater emphasis on regulation of debts than on the Saladin Tithe, and Frederick Barbarossa issued an edict that no crusader should set out on the journey without complete equipment and enough money to last two years.77

The popes of the thirteenth century undertook to provide a more corporative financial base for the crusade. Innocent III desired a crusade not only called by the papacy, but commanded by a papal legate; in order to ensure command, the papacy had also to control the financing of the crusade. The leaders of the Fourth Crusade refused papal direction and apparently received little or none of the forty-th collected by the pope for the crusade. The legacy of the count of Champagne and the individual financial arrangements of the crusaders supported this earlier crusades. The leaders contracted with Venice to pay 85,000 marks of Cologne to transport and feed 29,000 men and 4,500 horses for nine months. When only about half that number actually came to Venice, the leaders gave their own treasure and even borrowed what they could to pay off their debt to the Venetian state. Eventually they had to work it off by the capture of Zara, but this was hardly the kind of corporative finance envisioned by the pope.78

The Fifth Crusade most nearly embooched the papal plan. Going to Acre, king Andrew II of Hungary financed his expedition in the traditional way, by selling and mortgaging property, by debasing the coinage, and by taking the sacred utensils of the churches.99 But the twentieth exalted from the clergy of all Europe provided the legate Peiagius with a sizeable command in Egypt. By July of 1220 the pope

77 Annaler Margaritene, in MGH, SS. XVII, 164, of Annalenaen regni Ricardi, p. 43, which says one year.

78 The contract between Venice and the crusade leaders is printed in Ursulaen zur ehemaligen Hamburger und Staatsarchivarchiv der und in Beziehung auf der Zeugnisse und der Lehren von Gottlieb L. K. Thiel and Georg M. Thomas (Perecan rum aurifacorwn, Diplomataria et aest., XIII-XIV; 3 vols., Vienna, 1856-1857; suppl. Amsterdam, 1964), I, 360-371, no. 92. Villehardouin's manuscripts are curiously at variance on the total sum though all give the fare as 4 arlkk per horse and 2 marks per man. Four manuscripts of the thirteenth century have a total of 85,000 marks, but two mean manuscripts of the late fourteenth century and probably two that are now lost, representing a medium which Sirao (Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ii, 166-171) believes is better than that of the earlier manuscripts and takes for the basis of his tent. give 94,000 marks. Sirao 41, 215-217, and of Donald R. Queller, The Fourth Crusade (Philadelphia, 1977), pp. 18-22 and note 13.) explains this as a first offer of the Venetians of 6 marks for each horse and 8 marks for each knight, which was reduced before the contract was sealed. Robert of Clari has such a story (La Conquête de Constantinople, pp. 7-18), but the use of Villehardouin says nothing about such bargaining and a scriptural error may be all the explanation required.

79 Reinhold Rohricht, Studien zur Geschichte des fünften Kreuzzuges (Innsbruck, 1889), p. 24
had sent him approximately 100,000 marks, and in time his position became strong enough to enable him to lead the army to its defeat. Until that last fatal march, however, he had strong competition from other leaders whose finances were largely independent of the papacy: the king of Jerusalem, the masters of the crusading orders, and princes like the duke of Austria, Leopold VI. Oliver of Paderborn took pride in the well-supplied contingent of crusaders from his region of Cologne, and when he speaks of a "common treasury" under the legate's control, this cannot be taken to mean that the crusaders pooled all their resources. The spoils of Damietta, it is certain, were divided among the various leaders of the crusade. The legate's treasury must have been filled for the most part with money from the pope, although other crusaders contributed to it. Since the legate controlled no more than a fraction of the financial resources of the crusade, the ideal papal crusade failed of realization in its financing as it did in its military goal.

Later popes abandoned the principle of papal command of the crusades. They continued and extended taxation of the clergy and the collection of alms, legacies, and redemptions, but they granted the proceeds of these financial measures to lay crusaders. "Apostolic graces", as the papal grants were called, formed a prized source of support for the later thirteenth-century crusades. For his first crusade in 1249, Louis IX received all the crusade monies derived from alms, legacies, redemptions, usuries, and especially the tenth levied on the clergy of France, Lorraine, and Burgundy—all, that is, which the pope did not specifically grant to other crusaders. The king also collected aides from his vassals and tallies from his non-noble subjects. He presumably had savings to spend on the crusade plus as much of his annual revenues as he could persuade his mother, regent in his absence, to send to him. The king was the greatest and the richest single crusader in the army, but his wealth, even with the backing of the church, was insufficient to finance the crusade entirely. The Templars and Hospitalers provided large contingents of troops who represented another part of the corporative financial program of the church. Many crusaders other than the king received money from the church, notably his brothers Alphonse, count of Poitiers, and Robert, count of Artois; of mones

80 MGH, Epistolae sacrae XIII, 1, no. 114.
81 AOL, II-3, 106. William of Chartres was master of the Temple; Garm of Montaigu, of the Hospital.
83 Berger, Saint Louis et le Saint IV (Paris, 1893), pp. 105-207.
known to have been sent to Alphonse after his departure from France, roughly a fourth came from "graces". Along with the king and his brothers many crusaders probably took *avies* and *tuites*. The participation of the maritime cities, mercenary though it was for the most part, was presumably financed corporatively. Yet crusaders like Joinville still alienated their property for the expedition, and not a few, among them great nobles, borrowed large sums of money from Italian merchants in Cyprus, Egypt, and Syria.

Other crusades of the thirteenth century followed the same pattern of finance. For his crusade Frederick II took tax after tax from his subjects and especially from the churches of his dominions, and since he took so small an army with him when he finally went, he probably spent in the Holy Land only a fraction of what he collected. But in this as in so many things Frederick was the great exception. Papal taxation of the clergy and other papal monies provided much of the support for Richard of Cornwall in 1240 and for Prince Edward of England in 1270. Edward borrowed over 100,000 livres of Tours from merchants of Cahors on the security of a clerical twentieth in England granted in 1272, and a tenth was ordered collected in 1267 to reimburse Edward and his brother Edmund for their crusade expenses. Edward also and a twentieth of movables conceded by the English barons in 1269 that yielded over 125,000 livres. He received over 10,000 li. from the Jews; the royal demesnes were nullified; and in 1271 he was granted the revenues of all royal woodsheds and escheats, the regalian rights to the revenues of vacant prelacies, and the royal profits of justice. But he still had to pledge the customs of Bordeaux for four years for an unknown sum and for seven years for a loan of 70,000 li. from Louis IX. Altogether, Edward may easily have spent more than half a million livres on his crusade. Louis himself raised the money for his second expedition as for the first: a tenth for three years from the French clergy and a twentieth from the French-speaking parts of Lorraine and an aid from the townsfolk produced a great part of it. But he tried to recover a large loan he had made to his brother, Charles I of Anjou, and doubtless he scraped up every penny he could. Even

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65 *Layettes de trouvus au chevalier III*, min. 37000-3771, 3800, 3811, 3822, 3823, 3827, 3948, 3954, 3960.
if he did not, countless other crusaders continued to sell or pledge their lands or chattels to make the great journey.

Corporative finances remained in the thirteenth century a superstructure reared upon the solid base of individual finances. The reasons for this fact may be sought partly in the nature of the crusade, child of the individual pilgrimage and the individualistic chivalry, but partly also in the cost, which was greater not only than any individual could sustain but than any medieval state or corporation, even the church, was able or willing to afford. The evidence for the whole cost of any of the great expeditions is not forthcoming, but some idea of its magnitude can be obtained for Louis IX’s first crusade. A fourteenth-century account of the French government says the crusade cost the king over 1,517,570 li. It has been estimated that Louis financed between one half and three fifths of the crusaders, and if this calculation is correct, the whole cost of the crusade might have been between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000 li. The possibility of error in this figure is great, but it may help to put in perspective the relative value of individual and corporative sources of crusade finance. To begin with the largest corporate sum, the twentieth of their income paid by the clergy for the crusade of 1248 was probably in the neighborhood of 750,000 li. over the whole five-year period. The aims, legacies, redemptions, and usuries of the church would have added somewhat more to corporative support, as did the Templars and Hospitallers. Aides and tailles added still more: his towns may have contributed as much as 274,000 li. But when all allowances are made, it seems unlikely that half of the costs of the crusade came from corporative sources. The rest still had to be raised by the individual crusaders from savings, current income, or borrowings.

Something more can be said of the costs of the crusades for the various ranks of participants. For Louis’s second crusade in 1270 a document has preserved the gist of the contracts made between the king and a number of crusaders he took into his pay. The terms var-
red greatly, an indication that many still expected to finance their journeys in part; but the king contributed from 133½ to 400 li. per knight for a year's service, the total being above 100,000 li. for about 500 knights. Most of these barons and knights were also promised their passage, replacement of horses, and meals in the king's palace, the cost of which can hardly have been less than a half of their stipends. The king's brother, Alphonse of Poitiers, about the same time offered to knights who would furnish their own equipment, from 160 to 180 li. a year, representing a maximum stipend of 10 sous a day, while he offered 5 sous a day to mounted bowmen. All these wages were apparently supplemented by transportation and maintenance, and Alphonse specifically promised remounts to his bowmen in addition. Light cavalry thus cost half of the stipend of the chevalier and infantry a tenth or more. If Louis employed no more than 200 to 300 light cavalry and 1,600 infantry, as he did in Syria in 1250-1252, these men would have cost him well over 50,000 li. in annual stipends, plus transportation and maintenance. Transportation cost Louis over 100,000 li., and maintenance for a year would hardly have cost less. Altogether, Louis might have expected to pay 300,000 li. a year for his second expedition. On the earlier crusade, until Mansurah at least, Louis's army was larger than on the second and his campaign ran for six years. If the later account of his total costs is correct, his costs then would have averaged over 250,000 li. a year, about equal to his average annual royal revenue of 240,000 to 250,000 li. Since Louis's ordinary expenditures amounted to about half the royal revenue, even with the lion's share of apostolic graces, he might have had to raise 100,000 to 125,000 li. a year from savings, current income, aises, and taille. But that was a royal expense: Henry III of England had only an average ordinary income of about 100,000 li. a year before expenditures.

In the next rank among crusaders were the princes, of whom Alphonse of Poitiers may stand as an example. An extant account of his household provides exact figures from February 2 to December 10,

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26. The farming of Louis IX's first crusade has been described as done by Jordan, Louis IX, ch. 4.
27. James H. Ramsey, The Empire of the Crusaders (London, 1905), p. 297, where £60,000 is given as the ordinary revenue, but from this must be subtracted the £60,000 assigned to Prince Edward from 1255.
1250, for his costs on Louis's first crusade. The largest amount, 10,225 li., was spent for the hire and provisioning of ships and galleys and the wages of mariners, presumably for the journey from Damietta to Acre and thence to France. The domestic expenses of the count and countess also came to about 10,000 li. Military costs included 4,605 li. for horses, 2,529 li. for armor, and 120 li. for weapons. For the service of the barons, chevaliers, mounted bowmen, and foot-sergeants who composed his meunie, Alphonse paid only about 3,000 li. The total expenditure amounted to more than 35,000 li. Since Alphonse left France seventeen months before this account began, and his expenditures before the defeat at Mansurah may have been much larger, the complete costs of his crusade must have been several times larger than those here recorded. In 1270 Alphonse raised 100,000 li. for his participation in what was generally a smaller crusade. Even though Alphonse may have been extravagant, and though his expenses included his losses at Mansurah, yet his were the tastes and risks of crusader princes in the thirteenth century.

Of a baron's cost on this same crusade John of Joinville himself affords the best example. He tells of his financial preparations:

Because I did not wish to take away with me any penny wrongfully gotten therefore I went to Metz, in Lorraine, and placed in pawn the greater part of my land. And you must know that on the day when I left our country to go to the Holy Land, I did not hold more than one thousand livres a year in land. For my lady mother was still alive; and yet I went, taking with me nine knights and being the first of three knights-banniere. And I bring these things to your notice, so that you may understand that if God, who never yet failed me, had not come to my help, I should hardly have maintained myself for so long a space to the six years that I remained in the Holy Land.

God's agent in this help was the king. When the crusaders reached Cyprus, Joinville had only 240 li. left, and the king took the proud young marshal into hispay. In July 1250 Louis again retained him for the duration of his crusade with a company composed of three knights-banniere, each with two knights as companions, making a total of ten knights. The king paid Joinville at the rate of 3,000 li. a year, of which he kept 1,200 li. for the maintenance of the whole company and paid each of the banniere 600 li. They appear to have made their own terms with their companions, perhaps keeping something like 240 li. and giving the others 180 li. The king's officers thought Joinville asked too

98. Layetteau de l'Ordre des Chevaliers, III, p. 1940.
much, and he agreed that his terms were high. But he reminded the
king that he had lost all his possessions in Egypt including horse and
armor, the implication being that he would not ask as much as he was
worth if he did not have to. It seems reasonable to conclude, then,
that a baron could hardly take a company of ten knights on the crusade in 1250 for much less than 3,000 li. a year, and that Jouville had
been very rash to attempt it if his land was worth no more than 1,000
li. a year.

For the simple knight and the lower ranks of society the stipends
promised by Louis and Alphonse in 1270 afford the best measure of
the costs. To knights who took their meals at his table Louis gave 160
li. a year, but to those who undertook to maintain themselves he gave
wages of 10 sous a day, or 182½ li. a year. In all cases the king ap-
pears to have furnished transportation. It seems fair to say, therefore,
that the simple knight in the later thirteenth century needed roughly
200 li. a year to make his pilgrimage. By the same reckoning the
light cavalryman and the footsoldier needed about 100 and 20 li. re-
spectively.

If the cost of crusades varied with the rank and wealth of the cru-
saders, it varied also as western Europe experienced a rise in prices
and in the standard of living during the crusading era. In 1193 Henry
VI offered to pay his crusaders about 90 li. a year plus their mainte-
nance. A little earlier at Acre Philip Augustus was paying the going
rate of about 72 li. a year when Richard, with his usual chivalric magni-
cficence, offered 96 li. These stipends indicate that costs increased
two or three times between the Third Crusade and Louis’s second ex-
pedition. So also Richard spent about 400 to 500 li. each for his ships
and their sailors’ wages for a year, while Louis a century later paid
from 850 to 7,000 li., on the average seven to eight times as much,
but the ships were probably larger. Earlier than the Third Crusade good
evidence on costs fails, and the rate of increase between 1096 and 1191
cannot be stated. That costs rose, however, cannot be doubted. It is
probable that the money needed by a common footsoldier with Louis
IX would have sufficed a knight with Godfrey of Bouillon.

When costs of a crusade can be compared with the income of cru-
saders in the same period, the results are illuminating. At the time of
the Third Crusade when the two kings were paying 72 and 96 li. a year
to knights at Acre, it was held in England that a knight’s fee should

102. MGH, Legenda, II, 115; Chartularia regum Franciae, pp. 213-214.
pp. 8-9; Jfl, Arcis monachorum, ii, 307-615.
be worth roughly 80 lb. a year. If a knight had only 80 lb. a year income and it cost him about that to maintain himself in the Holy Land, then he had nothing with which to prepare and transport himself as well as to provide for his estate and family in his absence. In other words, current income was insufficient for the simple knight to finance a crusade. For the higher ranks of the feudality the matter is more complex: if a baron had an income of several hundred pounds, he could have gone on a crusade as a simple chevalier and paid the cost from his current income. But such a course of action would have violated the mores of the time; he was expected, in the words of Gregory IX, to take a "decent company" with him. Thus Joinville set out as the leader of a company of ten knights, a number he might have supported for forty days in France, but which required him to pawn his lands and still have no more than a third enough for his crusade. Again, if 3,000 lb. was the amount required for a baron to keep ten knights in the Holy Land, only a half a dozen or so of the barons of thirteenth-century England could have supported such an expedition from their current income.

The crusade was the most expensive adventure of mediæval chivalry, often financially ruinous to the individual crusaders. Collective and corporative methods of financing the crusades were imperative. Burghers, princes, and popes made use of such methods almost from the beginning, their individual resources being insufficient for the kind of expeditions they desired. The general taxation which reached a climax in the Saladin Tithe offered hope that a satisfactory financial structure might be created for the great enterprise. But the Saladin Tithe had no real successors. It was the model for taxation by princes for secular purposes; it was the model for taxation of the clergy by popes who found other uses for their money. The Holy Land continued to depend on armies essentially supported by private means, which were not sufficient, and the failure to develop sufficiently fast and far social methods of financing the crusades must be considered a factor in the loss of the Holy Land.

Like all wars the crusades were unproductive economically but had significant economic effects through their financing. Not only did the crusade taxes provide a model for later taxation on income and wealth, but the borrowing and lending necessary for most of the crusaders...
stimulated credit formation and the development of credit institutions and instruments. Indeed, the money economy as a whole must have been stimulated by these great enterprises which took so much money. The transformation of gold and silver altar ornaments into coin for crusaders may have helped to heighten the inflation that occurred during the crusades, especially in the later twelfth century. The sale of land to finance crusades most assuredly helped to make the market in real estate which was bringing about a new social order in the age of the crusades. The principal beneficiaries of all these financial transactions were the bourgeoisie, who loaned the money, bought the land, sold the provisions, furnished the transportation, and generally benefited by the financial activity of the crusaders. The peasantry who went on the crusades may have sacrificed everything but their souls, but as a class they must have gained very materially through the greater demand for their products and the greater supply of land on the market. Those members of the lay nobility who used up their savings, or sold or pledged their lands, may sometimes have been heavy losers because of the crusades, but as a whole the nobility probably lost economic power only relatively to the gains of the burghers and peasants. It was almost certainly the clergy, and especially the monasteries, who were the chief losers, as time and again they were forced to share their wealth with the crusaders either by loans without interest or by direct taxes. In essence the crusades redistributed some of Europe’s wealth out of the hands of the clergy and nobles into those of the bourgeoisie and peasantry.
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE KINGDOM OF CYPRUS

The adoption by the kingdom of Cyprus of institutions which existed in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem is well known to historians. Yet it is sometimes not sufficiently recognized that over a period of three centuries (1192–1489), these institutions underwent a development which profoundly modified them.

From 1192 to 1197 Cyprus formed a simple seigneurie, at first in the possession of the English king; then, when Richard the Lionhearted renounced his suzerainty, and his protégé Guy of Lusignan died in 1194, Guy's brother and heir Aimeric (1194–1205) was clever enough to acknowledge himself the vassal of the emperor Henry VI, who sent him a royal crown. In the same year, 1197, pope Celestine III created

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a church of the Latin rite in Cyprus. Although the heirs of Isaac Comnenus (d. 1195) still laid claim to the island until 1218, the actual rise of the kingdom can be dated from 1197.1

Imperial suzerainty occasioned difficult years for Cyprus, when Frederick II attempted to use his rights in order to nominate regents in 1228. King Henry I (1218–1253) was released from this dependency by Innocent IV in 1247, and the kingdom was from then on fully independent; the pretender Hugh of Brienne seems to have offered to become the vassal first of Charles I of Anjou, king of Sicily, and then of James I, king of Aragon-Catalonia, in exchange for their support, but without success.2 Some authors of crusading plans (Pierre Dubois, Manuel Pictet) proposed to transfer sovereignty to a prince who would be more useful for their plans. In 1303 there were plans for having the pope make a son of Frederick of Sicily king of Cyprus, in exchange for the

4. La situation juridique de la cité de Chypre, by H. Pictet, Revue d'histoire de la religion, 5 (1931), 100–103.
5. La situation officielle de la cité de Chypre, by H. Pictet, Revue d'histoire de la religion, 5 (1931), 100–103.

Among the studies of institutions, I might be permitted to cite my own articles, now reprinted in Origine et Occident au moyen âge, communs et relations (London, 1976), and Les Relations entre l'Occident et l'Orient au moyen âge (London, 1977).

4. La situation juridique de la cité de Chypre, by H. Pictet, Revue d'histoire de la religion, 5 (1931), 100–103.
5. La situation officielle de la cité de Chypre, by H. Pictet, Revue d'histoire de la religion, 5 (1931), 100–103.


4. La situation juridique de la cité de Chypre, by H. Pictet, Revue d'histoire de la religion, 5 (1931), 100–103.
5. La situation officielle de la cité de Chypre, by H. Pictet, Revue d'histoire de la religion, 5 (1931), 100–103.

surrender of the island of Sicily to the Angevins. None of these projects amounted to anything. But after his defeat at Khirokitia in 1426, King Janus (1398–1432) had to acknowledge his dependence on the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, who, from that time on, confirmed the kings of Cyprus in their office. The republic of Venice had to obtain the consent of the sultan in 1489 in order to take possession of the island.

Armory’s direct line died out in 1267. The high court recognized Hugh III (1267–1284), son of Henry of Antioch and Isabel of Lusignan, as heir to Hugh II, and thenceforth Cyprus was ruled by a branch of the princely house of Antioch. However, it took up the name and the traditions of the Lusignans: the Lusignan arms of a lion on a field of white and blue bars were quartered with the lion of Cyprus, the lion of Cilician Armenia, and the cross of Jerusalem. Further, the Lusignan colors, white and blue, were adopted for the silken cords on documents from which hung the king’s seal.

Rules for the succession were not firmly established. Preference was given to male heirs (in 1385 James I, a brother of Peter I, was chosen over Maria, Peter’s daughter), but Hugh III derived his rights from his mother, Isabel, and Charlotte, the daughter of John II, succeeded her father in 1458. The principle of choosing the heir closest to the last holder of the crown was retained: thus Hugh III was preferred to Hugh of Brienne, and Peter I was preferred to his nephew Hugh, the son of his older brother Guy, who had died in 1346 before their father, Hugh IV, did, although it was necessary for Hugh to have his second son, Peter, crowned in his own lifetime. Henry II (1285–1324) formally deprived the children of his brother Amalric of any claim to the throne in order to leave it to Hugh IV, the son of another brother, Guy.

In case of dispute, the high court decided. But in 1460 James (II), the illegitimate son of John II, appealed to the sultan Inal and obtained from him the investiture of the kingdom, which his half-sister Charlotte and her husband, Louis of Savoy, had been requesting. This investiture legitimized the forceful takeover which had won him the crown. Likewise the high court intervened to nominate regents. The barons were able to set aside Henry I’s mother, Alice, widow of Hugh (1205–1218), in order to commit the regency successively to Philip and to John of Ibelin. Henry II’s brother Amalric, titular lord of

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Tyre, obtained from the barons the government of the kingdom in place of his brother, who was declared incapable of ruling (1306). It was again the lieutenants who, on the death of Peter I, gave the regency to his brother John, titular prince of Antioch, whose murmur queen Eleanor brought about in 1375. Was it a high court decision in 1426 to give the regency to cardinal Hugh de Lusignan when his brother Janus was captured by the Egyptians? And was there likewise such a decision in 1473 to grant Catherine Cornaro, the widow of James II, the regency in the name of her infant son James III?

Armory of Lusignan had joined the crowns of Cyprus and Jerusalem by marrying Isabel, the widow of Henry of Champagne (1192-1197), the two crowns were separated at his death in 1203. However, when Conrade of Hohenstaufen died in 1268, Hugh III was acknowledged as his closest heir. From that time on the kings of Cyprus were simultaneously kings of Jerusalem. When the Frankish possessions in Syria were lost, Henry II had the idea of making Famagusta, which he endowed with high walls and franchises, the reflection of his lost kingdom. The cross of Jerusalem was displayed on his banners, on the seal of the bailiff of the comte, and on the coins struck in the town's mint. And after he had been crowned king of Cyprus in Santa Sophia of Nicosia, each new king would go to Saint Nicholas of Famagusta to receive the crown of Jerusalem, as late as the year 1372.

A third crown devolved on the king of Cyprus at the death in 1393 of Leon VI de Lusignan, king of Cilician Armenia. From then on the (de) Lusignans bore the title "king of Latin Jerusalem [with the number in order of the royal succession since Baldwin II], king of Cyprus, and king of Armenia". It is not known, however, whether the fortress of Corcyra, which the kings of Cyprus held from 1360 to 1448, was regarded as forming part of the kingdom of Cilician Armenia.

The Lusignans thus considered themselves entitled to confer the offices and fees of each of their three kingdoms. They nominated a marshal of Armenia; after they received the crown of Jerusalem, they nominated a seneschal, a constable, a marshal, a butler, and a chamberlain of Jerusalem; and after they received the crown of Cyprus,
they nominated titulars of these same offices, as well as an admiral, a turcopole, a chancellor, and an auditor for the kingdom of Cyprus. In addition, after the seigneurial families of the Holy Land died out, while retaining the titles of the princes of Antioch and Galilee and the counts of Tripoli for their younger sons, Peter I and his successors accorded to their subjects the titles of counts of Edessa and of Jaffa, and lords of Sidon, of Caesarea, and of Beirut. However, these titles did not include any territorial endowment, in contrast to the first titled seigneur created in the kingdom of Cyprus, the county of Carpas (Karpassos; 1472).  

When Guy of Lusignan became lord of Cyprus, he concerned himself with attracting enough Franks to the island to stabilize its occupation and ensure its defense. Some came from the kingdom of Jerusalem or the other principalities of the Latin east, others came from the west, especially from Poitou. He distributed fiefs among them generously (his brother Aimery reputedly reduced the extent of these concessions). It was undoubtedly the domain of the “emperor” Isaac Comnenus, who had deprived numerous members of the Greek aristocracy of their possessions, which was thus parcelled out, but many great Greek landholders, especially among the laity, and a number of Venetians were also despoiled—one tradition has it that the archontes had first to surrender half their possessions. In any case, it is certain that no Greek name is encountered among the vassals of the kings of Cyprus in the thirteenth century.  

Although generous, these feudal grants were never connected with important territories. There were no great seigneuries in Cyprus; most of them included no more than a single village (casal), or else a few scattered villages (one exception being the domain of Marethasa, belonging to the titular count of Edessa in the fifteenth century). Not all of them had even a fortified manor-house with a defense tower.  

The customs of the kingdom of Jerusalem were imposed with respect to feudal law: only minor differences may be noted (as, for example, the fief being passed on only to the direct descendants of a deceased

10 The “families of archontes which, without titles or arms, comprised a Greek nobility”, may have metamorphosed within the field of a population hostile to the invaders their rank and their prerogatives of yesteryear”, in renaissance in the 16th century: Vitalien Laurain’s review of C. Hill’s History of Cyprus in Revue des deux mondes, VII (1880), 369. The only Greek “nobles” known up to the 16th century is Constant Sambalikis, died in 1316 in the account book of Palermós, but were civil servants of the king or the church, bore names which seem to indicate a Greek aristocratic antecedent.
vassal). 11 Cyprus even conserved some practices which were tending to disappear elsewhere, in particular the right of the king to compel the heiresses of a vassal to remarry, by offering them a choice among three men of their rank. The manuscript of the Assises indicates "comme dame dont estre requise d'espouser baron". 12 This obligation was derived from that of guaranteeing the services of the vassal-holder in person.

Florio Buotron has given a precise definition of the military service of the vassals. The knight had to present himself to the army with four horses, the squere with three, the man-at-arms with two, and the turcopole (who was a lightly armed horseman, originally a Syrian) with one. Where the vassal was unable to guarantee this service — as in the case of a young unmarried woman or a widow who had not remarried, although other exemptions existed — the vassal had to pay a tax called "default of service", which was assessed according to the number of fees of knights or other warriors which he or she held. 13 Under Hugh III, the vassals claimed that they were not obliged to serve the king overseas or outside the kingdom. Prince Edward of England worked out a compromise limiting the duration of such service to forty days.

In accordance with the obligation to give advice to the king, the vassals were summoned to attend his court. The high court was made up of lieutenants who judged cases concerning seifs and vassals. Its jurisdiction is specified by two customals which particularly concern the kingdom of Cyprus: the Livre à un sieur seigneur of Philip of Novara (mid-thirteenth century) and the Livre contrefois des Assises, or Livre du Plédeant et du Plaidoyer, written a century later. 14

The high court was first of all an instrument of royal power, which elaborated the sentences promulgated by the king after the jury reported its decision to him. 15 It had charge of maintaining the rights of the king as well as judging disputes between him and his vassals. In this regard, the vassals were the guarantors of the king's acts; the Livre


12. *RHC, Lois,* II, 389. An exemption was given to James de Fleurie for his wife, allowing him to remarry anyone she chose: Richard, *Documents chypriotes,* p. 231.

13. Florio Buotron, *Chroniques,* pp. 462-463; Richard, *Documents chypriotes,* p. 131; *RHC, Lois,* II, 427-434. G. Hill, *History of Cyprus,* I, 368-370. The royalty seems to have been very liberal in conceding such "defaults", which made possible concentrations of seifs in fewer hands.

14. Maurice Cognélandes, *Études critiques sur les livres des assises de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1923), pp. 70-81. 127-135, 168-170. Philip summoned only the high court; the Livre contrefois dated primarily with the arrest of the bourgeois. Other works, though probably written in Cyprus (Geoffrey le Tort, James le Boet), are of no special interest for the kingdom.

15. See, for example, Richard, *Documents chypriotes,* p. 155; cf. *RHC, Lois,* II, 386.
des renembrances de la secréte of 1468–1469 includes an entire chapter entitled "des choses qui se font par la haute cour". By this time the participation of this court was entirely formal, since it was reduced to two or three knights who ordinarily belonged to the council of the king. But this participation symbolized the control which the court exercised over the development of the royal domain. In 1372 it forbade Peter II to give, sell, or exchange any elements of this domain because he had not yet reached the age of twenty-five. 16

The high court was also the court of first instance before which cases concerning the monarchy itself and the royal succession were brought. It judged the rights of claimants to the crown, proclaimed the legitimacy of the royal succession, 17 and nominated the regent, as in 1432 on the death of James, the regency council.

It also played another role. This court, which passed sentences and kept its own records, 18 was also the instrument by which the vassals and rear-vassals of the king expressed themselves as a group. As in Jerusalem, the latter formed a body which some texts, dated 1272 and 1324, called "the community of the men of Cyprus": they were the ones to voice their claims, through James of Ibelin, about overseas service; and it was to them that Henry II granted a "remedy", after his restoration, "de sorte que les gens ne soient pas perdus," by drawing up two charters, "dont l'une sera au pouvoir du roi et l'autre au pouvoir des hommes". 19

In fact the noble class was divided. It is likely that the high court consisted only of men of high nobility. These were the men who supported the usurpation led by Amalric of Tyre in 1306; it was the knights of secondary rank who put Henry II back on the throne in 1310. But it seems that the arbitrary acts of Peter I, who ignored the prerogatives of the high court and of the community of men, created unanimous opposition against him. He was compelled to authorize "les hommes", among whom were his two brothers, to meet in order to present him with a list of grievances. On the day after his assassination, this list was transformed into a "remède" adopted by the high court, which stipulated among other things that henceforth the Livre de Jean d'Ibelin would become the law code of the realm (1369). 20 The

16. Mazaras, Alcalès, cap. XXX.
17. There is a full description of the sitting of the court when Peter II was proclaimed king, ibid., caps. 319–326.
18. HHC, Law, II, 346.
19. Ibid., II, 360, 429, 430.
20. I have identified this document as the outcome of the deliberations of the Ibelin council, in "La Révolution de 1306" It must have been finally drawn up the day after the murder of the
Juridical theory of John of Ibelin, based on the Assise de la ligèce, could only strengthen the control exercised by the vassals over the crown.

In reality, although there was great respect throughout this period for this Livre (which the Venetian administration would later have translated into Italian), the Cypriote nobility did not succeed in imposing its will on the monarchy. The vassals' rights did not prevent the regents named either by Frederick II or by John of Ibelin from exiling their adversaries and confiscating their goods, which led to the exodus of many Cypriote nobles.²¹ Amalric of Tyre imprisoned and exiled his brother's followers, and Henry II cruelly revenged himself on Amalric's followers. Peter II confiscated the goods of his father's assassins, taking advantage of the fact that an attack on the island by the Genoese had defeated the party which had overthrown Peter I. John II seems to have deprived certain of his vassals of their fiefs in order to give them to others.²² But it was the advent of James II which provoked a real revolution. The great majority of liegemen had remained loyal to Charlotte and to Louis of Savoy; James, who was beseeching them in Kyrenia (1460–1464), confiscated all their fiefs and distributed them among his own supporters—Cypriote nobles, persons of lower birth, Italian or Spanish adventurers—and, when the defeated came over to his side, he gave them other fiefs, taken from the royal domain or from other vacant properties. The result of this immense upheaval was to modify profoundly the structure of the nobility, now completely shot through with new elements.²³

Among these were the descendants of a non-Latin bourgeoisie, often of Syrian extraction, which had grown rich either in trade or in the exercise of offices in the royal administration. Already, under Peter II, Thibaut Belpharage (Abū-l-Faraj), the bailie of a casal of the royal domain, who had raised a troop of mercenaries to fight against the Genoese, was raised to the rank of knight and turcopole of the realm, before being executed for the murder of the king's confessor, who had warned the king against giving Thibaut the castle of Corycus in fief.
(1376) Thomas Parek, cited in 1382, was also "a Greek bourgeois who had become a Latin knight". After James II, the Greek or Syrian families which filled the offices founded families of knights and barons who held their fiefs first from the king, then under the lordship of Venice.

Unlike those of the Latin empire of Constantinople or the Norman kingdom of Sicily, the dynasty which established itself in Cyprus does not seem to have retained any of the dignities or high offices which had existed under Isaac Comnenus. The king surrounded himself with a group of high officers who bore the titles of seneschal, constable, marshal, butler, and chamberlain. The role of these officers, defined in the Assises, was probably not purely honorary: in 1367 the constable ordered the auction of the possessions of bishop Guy of Limassol, which was carried out by his banner, and, in 1468, it was to him that a farmer engaged by the king was subject. But the royal household ("nostre court") was organized into several offices which functioned apart from them. The principal office was the chamber, which was responsible both for supplies and for the upkeep of the lodgings, the clothing of the king and his servants, and the management of the royal hunts: the huntsmen (braconniers) and the falconers came under the chamber. On the other hand, it was also the chamber which kept the royal treasure, and we shall find it again listed among the financial institutions. At its head was a squire, assisted by a scribe. The pantry, the butler, and the stable constituted the three other services over which presided the bailli de la court, who in the fifteenth century assumed the title of maistre de l'hostel.

Were the constable and marshal of Cyprus in charge of the army? In 1425 the army was commanded by Henry de Luignan, the titular prince of Galilee (although we do not know whether he was constable); the titular marshal of Jerusalem, who made decisions concerning provisioning, was Baldwin de Nores, who was above all the most trusted counselor of king Janus. The turscopoles of the royal army were theoretically subject to the turscopole. Besides the contingents who fought

25. The role of the queen, Helen Palaeologina (1442-1496), in the introduction of Greeks into the nobility has undoubtedly been exaggerated. It was limited to favoring certain Greeks who came with her, especially her future-brother Thomas of the Moros, who became chamberlain of the king. That is what led one titular count of Jaffa (himself married to a Cretan woman) to complain that "the government of this kingdom has fallen entirely into the hands of Greeks and petty people." See Baddeley di Tusa, "Il Matrimonio fra Ludovico di Savoia e Carlotta di Cipro," Bollettino storico siculo, CCXVII (1937), 79-83.
on horseback and who were equipped by the vassals of the king, the infantry comprised free men, Frankish or Greek bourgeois, Armenians, and Syrians; we know that those from Carpas were compelled to serve on horseback.27

From the thirteenth century on, however, the king also had to hire mercenaries. These were so numerous in the time of Peter I that the liegemen demanded in 1369 that no more than one hundred might be engaged without their consent. Beginning in 1373, however, the constable James de Lusignan had to reinforce his army with Armenian mercenaries, with Bulgarians previously in the service of Genoa, and with eight hundred men that Thibaut Belpharage hired in Venice. James II conquered his kingdom with a Modena contingent, but he formed a permanent army by engaging some men-at-arms coming from the west with their condottieri: Peter of Avila commanded an escadre of knights, while some condottieres had charge of the seldes de pié. The Venetians would later expel from the kingdom all those Franks and Sicilians whom they judged to be unreliable.

The marshal, for his part, was responsible for the material organization of the feudal army. Undoubtedly it was with regard to this that a tax called manœuvrée was levied on all owners of livestock; it was the marshal who had to replace horses lost by vassals in the service of the king. Moreover, his scribes (the manœuvriers) recorded the deeds which established feuds in the Livre des remembrances de la manœuvrée: it is likely that he controlled the administration of homage.

In the thirteenth century the kings of Cyprus had no navy and had to depend on the Genoese. The fall of Acre induced Henry II to construct some warships in order to ensure the security of the coasts of Cyprus and to pursue pirates. There soon appeared an admiral of Cyprus. Hugh IV maintained six galleys in the squadron of the “Holy Union”, which combatted Turkish piracy, and the arsenal of Famagusta built some warships.28 Its activity increased under Peter I, who entrusted the office of admiral to his most faithful aide, John Monstry, whom the conspirators of 1369 pursued with hatred. Janus conducted privateering operations against the Modens with “une galeée et une galiote”.29 Finally, James II built for himself a small squadron of galleys and compelled his subjects to supply crews, and his captains

27 Richard, Livre des remembrances, Introduction. Free men also owed guard duty, especially along the coasts.
28 L. de Mus Larié, “Nouvelles preuves,” Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, XXXIV, 52; Richard, Documentum chypriense, pp. 33-49
conducted operations which the Hospitallers and the merchants complained of.

The exercise of justice belonged to the seneschal, who presided over the high court in the king's absence. Viscouts in Nicosia (and in Famagusta from the beginning of the fourteenth century) presided over the court of burgesses, which was made up of twelve jurymen drawn from the Frankish bourgeoisie. The viscount, a Frankish knight nominated by the king, had the responsibility for the administration of justice as well as the maintenance of the king's rights, according to the conditions revealed by the Livre contrefais; he would have the orders and the bans of the king published and carried out. Henry II dismissed (in 1307?) viscount Hugh Pietau and his jurymen, who had refused to have enforced an ordnemen which was contrary to custom.30

An assize of 1355 reveals four bailies, those of Famagusta, Limassol, Paphos, and Cape Andreas, each of whom exercised in his "diosé" a jurisdiction analogous to that of the viscount, which extended over a vast district called the viscountcy.31 Sergeants would assist these officers; they were placed under the direction of one of them who bore the title of mathesep (Arabic, mubasah).

Around the time of Peter I this scheme was modified by the division of the island into twelve counties at the head of which were either a viscount or a bailie, or more often a chevetain. A judgment rendered in 1406 by the captain and chevetain of Kyrenia shows that this officer was assisted by a court of four jurymen.32

For the non-Frankish population special courts existed. In Famagusta, whose population was predominantly Syrian, the court of the ra'is seems to have ultimately supplanted the court of the viscount. But it is also known through gravestones that there were Frankish knights who bore the title of "râis des Syriens de Nicosie". For the Greeks, some documents originating in Marathasa reveal a nomikos and a taboularios, whose titles are those of agents of the Byzantine judicial administration, some elements of which the Franks had thus conserved.33

30. RHC, Livre, III, 293 ff., 320-328
31. Ibid., pp. 322-324 (jurisdiction of the bailie of Famagusta); cf. Richard, "La Révolution de 1307."
32. Richard, Livre des couventenous, inserevaluation.
33. Jean Durand, "Notes pour servir à l'histoire de Chypre," Kyprostati Spoudai, XV (1953), 85, 96-97. The first citation of a ra'is by name comes in Théophile Ersury, "The 'Caritas de Ma

Each casal had its juryman, nominated by the lord from the local inhabitants, who undoubtedly assisted the seigneurial bailli in the exercise of dominial justice. It is likely that the widespread enfranchisement of the Greek bourgeoisie under Peter I resulted in the access of Greeks (and Syrians) to the functions of the jurymen of the viscount’s court, initially reserved to Franks “de la loy de Rome”.

With regard to the confirmation of contracts, Cyprus was still unfamiliar with notarial institutions, according to the evidence of Pegolettu around 1325, and the king recognized as valid only those enacted before the courts, such as the court of the viscount, or before other jurisdictions, such as that of the bailie of the commune, which was competent in commercial matters. Beginning in 1311 at the latest, however, a new high official appeared, the auditor of Cyprus, whose role seems to have been that of authenticating the contracts which his scribe recorded in his cartulary; he also exercised the functions of the king’s procurator in the high court. But, in fact, it was already necessary to recognize as valid certain acts drawn up by notaries. The famous Genoese notary Lambert di Sambuceto was acting in Famagusta at the very beginning of the fourteenth century. In the fifteenth century there were numerous imperial notaries; at the very most, certain acts accepted by the latter would then receive the sanction of the viscount’s court.

The role of the high officers became noticeably less important in the direction of affairs. However, as early as the fourteenth century certain persons bore the title of counselor of the king. In the acts of John II and James II almost all the knights who represented the high court in the acts bore that title. And in 1452 the titular count of Jaffa, James de Fleury, was titled “chef de son conseil”—a title which might be compared with that of governador del regno di Cipro, which the admiral Muzzio di Costanzo bore in 1473. It seems that the king’s council was a well-defined group, of which the holders of the high offices of the two realms formed a part, as also the pourveurs and the bailie of the secrète, and undoubtedly other persons who were favored with dignities and pensions by the king. Without encroaching on the duties of the high court, they in effect supplanted the latter in the control of the government of the realm.

35 According to the testament of John Antiste of Richard, “Une Famille de ‘nativités blanches’”
37 The sentence of 1452, cited in the preceding note, gives the composition of the high court. All its members seem to have belonged in the king’s entourage.
The acts of the government were drawn up by the chancery, whose head was a chancellor, initially a notable (an ecclesiastic of high rank, later Philip of Mézères), later a simple notary, usually an Italian. It included a vice-chancellor, scribes, and a judge of the chancery, and would draw up the acts of the king according to a forimulary which had evolved over the course of centuries. They were sealed with a leaden bull, which was replaced in the fourteenth century by a seal of wax on which the king was represented sitting in majesty.24

Although our knowledge of the administrative organization of the island is very scanty for the period of Isaac Comnenus's autonomous dominion, it may be assumed that, as in the other Byzantine provinces, the fiscal administration had been based on the division of the territory into units, the casals (chórina). In each casal a katepános levied public taxes (dénomion, strateia) and there were cadastral registers (praktika) in which were inscribed the names of taxpayers assessed by household for the collection of the karpokon. The duke had a bureau (sêkrétion) directed by a prikitór.

As far as can be seen, the Latins used this fiscal structure in organizing the kingdom. The division into casals provided the framework for the allocation of lands; and the management of the king's finances was ensured by the secréte du roi, or the grande secréte (as Philip of Novara calls it). Its head, the baiile of the secréte, is often called priktór by Leontius Machaeras. It may be noted, moreover, that when the Mamilus took over Nicocia (1426), several officers of the secréte placed themselves at their disposal, and that they appointed a priktór.16

The secréte formed a college. The secrétains assembled for deliberation: one of them had charge of the Livre des remembrances in which were registered the orders of the king of financial import, the leases (speruts) of the revenues of the royal domain, the sales or exchanges made between individuals on property held of the crown by quit-rent or otherwise, and manumissions. It was the secréte which authorized expenditures by issuing writs of payment (apodizes) on the funds of the collectors, and examined the accounts of the latter; it also put dominial revenues out to farm.

Its personnel, other than the secrétains, consisted of scribes, sergeants, and a judge. At its head was a baiile, who up to the time of

24 Richard, "La Diplomatique royale dans les royaumes d'Arménie et de Cilicie," Bibliothèque d'Études des chartes, CXLIV (1908), 39-86.

25 For what follows, see ibid, Livre des remembrances, introduction.
James II was a Frankish knight, while the secrétains came from the Syrian or Greek milieu which furnished scribes for all the administrations. Finally, a treasurer of the secrète seems to have had charge of the money derived from the royal domain (régale).

Peter I had created an office of inquests, and the “master of the inquests” made decisions concerning the royal domain without asking the consent of the high court (even though the secrète recognized the “chozes qui se font par la haute cour”). The lieutenants obtained the abolition of the office of inquests in 1369. Under James II, there were two persons of the nobility who were called pourvœurs du secrète; one of them bore the title of the “superior of our secrète”, and both were associated with the bailli in the commands of the king as in the deliberations of the secrète. These men seem to have formed a section of the royal council competent in financial matters.

The royal chamber also had its part in the management of finances: the chamberlain John de Sturhis, under Peter I, and the heads of the chamber, Anthony of Bergamo and James Soutouan, under James I, had the responsibility for extraordinary taxation. From 1468 to 1472 James Zaplanus was “governor of the royal chamber”. A treasurer collected the sums which came from extraordinary revenues. In 1466 James II introduced a new tax, and created what was called a “new office” for the purpose.

The régale (the royal domain), which furnished the monarchy with its ordinary resources, included all the cities of the realm: Nicosia, Paphos, Kyrenia, Famagusta, and Limassol. Each was fortified, or at least possessed a royal castle. That of Nicosia, where the king customarily resided, was enlarged by Peter I, who added the Marguerite tower, and by Peter II, who had this tower torn down along with the “Palace of the Counts” where the royal children were lodged, in order to build the New Castle. Country residences at La Cava, Potamiou, and Akki, built in the fourteenth century, permitted the sovereign to devote himself to the hunt. The ancient fortresses of Pentadaktylos, St. Hilarion, Buffavento, and Kantara likewise belonged to the crown, as well as the Château—France, which James I constructed at Sigour in order to keep an eye on the Genoese of Famagusta. Thus, with the

40. Machonius, Recueil, cap. 633 and note (Byl. Dumbria, II, 211); Richard, "L’Arbale et d’Ori
cent latin," p. 253; "La Révolution de 1309," pp. 113–114 (where he mistakenly thought that the office of inquests might have had an essentially judicial quality).

41. Machonius, Recueil, cap. 87, 244, 594–597. According to George Samarin (cap. 1), after the royal palace was burned by the Mamluks (Machonius, cap. 608), the king adopted as his residence the quarters of Richard de la Soume. Cf. Camille Eaubert, L’Art gothique et de la Renaissance en Chypre (2 vols., Paris, 1899), II, 510–522.
exception of some towers belonging to the chief vassals and the fortified residences of the Temple and the Hospital (La Castri and Kolossi), the king had at his disposal all the fortresses of the realm, where he placed his castellans (later captains, at least in the most important ones), and occasionally garrisons. These fortresses also served as state prisons.

In area and in revenues the royal domain was as great as or greater than those of all the vassals combined. In the diocese of Limassol the king, the vassals, and the military orders shared the territory more or less equally. The accounts of the church of Limassol for 1367 show that at this time almost all the villages of the royal domain were farmed out (in agency). But in the years which followed, the king resumed their direct exploitation; royal bailies were charged with administering these villages, grouped into districts whose number, according to a list drawn up between 1510 and 1525, exceeded twenty. The Livre des remembrances contains acts relative to the appointment of the bailies, whose duties seem to have been essentially financial.42

The principal plantations of sugar cane, regarding which the king negotiated with the merchants who refined sugar, the salt beds of Larnaca, and the fisheries of the lake of Limassol belonged to the royal domain and ensured the king substantial revenues. Duties (the gabelles) were levied at the gates of Nicosia on the commodities taken to market; makers of fine cloth (camlet, samite) had to pay a tax when they sold their products, to which had to be affixed the bull of the royal dye-works. Other taxes were levied on commodities put up for sale in the market. Among them figured a tax of Byzantine origin, the commerc (kommérkion), the responsibility of a particular bailie. In Famagusta, in the fourteenth century, the bailie of the commerc collected the duties that the merchants had to pay when landing their goods, and provided over a court which settled disputes of a commercial nature.43

Fegolotti, who provides evidence on these last points, also reveals how the munt of Famagusta functioned. In the thirteenth century "white bezants" were struck, after the model of the Byzantine hyérpermon. In the fourteenth century, the bezant became a money of account, and the kings struck deniers, gros, and sâvants. Financial difficulties compelled them to devalue the coinage: one devaluation undoubtedly oc-

42 On the duties levied by the bailiess on the peasants of the villages in the royal domain, cf. volume V of the present work, chapter VI, section B. It was only in 1222 that the monarchy gave up the chancery or almoe from church lands, paid up to that time by the canons of the Monastery of Larnaca, Historia, III, 630.
curred in the first half of the fourteenth century, and another between 1440 and 1445.44

The institution of extraordinary taxes probably required the consent of the lieutenants and prelates, but the king tended to perpetuate their levy. Thus the testagium, a yearly tax of two bezants on each inhabitant of the realm (the clergy being exempt) instituted in 1292 in order to pay the soldiers and to construct boats, was not abolished until 1306 by the rebellious lieutenants, after fruitless efforts by Boniface VIII.45 Under Hugh IV the maintenance of the ships which policed the sea was financed by a levy on merchants who brought merchandise from overseas.46 In 1369 the lieutenants demanded the suppression of the taxes created by Peter I; a tax for the maintenance of soldiers, another for the arsenal of Famagusta, a levy for the fortification of Nicosia, and another for the construction of galleys.

The Genoese invasion of 1373 severely impoverished the kingdom, all the more so as it cut off its income from the revenues of Famagusta. At first it was necessary to have recourse to expedients, notably the sale of enfranchisements to some parovkoi (Peter I had already extensively enfranchised the perpetuarii, the Greek burgesses of the cities).47 Further, a tax was created of one bezant per person, the kaphalattikon; a salt levy, which compelled each inhabitant to buy one measure of salt each year at a price fixed by the secrét; and finally, a "royal tithe" on fields and rents, which was first levied in 1381 by a mixed commission of Genoese and Cypriotes in order to pay the war indemnity exacted by Genoa.48 The salt levy and the royal tithe continued, in spite of numerous exemptions. But it was necessary to raise new taxes after the defeat of 1426, in order to pay the tribute owed to the sultan, which aroused the opposition of subject Venetians, who attempted to evade it (1448). James II, in his turn, after having sold exemptions and enfranchisements, obtained in 1466 the right to a tax of twenty percent on wages and incomes (the rate) for three years.

Cyprus thus had a fiscal regime which was very similar to that of the western kingdoms. Here also the royal domain, although quite sub-

44. Ibid., pp. 62–63 Richard, Documentes cypriotes, pp. 16–17.
46 Pegolotti, Presso, pp. 63–66.
47 Cf. Peter III's letter confirming the enfranchisements made by his uncle (1374): Manoian, Recueil, cap. 376. On the enfranchisement of the perpetuarii demanded by John de Stilum in 1444, cap. 137.
48. Ibid., cap. 618, noting the suppression by James I, at the same time, of the office of the "taille" did this office originate with the reign of the sultan?
stantial compared to the holdings of the vassals and of the church, did not suffice to permit doing without extraordinary taxation.

The presence of colonies dependent upon the merchant cities of Italy, Provence, and Catalonia did not have the same characteristics on the island as in the Frankish states of Syria. The rights which the Pisans and Venetians had acquired in the time of the Byzantines, or of Guy of Lusignan, were modest. In 1232 Genoa received the first somewhat extensive privileges, thanks to the support of John of Ibelin. But it was not until 1291, at the time of the loss of their trading establishments in Syria, that the Pisans and Catalans obtained some privileges; the Pisans established some small colonies in which a privilege of 1321 permitted them to have parish churches. Venice asked for a charter of privileges in 1302, but did not acquire it until 1328. Venice aspired to its own quarters in Nicosia, Limassol, and Famagusta. In fact, it was only in Famagusta that there were communities of privileged merchants: Sicilians, Provençals, Pisans, and Barcelonans. Their main privilege was that of paying the comere at a very low rate; Pegolotti recounts how he managed to obtain the same favor for the Florentines when he was the factor of the Bardi in Cyprus (1324–1326). Only the Genoese and the Venetians—who enjoyed a complete franchise—had any notable establishments there: a hall where their consul presided, a church, and a street of houses.

They alone also played an important role in the history of the kingdom. Venice, for example, by threatening the king with a boycott, seriously affected the operations of Peter I against the Mamelukes, which had compromised Venetian interests by the sack of Alexandria. The boycott would have been all the more effective since the Venetians controlled practically all the exports of two of the principal resources of the monarchy, salt and sugar.


50 Pegolotti, Pratica, pp. 70–71.
51 Venice seems to have had a council for the Venetians in Cyprus since 1296, the title "bullie" appeared in 1306. Cf. Giovanni Maria, "Sigilli di bullie veneziane in Oriente," Archivio veneziano, 5th ser., XXIX (1941), 127–134, a list which may be completed by consulting L. de Mas Latrie, Historie, III, 840. On the existence of a council distinct from the bullie, cf. Livre des renommements, no. 234, n. 1.

52 On salt cf. Jean C. Hoepfner, Dictionnaire des ancêtres du sel en Méditerranée (Lille, 1971), pp. 227–232; on sugar see the note in the Livre des renommements. Every year in the fall, a
These two republics had to look after not only the interests of their merchants who traded in the kingdom or who put in at its ports, but also those of a considerable number of "white Venetians" and "white Genoese". These were descendants of Syrian protégés of Venice and Genoa who had established themselves in Cyprus after fleeing the Holy Land. They claimed to enjoy the exemptions granted to the Venetians and Genoese, and that their cases should come under the jurisdiction of the consuls of Venice and Genoa. This did not prevent them from acquiring land (the Assize forbade the sale of land to "gens de commune") or from holding administrative offices.  

A quarrel between the Genoese and the Venetians, at the time of the coronation of Peter II in Famagusta, following an earlier conflict which had arisen under Peter I concerning the desertion of sailors who had claimed to be Genoese, led first to an order of the podestà of Genoa to his compatriots to leave the island, and then to the arrival of a Genoese fleet. Peter II, captured by a ruse, had to consent to turn Famagusta over to the republic of Genoa as pledge for the payment of a heavy indemnity. This surrender was to last only twelve years, and reserved the rights of the king over the city (1374). James I had to give up Famagusta definitively on February 19, 1384. The city, with a band of territory surrounding it, was thus, in fact, independent of the kingdom until 1464. When James II repossessed it he preserved its peculiar status: the Greek bourgeoisie of the city continued to come under the jurisdiction of the court of the Saracens, and the royal writs drawn up at Famagusta were in Italian, not French.  

Venice, which had preserved its neutrality, maintained its privileged status in Famagusta, but its galleys put in at Larnaca when they came to pick up salt, or at Limassol to load sugar. The bailie of Venice, who represented the doge in the king's court, and who administered justice to subject Venetians, moved to Nicosia. Some Venetians began to take advantage of the difficulties of the crown, but the republic continued to be cautious in its attitude toward the Lusignans. When the Mamluks took Nicosia in 1426, the Venetian subjects gave them a warm welcome, thinking they would be treated as neutrals. But, in view of the king's...
need of money, the Venetian merchants and the Signory itself granted some loans for which the domanial revenues constituted the security. Venetian interests were becoming increasingly tied up with the fate of the kingdom. Mark Comaro and his brother Andrew played an important role in the service of John II; Andrew became the auditor of the kingdom under James II, who married his niece Catherine.

The bailie of Venice, who was designated every two years by the great council, and who was assisted by a vice-bailie and a council formed by visiting Venetian noblemen, was one of the important persons of the kingdom. It was his intervention which permitted Catherine to overcome the plot of November 1373. From then on, however, the republic designated two counselors to "assist" the queen permanently, while a provveditore commanded the Venetian troops stationed on the island. It would be sufficient, in 1483, to keep the queen at a distance and to nominate a "lieutenant of Cyprus" who, with the two counselors, formed a body of "rectors of the realm", in order to bring Cyprus effectively under the direct government of Venice.46

Because of the passing of the island under the domination of a Frankish dynasty, the Latin church had become the officially established church in the new kingdom of Cyprus.47 The archbishop and the three bishops, with their chapters, seem to have received posses-

46. Richard, "Cyprææ de poeculorum." The reforms inaugurated by Venice took careful account of the earlier consolidation. With respect to the administration of justice, see L. de Mac Laurie, "Documents nouveaux," pp. 341-354. For a layout of the administration of the island by Venice, see G. Mill, History of Cyprus, III, 745-779, and L. de Mac Laurie, Histories, III, in press.

47. For the period of the establishment of the Latin church and its early difficulties with the Greeks, cf. volume II of the present work, pp. 623-629. In place of the short, old work of L. de Mac Laurie, "Histoire des archévêques latins de Chypre," AOL, II (1834), 307-326, one may substitute John Hutchinson, A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (London, 1901), translated into Greek and expanded by Charalambos L. Papadopoulos (3 vols., Athens, 1925-1932), as a more work of reference. It is unfortunately marred by the annoyance of a state of permanent tension between Greeks and Latins. See also G. Mill, "The Two Churches," in History of Cyprus, III, 104-1104, Joseph Gill, "The Tributaries of the Greek Church in Cyprus, 1196-1180," Symoieutikhe Paraskewes, V (1977), 71-93. The history of the Latin church has been in part revised by the study of manuscripts at the collection of Manuscripts in the Vatican Archives, which has provided, in particular, the dossier of the succession of bishop Ous of Limassol in 1367. Richard, "Un Évêque d'Orient latin," and Documents chypriotes, pp. 91-93. The important series of the acts of the synods of the province of Nicomedia (up to 1354) has been published in Manuel Comnène, XXVIII, cols. 211-362. The cartulary of Saint Sophia of Nicomedia, published by L. de Mac Laurie as an appendix to vol. III of his Histoire, was reprinted by John L. LaMantia, "A Register of the Cartulary of the Cathedral of Santa Sophia of Nicomedia," Byzantion, V (1929-1930), 419-522. An important study of the Greek church and its relations with the Latins in Crete, "Récits synodaux chypriotes," Revue des études byzantines, XXXVII (1939), 5-122.
sion of the cathedral churches of the four episcopal sees (Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, and Paphos), but without the substantial endowment which these churches had enjoyed under the Byzantine regime. Their endowment remained relatively modest; it was increased by gifts from Frankish nobles, as the cartulary of Santa Sophia of Nicosia shows. But the bulk of their revenue came from tithes which, as in the kingdom of Jerusalem, were paid by the king and by the nobles on the revenue of their domains, as well as by the holders of certain "free" lands, in accordance with the concordat of 1222. From these revenues the bishop had to ensure the maintenance of his church, the payment of the prebends of the canons and of the "assises" of the rest of the clergy, and the pay of "parochial priora" of the few parochial churches of Latin rite. However, this allowed the maintenance of only very modest cathedral chapters.58

As in the west, the bishops of Cyprus felt it necessary to be assisted in the exercise of their episcopal duties by auxiliary bishops. Several bishops from the Holy Land thus established themselves in Cyprus at the end of the thirteenth century and on occasion obtained the administration of episcopal sees (the see of Tortosa was even united to that of Famagusta). Later their number decreased, and it seems that only one auxiliary served as vicar in pontificalibus in the four dioceses: Dimanche de Deux-Lions, titular bishop of Mesembria, in 1367; Solomon Cardus and Anthony Audeth, titular bishops of Tortosa, then Nicholas de Courio, titular bishop of Hebron, who died in 1468.

The Constitutio Cypriae of 1260 attributed to the Greek bishop the function of "vicar of the Greeks" under the Latin bishop. The Greek bishop resided in the same diocese, but in another city: Soli for the diocese of Nicosia, Lefkara for that of Limassol, Arsinoe (Polis) for that of Paphos, and Carpas for that of Famagusta. The bishop of Soli, however, enjoyed the possession of a second episcopal see, the church of St. Barnabas at Nicosia. Each of them was assisted by a chapter of Greek canons: in 1301 the deans of Soli and of St. Barnabas intrigued for the succession to the bishopric. Their endowment was likened to an episcopal menae. In 1321 pope John XXII increased that of the bishop of Lefkara by placing under him the monastery of the Holy Savior of Lefkara.59 The Greek bishop had complete authority over

58 That comes from the account of the diocese of Limassol in 1367 Rachelot, Documenta cypriana, pp. 61 ff. The tribute was introduced in Cyprus by the Franks: Greek bishops were entitled, as before the conquest, to assess a henteus on the followers of the Greek rite, and a termination on the clergy.

the Greek priests of his diocese, and he was the judge of the Greek laity for all matters within the competence of the church's courts, which is to say for the greater part of private law. He had to swear obedience (the oath was carefully phrased, according to the compromise reached in 1260) to the Latin bishop of the diocese, but it was rare that a Latin bishop ventured to visit the person who was canonically his subordinate, as did the Dominican Bérand, bishop of Larnassos in 1295, who deposed bishop Matthew of Lefkara as a "heretic." It is noteworthy that some bishops, like Leo of Soli, did not hesitate to have recourse to Rome in order to strengthen their position. In the three centuries between 1260 and 1570, incidents provoked in general by excess of zeal on the part of some prelates, or of papal legates such as Peter de Pleine Chassagne in 1310 or Peter Thomas in 1340, were relatively rare; the two churches lived their parallel lives without interference. The Latin church, however, seems to have feared seeing its faithful pass to the Greek rite, and some measures were taken to prevent it. Meanwhile, the monarchy worried about limiting the access of parniques to the priesthood, seeing this as an indirect means of escaping their servile condition.

Among the Syrians, the Melkites (Syri) were grouped with the Greeks and were placed under the same bishops. The Maronites, Nestorians, Jacobites, Armenians, and Copts had their own churches, notably in Famagusta and Nicia, and their own ecclesiastical organization; they were probably more constrained to perform an act of obedience to the Latin bishop of each diocese. However, archbishop Elias summoned the heads of these communities to a provincial synod in 1340, along with the Greek bishops, in order to obtain their adherence to the canons that he promulgated; and, after the Council of Florence, representatives of the pope came to demand their adherence to the church union which had been proclaimed there.

The establishment of Latin monasticism was accomplished in stages.
It is not known to what extent any Latin monasteries replaced Greek monasteries; this was undoubtedly exceptional. It may perhaps have occurred in the case of the Benedictine monastery of the Cross in Cyprus (Stavrovouni), to which the monastery of St. Paul of Antioch was united after 1268, or in the case of the priory of Augustinian canons of Bellapais, which later adopted the Premonstratensian rule. But Latin monasteries was generally a matter of new foundations (the Cistercians of Beaulieu, and the Cistercian sisters of St. Theodore). The religious who were expelled by the Mamluk invasion transferred their communities to Cyprus: thus the Benedictine sisters of Our Lady of Tyre and of Our Lady of Tortosa were in Nicosia. Franciscans, Dominicans, and Carmelites then established the centers of their respective provinces of the Holy Land in Cyprus. The Temple and the Hospital, which were well endowed there, likewise established their seats in Cyprus, on a temporary basis, after the fall of Acre. The Teutonic Knights and the order of St. Thomas the Martyr (or the order of the English) also had headquarters there.\(^62\)

The growth of Latin monasteries was paralleled by that of Greek monasteries. The concordat of 1222 had sought to limit the number of Greek monks, and it is possible that a part of their domains had been appropriated for the formation of fiefs. But the survival of large foundations which possessed some important domains, such as Kykkou, Mangana, Agios, Machaeras, and Enkleistra, and the two abbeys in Nicosia called "of the Meo" (Andros) and "of the Women" (Ienako), is noteworthy. The Armenian prince Hwoum, who had become a Premonstratensian, asked Clement V to unite Mangana to Bellapais. The inquiry prescribed by the pope had no effect, and Mangana kept its independence. Now and again the seigneuries subject to these monasteries may have had to pay tithes; the pope exempted them from doing so. Peter I was one of the benefactors of Kykkou, and Frankish nobles often gave evidence of their devotion to the monasteries. The Greek monasteries of Palestine, which like their Latin counterparts had lands on Cyprus, held on to them, as, for example, did that of St. Theodosius of the desert of Judaea and especially that of Sinai, which founded

\(^62\) Richard, Documents inapprop., pp. 67-69, 131-120. The goods of the Temple, seized upon the arrest of the knights, whom Henry II punished severely for the help they had given Amalric of Tyre (Hugh III had already dealt with them honestly by taking the monastery of La Cistre) were given to the Hospitall, except for Palmolida, which was given to the titular patriarch of Jerusalem, Anthony. The Hospital divided its them between the chief commandary (Kobane) and the commandaries of Fluminia and Tombris; in 1468, James II appears to have appropriated the revenues of these domains. Many temples of Khandes entered his service.
a priory, St. Simeon of Famagusta, which pope John XXII endowed with privileges in 1334. 63

There were also many small abbeys which were incorporated into the Frankish seigneuries as they had been in the great Byzantine domains, with the Latin lord now becoming the monastery's patron, investing the abbot, and sometimes donating an icon or having a church built. In the towns, the families which occupied high administrative posts also founded monasteries or churches such as St. John of Bibi or St. Nicholas tou Soulouamy. Christians of eastern rite also had their convents, such as those of the Jacobites at Omorhita (Morfittes) and of the Armenians at St. Macarius. The Ethiopian convent of Jerusalem itself had a priory at Nicosia.

The Cypriote monarchy, which had to get the Holy See to intervene on several occasions to support it in its difficulties, tried to reconcile its concern for keeping the peace between the different religious communities with its attachment to the Roman church. It does not seem to have had any serious problems with regard to the latter, with the exception of crises caused by the conflicts between the archbishops of Nicosia and the Greek episcopate before 1260. The kings of Cyprus seem to have tried to have Cypriote subjects provided with ecclesiastical benefices, though with only partial success. 64 Henry II tried in vain to have his chancellor Henry de Gibelet promoted to the archiepiscopal see. The brother of Janus, Hugh of Luignan, was archbishop-elect of Nicosia, then became a cardinal (he played something of a role in the Council of Basel and took part in the negotiations between France, England, and Burgundy). But John II could not get the pope's agreement for the nomination to the same see of his bastard son James, who remained a postulant until he became king.


64 CY N Krümmel, Die novizienten im Kämpfer (Leverkusen, 1970). A good example is Saint Sabas, in the diocese of Paphos, in the possession of Baldwin of Montferrat in 1234. This abbey was the subject of a proposed reform in 1306. It received a donation from James II in 1468 (Livre des renommements, no. 177). The suppression that belonged to the Latin rule in the 13th century is incorrect.

One remains struck by the loyalty which, on the whole, the peoples of the kingdom evinced for the Frankish dynasty. The only known popular rebellion was that of the peasants who rose up after the defeat of Khirokita, electing several captains and even proclaiming one Alexis “king” at Lefkoniko; it was a sort of jacquerie, quite comparable to that which troubled the kingdom of France after Pontiers. The chronicler Leonidas Machaeras, in the fifteenth century, shows himself to be a devoted subject of the Lusignans.

The various communities experienced a gradual coming together. Kings and nobles made pilgrimages to Greek monasteries; the confessor of king Peter II, a Latin priest, visited his mother, a religious in the Greek convent of St. Mammas of Nicomedia; the Dominican James (“Eustene”) de Lusignan had a brother who was a Basilian, the Audchis, who belonged to the Jacobite rite, established religious services in the Latin and even the Greek rite, and left legacies to Coptic, Jacobite, Armenian, Maronite, Greek, and Latin churches. One of them even became a bishop in the Latin church. The use of Greek was so widespread among the Franks that queen Charlotte spoke it better than French, and Hugh Bousset took his personal notes in Greek. Latin priests had to take measures to prevent their flock from adopting customs appropriate to the Greek church.

While the feudal institutions had been conceived for the purpose of strengthening the domination of the Frankish element, they gradually ceased to play this role. Greek and Syriac names penetrated little by little into the nobility, especially from the time of James II on. Rich burgesses had before that time acquired landed properties and became lords of fiefs. During the Venetian domination, the Synklitikos and the Sozomenos held first place among the liegemen, but well before that time the royal administration and been filled with Greek and Syrian elements.

The feudal regime, though it endured until 1570, was probably no

46 Machaeras, Recueil, pp. 436-437.
47 Ibid., cap. 566-577; Bousset, “Une Famille de Savoie Immortelle”.
49 In a contrary sense, see the reflections of Leonidas Machaeras regarding Thibaut Belphrange’s conversion to the Latin rite (cap. 579). The reminder by Sultan IV in 1472 of the rules imposed on Greek bishops by the Council of 1269 (Mun Luttre, Histoire III, 525-530) is evidence of the habitual transgression of these rules, especially with respect to episcopal jurisdiction. A 16th-century tradition has assigned the name of Helenus Palmaelorynax, a renowned authority of the Greek clergy, but I believe that these transgressions were an older phenomenon.
50 This is not an isolated case, as can be seen by a quick look at the schedule drawn up by the Venetian administration between 1538 and 1539, which includes a list of those enfeoffed
longer the essential characteristic of Cypriote institutions. Despite the rebellion of the liegemen against Peter I, the Lusignan monarchy maintained itself as the real master of the kingdom. Janus, John II, and James II governed without concern for the control of the high court, which was completely transformed by the very composition of the nobility. The Latin church, whose wealth remained restricted, no more represented a force of opposition than did the Greek church. The cities did not play a political role. The very crises which the kingdom experienced, with the exception of foreign interventions, were more the result of court intrigues and palace revolutions than of more profound movements. It was indeed the permanence of a well-established monarchy which guaranteed the stability of the kingdom of Cyprus, a mosaic of peoples, but of peoples among whom a true symbiosis was achieved up to 1489, and even beyond while under the domination of Venice.
VI
SOCIAL EVOLUTION
IN LATIN GREECE

Latin expansion into Byzantine territory — "Romania" — took place in several closely related fields: in addition to military and political aspects, it had also economic, demographic, and ecclesiastical repercussions. Military expansion with its political consequences is no doubt

Published sources, studies, and bibliographies bearing on Latin Greece are numerous. Therefore only publications with a direct bearing on the subject of this chapter are cited here, especially those which have been published in the last twenty years or so, and present new evidence or interpretations.

best known. It began in the early thirteenth century, during and following the Fourth Crusade, which was a turning point in the political history of Romania. Within a few years Frankish knights, the Venetian state, and several Italian adventurers acting on their own behalf conquered extensive areas of the Byzantine empire, some of which re-

Among the sources reflecting the structure and evolution of society in the feudalized areas of Latin Greece, the _Ammianus of Romania_ are the most important. This legal treatise compiled in the Moros has been edited and translated into French by Georges Recours, _Les Annales de Romania_ (Paris, 1936), an English translation and a study of it have been made by Tollancing, _État civilisations de Romania, en a time of le Code de Frankreich_ (Philadelphia, 1909). Carminata in the text and previous translations, as well as a thorough study of the sources, have appeared in David Jacoby, _La Fonction en Grèce médiévale, les Annales de Romania, souvenirs, application en affection_ (Paris, 1971), as well as other, _Les Annales gréco et en Romania et Romania latine_ (Kilin-Khris alonkeu, London, 1975). _The Chronicle of the Moros presents a vivid description of feudal society in the Moros_. On the first version of the Chronicle, of which the French seems definitely to be the original of Jacoby, "Quelques considérations sur les versions de la _Chronique de Moros_," Journal des Savants (1968), pp. 153–180, reprinted in _Les Annales de Romania_ (Paris, 1975), also by M. J. J. A. Pouiteur, "_The Chronicle of the Moros: Priority of the Greek Version," Byzantinische Zeitschrift_, LXVIII (1973), 304–350, which claims it is impossible in ascept on historical grounds. Although at times faulty, the chronicles of _Marinos Sasso Porteletto, "histoire du royaume de Romania,"_ in Charles (Carlo) Hoppe, _Chroniques grecs-russo-russes indus de le années_ (Berlin, 1875, repr. 1960), pp. 99–170, is an invaluable source for the Moros and especially the Angean lordships in the second half of the thirteenth century. The letters of _Marinos provide evidence by a contemporary till 1333, especially on_ Excav, on their edition and dating see Jacoby, _"Catalans, Turcs et Venitiens en Romania_ (1300–1332); un nouveau document de Marinos Sasso Porteletto," Studi medicei, on 3, XV (1974), 287–223.

Documentary evidence on the Moros for the reigns of Charles I and Charles II of Anjou, kings of Sicily, who from 1276 on maintained a certain in the life of the principality, is to be found in Roberto Filangieri et al., _Il Regesto del consorzio amico, vol. I–XXXII_ (Naples, 1950 ff.), which superseded all previous publications of documents from the Aspimeni archives of Naples; for the period of Charles II are also Charles Porren and Longman, _Acta relativa à_ le principate _de Moros, 1289–1308_ (Paris, 1967), Longman and Tollancing, _Documents sur la régions du servie dans le principate de Moros en XIVe siècle_ (Paris, 1969), provide invaluable evidence on landholding, agricultural exploitation, and the roads of the province, which corroborates the information found in the _Ammianus of Romania_, see also Jacoby's review in _Byzantinische Zeitschrift_, LXIX (1976), 97–92. Ernst Gerland, _Nata Querz zur Geschichte des innersten Erzogtums Bukrow_ (Leipzig, 1900), includes documents on the Moros and Venetian connections dealing with similar problems.

In view of the position of Venice as the eastern Mediterranean and particularly in Latin Greece, it is not surprising that Venetian documents seconded by of minor importance for the whole area. They are reprinted in exhaustive examination, and most of them remain unpublished. Official documents on summonses Italian are included in the following publications (only the main ones are mentioned here): _Urkunden zur edition Havelsky and Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig aus internen berühren, 1300–1332_ (Venice, 1887); _Georg M. Thomas and Riccardo Procelli, Diplomana-
named for two centuries or more under Latin rule; such was the case with Crete, most of the Peloponnesus (Morea), Attica, Boeotia, and Euboea, as well as numerous other islands of the Aegean. This chapter deals with these areas of Greece down to about 1450.

In the political sphere, the most striking result of the Latin cou-
quest was the extreme fragmentation of Romanesque after 1204, in marked contrast to the earlier unity of Byzantium. To a large extent, this fragmentation explains the diversity of the political and social regimes instituted by the Latins, as well as the nature and orientation of the

(Thomassin, 1972), esp. pp. 123–127; see also the volumes edited on behalf of the PC, Pustini per J. P. Vitracou (Vatican City, 1943–1950, and Resniz, 1961 ff.).

Until recently only moderate attention has been devoted to the social history of Latins Greece. This chapter aims at reconstructing the dynamics of social evolution resulting from the encounter of Latin conquerors and subjects with the indigenous populations, overwhelmingly Greek, for lack of space, small minorities with in the Jews, the Slavs, the Albanians, and the Armenians have not been treated here. Besides, an attempt has been made to study foundations and multifaceted armies in a comparative framework. This method has enabled us to trace Byzantine continuity in the social, legal, and institutional system. With the help of material relevant to Latins Greece it has been possible to supplement the available documentation on Byzantine Greece before 1204. This approach is illustrated in three recent studies by Jacoby, whose views differ on many points but none of pervious authors. “The Exclusion of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnese after the Fourth Crusade,” American Historical Review, LXXV (1970), 973–986; “Une Classe étroite à Byzance et un Romanisme intime. Les incertitudes de la mort, structures en émancipation,” Actes du XVe Congrès international des études byzantines, 11 (Bucarest, 1975), 139–152; and “Les états latins en Roumanie: Photineux sociaux et économiques (1204–1560 avoue),” XIVe Congrès international d'études byzantines, Rapports et co-rapports, 1 Revue, 1976, 1, Athens, 1976). The present chapter relies heavily on these studies, all reprinted in Jacoby’s Researches on the Medieval Orient and the West 1960–1980 (London, 1982). As well as on the same author’s other studies already cited above, see also Jacoby’s “Les croisés de la maison de guerre vicinoïs de la main Epe à l’XIe et l’XVe siècles,” in Le Temps du manuscrit médiéval, ed. E. Gagnon, 1 – XVIIe Colloque international du centre d'études d'histoire des manuscrits (Naples, 1980) (Naples, 1981), I, 109–200. On society in Byzantine Greece shortly before the conquest and on Frankish Greece, see the studies by Jacoby just mentioned.


economic activity and demographic currents in this area after 1204. Although the conquest resulted in a definite break in the political sphere, it did not bring about a similar phenomenon in the social or economic field. Latin Romans witnessed the encounter of various ethnic com-

flows contemporarea, see 2, X (1956), 255–265, supra note 1 in his Studi sui dati romani del XII secolo (London, 1977). Carlia, La Condizione umana nella storia latina del XIV secolo (Bologna, 1974), is a major unpublished manuscript as well as the many and the annals of the Morea, see Jacoby's review in Byzantinische Zeitschrift, LXXXII (1990), 356–364. See also Carlia, "Rapporto traignorata e cospicuus alla luce della formazione della rendita funziale nella Morea latina del secolo XIV," Rivista storica italiana, LXXXVIII (1976), 540–570.

On the Aegean and Albanian frontiers, Storia antica e civiltà veneziana in Romani nel XII secolo (Naples, 1966), which should be corrected and supplemented by Jacoby, La Storia e civiltà veneziana in Romani nel XII secolo (Bologna, 1974), which includes numerous excerpts of unpublished documents. Baston has dealt in several studies with legal problems in Crete, two of them are particularly relevant: La Nazione di "freudianum" in Crete veneziana (XVIII–XVII secolo) and on the subject; see also Elizabeth A. Charbonneau, Thera and Crete Mean, Constantinople and the Emperors of Byzantium and Apollon (1300–1256) (Venice, 1983), 216. 1302–1307.

Various aspects of the social, economic, and religious development at this and the Crusades have been treated in numerous publications cited above and also recently in the following studies: Konstanz, "Die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der venezianischen Einfluss auf die Development of the Latin and Greek Churches in the Crusades and in the "Catalan Crusades in the Fourth Century," Études in Memory of Bernhard Lamennais (Thomas, 1975), pp. 241–264. On the early years of the Catalan Crusade is the study by Jacoby, "La Com-
munities as well as social groups and classes. The Latin conquerors faced an indigenous population, predominantly Greek, whose social structure, institutions, legal traditions, and mentality differed from their own. The encounter of westerners and Byzantines resulted in continuity in certain spheres, a break in others, and accommodation elsewhere. An investigation of the character, stages, and limitations of this encounter requires a survey of the structure of Byzantine society before 1204, an examination of the Latin impact, and an evaluation of the social, legal, and institutional evolution generated in both societies by the conquest.

Recognition of the clear-cut distinction between slaves and free men is fundamental to the understanding of Byzantine society. Legally, all free men were equal; in practice, however, obvious social and economic differences existed, yet they did not generate legal classes, as in the west at the same period. The same holds true of imperial privileges granted on an individual basis or collectively: the grantees remained justiciable according to Byzantine common law. The classification of free men as "powerful" (dynamoi) or "weak" (pochtai) lacked precision. It is indicative of the absence of a rigid system of social stratification and of well-defined legal classes; this was still the case in the twelfth century. A restricted measure of social mobility enabled men of lowly origin to gain access to the elite by displaying efficiency in the imperial administration or the army, or by serving powerful men. The status of the paroikos or dependent peasant was somewhat exceptional in the Byzantine framework, although legally free and answerable as such to public courts, he was subject also to personal restrictions and was tied to his lord by links of dependence of a legal nature.

In the western provinces, as elsewhere in the empire, land was the major source of wealth, power, and prestige. Society was essentially rural in character. It was dominated by an upper class lacking legal definition, embracing great landlords, imperial officials, and imperial dignitaries. The use of the term "archon" for all these powerful men

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47-60. A. R. Lewis, "The Catalaunian Peace in Acculturation in Frankish Greece and the Islamic World during the Fourth-Century," Pastor, XI (1989), 361-369, does not point to the main reasons for this phenomenon, examined below.

This study has been prepared with the help of a grant provided by the American Philosophical Society in 1977, and has been revised and updated since.

1. On Byzantine society and the archontes see Janin, "The Encounter," pp. 875-876, 879-883, and "Les États byzantins," pp. 4-7, where the reader will find extensive bibliographical references. See also Kastoula, Seccao 47;6oos: On the Slave archontes of the Peloponnesus see below, note 34.
clearly indicates that they were often identical. One occasionally would make a distinction between the rich landlord or ktenastikos archon and the official in charge of civilian administration or the military officer, known respectively as themastikos and ttagmatikos archon, who exercised authority from the urban center over a district which at times was limited to a city and its neighboring territory. In certain cases the emperor recognized the authority and traditional status of the chiefs of foreign populations which had settled in the empire by conferring on them imperial titles, he strengthened their position. It is therefore not surprising that they too were considered as archontes. This was the case with the chiefs of Slav groups who preserved their tribal structure in the Peloponneseus, such as the Melings of Mount Taygetus.

The great provincial landlords were not content with the power deriving from their estates. In order to enhance their prestige and social ascendency they strove to acquire administrative or military functions within the imperial machine of government or honorary titles in the imperial hierarchy. Imperial grants of offices and court titles ensured their cooperation. On the eve of the conquest, several great landlords of Crete and the Peloponneseus bore court titles, and some had close relations with the imperial court. A Cretan archon who was a magistratus and "friend of the emperor" traveled to Constantinople and persuaded Isaac II Angelus (1185–1195) to grant an estate to the bishop of Calamona (Rethymno) for his lifetime. Leo Saouros, an archon of Nauplia in the Peloponneseus, married the daughter of ex-emperor Alexius III Angelus (1195–1203) in 1204. The association of the archontes with the church was often quite close, since some of their relatives served as church dignitaries or officials. Besides, the patronage of ecclesiastical institutions enhanced their prestige and, occasionally, also their income, whenever they obtained the management of these institutions and their property.

Powerful archontes also developed in their own interests a network of personal bonds of dependence, yet these always retained their private nature and were never recognized by law or sanctioned by custom. They were thus basically different from western vassalage. Dependents, real or fictitious relatives, and allies occasionally constituted a large family or a real clan. It is within this framework that the archontopouloi of Crete and the Peloponneseus were to be found. In the early thirteenth century, these were not just "sons of archontes", but a part-


3 See an example above, p. 67; in the late thirteenth century, some fangiaioi were supposed to include about two thousand people or descendants.
ticular group situated at a lower rank than the archontes within the social elite.

Although landed property constituted the principal source of their income, many archontes resided in cities, especially in those which served as administrative, military, or ecclesiastical centers, such as Athens, Thebes, Monemvasia, Corinth, or Nauplia. Those who lived within the urban enclosure of a κωστρον or the fortified acropolis overlooking a city were sometimes called kastroi or “dwellers of a fortified city”, as in Athens. Yet not all archontes lived in urban centers. The leaders of the Slav populations of the Taygetus and most of the Cretan archontes presumably resided on their rural estates, in the midst of their followers and dependents; such would also be the case after the Latin conquest. It has already been mentioned that occasionally the emperor granted privileges to individuals, to ecclesiastical institutions, or collectively to the inhabitants of a city or territory, like those of Monemvasia. These privileges, which were mostly of a fiscal nature, did not entail a definitive alienation of state prerogatives or the development of private jurisdiction.

Among the various grants awarded, the pronoia has drawn particular attention. Literally “provision”, it consisted of a concession of state revenues to an individual who collected them directly; to effect this the emperor transferred to the recipient certain peasants and the imperial land they cultivated. The pronoia originated in the late eleventh or early twelfth century and became more widespread under emperor Manuel I Comnenus (1143–1180). It has been claimed that the pronoia was the counterpart of the western fief, the basis of the imperial military system, and a major factor in the so-called “feudalization” of the empire, which allegedly led to its downfall. Furthermore, the similarity between a pronoia and a fief supposedly explains why the Latin conquerors found it so easy to adapt to Byzantine conditions. The foregoing examination of Byzantine society has already emphasized that it differed fundamentally from feudal society. For our purpose here it is essential to discover how widespread the pronoia was in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries in the regions of Greece conquered by the Latins.

It is rather striking that no contemporary source ever mentions the existence of pronotarios or pronoi holders. A privilege delivered in 1183 by the duke of Crete, Constantine Ducass, confirmed the property of George Skordilis and his brothers, members of an archontic family.

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4 On the pronoia see Jacoby, “The Encyclopaedia,” pp. 376–378, with bibliographical references to previous work on the subject.
Pronoiai are mentioned in the preamble of this document, together with patrimonial estates, in what clearly appears to be a current formula used by the imperial administration. The provisions of the privilege mention, however, only hereditary property. The preamble may therefore provide evidence as to the existence and diffusion of the pronoia in the empire, although not to its extent. It certainly does not prove that pronoiai were to be found in Crete before 1204, nor can one deduce this from a grant of Cretan imperial land made in 1170–1171. The main argument in favor of a wide diffusion of the pronoia in the empire before 1204 rests on the Greek version of the Chronicle of the Morea. However, this is a late source deriving from a French original; it obviously reflects conditions existing in the second half of the fourteenth century in the principality of the Morea, an area feudalized after its conquest by the Frankish knights. The Greek Chronicle was presumably composed between 1341 and 1388 by a Greek archon who was firmly integrated into the class of feudatories of the principality. His work is therefore not a valid source for a description of Byzantine social and institutional realities at the time of the conquest, about a century and a half earlier. In view of his social standing, it is not surprising that the author was familiar with feudal institutions. His use of pronoia as the equivalent of fief and of archon as the counterpart of knyght may be explained by the absorption of the archontes into the feudal hierarchy of the Morea, as well as by the evolution of the Byzantine pronoia in the period of the Palaeologi and the knowledge thereof in the principality; indeed the pronoia gradually evolved into a hereditary tenure, its military nature became more pronounced, and it then resembled the western fief more than it previously had.

It should also be noted that the Assyces of Romania, a legal treatise compiled in the Morea between 1333 and 1346, had retained various provisions of Byzantine law as they existed before the Latin conquest. There is no trace, however, of the pronoia. Although called fiefs, the landed estates of the Greek archontes of the Morea mentioned in the Assyces were not analogous to Frankish fiefs, nor were they subject to feudal law; their transfer and succession, as well as the constitution

6. See Jacoby, "Quaerentes Convalescentia," pp. 183-184 and 187 in this version; Joffrey, "The Chronicle of the Morea," pp. 304-359, attempts to prove that the prototype was written in Greek. It is impossible, however, to deal with the subject only on a literary and philological basis. The social context has to be taken into account, and it is unlikely that Greeks should have praised the deeds of the Franks before the latter did so.
8. See Jacoby, La Palaeologai, pp. 75-82, on the dating of the Assyces, and pp. 32-36, on Byzantine law therein.
of a dower, reveal that they were in fact patrimonial estates governed by Byzantine law. To sum up, there is no evidence of the pronoia before 1204 in the territories of Greece conquered by the Latins. This is rather surprising, considering the general evidence for its existence in the Byzantine empire. Specific references to Greece may be lacking because sources bearing on this region are scant, or because the diffusion of the pronoia in the empire may have been more limited, quantitatively and geographically, than is commonly assumed; at any rate, it is quite obvious that the pronoia was not the dominant form of possession of landed property at this period. The possible annexation of pronoia by local archontes who assimilated them to their patrimonial estates is also to be taken into account, especially in the political context of the period immediately proceeding, and contemporaneous with, the Latin conquest, with the disappearance of the curbing restraint of the imperial authority.

There can be no doubt that the weakening of the imperial government after the death of Manuel I Comnenus in 1180 enabled the expansion of the large estates, both lay and ecclesiastical, especially at the expense of the small landholders and the state. In 1198 Michael Choniates, the metropolitan of Athens, accused the hastenoi inhabiting this city of using coercion to acquire land in the surrounding countryside. This evolution was accelerated at the time of the Latin conquest. Virtually independent for a few years, the great archontes were able to seize estates of the floc and, as the Peloponnesus, also appanages of members of the imperial family, as well as property of Constantinopolitan monasteries. It may be conjectured that the grant of such land to their followers enhanced their prestige and authority. The annexation of pronoia at this period is not to be excluded. The Latin conquerors consulted Byzantine cadastral registers with the help of archontes, as in the Morea, and gathered oral evidence, as in Crete, which enabled them to detect instances of fraud. It was thus possible

9 See Jacobs, “Les Archontes,” pp. 451-463, this is also the case in the areas of Coron and Modon and in the rest of the southern Peloponnesus which came under Venetian rule in 1207: ibid., pp. 426-427, 438-439. Carlisle, “Sulla pronoia,” claims that the pronoia existed in the Morea before 1204. However, he (op. cit. p. 50) does not take into account that the rules of succession to the "berka" of the archontes were entirely different from those applying to flocks in the areas from which the berka originated.

10. On these estates in the Peloponnesus see Jacobs, “Les Archontes,” pp. 421-427


to discover evidence of the usurpation of land that had belonged to the imperial fisc, yet no trace of pronosar was found. It may be that in the cadastral registers annexed pronosar had been disguised as patrimonial estates; as they were already inscribed before 1204 under the name of their beneficiaries, such deception would have been easier than for other land. This conjecture is no doubt tempting, yet only direct evidence will enable us to ascertain the existence and diffusion of the pronosar in the areas of Greece conquered by the Latins. For the time being, such evidence is lacking.

The collapse of the Byzantine provincial government shortly before 1204 also had other consequences: the great archontes took over its military, fiscal, and judicial prerogatives. Especially those who were invested with imperial power or bore court titles took advantage of the new situation. Leo Chamaretos ruled in 1205 over Sparta and the neighboring countryside; Leo Sigouros inherited the tyrannical power of his father in Nauplia and extended his sway over Argolis and the city of Corinth, where another archon succeeded him; in the southern Peloponneseus, yet another archon from the area of Modon convinced Geoffrey of Villehardouin to conquer the peninsula together with him. In Crete the heads of great archontic families fully exercised state prerogatives in the areas which they controlled. The social standing of these archontes, the means at their disposal, their ascendancy over their clients and dependent peasants, and the support they offered to the Greek clergy facing the Latin church, all marked them as leaders of the Greek resistance to the conquerors.

In the region under consideration here, it is practically impossible to get a clear view of the groups of society situated below the archontes and archontopoulai. Sources referring to city-dwellers other than the archontes are totally lacking. Many questions concerning the status of the peasantry remain unresolved. Peasants subject to a lord or to an ecclesiastical institution and settled on their land were known as paraikoi. An issue hotly debated in recent years is whether there still existed free peasants paying fiscal dues directly to the state, or whether these peasants had all been assimilated to the demovarioi.

13 On the general situation in the area see Harrow, "Realism of Byzantine Provincial Government"; the author somewhat underestimates the role of the independent archontes.

14 The impact of Slav groups settled in the Peloponneseus had long before been granted court titles and fiscal privileges, and their constitutional status and authority had thereby been strengthened. See the case of the Melissas in Hélène Cl. Ahrens, "Le Sélenia, chef de groupes ethniques," Polychronia, Festschrift Franz Delger zum 75. Geburtstag (Heidelberg, 1966), pp. 35-39

15 See Jaccard, "Les États latins," p. 11.
paroikoi or dependent peasants of the state. Twelfth-century evidence from Crete does not help to clarify the matter. A charter of 1197 deals with the donation of property by a Cretan to the monastery of Patmos, where the grantor became a monk. According to another charter, drafted in 1193, the vendors of a vineyard had first offered it to the holders of adjoining plots, in accordance with Byzantine law, so as to enable them to exercise their right of preemption (protemēsia); thereafter, the vendors had asked two imperial officials for permission to proceed with the sale. At first glance, this would seem to indicate that they were paroikoi of the state, yet no such conclusion can be reached. The two Cretan charters do not inform us about the status of either the grantor or the vendors. Moreover, various sources indicate that the donation and sale of property, as well as the exercise of the right of preemption, were not peculiar to free peasants. Finally, the transfer of immovable property was severely controlled by the state, as such property was liable to fiscal dues; this may explain why imperial officials intervened in the sale of 1193. Thus the evidence of the two Cretan charters remains inconclusive. The rather meager twelfth-century sources on the Byzantine peasantry in general may be supplemented with later data from areas conquered by the Latins; this procedure is justified by the fact that various provisions of Byzantine law were preserved and applied under their rule.

There can be no doubt that even before 1204, the subject of the paroikoi to his lord had become very tight. The subject of the paroikoi may have become binding one year after he had been settled by a lord on his land. The acquisition by the lord of definitive rights to his person and that of his descendants was achieved after a period of thirty years, during which the peasant fulfilled his fiscal and manorial obligations. The exercise of a thirty-year prescription is not documented directly for the twelfth century, yet it can be inferred from later sources bearing on Latin Romania. Moreover, it is quite likely that this prescription was already applied in the eleventh century, if not earlier.

16. Opposing views have been expressed by George Czerny, *Quelques problèmes de l'histoire de la paysannerie byzantine* (Bruxelles, 1956), by Johannes Kassianopulos, in his review of this study in Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 5 (1957), 967-162, and recently in Idem, "Ein Problem der spätbyzantinischen Agrargeschichte," *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*, XXX (1981), 267-237, where he also deals with the post-1204 period, this author claims that no dependent peasantry existed in Byzantium. Latin-Byzantinische, *Review Society*, pp. 142-222, 264 (especially 142-158), 16 of the opinion that the hereditary status of the paroikos was not extended to all his offspring before the fourteenth century; this would imply that the subjugation of the paroikoi to his lord in territories held by the Latins was an innovation introduced by the conquerors. For a different interpretation, see below.

The calculation of the thirty-year period extended not only to the sub-
jection of the dependent person, but also to that of his descendants,
at least of his male offspring. This confirms that the status of the
paroikos was permanent during his lifetime, as well as hereditary. The
paroikos remained legally free, in strict accordance with Byzantine law,
as is clearly illustrated by the fact that he had access to, and testified
in, imperial courts. Occasionally he was transferred from one lord to
another, yet he could not escape his social status, while paradoxically
the slave became free when emancipated by his lord. When the paroik-
kos had severed the link of subjection by migrating afar and was no
longer inscribed on the cadastral registers as belonging to the estate
of his lord, he became “unknown to the fisc” or “free” (eleutheros),
that is, free of any specific fiscal obligations toward the state and of
dependence on a specific lord. It should be emphasized that this “free-
dom” was only of a fiscal nature, and was temporary; it did not extend
to the social status of the paroikos, which remained permanent and her-
editary. Indeed, the imperial administration considered the eleutheros
as a paroikos of the state or demosarios paroikos, and the same rule
applied to persons previously not subjected to any lord, but unable
to explain their fiscal status: the assimilation of the latter group to the
paroikoi of the state implies that the Byzantine peasantry as a whole
was of dependent status. The temporary nature of the “freedom” en-
joyed by the eleutheros is illustrated by the procedure implemented by
the imperial administration: once located, he was settled on imperial
or state land, or else granted to an individual or an ecclesiastical insti-
tution, and became again liable to fiscal dues. He was thereby fully
reintegrated into the class of the paroikoi.18

Two documents seem to contradict the assumption that the status
of the paroikos had already become hereditary before 1204. Imperial
privileges delivered respectively to the monastery of Lavra on Mount
Athos in 1079 and to that of Eleousa in Macedonia in 1156 granted
them the right to increase the number of paroikoi exempted from fis-
cal dues whom they held in their subjection; the additional peasants
were to be selected from among their descendants.19 The exercise of
imperial rights over the descendants would seem to indicate that they
did not belong to these institutions. A closer examination of these doc-
ments reveals, however, that the provisions of the grants aimed only

18. On the eleutheroi see Scalabrini, “Une Classe libre,” pp. 139-152.
19. Texts in Paul Lemerle, André Guillon, and Nicolas G. Spyropoulos, Acta de Lavra, 1 [Ar-
Dame de Plati en Macedoine,” Journées numismatico-bibliothéiques organisées à Constantinop-
ole, VI (1990), 28-29 32-40; see also Omeganikii, op. cit., pp. 28-30
at the creation of additional exempted fiscal units. For this purpose, peasants could of course have been recruited, as in other cases, among the paroikoi of the state or the eleutheroi, who were temporarily free of tax payments and of subjection to a specific lord. The imperial government was reluctant, however, to grant manpower which it considered as belonging to the state. Instead, it was stipulated that the new fiscal units should be constituted by peasants who were already established on the monastery's lands. The issue was thus exclusively of a fiscal nature. The status of the descendants of the exempted paroikoi was not at stake, and no change in their status was contemplated: they were paroikoi of the monasteries before the imperial grants were made, and remained so afterwards.

It is already evident by now that the subjection of the paroikos to his lord entailed severe restrictions on his freedom. The lord could prevent him from leaving his land. However, migration did not necessarily sever the link to the lord; subjection was maintained as long as the paroikos paid the customary dues incumbent upon the fiscal unit for which he was responsible. The link of the paroikos to his lord was thus of a personal nature; he was not tied to the soil. Some degree of mobility among the paroikoi is indeed attested. In certain cases, it was due to economic incentives; in others, it was prompted by the urge of the paroikos to find a spouse: the high excess of males in many villages, as well as ecclesiastical prohibition of marriage between relatives, inevitably led to exogamy. It is therefore not surprising that members of the same family appeared occasionally in villages of the same lord or on the estates of neighboring landlords, as well as in a nearby city.20

The economic and fiscal unit or statis headed by the dependent peasant was liable to taxes known as sedos, as well as to labor services or angareia which he owed to the state; they were occasionally transferred by the emperor to an individual or an ecclesiastical institution. As a rule, the statis included land. An eleventh-century legal decision rendered by the magistros Constantin specified that land held according to the paroikikon diktion or "law of the paroikos" belonged to the lord and could not be alienated by the paroikoi.21 In practice, however, it was inherited, divided among heirs, or partly granted in dower. It may be assumed that in all these cases the lord did not object and possibly even agreed to the transfer of property, as long as the land was held

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21. Test u. See G. I. Uspehki, Akta studiarion (Londra, 1927), pp. XXXV-XXXVI. No such provision existed when land was held under a lease, as legal conditions were thus duly specified.
by people subject to him and the obligations of the fiscal unit were fulfilled. Restrictions on the rights of the paonkos to his lord’s land did not prevent him from acquiring full ownership of land and other property by purchase or through agricultural contracts; some of these provided for the division of newly planted trees or vines between the lord on whose land they were grown and the peasant who had supplied the labor. Thus the paonkos could come into possession of free property even on his own lord’s land. Yet if the dependent peasant died without heirs of his body, his lord succeeded to the entire immovable property situated on his domain, as well as to his chattels; this was a further mark of the paonkos’s subjection to his lord.  

The impact of the Latins on this Greek society was particularly marked in the fields of political organization and social structures closely linked to each other. The nature of the encounter of conquerors and conquered varied, however, according to the nature of the new ruling elite. Some territories were conquered by knights who imposed a feudal superstructure upon Byzantine society; other territories came almost directly under the rule of Venice or the Catalans, both with non-feudal elites; and some territories went first through a phase of feudal rule before being occupied by Venice.

In the territories belonging to the first category, such as the Morea and the duchy of Athens, feudalism was introduced by knights who came mainly from the county of Champagne and the duchy of Burgundy; in these areas of the west, feudalism was then in full bloom. In Euboea, which belonged to the third category of territories, it was introduced by knights from Lombardy and Tuscany, areas where feudalism was in regression as a result of the fierce onslaught of the communes. In many islands of the Aegean, Italian knights from these same areas, and the Venetians, imposed feudal institutions upon local society.

Despite significant differences in their respective backgrounds, the French and Italian knights and the Venetian lords of the Aegean brought with them political institutions and traditions, as well as attitudes and values, common to the whole of the feudal elite in the west toward

22 See Jacoby, “Les Francais latins,” pp. 13-46. On these agricultural contracts see Jacoby, La Fédéralité, p. 37 and note 4; they were similar to the agreements or indentures found in the west in the same period, yet in Byzantium they generated property rights.

23 See Jacoby, La Fédéralité, pp. 29-30, 62-63, 85-96. Langanc, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin, shows that many enzamens were relatives or neighbors; others were vassals of the powerful feudal lords.

the end of the twelfth century. In the areas from which they came (except for the city of Venice) society was strictly stratified, social status being virtually synonymous with legal status and transmitted by inheritance. Each class was governed by its particular legal system. Social promotion involving the crossing of class boundaries was largely restricted to the lower strata of society, when servile peasants became free. Promotion to the upper class of society was rendered most difficult by the development of class-consciousness within the ranks of the feudatories, illustrated by the ceremony of dubbing and the evolution of the nobility into an order, with its specific rituals, morals, and obligations, as well as a particular life-style and mentality. Personal bonds of a private nature, backed within the knighthly class by vassalage, provided the backbone of social and political hierarchy, while judicial and legislative authority, as well as the right of taxation, were essentially vested in private hands; the concept of a state was alien to the minds of the members of the knighthly class.

All these features of political institutions and social structure were transplanted by the feudal elite to Greece. Prerogatives exercised by the Byzantine imperial government until a few years before the conquest passed into the hands of the upper echelons of the Latin knighthly class. The feudal hierarchy is best known in the principality of Achaea. At most, it had only three ranks below the prince: there were his direct vassals, whether liege men or feudatories of simple homage; among the liege men the barons enjoyed special position as his tenants-in-chief. In turn, all the liege men of this first rank could have vassals of their own, and so too could those of the second rank. Social differentiation within this Frankish elite was pronounced, and the gulf between vassals of simple homage and greater feudatories was especially marked; members of the lowest stratum, among whom sergeants were included, were not members of the knighthly class. This fact goes far to explain the gradual integration of Greek archontes within their ranks and, in some cases, even within the ranks of the knighthly class. Besides, Italians of non-noble descent also gained access to this class, whose nature thus evolved in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

A hierarchy of fealty corresponding to that of the feudatories, knights

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25 For what follows see Locock, “The Encomium,” pp. 803–805, 807–808, 809, 901–902. On the integration into the feudal hierarchy of Slavs and, exceptionally in 1263, of Turkish leaders who were baptised see ibid., pp. 900–901. The description of the feudal hierarchy in the present work, vol. II, p. 249, should be corrected. The social ethos of the knights was reflected in their life style, the books they read, and the many works they composed, as well as in the wall paintings that adorned their mansions; see Locock, “La Littérature française” and “Knighthly Values.”
as well as sergeants, was also instituted. As the conquest proceeded,
Latin knights assisted by Greeks consulted the Byzantine cadastral reg-
isters and divided into feudal tenements land previously held by the
Byzantine duc, the crown, and ecclesiastical institutions housed in Con-
stantinople, land perhaps partly usurped by local archontes. The same
holds true of the estates of absentee archontes or those opposing Latin
rule, as well as numerous ecclesiastical properties, parts of which were
secularized on various occasions. Enfeoffment of knights and mounted
sergeants was restricted, however, by the prince and the barons, who
were eager to preserve their political, social, and economic ascendancy.
Many knights held only one fief, the standard yearly revenue of which
was about 1,000 hyperpera, or part of a fief, and mounted sergeants
half a fief or even less. The existence of money-fiefs and household
knights further emphasizes the precarious standing of many feuda-
tories and their dependence upon their lords. 16

The feudal class in the Morea was more numerous than in other
areas of Latin Greece and displayed strong cohesion, stability, and con-
tinuity. All these factors help to explain the important role of the Morea,
especially after 1248 when its prince William II of Villehardouin re-
ceived from emperor Baldwin II suzerainty over the islands of the
Aegean. The main vassals of the prince, including the triarchs (ten-
ziari) of Euboea, the lords of Tenos and Myconos, and the dukes of
the Archipelago, participated in court gatherings convened by him and,
from 1278, occasionally by his representative or bailie; they also took
part in military expeditions. They were thereby closely associated with
the progressive growth and diffusion in their own territories of a body
of law transcribed in the Assizes of Romania, whose final version in
French was compiled between 1333 and 1346. This private legal trea-
tise was based partly upon custom, imported by the conquerors from
their native countries as well as from the Latin empire of Constan-
tinople and the Latin kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus, where the
Latinos faced political and military circumstances similar to those of
the Morea, and existed in a virtual state of perpetual war. In addition,
the influence of royal Capetian legislation and of the Angevin king-
dom of Sicily is perceptible in the Assizes. Byzantine private law ap-
licable to family possessions and agricultural exploitation, as well as
various rules concerning the parakutor or dependent persons, were also
incorporated, although the conquerors severely restricted their use when
it conflicted with seignorial prerogatives. Finally, the Assizes of Ro-
mania also embody legislation emanating from the princely court, and

legal principles based on sentences pronounced by various courts of the principality. As a result of immigration after the conquest, burgesses or non-nobles, coming mostly from Italy, soon constituted the majority of the Latin population in the Morea. Political power remained, however, in the hands of the knightly class, and the regime instituted by the conquerors bore a decisive feudal imprint. The Assizes of Romania faithfully reflect the social, legal, and political realities of Frankish Morea. This was not the case in all the territories of the Aegean where the Assizes were applied. In several of them, the process of "feudalization" was quite limited; it nevertheless had an impact on the structure of Greek society.

Other territories of Romania were conquered by non-feudal elites and therefore did not witness the imposition of a feudal regime. Such was the case in areas which came under the sway of Venice; in them the commune made use of feudal institutions and terminology which it had previously applied in its territories of the Latin Orient, as in the region of Tyre. This was the case when in 1207 Venice ceded Corfu to ten members of old Venetian families, with extensive prerogatives, and in the territories around Coron and Modon, two ports in the southern Morea. Feudal terminology was also applied in Crete after 1211, the year in which Venice began the colonization of the isleand, which it intended to keep under its direct rule. The settlers who belonged to the old Venetian families were called in Crete militiae or feudati, knights or feudatories; they were provided with military tenements called militiae, cavalieriae, or seignords, for which they owed mounted military service. The popolani or members of non-noble families were given smaller tenures called serventiae or seigneuries, liable to service on foot.

Yet the use of this terminology should not be mistaken for the introduction in Crete of a feudal regime, which was totally alien to the social and political structure of Venice and the mentality of its citizens. This is clearly illustrated by the system of government imposed upon Crete and the areas of Coron and Modon. The rule of Venice in these territories not only succeeded that of Byzantium; in many respects it also bore a striking similarity to that of the empire, and contrasted markedly with the feudal regime introduced in other Greek territories. The supreme and direct authority of the state remained unrestricted, and expressed itself in numerous spheres. Venice inherited the estates of the Byzantine bis and its paroikai or villeneus (villam),

27 See Jacoby, La Feudalité, pp. 23-31.
28 See below, p. 200.
as well as the ownership by the state of the floating peasant population. The commune also confiscated Greek imperial monasteries and two thirds of the other Greek ecclesiastical estates, keeping one third for itself and appropriating the rest in military tenements for Latin settlers. The grant of these tenements in Crete, as well as in southern Messenia, where they seem to have been rather rare, did not restrict the authority of the state, nor did they imply any privatization of its rights and prerogatives in the judicial or fiscal spheres, as in feudalistized areas. These prerogatives were exercised by means of a highly centralized administration, closely supervised by the metropolitan authorities. Venetian law was enforced in all spheres and supplemented by rules adapted to the specific needs of each Venetian territory.

In 1311 the duchy of Athens was subjugated by non-feudal conquerors, members of the so-called Catalan Company, who settled exclusively in cities. The feudal regime and institutions introduced by the Frankish knights were immediately abolished, as was the use of the Assizes of Romans. In a way, it was as if the conquerors had succeeded directly to Byzantine rule; this was certainly the case in southern Thessaly, which was conquered by the Catalans in 1318 and 1319. At the outset, authority was vested entirely in the hands of the Catalan Company, whose institutions were supplemented by the customs of Barcelona, presumably introduced soon after the conquest; this reflects the urban character of the Catalan conquerors. No wonder, therefore, that their attitude toward the indigenous population was similar to that of the Venetians. The legal and social framework reflecting this attitude, which they created in 1311-1312, was maintained by the Catalans, in spite of their acceptance in 1312 of the kings of Sicily as supreme rulers. Sicilian rule introduced two new factors in the life of the duchy. Royal authority evidently curtailed that of the Company, which was nevertheless maintained as a corporation composed exclusively of Latio settlers and representing their predominantly urban interests. Besides, Sicilian rule introduced feudalism into the duchy. This complex regime persisted as long as the Catalan duchy existed.


20 Ibid., pp. 235-241. On the rules applying to military tenures in Crete see Santachi, La Notion de "feudaire," pp. 93-167. The conditional character of these tenures and the feudal terminology applied in Crete do not warrant the assumption of Santachi (esp. cit., especially pp. 145-212) that Venice introduced feudalism in the island. The basic characteristic of feudalism, the privatization of state prerogatives, is totally missing in Crete; see below.

The island of Euboea or Negroponte, as well as those of Teos and Myconos, about which we are less informed, may be included in the third category of territories alluded to above. Euboea was conquered in 1205 by Boniface of Montferrat and his vassals, who prevented Venice from taking possession of the two thirds of the island it had been promised by the other leaders of the Fourth Crusade in the treaty of March 1204. During the whole of the thirteenth century, except for the years 1255-1262, the authority of Venice in Euboea was restricted to its quarter in the city of Negroponte, which was progressively extended. Although Venice actively intervened in the political and feudal affairs of the island, whose main feudal lords were its vassals from 1211 on, it wielded no direct authority over their fiefs. It is only around 1323 that Venice began its territorial expansion in the island, which culminated in 1390 with rule over the entire island. At first, feudalism had coexisted in the island with Venetian rule. The imposition of the latter in areas previously governed by a feudal elite created a complex social, legal, and institutional regime, especially as Venice had to take into account existing structures. This is clearly borne out by its use of the Assizes of Romania, which were translated into the Venetian dialect, presumably in Euboea in the late fourteenth century. At the insistence of the feudal lords of the island, a version of the Assizes of Romania prepared by an official commission was sanctioned by the Venetian senate in 1452, and its dispositions acquired legal force. It soon became the only binding treatise of feudal law not only in Euboea, for which it had been prepared, but in all Venetian colonial territories, including even Corfu, which had never had any political or feudal link with the principality of Achaea. The continuity of feudal law was thereby ensured. It was applied by feudal lords as well as by Venice to feudatories, feudal tenements, and vassals. Byzantine private law regulated the civil affairs of the Greek population, restricting thereby the use of Venetian law. On the other hand, Venetian criminal and commercial law were fully enforced, as in Crete and southern Messenia. A similar complex system prevailed in areas of Frankish Mores annexed by Venice, such as Nauplia and Argos in 1389, the hinterland of Coron and Modon from 1420 on, and Tenos and Myconos in 1390.

The Latin population established on Byzantine soil during the pe-
period of the conquest was gradually reinforced in numbers by migration, and its composition became more diversified. Except for the feudatories hailing from Capetian France, most new settlers, nobles as well as commoners, had lived in urban centers in the west, mainly in Italy, and were accustomed to urban life and occupations. It is therefore not surprising that they established themselves mainly in the cities of Latin Greece, especially in harbor cities, the centers of its most intense economic activity. This was also the case with the settlers whom Venice sent to Crete; in addition to rural military tenements, they were provided with houses in Candia or in Canea. These settlers resided only temporarily in the villages assigned to them. In Euboea many feudatories lived in the city of Negroponte. Even knights originating from feudal areas in the west, though accustomed to a different lifestyle, favored urban settlement. True, some of them lived in isolated mountain castles or fortified rural mansions, although they resided occasionally in the houses they held in cities. Most of them, however, lived in the repaired or enlarged acropolis or kastro of a city or elsewhere inside the city walls, whether in the Morea or in the duchy of Athens. Significantly, after their conquest of the duchy in 1311 the Catalans acted in the same way and succeeded their Frankish predecessors in such fortified areas.

It is obvious that preference for urban settlement cannot be explained solely by economic considerations. Psychological factors of a more general nature also exerted a powerful influence in this respect: the tendency of the Latin conquerors and the western settlers who joined them to cluster behind the walls of a fortified city or acropolis arose from the urge for security of a minority group, conscious of its isolation in the midst of a numerous local Greek population. Events in Crete justified this feeling and clearly illustrate this phenomenon of aggregation: whenever a Greek rebellion threatened them, the Latins abandoned their rural holdings and took refuge in the cities. It is therefore not surprising that Venetian settlement policy was aimed at increasing the numbers of Latins in urban centers. This is illustrated by the building in Crete of a new city, Canea, as well as by the grant of houses to Venetian settlers in the island in the thirteenth century, already mentioned, and even more markedly in the following century. In 1301 twenty-four Venetian families were sent from Venice to Corin

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36 Nevertheless, some Latins remained permanently in the rural area, close to Candia, where they engaged in land cultivation and the raising of animals: see Trapp, "Co-existence of Greeks and Latins," p. 19.
37 An example of 1295 in Daniell, II Disono, pp. 82-83.
and Modon in order to reinforce the number of Latins residing in these cities. In 1340 Venetian citizenship restricted to Romania was granted to the Latins inhabiting the Venetian quarter of the city of Negroponte and to others who would settle there. In 1353, after the Black Death, Venice promised full and unrestricted citizenship to Latins willing to settle with their families for a period of at least ten years in the cities of Candia, Canaia, Retimo, and Suya in Crete, of Corun and Modon in the Morea, or in the Venetian quarter of Negroponte.

For lack of adequate sources, it is impossible to assess the relative numbers of the Latins and Greeks, yet the available information points to the fact that Latins remained a small minority. According to a list compiled around 1225, the principality of Achaia comprised 170 knight-fiefs and could muster some 450 mounted men. A report written in 1338 or somewhat later assessed at more than one thousand the number of knight-fiefs existing in the principality and territories subject to the suzerainty of the prince of Achaia. Even if accurate, this number is rather unimpressive, especially if the dispersion of the fiefdoms is taken into account. Moreover, it would be erroneous to multiply this number by a family coefficient in order to calculate the total knightly population. As all long-distance, voluntary, and individual migration is sex-selective, men accounted for an overwhelming majority among the knightly settlers; many of them arrived without a family, and subsequent immigration of relatives did not basically change the sex ratio (number of men to 100 women) within this group. The situation in this respect was worsened by the powerful class-consciousness of the feudal nobility and of the nobles hailing from Venice and other Italian cities who adopted their social ethos. Social exclusiveness, especially marked in the small group of the barons, was expressed in their matrimonial policy. Several Moreote knights married daughters of noble families in areas in the west from which they originated and later brought them over to Greece. Most of them, however, wedded Latin noblewomen from the eastern Mediterranean whose families had come from Venice, other Italian cities, France, or neighboring areas. The smallness of the knightly class and its predominantly male composition, as well as frequent marriages in its midst, gradually increased the problem of consanguinity which restricted marriage within the group, or threatened the validity of marriages already contracted. Economic considerations no doubt further limited the chances of marriage opportunities within the same group. It is significant that in 1336 pope Benedict XII justified his dispensation for a marriage in Negroponte within the forbidden degrees of consanguinity by stressing the small number of Latin nobles and his desire to prevent intermarriage with Greeks.
In Venetian Crete, the organized and imposed migration of families inaugurated in 1211, reinforced by voluntary migration, eliminated at the outset the impediment of consanguinity. Yet the groups of settlers sent from Venice to Crete were also small. In 1211 it was decided to establish 152 milia and 408 serjeantries; thus the arrival of 540 families or some 2,500 persons was contemplated. However, the settlers who arrived in successive waves in 1211, 1222, 1233, and 1252 did not reach these numbers. This is confirmed by the holding of military tenements by Latins who were not Venetians, although initially only the latter were to hold them; the acquisition of several milia or serjeantries by one settler also points to the same conclusion. In spite of a constant trickle of Latin settlers, the Latin population of the cities of the Venetian empire remained quite small. In 1302 Camen was almost totally empty; the year before, 24 Venetian settlers with their families, a small number indeed, departed for Coron and Modon. The population of Coron amounted in 1401 to 480 inhabitants, of whom only 80 were Latins. In the cities of the Catalan duchy of Athens, even the most populous, the Latins may not have numbered more than a few hundred.  

As a result of the conquest, society in Latin Romania was divided into two distinct groups: on one hand, the Latin conquerors and the western immigrants who joined them; on the other, the indigenous Greeks and Slavs. Religious affiliation did not constitute an important factor in the relations between the members of the two communities, yet it became a basic criterion of social stratification and individual status, providing a convenient means of group identification. The Latins were those who recognized the authority of the Roman church and enjoyed the status of freemen, hence Francus, synonymous with Latinus, also meant free. The indigenous society remained faithful to the Byzantine church. It underwent a considerable change, although some thirteenth- and fourteenth-century sources seem to imply the contrary, and its internal structure was altered. In conformity with their own political and institutional traditions and concepts, the Frankish knights conceived of society as strongly stratified, each class being governed by its own set of laws. They therefore translated social realities into legal terms and ascribed to the local society a socio-legal system similar to the one proper to a feudal society. Conquerors of urban origin, such as the Venetians and the Catalans, applied a similar social stratification to the local population. On the whole, Greeks and Slavs, peas-

ants and presumably city-dwellers, were relegated to the rank of villeins, regardless of their status before the conquest.

Those who escaped the process of debasement and leveling constituted numerically only a marginal element in the indigenous society: such were the archontes, the *archontopouloi*, and a few other Greek or Slav free men, as well as emancipated villeins or slaves. Thanks to their wealth, their social ascendancy, and their life-style, as well as to the fiscal exemptions they enjoyed occasionally at the time of conquest, the archontes differed considerably from the rest of the local population. They became under Latin rule a socio-legal class enjoying hereditary status and privileges. Only those who had belonged to their group, and their descendants, benefitted from this evolution; once defined, their class became practically sealed and crossing its boundaries presumably impossible. The *Assizes of Romania* forbade free Greek archontes to unfree villeins; the same holds true in Venetian Crete. The free status of archontes and *archontopouloi* is illustrated by the fact that some of them were granted military tenures. In the treaty of 1299 between Venice and Alexius Callerges, they appear alongside the Latins among those enjoying complete freedom. Moreover, the distinction between them and the villeins was recognized by Venetian courts.10

In spite of the clear-cut existing between the conquerors and the local population, archontes and *archontopouloi* were gradually integrated, in varying degrees, into the Latin social elite. In Frankish Morea, where they were particularly numerous, this integration began at the time of the conquest, when they submitted themselves to the authority of, and performed homage and swore an oath of fealty to, the leaders of the conquerors. On a personal and legal level they were integrated among the feudatories owing simple homage, the lowest stratum in the feudal hierarchy. Yet this integration did not affect the status of their patrimonial estates, which remained hereditary and were governed as before the conquest by Byzantine law. Toward the middle of the thirteenth century the integration of several archontes proceeded beyond this first stage; they were endowed with feudal tenements, many of them quite small, which were governed by feudal law. Some archontes were even dubbed by princes or barons; as a result, they became knights and were assimilated from a legal point of view to the ille men, their new status being hereditary. In this way they achieved so-

10 See Jacoby, "The Byzantines," pp. 205–206, and "Les États locaux," pp. 23–24. Only archontes who had sufficient proof of their status were recognized as such. This was not the case with Theodora Makremboliti, who fled from Constantinople in 1204 and became a partaker in Cárcia: see Dimitrios Chaniotis, ed., Jean B. Pina, *Anabaptic sacru o eklektik xorlogikis aristokratias, VI* (Rome, 1891), vol. 226, no. L.
cial integration within the feudal nobility. Their holding of non-feudal land exempt from military service produced some resentment against them in the ranks of the Latin feudatories in the first half of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, their integration continued unabated and even gained considerable impetus as time passed.

Two factors prompted the princes and barons to loosen the rigid system of social and legal stratification imposed by the Latin conquerors: the growing need for administrative personnel capable of handling the complex Byzantine fiscal system and the Greek documentation, and the lack of sufficient military forces, due especially to a decline in the number of Frankish feudatories. In the second half of the fourteenth century, the integration of some of the Greek archontes expressed itself in their subjective identification with the values, attitudes, and class-consciousness, as well as the cause and history, of the Latin knights who had conquered the Peloponnesus and other members of their class. This is well illustrated in the Greek version of the Chronicle of Mores, composed between 1341 and 1380. Yet the very existence of this version, no doubt intended for Greek-speaking feudatories, emphasizes that a cultural gap persisted between Greek archontes and Frankish feudatories. Moreover, several passages in this version emphasize the distinction between Greeks and Latins, especially in the religious sphere, although the author seems to have been an Orthodox Greek who accepted the supreme authority of the Roman church. Indeed, the religious distinction between Latins and Greeks persisted, in spite of some manifestations of religious symbiosis which will be discussed below. Intermarriage between members of the two groups must have remained rare, certainly not common enough to obliterate Greek identity. Mixed marriages were contracted by members of the highest scholion of feudal society, obviously for political reasons, while others involved members of the lowest stratum of the non-noble feudatories, as implied by the Assizes of Romania (arts. 75, 125, 139). Illegitimate children born of Greek mothers who were villeins could not gain access to the feudal class, as Moreote feudal law provided that in such cases “the offspring follow the status of the mother” (art. 174).44

The eagerness of the archontes and other Greeks to achieve integration within the Latin elite may be ascribed to economic as well as social motivation. The conquerors confirmed their patrimonial estates and their hold on the peasants needed for their cultivation, which constituted the foundations of their power and social ascendancy, and endowed them with fiefs. These moves lifted the archontes to the level of

the Frankish feudatories and enhanced their social superiority within their own community. Administrative and military considerations already mentioned induced the princes and the barons of the Morea to encourage this process, thereby ensuring the loyalty, cooperation, and services of the Greek elite. As a result, the Greek population was deprived of an upper class willing to join the Greek church in its opposition to the Latins and to take the lead in this opposition, or to favor the Byzantine expansion in the Peloponnese begun in 1262.\(^2\)

A similar process of integration, although somewhat different in nature, took place in the lordships of the Aegean. The conciliatory approach of Marco I Sanudo, duke of the Archipelago (1207–1227), toward the Greeks was expressed in his religious policy and illustrated by the willingness of twenty Cretan archontes to leave their native island and join him in 1213. The smallness of the class of Latin conquerors and archontes in the duchy no doubt led, from an early stage, to the integration of Greeks of a lower rank into the class of the feudatories. The Ghisi, lords of Tenos and Myconos, awarded tenements to Greeks and Latins whom they bound to be their vassals and whom they “ennobled” in return for military service. The imposition of feudal terminology and rules constituted a legal fiction, both useful and necessary. Yet no change occurred in the economic activity of these Greek feudatories, who continued to till their land. Their particular status and social promotion produced, however, a new stratification within the indigenous society.\(^3\)

The Venetian implantation in Crete, begun in 1211, was based on the military colonization of the island. It led to an expropriation of church land and the estates of several archontes which drove the Greeks to rise against Venice in 1212. This first rebellion ended with the departure of twenty archontes from the island, yet most of their class remained in Crete. The division within their ranks, which dated back to the period preceding the conquest, prevented them from forming a united front against Venice, thus enabling the commune to rally them progressively to its cause by granting them various concessions. The settlement reached by Venice in 1219 with two rebel leaders may be considered as the first stage in the integration of the archontes within the ranks of the Latin elite. The commune granted each of them a half militia in return for military service, an annual payment, and a promise of loyalty. In all respects, the two archontes were assimilated to the Latin holders of military tenements, yet at the same time they retained

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42. See Jacoby, La Réunion, pp. 242–250, 264.
their patrimonial estates, as well as their social position in Greek society. The same Venetian policy was applied on several occasions after 1219. In 1224 two militiae were granted; in 1233, several others; and in 1252 Greeks were to be endowed with some of the fifteen available; in 1265 two militiae and five and a half serjeanties, each a sixth of a militia, were again granted. In 1299 Alexius Callerges obtained the restitution of confiscated militiae, and the commune granted him four more and allowed him to buy nine others, two to six of which were designated for his followers.

As in the feudal Morea, Venice integrated the archontes, yet according to its own interests, social structure, and institutions. The process of integration initiated in Crete in 1219 therefore differed markedly on many counts from that in the principality. It was neither progressive nor generalized, but took place in stages, and archontes enjoyed it only in exceptional instances, as a result of specific agreements arrived at with Venice after uprisings or as a reward for services rendered to the commune. The number of archontes benefiting from integraliaco was therefore limited, although it steadily increased during the thirteenth century. The endowment of their followers with military tenements enhanced the social standing of the upper ranks of the archontes; so did their concern for the villeins oppressed by Latin masters, as well as for those who supported their successive rebellions and whose emancipation they managed to obtain or preserve, respectively. The concessions regarding villeins granted by Venice in 1299 to Alexius Callerges were particularly extensive. Venice even recognized the validity of the sentences pronounced by Alexius and the judges he had appointed during his long reign, and he was allowed to receive voluntary payments and services from Greeks. All this implies considerable social ascendancy, not only over Greeks who were his followers or directly subjected to him, but also over Greeks subjected to Latin holders of military tenements or to the commune. It is therefore obvious that a network of social ties headed by the archontes existed alongside the social and legal relationship recognized by Venice.

The slow pace at which Venice succeeded in rallying the archontes to its cause explains the continuous role of the Greek church as a focus of opposition to foreign rule, both on a religious and an ethnic level, and as a source of Greek popular resentment against the Latins. The alliance of the archontes with the Greek church, which enhanced their prestige, was also strengthened by the support lent on several occasions by the Byzantine emperors, such as John III Vatatzes and the Palaeologi, to those who rebelled. Although Venice granted military tenements to archontes in the thirteenth century, it remained suspi-
cious of the Greeks. In principle, military tenements could be alienated only in favor of Venetians, but in practice other Latins also acquired them, alienation was strictly controlled, however, especially in order to prevent Greeks from acquiring land held by Latins or by the commune. It is thus obvious that Greeks holding military tenements could do so only with the approval of the Venetian authorities. It is significant that Venice demanded hostages to ensure the implementation of agreements, at times even from the same archontes to whom it granted militiae. In view of this ambivalent attitude, one of the concessions granted to Alexis Calerges in 1299 commands particular attention: the right of Alexis and those who had followed him during the rebellion to marry into Latin families. In order to evaluate properly the scope of this privilege, its context should be closely examined. 43

There can be no doubt that Venice implemented a policy of segregation in Crete. To be sure, marriages of prominent Venetians with Greek women had already taken place earlier in the century and in some cases may have been favored by Venice. Such was certainly the case, for instance, with that of Marco Venier, holder of a militia in Crete, who by marrying the daughter of the Greek archon Nicholas Endamono Iannes acquired Cerigo in 1238 and thereby ensured Venice’s control over this island. 44 George Laba, holder of a sergeanty of sixth of a militia in 1271, if not earlier, married into a branch of the Venetian Gradentioni family in this period. 45 Yet when the daughters of Manuel Dragondopoulos were granted in 1272 the right to marry Latins, this was no doubt considered a major concession made by the commune. 46

In 1293 Venice forbade all Latins holding military tenements or other land to marry into Greek families and threatened them with the loss of all their estates and with banishment from the island if they did so. Venice obviously feared that these estates might be transferred to Greeks who married Latin women. The decree stating this policy of

43. See Ascoli, “Le Istmei aiati,” pp. 26–29; Borromi, Il Dominio veneziano, pp. 73–77, has assembled evidence about non-Venetian and Greek holders of militiae in a number of Latins of the thirteenth century.


46. Test in Cena, Dell’erezione del Maggior Consiglio, II, 153, no. 72.
segregation in 1293 implied that such marriages were nevertheless taking place, although the commune was then fighting Alexius Callerges. In 1274, during the uprising of the Choriatzes clan, the commune decreed that rebellious vasmuli would be banished from Crete or, if found in the island, reduced forever to the status of villeins of the commune. These offspring of marriages to, and especially illegitimate unions with, Greek women, obviously were considered free, a fact confirmed by the agreement of 1299 in which they are mentioned alongside the archontes, the archontopoulloi, and the Latins. According to Venetian practice in Crete, only the offspring, whether legitimate or not, of a Latin or a free Greek father was considered free.

Various sources agree to imply that most vasmuli of the upper class were the illegitimate children of Latin fathers and Greek mothers. The excess of men in the Latin population in Crete at all its social levels may well explain unions, legitimate and especially illegitimate, with Greek women. In 1319 Scopeluto Tiepolo was recognized as the illegitimate son of James Tiepolo, who had been duke of Crete in 1298, and of a Greek mother who presumably was a villeine; his free status was confirmed by the authorities. In 1318 two Choriatzes attempted to prove, with the help of Greek and Latin witnesses, that they were "Latins and sons of Latins and Venetians"; they too were probably illegitimate sons of Venetian fathers. In 1302 the feudatories of Canea protested against the holding of military tenements and offices, to which they alone were entitled, by vasmuli and Greeks, as well as against the participation of members of these two groups in the assembly of the feudatories. Various sources seem to indicate that these vasmuli were favored by the Venetian officers in charge in Crete because they were the sons of Venetian noblemen, such as the Tiepolos mentioned above.

Obviously, the holding of military tenements did not ensure Greek archontes of social integration within the Latin elite. The eagerness of the Callerges and their subordinate archontes to contract mixed marriages is therefore understandable, yet the number of such marriages remained quite small, limited, it seems, to the Callerges of Millipotamo, whose members married into the noble Venetian families of Sagredo and Zeno. Other archontes remained within their own community, especially those refusing to accommodate themselves to Venetian rule; intermittent rebellions broke out in the area of Canea, and Venice remained suspicious. The acquisition by Greeks of Latin military tenures was prohibited in 1319, and in 1334 the authorities prevented Greeks from acquiring the estates of Andrew Callerges, who had died while heavily in debt. In spite of the favoritism displayed by Venetian
officers toward some Greeks, few sat in the great council of Candia. 47
In the fifteenth century Venice remained as intransigent as before about
segregation, and persisted in opposing the participation of Greeks in
Venetian assemblies and their holding of high administrative offices.
A decree to this effect was issued in Crete in 1422. 48
It has been claimed that the agreement concluded in 1299 by Venice
with Alexius Callerges opened the way to a reconciliation between Ven-
ice and the Greek community of Crete, which eventually, in the sec-
ond half of the fourteenth century, generated an alliance of Venetian
feudatories with the Greek archontes. 49 It is significant that members
of the Grademigo and the Venet families, who had intermarried with
Greek archontic families, plotted against Venice in 1355 and were among
the leaders of the Cretan rebellion in 1363. Their attitude, however,
does not seem to have been shared by the majority of the Latin feu-
datories of the island. Nor should we be deceived by the measures they
adopted in 1363. The substitution of the standard of St. Titus, patron
of Crete, for that of St. Mark, patron of Venice, the license granted
to Greeks to become priests if they wished, and the adoption of the
Orthodox rite by Leonard Grademigo were all measures dictated by the
circumstances of the revolt and the opposition to Venice. They did not
derive from a progressive rapprochement between Venetian and Greek
elites (at best limited in scope), but reflected the opportunism of the
Venetian leaders of the rebellion, who were fully aware of the ascen-
dancy of the Greek archontes over their followers and dependents and
of the absolute need to ensure their support.
Venice also strongly opposed the unions, whether legal or not, of
Latin and Greeks within ranks of society other than the elites, yet
could not entirely prevent them. Some Latin notaries and craftsmen
married Greek women in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth cen-
tury, learned Greek, and became hellenized, and this phenomenon no
doubt increased in scope in the following period. The appearance of
vasmuli in 1274 and 1299 as a particular group is no doubt signifi-
cant, yet this is no indication as to their numerical importance. At any
rate, they did not constitute a homogeneous social group, in all like-
lihood many, if not most, of them were illegitimate children of Latin
fathers. Unlike the sons of Venetian noblemen mentioned above, the
vasmul, whom Venice hoped to recruit for its armies in 1365, along
with Turks and slaves, were no doubt the offspring of illegitimate mixed

unions at the lowest ranks of society. Nevertheless Venice reacted strongly when in 1369 the authorities discovered that many Italian mercenaries recruited during the great Cretan rebellion of 1363–1366 had married Greek women of the island. The considerations which prompted Venice to oppose such unions were different from those involving members of aristocratic families; evidently Venice feared that women of lowly origin would escape their unfree status by marrying free men and that their marriage to the latter would undermine the mercenaries' allegiance to the state. It therefore dismissed in 1371 all mercenaries married to local Greek women, as well as all Greeks serving in the Venetian armies.50

This examination of the social evolution in Crete leads to the conclusion that Venice persisted in its policy of segregation there, although it could not effectively enforce its ban on intermarriage at all levels of Cretan society. The religious policy implemented by the commune in Crete also points to the continuity of its segregationist attitude. Venice considered the Latin church an instrument of government, indispensable for the strengthening of its rule over former Byzantine territories. It was to serve the interests of the state, and therefore the Venetian authorities interfered in ecclesiastical appointments and closely supervised the activity of the Latin and Greek churches. Venice was well aware of the strong opposition of the Greeks, especially the Greek clergy, to any attempt to persuade them to join the Roman church or to enforce the union of the churches proclaimed in 1369 and 1439. On the whole, therefore, it refrained from supporting any action to this effect for fear of unrest. In fact, few Greeks joined the Latin church Venetian suspicions were aroused by Greek religious unrest, constantly stimulated by the arrival of numerous Greek priests from Byzantine territories, especially around 1450.51 The commune's segregationist policy led to strong misgivings in Venice about the growing numbers of Latins attending services in Greek churches or having recourse to Greek priests. In 1349 the duke of Crete forcefully restated that such practices were prohibited, and imposed fines on all Latins and Greek priests involved in them. Significantly, this decree was to be publicly read every three months in all parts of Crete. It was promulgated anew.

in 1405. The same problem arose again in the following years. Though Venice shared the opposition of the popes to religious symbiosis, its considerations were not exclusively of a religious nature. It combatted greekization because it entailed the loss of Latin group identity and endangered the basic tenets of a rule based on segregation.

In Catalan Greece, the conquerors imposed a segregation similar to that implemented by Venice in the thirteenth and fourteenth-century Crete. In 1311, the castell of Livadia was handed over to the Catalan Company by several of its inhabitants, presumably archontes. They and their descendants were rewarded with the grant of the status of Franks or Latins, thus constituting an exception to the rule. However, their full integration as freemen within the class of the conquerors was prevented, since the Company decreed in 1311–1312 that Greeks could not marry Catholic women. This ban was extended even to Greeks who had joined the Roman church. Catalan legislation was somewhat more lenient than Venetian legislation in Crete, since Latins could marry Greek women; several such marriages occurred in the upper class of Latins.

The Company also prohibited, presumably in the early years of its rule, the acquisition of real estate by Greeks. The link between this provision and the interdiction of marriage of Latin women to Greeks is obvious. As in Venetian Crete, land was the source of political and military power, and its transfer to Greeks was to be prevented, or at least strictly controlled. Further social integration, which was contrary to the policy of the Company, was only exceptionally granted. Such was the case in 1362, when two Greek notaries and their male offspring, though remaining Orthodox, were authorized to marry Latin women. One of them also obtained the right to acquire and alienate real estate like the Franks or Latins. In 1380 the latter privilege was also granted to the Greek mistress of the military commandant of Athens, by whom she had borne several children; she was also awarded personal freedom on the same occasion. Few Greeks of the Catalan duchy of Athens seem to have joined the Roman church, and some

52 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Donor di Candia, br. 50, fol. 58v–59r (nuova numerazione); una satisfactione missioni by Estelliano Marchese,-legislazione veneta, 3 capitoli di Candia (Venise, 1940), pp. 124–125
53 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Donor di Candia, secretaria, reg. 7, fol. 99r (unpublished). 1418, and see below, note 91
55 Thul in Rhibi de Lluch, Diplomataria, p. 362, n. 294; see also p. 477, n. 391
56 See above, note 54 and in addition in note 53. He was Romeo de Bellarosa; she was Zoe of Megara.
of those were induced to do so for opportunistic reasons; their return to the Orthodox faith was punished by the confiscation of their property. On the whole the Greeks remained within their community, as implied by the case of the two notaries mentioned above. The prolonged excommunication of the Latins residing in the Catalan duchy no doubt weakened the Roman church within its boundaries, but the outcry of pope Urban V in 1363 that almost all the Latins had gone over to the Orthodox rite seems to have been an overstatement. As a rule, social segregation based on religious affiliation was strictly maintained in Catalan Greece.

It is significant that both in Venetian Crete and in the Catalan duchy of Athens social segregation was enforced by legislation. In spite of some variations due to different local conditions, one perceives a striking agreement between the behavior of the conquering elites of urban origin in these two areas. Everyday life and the pursuit of similar or joint economic activities brought Latins into close contact with the ruled, especially in urban centers, and hardly any factor save religion differentiated them from the Greeks, whose numbers were vastly superior. The constant threat of assimilation into the surrounding Greek society endangered their social supremacy and political prerogatives. The ruling Latin elite therefore resorted to institutionalized segregation in order to preserve the separate group identity of the Latins. The knights of the feudal Morea did not have recourse to such measures. Their class-consciousness and sense of social superiority and the strictly stratified structure of society, as well as their life-style and particular occupation, which matched their status, all created a deep gulf between them and most Greeks and ensured social segregation.

In spite of substantial differences among the various regimes established by the Latins in Romania, the evolution of the bulk of the indigenous population ran along parallel lines. Both in feudal and non-feudal areas one finds similar social institutions, rules, and phenomena which go back in part to the Byzantine period. It would be erroneous, however, to assume that the conquest resulted solely in a change of masters for the dependent peasants. The Latins assimilated the entire subjugated indigenous population, rural as well as urban, to the paroikoi, or villemes (villani) as they were called by the Latins. Only the archontes and archontopouloi, as well as a few free and emanci-

57 Year in Rundbøl I Lunds, Diplomatarium, pp. 360-381, no. 292.
58 Ibid., pp. 336-338, no. 259.
59 The equation appears in a Croatian text. See Strickland I Dalmatia, p. 19, note 100.
pated parcokoi, escaped debasement. Thus most free men sank into a state of dependency. Moreover, in spite of continuity in the use of the term parcokoi, a major change occurred in the status of these men and women: Byzantine parcokoi were legally free, but under Latin rule the villeins were considered unfree, and as such constituted a legal class from which they could escape only by a formal act of emancipation. The presumption of subjection was so well established that the status of freedom became exceptional and had to be duly proven by those who enjoyed it. In addition to its legal aspect, the subjection of the villeins was also expressed in the attitude of the Latin lords toward them. This attitude was similar to that of their counterparts in the west, where the dependency of the peasantry entailed a definite note of inferiority and contempt. No doubt it differed from the attitude of the Byzantine lord toward his parcokoi, who were legally free and had access to imperial courts. It may be assumed, however, that under the influence of the Latins a change also occurred in the relationship of Greek lords with their own parcokoi. To some extent, continuity prevailed in Venetian territories, where the commune had succeeded to the Byzantine state; it owned villeins known as villani comunes, similar to the demostatoi parcokoi in the empire. Moreover, the commune assimilated to its own villeins "non-inscribed" villeins (agrai?) or "foreign men" (exter homines), Greeks not subject to any lord; this practice was similar to that applied to the eleutheroi in the empire. No such precedence in the acquisition of new manpower existed in feudalized territories, where this former right of the state was now exercised by all feudal lords. There were also villani militum included in the military tenements granted by Venice to Latins, and occasionally to Greeks. Villeins could also be owned privately as patrimonial property if they were extra feudum, not part of a military tenement. Villeins of the state were obviously not to be found in feudalized areas, in which the prerogatives of the state had been transferred into private hands.60

Like the Byzantine parcokoi, the villein inherited his status from his father; illegitimate children born from a free father and a dependent mother were considered villeins according to feudal law, but free under Venetian rule, in accordance with Roman law.61 The dependence of the villein extended to his descendants, and enforcement of the thirty-year prescription resulted in perpetual subjection to the lord: the Assizes

60. See Jacoby, "Une Classe Facile," pp. 148-151; the number of villeins handling fiscal units in a Comita militum vessel from about 1000: ibid., p. 149, note 54

61. For feudal law see Jacoby, La Feudalité, pp. 30-31, 309, on the basis of the Andze of Romania (ed. Requien), arts. 74, 174, 179; for Venetian rule see Sansi, "Quelques aspects du statut," pp. 116 ff
of Romania attest it for the Morea; it is also documented in the fifteenth century for Euboæa; and in 1410 it was specified that in Crete the calculation of the period extended to the direct male ancestors of the person whose status was debated. The enforcement of the prescription in these three areas, each with a different regime, emphases that it was applied continuously since the conquest, and also valid in the Byzantine period. Cases regarding the subjection of villeins were indeed decided on the basis of testimonies regarding their lineal ancestors.61 Besides, Venetian officials in Crete were ordered to reclaim all fugitive villeins of the commune, whether heads of fiscal units or their sons inscribed on the cadastral registers within these units. The purpose of this inscription, as well as that of the eldest brother when only orphans were left, was to ensure the subjection of these villeins to their lord. It is therefore not surprising that the villein could be transferred with his wife and children, if the latter were less than sixteen years old. At this age fiscal responsibility was reached, and the son could be removed from the fiscal unit headed by his father or widowed mother, or his elder brother or sister if only orphans were registered as belonging to the fiscal unit.62

The subjection of the villein to his lord was extremely rigorous, regardless of whether the lord was an individual, an institution, or the state as in Venetian territory. The villein was a mere chattel who could be owned jointly by several lords, enslaved, held in seisin, exchanged, or sold. As his labor constituted a source of income, he might even be leased for a definite period extending from a few days, especially during the peak of the agricultural season, to several years. If he was removed by the state from a property in Venetian territory or killed by accident by a large man in a feudal area, he was replaced by another villein. His lord was entitled to remove him from his holding and take his movable goods, provided he left him the means necessary for his sustenance and for the fulfillment of his fiscal obligations. In the case of transfer or lease for a definite period, the temporary lord exercised the prerogatives of the legitimate lord, except in the realm of criminal justice.63

As a rule, the lord determined where the villein should reside. In

63. On this rule see units in Borrom., H. Dorema, p. 91, note 10 and 11
this respect the condition of the state’s vellieus in Venetian Crete seems to have been somewhat better. Since the domain of the commune extended over large sections of the island, there was more room for mobility. The agreement of 1299 with Alezis Callerges specified that vellieus other than those belonging to military tenements should be allowed to reside where they wished. In 1313 it was decreed that vellieus of the state might dwell in Candia or in a village, at will, without fear of being regarded as vellieus of feudatories; they were, however, forbidden to leave Crete or the land they held and were compelled to fulfill their obligations to the commune, such as the payment of the villanazia, an annual tax amounting to one hyperper imposed upon state vellieus. In 1334 the Venetian authorities refused to exempt vellieus inhabiting Candia from this tax, for fear that this might lead to a massive exodus of peasants from rural areas to the city. At any rate, the commune exercised strict supervision over its vellieus. In 1339 those of Crete were ordered to register in the district where they had settled within fifteen days of their arrival; the following year the authorities discovered that in the area of Candia many state vellieus had exhibited false privileges of enfranchisement which they had purchased, inter alia, in order to be allowed to settle wherever they wished.63

In spite of the restrictions imposed upon the mobility of the vellieus, their migration is abundantly documented for Latin Greece. Besides economic or matrimonial considerations of an individual nature, as in the Byzantine empire, catastrophic events, as well as the general conditions prevailing in the area, explain this mobility. Frequent revolts in thirteenth-century Crete, warfare between Latin and Byzantines in the Morea, the raids of the Catalans in the peninsula and in Euboia from 1311 to 1329, the activity of Latin—and in the fourteenth and fifteenth century also of Turkish—pirates, all these increased the number of fugitive vellieus. Besides, famine and recurring waves of plague after the Black Death of 1347–1348 prompted them to seek refuge elsewhere. In 1401 the Venetian authorities complained that many Greeks fearing service in the navy had fled to Anatolia. The extreme political fragmentation of Greece after 1204 no doubt provided vellieus many opportunities to abandon their residence and thereby sever the link of sujektion.64

The lord had the right to recover a vellieu who had abandoned his residence without permission. After locating the fugitive, he appealed

to a competent court in order to prove his subjection and obtain the intervention of state officials in Crete or, if in feudalized territories, that of the prince, the baron, or other feudal lords exercising high justice. In Venetian territories the state villeins were recovered by officials. Any unilateral action by the lord to reclaim his villeins was prohibited, as the Cretan fundatorites were remanded in 1349. Moreover, the commune imposed heavy penalties on fugitive villeins and those who provided them with shelter, often with the intent of holding them permanently. While awaiting the verdict of the court, the fugitive was usually imprisoned at the expense of the lord who claimed him; if the lord did not provide for his sustenance, he forfeited his rights over the villein. 67

The legal capacity of a villein was also restricted in other ways. We are particularly well informed about the Morea. He could neither contract marriage himself nor marry off his daughter, especially if the spouse was dependent upon another lord, without the permission of his own lord; the latter was compelled, however, to accept a marriage which had been contracted, even by a female villein with a free man, whereby she acquired permanent freedom. A villein was tried by his lord in civil cases, although criminal jurisdiction was the exclusive right of the prince and the barons. A villein wronged by his own lord could not lodge a complaint against him, nor appeal to a superior lord; his testimony was valid only if it concerned a portion or the boundaries of a field, but not a liege man in a criminal case. If a villein died, died without offspring, or willed his property without the consent of his lord, the latter inherited his goods. This rule also held in favor of a foreign lord whose land he had cultivated under a contract providing for the division of newly planted trees or vines. 68 In Venetian territories criminal justice was an exclusive prerogative of the state, and all villeins were tried in state courts, whether or not they belonged to a military tenure, an individual, or the commune. These courts also dealt with civil cases, especially those involving control over state villeins. 69 Unfortunately, there is no information about the exercise of civil justice by Latin lords or Greek archontes.

The continuity of certain aspects of the Byzantine fiscal system is well documented, yet this system underwent important changes as the

67 See Joumaly, "Une Classe fixture," pp. 142-143; and on Santec, "Quelques aspects du statut," pp. 110-112, 123-127; Rauli Vedulici, *Duce di Causa; Quaerevit Constantinum*, p. 117 (February 6, 1349).
68 *Antkne of Romance* (ed. Rousseau), arts. 42, 43, 123, 174-175, 184-185, 189, 196, and see above, note 67
Latinus adapted it to their own needs and concepts. The debasement of many free men who had become villeins under Latin rule obviously entailed the imposition of heavier fiscal obligations upon them. It will be remembered that the Byzantine paraokuos owed dues and labor services to the state. After the Latin conquest, this remained the case with Venetian state villeins only. All the other villeins, whether in Venetian or in feudal territories, were bound to provide dues and services to their lord; if the land on which they dwelt was leased to an individual or an institution, the temporary lord was entitled to collect them, as illustrated by evidence from Venetian Messenia.

The rights of the permanent or temporary lord, as well as those of the commune, also restricted the legal capacity of the villein in the economic sphere. As a rule, he could not borrow, engage in trade, or alienate movable property without the consent of his lord. The Assizes of Romania (art. 215) clearly distinguish between villeins who borrowed for sustenance and those who incurred commercial debts, even with the permission of their lord, which was considered more serious. A similar distinction between indebtedness and a trade operation is to be found in Venetian Crete; the villeins of the commune were allowed to borrow and to engage in trade, unless they had been explicitly forbidden to do so.

The alienation of real estate presented a particular problem, as this property was taxable and had to be registered in the cadastral registers. It was therefore necessary for villeins to obtain the agreement of their lord, or that of the commune, for villeins of the state. In 1292 a state villein living in Coron made his will after its clauses had been approved by Venetian officials. Lack of approval entailed the cancelation of sales. 70 On the other hand, the acquisition of property was not restricted, as it was indirectly of advantage to the lord. It may be assumed that in many cases, the person entering an agreement with a villein was aware of the latter’s status and limitations; however, this was not always the case. In 1319 the commune ordered the official brokers operating on its behalf in Crete to disclose the status of the borrower to the other contracting party before the latter provided a loan to, or accepted security from, a villein, to enable the lenders to protect their interests and prevent them from being defrauded by villeins. Villeins are seldom mentioned in notarial documents; either they concealed their status, or else the parties to a contract did not consider that it need be stated explicitly. In any case, it seems evident that the overwhelming majority of the Greeks involved in agricultural con-

70. The estate could not be alienated: Assizes of Romania (ed. Runciman), art. 215
tracts, loans, or the purchase of animals were villeins. It would be a mistake to consider them as free when their status is not specified; a cross-checking with judicial documents will no doubt confirm this assumption.

Manumission of villeins does not seem to have been practised on a large scale, except in special circumstances; such was the case in 1299 at the request of Alexius Callerges. The manumission of a villein belonging to a military tenement obviously reduced its value. It was therefore subject to approval by the prince in the Morea, presumably by the chief lord in each of the various lordships of the Aegean, or by the commune in Venetian territory. On the other hand, the Latin and the Greek archontes of Crete could free, without restriction, villeins whom they held in full ownership. In Venetian territories the commune also manumitted villeins who belonged to other lords and compensated the latter for the loss by granting them "non-inscribed" or state villeins. Manumission was granted by lords mainly as a pious act, and by the commune as a reward for services or loyalty. According to Venetian sources of the first half of the fourteenth century conditional freedom was granted in Crete to Greek sailors newly established in the island and to Greek villeins settling in Candia as long as they would serve aboard the ships of the Venetian navy.

In certain cases a villein could redeem himself by paying a large sum to his lord. In 1434 the Venetian senate decided that state villeins in Crete should be able to do so if they paid to the commune 50 ducats or more, which at the time amounted to some 250 hyperpers. This fiscal expedient was regarded as particularly useful because Venice was then at war in Lombardy and in urgent need of income, besides, manumission on a large scale would have reduced administrative expenses involved in the collection of the yearly villanowio of one hyperper. It seems unlikely, however, that many state villeins took advantage of the offer, as the sum required was huge compared with the yearly tax they paid, equivalent to the price of several oxen, even one of which peasants often found it difficult to afford. Yet there can be no doubt that many.

73 A case for 60 hyperpers is mentioned in 1306: see Sansotti, *La Notitia* de "feudum*; p. 177, note 28.
74 Text in Noéres, *Documents de l'âge* du-en, pp. 363-364. But the price of a slave was then lower, between 27 and 40 ducats: see Vermeulen, *l'Eschange*, 12, 879-881. In 1416 oxen were bought from villeins in the west and the communes of Crete for 23 hyperpers, and said in the eastern part for 60 hyperpers: see Thiriet, *La Romanie*, p. 416.
villeins aspired to freedom. In 1415 social unrest spread among the villeins of Crete, when several of them claimed that they were free men and should be treated as such. 73 No doubt the demographic contraction of the fourteenth and early fifteenth century—due to catastrophic events and the recurring plague—had increased the pressure of the lords on their villeins and, on the other hand, the awareness of the latter that the economy of the island and the prosperity of their lords depended on them. Enfranchised villeins were not always entitled to move freely. In Crete the commune occasionally imposed residence in inland cities on its former villeins. The loss of the document granting enfranchisement, disobedience, or rebellion involved a return to the unfree status.

Freedom was so exceptional that free Greeks who were not archontes or archontiopoloi sometimes specified their status in documents, for fear of being mistakenly considered villeins. This was especially so in cases involving residence in a rural area or agricultural work. In 1301 a free Cretan Greek indebted to a Latin promised to reside for four years in a village of his and pay him dues “as do the other free inhabitants of this place”; in 1352 a plot of land was leased to four Cretan Greeks who stated explicitly that they were free. On the basis of documents bearing on the area of Patras in the northern Morea it has been claimed that communities of free peasants still existed in the fourteenth century in certain areas of Latin Greece. A closer look at these documents reveals, however, that this assumption is not warranted: a vineyard thought to be the holding of a free peasant was in fact part of a seigniorial domain. 76

Slaves frequently appear in Latin Greece. 77 The political fragmentation of the area and the frequent warfare were fully exploited by numerous pirates who raided the islands of the Aegean and the coasts of continental Greece. They were joined by Catalans from the duchy of Athens from 1311 to 1329, as well as by Turkish pirates, whose activity in the area steadily increased thereafter. 76 It is therefore surprising that Greeks constituted a majority among the slaves on the markets of Latin Greece in the first half of the fourteenth century. Gradually the proportion of Slavs from the Morea increased, and for
a short period in the late fourteenth century Bulgarians in particular became numerous. In addition to the Black Sea the Turkish emirates of Anatolia constituted an important source of supply. The flow of slaves was considerably reduced by the Ottoman conquest in the following century.

Slaves were to be found in the Morea, in Venetian Messenia, and in the Catalan duchy of Athens, whence many of them were shipped to Crete. This island was the main emporium for the slave trade to the west, although many slaves remained there. Considered mere chattels, they were owned by Latins and Greeks of all ranks of society engaged in various occupations, by members of the Catholic and Greek clergy, and even by Jews. In spite of his status, even a villein might own a slave, while the reverse was of course impossible, this is a clear mark of the slave's inferior status, also implied by the Assizes of Romania (art. 219). Female slaves were bought for domestic purposes and served in cities as well as in rural areas; we may assume that such was also the case with most male slaves. A shortage of agricultural manpower in the second half of the fourteenth century partly explains a substantial rise in the price of male slaves; it induced the Venetian authorities to promote in 1393 and 1397 their import to Crete, in order to settle them on abandoned land held by Latin feudatories. Even earlier manumitted male slaves were occasionally bound to reside in a village of their former master and to provide some amount of agricultural work for a specified number of years. All of them seem to have paid a yearly sum to their former masters. In certain cases, slaves were allowed to redeem themselves, although it is not always clear how they managed to gather the means to do so. In 1315 the Venetian authorities of Crete decreed that slaves who were taught by their masters the trade of a carpenter or a calker would be freed from servitude; from this text it is not clear whether the commune was opposed to any such training or approved of it. Manumission did not necessarily become effective when granted; its enforcement might be postponed for a specified period, sometimes several years. Slaves could

79. See also Sottas, Crumbo Dominazione, p. 87, and Santerci, "Quelques aspects du statut," p. 128, on a sale by Constans around 1345.
81. Ibid., II, 877-878. Contrary to Thiriot, Le Roumaine, pp. 314-315, who relies on a shipment which arrived in Crete in August 1308, there is no reason to assume that slaves were imported then for agricultural work.
be married. An abandoned infant slave became free if not claimed, in conformity with Roman law. To sum up, although certain rules applied to slave and villein alike, the latter enjoyed a superior status.

Economic factors no doubt played an important role in shaping the pattern of daily coexistence of individuals belonging respectively to the Latin and Greek communities; these factors also generated divergent and even contrasting attitudes and feelings.

Land remained, as before the conquest, the principal source of income in Greece. Whether held in full ownership or as a conditional tenement, it was mostly in the hands of the Latins, who expropriated the Greeks’ land on a large scale and replaced them as landlords. In contrast to the Byzantine period, land became under Latin rule a double source of revenue for the landlords: income deriving from agricultural exploitation and income from what had been public taxes, especially in feudalized areas and, to a lesser degree, in Venetian territories, as a result of the transfer of fiscal state prerogatives into private hands. Land seems to have yielded good returns: it provided knights with means to maintain an appropriate standard of living, and its temporary or permanent acquisition was considered a good investment, as illustrated by the commercialization of military tenements in Crete. On the whole, Greeks were prevented by social and legal barriers from substantially enlarging their landholding and getting their share of a prosperous agriculture increasingly geared to export. It may be assumed that this situation generated some degree of resentment within the ranks of the Greek elite, further enhanced by its exclusion from the economic benefits deriving from power positions in feudalized areas, as well as from governmental offices in Venetian territories and Catalan cities.


86. Presumably because of the export of gums plants; same plants listed at the thirteenth century for daily commerce are mentioned by Borm, H. Dominick, opposite p. 84.
In the Morea the archontes benefited from grants of land, generally on a moderate scale, and some of them served in the princely and seigniorial administration; these two economic facets of integration into the ruling elite provided them with partial compensation for the loss of their social standing.

The holding of large estates by the Latins influenced not only the attitude of the Greek elite toward them, but also that of the peasants. The constant presence of Latin lords on these lands or in their vicinity, or, in the case of Italian landholders in the Morea, of their agents engaged in improving agricultural exploitation, their endeavor to ensure growing profits in a true commercial spirit, and a manpower shortage due to demographic contraction all brought heavy pressure to bear on the dependent peasantry, especially in Crete. The ethnic cleavage in the island was exacerbated by economic factors; it is therefore not surprising that Cretan peasants were often willing to join the archontes and the Greek clergy in opposing Venetian rule.

On the other hand, the expanding demand in Venice for agricultural products from Greece, grain and wine in particular, as well as raisins, cheese, wool, and hides, encouraged the cultivation of numerous plots of land and the raising of animals by landowners, lessees, and sharecroppers belonging to almost all ranks of society. It also afforded seasonal work for hired laborers. Latins and Greeks appear side by side, at times as partners, in numerous business contracts involving investments, loans, and labor in agriculture and the raising of animals. The same holds true with the manufacturing of goods and the supply of services, as well as local and regional commerce on land and at sea. Greeks, however, suffered from various restrictions in maritime trade. Villeins were not allowed to leave the territory in which they lived. Thus, for instance, those of Crete were barred from traveling outside the island. In addition, Venetians and especially Venetian citizens seem to have acquired since the 1270's at the latest a dominant position in regional maritime transportation. This activity was partly integrated into the pattern of long-distance commerce and transportation dominated by Venetian traders and ships operating from Venice, and enjoying a favored status and the commune's protection. Some members of prominent Venetian families such as the Cornaro, Ghisi, Morosini, and Sanudo, who had settled in Crete, also participated in regional

87 See above, note 36. The production and trade of Cretan grain was stimulated in 1281 and the following decades by numerous purchases made by the commune at guaranteed prices higher than those on the free market.
trade and shipping. In fourteenth-century Morea Florentine and south Italian traders largely monopolized the export of agricultural produce and its transportation to the Angevin kingdom of Sicily.

Activity related to manufacturing, trade, and shipping was mainly concentrated in urban centers. By crossing class and community boundaries, similar or joint economic activity led to social intercourse, tempered ethnic tensions somewhat, and opened the way to accommodation on a daily level between Greek and Latin city-dwellers. It is precisely this phenomenon that so worried the ruling élites in non-feudal territories and prompted them to enforce institutionalized ethnic segregation, as illustrated in Venetian Crete from the thirteenth century on and in the Catalan duchy of Athens in the fourteenth century.

This rapprochement occasionally extended to another sphere of daily life. Within a few years after the conquest, the Greek clergy was deprived of its higher ranks and of educated priests, who fled Latin rule, yet it displayed a considerable vitality. Two factors explain its influence on the Greek community, especially in rural areas. Greek monks and Greek priests were to be found in cities and villages alike; besides, the latter lived among the laymen and shared their fate, as most priests were villeins. This situation contrasted sharply with that of the Latin clergy. Catholic priests were not numerous enough to attend to the religious needs of the Latin population, which was scattered all over Latin Greece, often in very small groups: in 1210 Othon de la Roche, the “great lord” of Athens, asked pope Innocent III to provide priests for all castles and villages in which twelve Catholics were settled. Besides, Latin priests were seldom present in rural areas or inland cities; most of them resided in coastal cities, where a major part of the Latin population dwelt. Finally, members of the higher Latin clergy were often absent from their sees and offices. It is therefore not surprising that growing numbers of Latins turned to Greek priests and attended their religious services. It may safely be assumed, however, that this religious symbiosis was not generalized and occurred only in places where Latins were few. In 1322 pope John XXII com-

90. As mentioned in a letter of Innocent III, in PL, 216, col. 215.
plained bitterly that in the Morea Latins mingled with Greeks at religious services. The same phenomenon is attested in Crete by numerous sources, yet it is significant that a decree issued in 1349 specifically prohibited minor Venetian officials in the inland areas from having recourse to Greek priests. It remains to be seen what impact this process had on the relations between the Latins and the Greek population.

The social, legal, and institutional framework established by the Latins in their respective territories shortly after the conquest no doubt conditioned to a large extent the attitudes and behavior of the Latin rulers and settlers toward the indigenous population, and vice versa. In spite of the diversity of regimes, certain basic features were common to all areas of Latin Greece: such were legal and social stratification and, broadly speaking, the deterioration in the status and condition of the Greeks. Daily coexistence affected, however, the pattern of relations between the two communities and their respective members, yet not to the same degree or in the same manner everywhere. In feudalized areas coexistence produced legal and social, but not religious or cultural, integration of the Greek elite into the Latin upper class. In non-feudal areas, even this limited integration remained exceptional. Institutionalized segregation was steadily enforced by Venice in Crete, yet proved effective at the level of the elites only. It seems to have been more successful in the Catalan duchy of Athens. Whatever the case, in the period under consideration here intermarriage seems to have remained a marginal phenomenon in Latin Greece, and coexistence never developed into an assimilation of the Latins to the Greek population.

In the fourteenth century the crossing of religious boundaries occurred in both directions, yet was apparently limited in scope. More important in this respect was the religious symbiosis spreading to inland areas, which, however, was restricted to common religious practice. It derived no doubt from the practical needs of Latins and did not necessarily imply a change in religious affiliation, nor was it tanta-

92 Letter in Caesar Baronio, Annals centralis, XXIV (Bar-le-Duc, 1873), cols. 157–180
93 See above, note 52. Common religious services in clero were quite exceptional see Thiriet, "Le Zèle ininterrompu d’un franciscain esclave en la riposte de Venise (1444)." Polyhistorien (above, note 14), pp. 496–504.
94 See above, notes 51 and 57; also especially Thuinet, "Études, réflexions et croyances," pp. 483–495, and Lolli, "Quelques observations," pp. 197–198, who refers to mixed marriages which in doubt promoted the Latins' accommodation.
mount to conversion to Orthodoxy. Furthermore, it did not generate mutual accommodation between the Greek and Latin communities at large, nor did the spreading knowledge of the Greek language among Latins or social and economic intercourse between them and the Greeks, attested from the thirteenth century on, achieve this result. About 1220 Greek priests of Latin Morea co-operated with their fellow Greeks of Epirus, 95 and in 1244 Greek monks living in the duchy of Athens collaborated with those of Epirus or Nicaea. 96 About 1330, more than a century after the imposition of Latin rule, Marmo Sanudo, an acute observer of Latin Greece, described the situation in Cyprus, Crete, Euboea, Rhodes, and other islands, as well as in the Morea, as follows: "Although these places are subjected to the rule of the Franks and obedience to the Roman church, almost all the population is Greek and is inclined towards the Greek church, and their hearts are turned towards Greek matters, and when they can show they do so." 97 Venice was perfectly aware of this crucial fact, which explains its segregationist policy and its reluctance to enlist Greeks in the armed forces, on a temporary basis, on a limited scale. 98

It has been claimed that Venice's attitude toward its Greek subjects became more lenient from the late fourteenth century on, against the background of the Ottoman advance in the Balkans. 99 This statement requires some qualifications. It is true that the commune became somewhat more attentive to the wishes of the Greek population in its territories and adopted a more flexible attitude on practical matters, such as the training of Greek archers in order to ensure the coastal defense of Crete. 80 With that it is significant, as noted above, that it basically maintained its stance on mixed marriages, the participation of Greeks and Venetians in political assemblies, and their holding of high state offices, as well as on religious symbiosis. The anti-Venetian unrest stimulated in Crete and Corfu from the mid-fifteenth century on by the arrival of Greek priests from Byzantine and Turkish territories leads to the conclusion that Sanudo's statement about the Greek attitude towards the Latins remained largely valid in this period. He had rightly

95 See Dumitru Ch看病nianu, ed. Pitra, VII, cols. 87-96, no. 22.
97 "Lettera del Regeo di Romana," ed. Hepi, Chroniques gréco-romaines, p. 143
100 See Jacoby, "Les Gens de mer," p. 185.
perceived that Greek religious affiliation was the source of Greek ethnic awareness. It is only later, in the sixteenth century, that Latin acculturation proceeded further, and accommodation between Latins and Greeks emerged in the territories remaining under Venetian rule.

101 For this reason Greek priests may have pretended to know no language other than their own, as suggested by a trial held in Candia in 1562: see Thiriot, "Égares, fideles et clergés," pp. 493–496.
A. Turkish Settlement and Christian Reaction, 1329–1361

The fall of Acre in 1291 did not end the crusader peril for the Moslem world. Western Christendom was still unchallenged at sea in the eastern Mediterranean, and its forces had the advantage of being able to land at any time anywhere on the coasts, which therefore remained


Other histories relevant to our subject include Frederick W. Hussey, Christianity and Islam under the Seljuqs (2 vols., Oxford, 1929); Melanges offerts à M. Isaac Rivière par ses amis (Paris, 1932); Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turks: A Pattern of Alliances, 1600–1700 (Liverpool, 1954); and Franz Bodmann, Ausführliche und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas und der Levante (1, 2, Leipzig, 1906–1954).

A long list of Ottoman documents published in various countries is contained in the Introduction to Jan Rychlova and Anna M. Zajaczekowski, Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomacy, in Andrew S. Fishman, ed., Tiberius Katona (The Hague and Paris, 1961). Journals frequently publishing Ottoman documents include Türkiye'de Osmanlı dönemleri mecmuasi (Istanbul, 1908–1931), Bâleâtes (Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, since 1897), Türkiye tarihleri (Ankara, 1941–1961; Tarih Enstitüsü, Faculty of Letters, University of Istanbul, since 1950), Tarih, za orijentalistik biologije (Osmanlî tarih in Sarajevo; annually since 1930), Mecmâ-i türki hemşerimiz SIYASANIN moderne dönemimini ahlâkimiz (Istanbul; since 1937), Fonste historique Bulgare, etc.
the boundaries between Islam and Christendom. The Christian's pre-
dominance on the sea was acknowledged by the Mamluks. In fact,
in the period after 1291 a blockade—ordered by pope Nicholas IV
(1284–1292)—of Egypt, Syria, and Turkey seriously threatened to cut
the supply lines of commodities vital to the Mamluks—arms, timber,

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[XV–XVI. Florentine manuscript (Spils, since 1864), and Bolgafer (Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, since 1964). See also Artik Kilisemi (2 vols., Istanbul, 1936–1940), an incomplete guide to the collections of documents of the Topkapı Sarayi archives (TKS). M. Zeynep Gedik, 1746–

Western collections of documents include Erwin Reuter, ed., Déclarations de la France dans le Levant (14 vols., Paris, 1840); Guye J. Muller, ed., Documenta sive relations ab eis cuius pars
1961).

Western memoirs of interest include G. Georgiadis Arnavak, "Crónicas de los Mamelucos durante las guerras y documentos de sus actividades como historiadores," Saporstein, XXXVI (1931) 104–
110; Reisen der Johann Schalberger ... ed. Karl F. Heinemann (Munich, 1839), tr. J. Buchan Teller de la Salle, and Travels of Johann Schalberger in Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1694–1627, with notes by Philipp Brand (Hakney Society, London, 1879); he was captured by the Turks in 1616 and served the sultan for six years; Serafín de la Salle, Voyage d'Observation et Charles de Schaf (Paris, 1837), and "Deconta la Leone" (Oliviero-Maria Angiolillo, Historia turcica, 1300–1314, ed. Ivo Lorti [Florence, 1954]).

For Ottoman chronicles see Bolgafer, Die Geschichtsschreibung der Osmanen und ihre Werke (Leipzig, 1927). The earliest surviving sources of Ottoman history is Turkish in its treatment of the Iberian wars of the conquistador Saladin (1085–1118); the text was last published by Nihat Altun in Osmanlı tarihi (Istanbul, 1949), pp. 1–35 (briefly summarized, with historical data in brief text and some verses). Early Ottoman tradition, apparently composed in chronic or form under Orkhan (1325–1363), are lost, but their contents are partially known from compilations made under Bayazid I (1404–1512). "Aslıa Fakih—whom was mentioned them in faithful detail in his Mirdahit-Àr-Florise, ed. Adriani on Naippehke sarbii-i (Istanbul, 1949), pp. 79–318, tr. Richard F. Krommel, Four Historiographies of the Ottoman Empire (Vienna and Cologne, 1939)." Legendary folk tales are integrated with genuine historical accounts, deteriorating critical use of this important source.

The second and third compilations—Rödel (in Pseudo-Rödel) and the anonymous chronicle —used some of the same sources as the first. For discussion see Inalbek, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," in Hanstein bei the Middle East, ed. Bernard Lewis and Peter hop (London, 1963), pp. 152–167; Valerie McLean, "The Formation of Ottoman Historiography," ibid., pp. 168–179; and idem, "Needle's History of the Ottoman: the Account and Development of the

iron, and most important of all, slaves. Since these materials and slaves were imported from Turkey or through the Aegean Sea from the Black Sea, the islands of the eastern Mediterranean acquired major importance in western strategy. As a result of this new situation, the uf (frontier) Turcomans in Anatolia, dependent on the export to Egypt of
their timber and slaves, were brought into a closer relationship with the Mamluks.

One crucial development in the ensuing period of struggle between Islam and Christendom was the rise in the first half of the fourteenth century of Turkish navies manned by sea ghaizis, who were later to


Byzantine chronicles are indispensable but Ottoman historiography begins 1453; John Chronicon, a memoria, Historiae historiæ IV, ed. Ludwig Schwan (CSFRA, vol. 3, Bonn, 1830–1832; also in FG, vol. CLXXXI), are analyzed by Valentin Furtwängler, Contraaddam, homme d'État et historien (Paris, 1843), and by Louter, L'Empire, in the light of Nikiphoros Ormeus (1299–1368) and other contemporary sources. For this period 1360–1408 an Ottoman chronicle comparable to these two exists. For 1400–1462 the most important source is Ducas (Ducasian), Historia byzantina, ed. Immanuel Bekker (CSFR, Bonn, 1834; also in FG, vol. CLXV), or Harry J. Magaeanos, ed. Doctrine and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks (Historia nova-byzantina, 1541–1462) (Detroit, 1975). Ducas should be supplemented by George Schvachmov, Chronicon minus, ed. Bekker (CSFR, Bonn, 1839, also in FG, vol. CLXVII), or Markos Philopappos, ed. The Fall of the Byzantine Empire (Athens, 1969). For 1420–1443 we also have Karamanlidiotis, Historiarum demonstrationes, ed. Eugen Darché (2 vols. in 3, Budapest, 1922–1927) or Akan Necipo (Kuran), Die türkische Prosaquelle der Konstantinople Chil Statusky (Hamburg, 1933). Charles (Karl) Hoyt, Chroniques grecs-corinthiens établies par la commissariat (Berlin, 1873; repr. 1966), is still useful.

form the nucleus of Ottoman sea power. The emergence of these sea
gazas can be seen as a continuation of the Turkish expansion
movement toward the west. Turkish azeb (from Arabic `azab, bachelor,
youth), the fighting men on these flotillas, were identical in origin, mo-
tivation, and organization to the frontier gazzas. One of the first re-
results of this new set of circumstances was a northward shift of the
main field of action, eventually leaving Egypt and Syria out of the ac-
tual struggle.

The Turkish conquest of western Anatolia from the Byzantines in

L'Empire ottoman," *Arts du pouvoir. Commissions internationales des études historiques et sciences humai-


On the outcome of Vasquez von der amsbergschirme, *Gospodar-1 Sylveti Murtul b. Mehmed
med H. em. ve M. Oguz (Ankara, 1778); Lajos Fekekes, "Die Geschichten über die
Osttirol in der kurhinsländin (1441-1444)," *Hamburgerischen Geschichteschrift*, XX, -XXII (1919-1921), 1-64; Paul Pfaff,
"Studien zu der Crusade von Vara: die quellen der von der Posa und der Kapitulation (1444)," *AR, ESH, XXI (1941), 144-166; H. L. Block, *The Crusade of Varna: Discussion of Controversial Pro-
blems* (New York, 1941); and Jan Dlugosch, *Annals 1444*. *Bulletin international de l'Acadé-
mie polonaise des sciences et des lettres: Classe d'histoire et de philologie*, n.p. no. 6 (Cra-
cow, 1951).

For the Ottoman adoption of Hunnic weapon tactics see M. Wolf, *Die hunschische Waffen-
bau (Berlin, 1889); J. Dumont, *Hunschische Waffensystem (Berlin, 1861); and Gospodar-1 Sylveti
Murtul, ed. Stachow and Oguz."
the second half of the thirteenth century had not caused serious alarm in the west, since western Christendom was then primarily concerned with the fate of the last remnants of the crusader states on the Syrian coast and with the restoration of the Latin empire in Constantinople. The Turkish warrior-nomads had been active on the Seljukid-Byzantine frontiers for a long period of time without making a determined attempt at invasion, and, in any case, their repulsion was thought not to be a difficult task for the Byzantine state. In the crusade projects drawn up around 1300 the Turkish invasion of western Anatolia was regarded as a minor question to be dealt with by the crusader army on its way to Palestine.

Today most historians try to explain the collapse of Byzantine rule in western Anatolia by focusing on certain "unsound" policies of the Byzantine government. But it seems clear that the fundamental reason for the collapse is the mass migration of the Turcomans (Türkmen) westward in the last decades of the thirteenth century, an event reminiscent of the first Turkish invasion of Anatolia after the battle of Manzikert (1071). Christian Europe became aware of the significance of the Turkish advance only in the early fourteenth century, when Latin possessions and commercial traffic came increasingly under attack by the Turcoman ghazis, fighters for Islamic holy war (jihad) operating on the Aegean Sea. Thus, with Islam issuing a direct challenge to Europe on the sea, an entirely new situation arose in the long struggle between Islam and Christendom.

The gravity of the threat on the Aegean was clearly seen by Marino Sanudo "Torcello" (1270–1337). A tireless propagandist for a general crusade against Egypt since 1306, Sanudo had by 1320 developed the view that the first objective of a crusade should be the expulsion of the Turks from the Aegean. Indeed, coupled with an effective military organization and with the revival of the holy war, the mass movement of the Turks toward the west assumed, after the first successes, such a magnitude that there was soon talk of a Turkish peril for all Europe.

When a new Turkey with great demographic potential and a heightened holy war ideology emerged in the old Seljukid (Seljuk) frontier zone, east of a line from the mouth of the Dalmatian (Indos) river to that of the Sakarya (Sangarius), a threat by this explosive frontier society against the neighboring Byzantine territory in western Anatolia was almost inevitable.

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This westward expansion had been accomplished in four stages: the seasonal transhumance movements of Turkoman nomadic groups into the Byzantine coastal plains; the organization of small raiding groups under ghazi leaders, mostly of tribal origin, for booty raids or for employment as mercenaries; the emergence of successful leaders capable of bringing local chiefs together as their clients, for conquest and for the establishment of beyliks (principalities) in the conquered lands, on the model of the principalities founded in the old Selçukid frontier zone; and finally, the involvement of these ghazi beyliks, with definite political and economic goals, in the regional struggle for supremacy in the Aegean and in the Balkans.

In the 1320's and 1330's, Turkish groups acting as ghazi raiding parties or mercenary companies joined together under the command of powerful leaders such as Ummar Pasha (1334-1348) of the Aydın dynasty or Orkhan (1326-1342) and his eldest son, Suleiman Pasha, of the Ottoman house; only through them could the Byzantines hope to acquire sizable mercenary aid from Anatolia. Through alliance with the Byzantines the Turkoman beg in turn could provide employment and booty for the ever-growing number of ghazis gathering under their banners for raids on an increasingly larger scale in the Balkans. At this stage better Ummar nor Orkhan was interested in conquest or settlement of overseas lands.

Between 1329 and 1337, while Ummar was launching his spectacular sea expeditions from Smyrna, the Ottomans, fighting against the Byzantines in northwestern Anatolia, were also making important conquests, including Nicæa on March 2, 1336, and Nicomedia in 1337. Their first significant advances came during the period 1329-1334, when Ummar too was engaged in hostilities with the Byzantines. Though our sources give no hint of an alliance or actual cooperation between Ummar and Orkhan, circumstances made them natural allies in this period, and again from 1342 to 1346, when Ummar was giving strong support to John VI Cantacuzenos against his rivals in Constantinople.4 The efforts of the latter to secure military aid from Orkhan failed, instead, with the assistance of Ottoman troops, Cantacuzenos was able to seize all the Black Sea ports except Sozopolis from the hands of his enemies. The marriage of his daughter Theodore to Orkhan in June 1346 cemented Cantacuzenos’s alliance with the Ottoman principality, by

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then the strongest of the Turcoman states. Once in full power in Constantinople (February 3, 1347), however, Cantacuzenus appeared to turn to a policy of cooperation with the Latins against the Turks, offering in 1348 to continue the Byzantine alliance with pope Clement VI (1342–1352) and Humbert II of Viennois (d. 1355). This policy, however, was intended primarily to thwart the plans of Stephen IV Dushan, the Serbian king (1331–1355), who in 1345 had proclaimed himself “emperor of the Serbs and Greeks”.

By 1347 Dushan’s advances had become a major threat to the existence of the empire, as he was seeking Venetian assistance in the conquest of Constantinople. Under the circumstances Cantacuzenus had to maintain close relations with the Ottomans, the only source from which he could expect substantial military aid; it was this situation that led to the Turkish settlement in Europe.

While the Turks of Aydinia were effectively neutralized by the capture of the castle at Smyrna (Izmir), which the pope had decided to keep as a check upon them, the Ottoman Turks were becoming more and more involved in Balkan affairs, especially after they had firmly established themselves in Karam, facing Thrace. Umur’s death in the spring of 1348 led to Aydin’s decline as a threat to the Latins, but it also served to strengthen the position of the Ottomans, bringing under their banner an increasing number of ghazis. The leaders of the ghazis in Karasi appear to have collaborated with the Ottomans to bring about the union of the two states, and the Ottoman conquests in Thrace in the next decade were to be basically the work of ghazis from Karasi.

Immediately after the first conquests in Karasi, the area was made into an Ottoman sanjak (frontier sanjak) with Isga (Isga) as its center, under the leadership of Suleiman Pasha, an ardent advocate of frontier warfare (ghazas), who was to become responsible for the shaping of Ottoman western policy. The new frontier sanjak had important sea bases at Lampos (Lapta), Aydinjik (near Cyzicus), and Kemer (Keramides?), which from Byzantine times had sheltered corsairs who preyed on the merchant ships traveling between the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. In 1352 the principal Ottoman army was to embark from Kemer for their conquest of the isthmus of the Gallipoli peninsula.

6. J. Burckhardt, Geschichte der Serben, 1, 386-387, 596; Thurz, Algeninstitut, II, no. 189.
7. Lemerle, L’Empire, pp. 219-222. The area around Pergamum (Bergama) and Troy forming the Dardanelles appears to have been organized as a frontier sanjak under a branch of the Karam dynasty, first under Yakhuni Beg and then under Suleiman Beg.
We cannot tell with certainty which of the Turkish groups active in Thrace in this period came from the Ottoman dominions. On two occasions Byzantine historians speak specifically of Ottoman armies sent over to Thrace: the first came shortly after the meeting of Orkhan with Cantacuzenus at Scutian (Üsküdar) in 1346, when Süleiman Pasha, at the head of an army of ten thousand, was sent to Thrace against the Serbs. Evidently the Ottoman soldiery engaged rather in the usual booty raids, and soon returned home to Anatolia. In 1350, when Stephen Dushan threatened Thessalonica, a second large Ottoman army, reportedly twenty thousand in number, again under Süleiman Pasha, proceeded along the Aegean coast of Thrace together with the Byzantine forces under Matthew Cantacuzenus, son of John VI, while John VI Cantacuzenus and co-emperor John V Palaeologus sailed by sea to Thessalonica. Before the armies reached their objective, however, Orkhan stated that he was threatened by Turkish emirs, his neighbors in Anatolia, and called Süleiman back; after a raid into Bulgaria, the latter returned.

A crisis parallel to that of Byzantium also helped to make possible the Ottoman passage into Europe: the conflict between Genoa and Venice over the Byzantine heritage in the eastern Aegean. The Venetian-Genoese war (1350–1353), which caused the dissolution of the anti-Turkish coalition in the Aegean, gave rise to a new power alignment in the area. While the Venetians moved closer to Cantacuzenus and king Peter IV of Aragon-Catalonia (1336–1387) and his Catalans in the Levant, the Genoese allied themselves with the leading Turkish emirs, Khâidar (Hizir) Beg of Aydin and the Ottoman Orkhan. During the war the Turkish emirs provided the Genoese not only with badly needed provisions but also with military aid. Cantacuzenus, always hoping that Byzantine sovereignty might be re-established in Chios and the two Phocaeas, then in Genoese hands, actually concluded a treaty of alliance with Venice in May 1351. Venice promised to mediate between the emperor and Stephen Dushan.

Both the Venetians and the Genoese sought the alliance of the Ottomans in this all-out war for the control of the waterways to the Black Sea. The Ottomans controlled the Asiatic side of the Bosporus, and their aid to Pera was of crucial importance. Despite the solicitations of the Venetians and Cantacuzenus, the Ottomans chose to support the Genoese, a logical policy for them to follow since the Venetians were known to be the principal contender against Turkish westward expansion in this period, while the Genoese showed themselves to be generally co-operative. Apparently the Genoese-Ottoman treaty was the first treaty concluded between the Ottomans and a western nation.
(The document itself is not extant, and its exact date is not known.) During the war the Ottomans supplied the Genoese with one thousand archers, who were stationed at Pera and on the Genoese ships. 1

The Ottomans apparently took part in the defense of Pera in the summer of 1351, when, following a surprise attack by the Venetians, the city was besieged by joint Venetian-Byzantine forces. Orkhan himself, at the head of his army, arranged an interview with the Genoese admiral Pagano Doria at Chalcedon to the south of the Bosphorus. 9 The major clash between the two parties took place on the Bosphorus on February 15, 1352. Judging from a Genoese document of a later date, praising the role Orkhan played on the occasion, 10 he must have taken an active part in this crucial battle between the Genoese armada under Doria and the allied fleets of Venice and Aragon. Abandoned by his allies and surrounded in Constantinople by victorious Ottoman and Genoese forces, Cantacuzenus had to accept a treaty of peace with Doria, signed May 6, 1352, which forbade the use of Greek territories or seamen by the Venetians against the Genoese, and recognized the Genoese possession of Pera within its new limits. 11

Thanks to Genoese assistance, the Ottomans were provided with a safe means of crossing the Straits whenever they wished, aboard Genoese ships, while the Genoese in turn secured Ottoman protection for Pera and commercial privileges within Ottoman dominions. A first example of this cooperation occurred in 1352 when the Ottoman forces under Suleiman and his brother Khalil were ferried across the Bosphorus on Genoese ships for raids into Greek territories in Thrace. 12 Commercial ties between Pera and Bursa (Brusa) would be of considerable benefit to the development of both cities. Bursa was soon to become a terminus for caravans bringing silk from Iran, and the silk trade was one of the sources of Pera's renewed prosperity. Pera, in turn, was to be the Ottomans' market for obtaining western commodities, principally the fine woolens much in demand in the Near East.

In 1352 the Ottomans were still at war with Byzantium. Their collaboration with the Genoese in the siege of Constantinople, coupled with the invasion of Thrace by an Ottoman army under Suleiman, must

11. Documents published by Saufi, Delia Colonia dei genovesi in Galatia, 11, 216.
have been decisive in inducing Cantacuzenus to abandon his western allies. He hastened to make peace with the Ottomans, still with the idea that he could use them as he had Umar's ghazis, to further his own interests in protecting the empire against Stephen Dushan and in replacing the Palaeologus on the Byzantine throne. Dushan, in turn, chose to protect John V Palaeologus (1341/1391) in the civil war which broke out again in Thrace in the summer of 1352 and lasted through the summer of 1356. Allied to the Venetians in return for a promise to resecure the island of Tenos, John V mobilized a Serbian-Bulgarian army in Demotica to set out against Matthew Cantacuzenus in Adrianople. Suddenly an Ottoman army of ten thousand men under Suleiman arrived to oppose the allied army, and inflicted a crushing defeat on it at Pytion in October 1352. This was the first Ottoman victory over the Serbs, who were to be until 1389 the major contenders against Ottoman expansion into the Balkans.

John V Palaeologus fled, and took shelter at Tenos under Venetian protection, finally leaving Cantacuzenus free to claim the throne. Suleiman then entered Adrianople as an ally of Cantacuzenus, which the Ottoman epic fancies as the first "conquest" of the city by the Ottomans. Suleiman returned home after this meeting, but he left behind a small Turkish force that took up winter quarters in a site reportedly assigned by Cantacuzenus, at Tryme (Jinbli), a small fortress on the coast north of Gallipoli. As a bridgehead on the western shore of the Marmara sea, the occupation of Tryme was important as a harbinger of the Turkish settlement in Europe to come.

The historian Nicephorus Gregoras asserted that Cantacuzenus himself gave the Turks the fortress, and that they lived in Tryme with their families under a qadi with their own mosque, forming a military colony in the pay of Cantacuzenus. The latter, in reply, tried to absolve himself of responsibility for the incident by saying that the fortress was taken by the Ottoman Turks during the events of 1351–1352. In Ottoman tradition Tryme was captured by surprise by a small group (seventy men) with the aid of a native Greek. However that may be,
once settled in Tzympes, Eje Beg, accompanied by Melik Beg, the converted son of Asen, Greek lord of Gallipoli, ferried fresh forces amounting in a few days to two thousand men from the Anatolian to the European coast on Greek ships found in the port of Tzympes. Asen, failing to overcome them, shut himself in his castle. In Bega Suleiman Pasha put the new frontier thus established around Tzympes under the command of Eje Beg, who, it seems, had formulated the original plan to organize the ghazis under the protection of the Ottoman state into a permanent settlement on the European side of the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{14}

A new and decisive development in the settlement of Turks in Thrace was, according to the Ottoman sources, the transfer under Suleiman Pasha himself of a regular army, three thousand in number, by ship from Kemen to Kozlu-Dere, a valley near Tzympes that led up to the Hexamilion on the heights dominating the isthmus of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Suleiman set up headquarters at Bolyar on the heights of the isthmus and organized his ghazis into two fronts, one against Gallipoli under Eje Beg and Ghazi Fadul, the other against Thrace under Haji Ubeg and Evrenos (Evrenus), all from Karasi. Gallipoli was put under constant pressure by the ghazis, who also tried to cut off its sea communications.\textsuperscript{15} In the north Suleiman Pasha succeeded by 1354 in subduing the area between Saros bay and Megali-Agora (Migal-Kara), thus penetrating deep into Thrace.

Determined to maintain themselves in Thrace, the Ottomans pursued their traditional policy of istimdat, whereby they tried to win over the native population through friendly and conciliatory treatment, while deporting to Anatolia any Greek military elements capable of organizing resistance.

The Turkish settlement in Thrace caused consternation in Byzantium, but the situation was militarily hopeless. The number of Byzan-

\textsuperscript{14} According to Kavouri, Geniitkoum, p. 23, the last fortress conquered by the Ottomans in Thrace was not Tzympes but Alcha-Burgoz. A village by the name of Alcha-Burgoz in the Kozlu-Dere area near Gallipoli is mentioned in the Ottoman survey book of Gallipoli dated 1476 (Istanbul, Beyazidoski Library, Codex no. O-79). In the 'Asilok Pasha tribe name (op. cit., p. 124) Alcha-Linam or Alcha-Burgoz is the target of Ottoman attacks, but only after the conquest of Tzympes (Tzympas). The Ottomans, he says, after failing at Ialbi, burned the ships lying at Alcha-Linam.

\textsuperscript{15} The Ottoman tradition misfires the original idea to the Ottoman leaders, Suleiman or (more likely) Orkhan. Allegedly Eje Beg met Suleiman or Bega, or Suleiman met his father, Orkhan, at Burna, and got the idea for a permanent conquest of Thrace. These homes were evidently later additions intended to narrate the original idea to the Ottoman house.

\textsuperscript{16} They left their ships arrive or disembark at Gallipoli ('Asilok Pasha-Atik, op. cit., p. 124).
tine and Catalan soldiers employed by the empire had greatly diminished, as Cantacuzenus himself admitted, as a result of the recent civil war, so the emperor had for some time been dependent on the Turkish troops sent by his son-in-law Orkhan. The only means left to him to exert pressure on Suleiman were diplomatic, through Orkhan. It appears that Orkhan and the emperor finally signed a treaty providing for the evacuation of the area occupied in Thrace in return for the payment to Suleiman of ten thousand gold pieces. 20

The earthquake of March 2, 1354, which demolished the walls of Gallipoli and other fortifications in the area, completely altered the situation. Exposed to the raids of the surrounding Turks, most of the towns' population either took shelter in the few fortified places still left standing or fled to Constantinople by sea. The ghazis immediately took possession of Gallipoli and other abandoned sites. The Ottoman tradition says that on this occasion "since there were innumerable 'Frems' (Catalan mercenaries) in Gallipoli, it was impossible to capture it. There was nothing more for the ghazis to do but pray for its fall. And then, early one morning the walls suddenly collapsed. Its commander left in a ship." 21

Suleiman was in his capital, Buda, in Anatolia, when the earthquake occurred. He hurried quickly to Gallipoli and took steps to secure the Turkish presence in the newly occupied places, repairing fortifications and bringing more ghazis and whole colonies of settlers from Anatolia to settle in and reinforce the defenses of the abandoned towns. 22 While he was there, he led his ghazis on a raid for booty into Bulgaria, though sparing Byzantine lands out of respect, apparently, for the recent peace treaty with the emperor.

In the face of Cantacuzenus's protest to Orkhan that Suleiman's occupation of Byzantine cities was against the terms of their peace treaty, Suleiman replied that he had not taken them by force but had simply occupied some abandoned towns. It appears that there was quite a lengthy exchange of views before Orkhan, in exchange for forty thousand gold pieces, agreed to try to persuade his son to heed the emperor's demands. For Cantacuzenus this was a critical issue, upon which his very survival on the Byzantine throne depended, as he was accused by his opponents of "delivering the empire and the Christians into the hands of the Turks." 23 The people of Constantinople were in a state

20 Cantacuzenus, op cit, III, 163, refers repeatedly to such a treaty.
21 On this point Ashik Pasha-sole, loc cit, and Cantacuzenus, loc cit, concur; see in particular the important document in Balicacesan-Salazov, Recherches, pp. 135-148.
of great agitation, anticipating that the Turks might even attack the city, when on November 22, 1354, John V Palaeologus suddenly appeared from his exile on Tenedos. In the face of the threatening mobs of the city, Cantacuzenus had no recourse but to resign.

With the fall of Cantacuzenus, Byzantine politics took on a more belligerent orientation, the first stage of which, it was believed, ought to be the resumption of negotiations with Pope Innocent VI (1352–1362) for a crusade against the Turks, in exchange for the union of the churches. As early as December 20, 1355, John V Palaeologus, formally promising the union of the churches, always a precondition for papal cooperation, asked for immediate military aid (five galleys and fifteen transport ships with five hundred horses and a thousand footmen within six months), and the preparation of a large-scale crusade against the Turks.\(^3\) That the emperor was in a desperate position was further shown by his promise to send his son Manuel as a hostage to the pope’s court at Avignon. At this point, however, it was difficult for the pope even to secure money to maintain the defenses of Smyrna, always his primary concern.

In the summer of 1356, letters sent by the pope to Venice, Genoa, Cyprus, and the Hospitallers asking them to give military aid to the emperor were left unanswered. Even Venice, which was expected to be the most concerned about the Ottoman menace to Byzantium, remained passive. The Ottoman occupation of Gallipoli coincided first with Venice’s war against Genoa, and then—despite the efforts of Peter Thomas, the papal nuncio, to bring about peace, while in Buda on his way to Constantinople in 1356—with resumption of the war between Venice and Hungary in April 1357. It is true that the Venetian bailie in Constantinople warned his government in time about the imminent danger created by the Ottoman settlement in Thrace. As early as 1354, during the panic caused by the news that Gallipoli had fallen, the bailie had written that the Greeks of Constantinople thought they had best put themselves under the protection of a strong Christian government such as Venice, Hungary, or Serbia.\(^4\) The short-sighted and avuncular senate, however, was interested not in considering any steps to be taken against the Ottomans, but rather in forcing the emperor to pay heavy interest on its loans and to strengthen the existing ruinous trade privileges.

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The bailie was Matthew Venet.
Although Peter Thomas's mission to Constantinople as the pope's nuncio, which lasted from the end of May to November 1357, did not produce the results hoped for by both sides, it is significant nevertheless as the first sign of papal awareness of the immediacy of the Ottoman threat to Byzantium. Following Peter Thomas's mission the pope began to mention Romania and Constantinople side by side with Smyrna as areas that had to be defended against the Turks. It is safe to say that it was at this time that western Europe began to see the Ottomans as the principal enemies of Christendom, and to make Gallipoli one of the principal targets of crusading activities.

When Peter Thomas arrived in Constantinople in the spring of 1357, he found that the emperor was away on campaign against the Ottomans, who had advanced rapidly through Thrace since the fall of Gallipoli in March 1354. As both Byzantine and Ottoman sources recount, immediately following the earthquake and subsequent capture of Gallipoli Suleyman buried himself in creating a strong Turkish bridgehead there. One of the earliest Ottoman traditions says: "[after the capture of Gallipoli] Suleyman sent word to his father: 'Now a great number of people of the Islamic faith are needed here so that the conquered fortresses can be settled and the country around them be made to flourish. We need also many ghazi voidaad (ghazi companions) to garrison and reinforce the conquered fortresses.' Orkhan agreed with the proposal. First they deported over to Ruscelia the Arab nomads who had arrived in Karasi. These remained for some time in the area around Gallipoli... [while Suleyman made further conquests in Thrace]. Every day new immigrants came over from Karasi. Settling down, they commenced ghazi activities. Briefly speaking, Islam was so strengthened that whenever they attacked, the infidels were unable to resist them."

The capture by Phocaean corsairs of prince Khalil, the eleven-year-old son of Orkhan, in the early summer of 1357, and the sudden death of Suleyman soon afterward, put Orkhan in a difficult position, compelling him to come to an agreement with John V, as it was only through him that Orkhan could hope to secure the release of his son from captivity. From Gregoros's detailed account of the event it becomes clear that the agreement involved Orkhan's promise to cease all aggression against Byzantine territory, to stop any aid to Matthew Cantacuzenus in Thrace, to reimburse all expenses incurred in the outfitting of ships to be sent against the Phocaens, and to cancel the

26 Between early June and July; see John's letter to Sultan, The Popes, 1, 228.
outstanding debts of the emperor. It appears that John V even hoped to recover the territory occupied by the Ottomans in Thrace, since the aggressive Suleiman was now dead. Thus in his answer to the pope’s letter dated July 21, 1357, the emperor was able to communicate to Innocent VI some signs of success over his enemies and high hopes for the future. For the ghazis the agreement, signed under duress, was a great sacrifice. It meant the cessation of warfare and the abandonment of the Turks who had recently settled in Thrace.

After his rescue of Khalil from the corsairs in the early summer of 1358, John V conceived a plan that would maintain peace with the Ottomans. Following the example of Cantacuzenus, he secured Orkhan’s agreement to the engagement of his daughter Irene, then almost ten years old, to the Ottoman prince in Constantinople. He then returned Khalil to his father at Nicomedia. Furthermore, he had the promise of the old Orkhan that Khalil was to succeed him on the throne at his death. After Suleiman’s death prince Murad, with his tutor Lala Shahin, took his place in Gallipoli as frontier lord. Khalil, in his appanage in Nicaea, died soon afterward, in 1359.

The Ottoman tradition is important for the historian of the crusades since it seems to corroborate a disputed account given by Philip of Mézières, the biographer of Peter Thomas, on the crusaders’ campaign against the Ottomans in 1359. Back in Constantinople in the autumn of 1359 as the pope’s apostolic legate in the east, Peter Thomas had brought with him a small crusading force composed of Hospitallers, Venetians, Genoese, and English soldiers on Venetian galleys. He found John V engaged in hostilities with the Ottomans, Khalil having by that time returned home, and perhaps died. According to Philip the crusaders, joined by Greek forces, captured and burned Lampascus, an Ottoman transit port on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. During their return to their ships they were attacked by Turks waiting in ambush. Fleeing in disorder with the legate at their head, the Christians barely escaped a massacre.

Turkish tradition mentions an engagement on the plain adjoining

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28 Sottos, The Papacy I, 228.
29 See Paurier, Continuance, pp. 298-309; Ingraham, "Lebanon," p. 218, but the date given there, 1156, is erroneous.
30 Anonymous, Bedrijet-1 Ali Othman, ed. Guise as Die ahnungslosen anonymen Chroniken ..., I (Breslau, 1922), 18, a ghazi tradition in Orui, Bedirjet-1 Ali Othman, ed. Franz Babinger (Hannover, 1925), p. 19, makes Ummet Paulus encourage Suleiman not to abandon his conquests in Europe.
Saros bay on the Aegean, and gives the impression that it occurred shortly after the death of Suleiman in 1357. At that time the Byzantines might have made a show of force there just to intimidate the ghazis into evacuating. But it is also plausible that in 1359 the crusaders made an attack at Saros bay as well as at Lampsacus. At any rate, this was the first Ottoman engagement with a crusading force, and seems to show that Philip's account is in general reliable.

A vigorous Ottoman onslaught started in Thrace under the leadership of prince Murad and his tutor Lala Shahin in 1359. Matthew Villani reports that in 1359 Turks appeared before the walls of Constantinople, the first Ottoman threat against the imperial capital. He may have been referring to an event that is described in The Anonymous Ottoman Chronicles as Murad's surrounding a fortress "near Istanbul" in A.M. 761 (October 23, 1359–October 13, 1360). The following year the Ottoman army systematically occupied the fortresses on the two main roads between Constantinople and Adrianople, isolating the latter city and finally forcing it to surrender in the early spring of 1361. To facilitate their rapid occupation of Thrace and its capital Adrianople, the Ottomans appear to have shrewdly made Matthew Cantacuzenus's cause their own, claiming that they were acting to protect the rights of the house of Cantacuzenus in the district of Adrianople, from which he had been driven out. The Ottoman ruler seems to have been exploiting his traditional role as a "supporter" of the rights of Cantacuzenus, his brother-in-law, and it would seem that there were still partisans of the Cantacuzenus in the region.

In connection with the Ottoman offensive between 1359 and 1361, the report of a conspiracy between Lala Shahin and the partisans of Cantacuzenus against John V's life should be mentioned. Rumors of the conspiracy reached Italy at the beginning of 1360, with emphasis on the role played by the Ottomans, who were suspected of desiring through it to lay hands on the imperial city. Orkhan died in 1362, and was succeeded by his son Murad I (1362–1389).

31 Matthew Villani, "Itinaria," RACI, XCV (Villani, 1729), 549–550. He also tells us that in 1336 the Hospitallers of Rhodes captured a Turkish fleet of 29 vessels returning from a raid on the Thracian coast.
32 See note 30.
B. Ottoman Conquests and the Crusade, 1361–1421

In the papal declarations of the second half of the fourteenth century propaganda for the crusade began to be formulated as a defensive struggle to save Europe from the Turks. But actually this meant, at this period, to protect the Latin possessions and interests in Greece and the Aegean Sea against the growing Turkish threat. Also it meant to save Byzantium and eastern Christendom, since the aid was expected to entail the submission of the Greek church to Rome, with resulting advantages for the papacy’s position in the west. Throughout the period 1300–1453, however, the campaigns against the Turks turned into full-fledged crusades only when they coincided with the interests of the Venetian colonial empire in the Levant or those of Hungary for its sphere of influence in the Balkans. For Venice it was vital to keep its control over the coasts and islands strategically important for its sea communications with the Levant: Dalmatia, Albania, the Ionian islands, the Morea, and the Aegean, while Hungary under the Angevin king Louis I “the Great” (1342–1382) embarked upon building an empire from the Adriatic to the Black Sea with complete control of the Danubian countries: Dalmatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Wallachia, and Moldavia.

It is therefore important for the historian of the crusades to find out at what particular times these two great powers found the Ottomans a major threat to their interests, and, in the face of this challenge, how they intensified their activities to establish their own control in the threatened areas and consequently tried to mobilize the forces of Christian Europe in “crusades”. In the following pages we shall focus our attention on these points.

During the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans the Serbs, Venetians, and Hungarians had to deal first with the frontier begs, and when these Christian states made a major attempt at driving them away they were faced with the Ottoman army under the sultan, the ghazi of the ghazis. The Ottoman military frontier zones in the Balkans moved forward in successive waves: first, from 1354 to 1361, as far as the Maritsa river; second, from 1361 to 1383, up to the Balkan mountain range, to Sredna Gora in the north and to the Struma (Struma) river in the south; third, from 1383 to 1393, in the Dobruja, along the Danube, and in the Skopje-Kosovo area; and fourth, from 1393 to 1454, in Albania, Thessaly, upper Serbia, and Vidin. At each shift of the mili-
tary frontier the hinterland came under the direct rule of the Ottoman central government. It was only under Mehmed II (1451–1481) that the Morea, Serbia, and Bosnia would be annexed to the Ottoman empire, making the Balkans south of the Danube a compact Ottoman territory with the exception of some ports or strongholds still under Venetian or Hungarian control. However, it was only with the conquests of Bayazid I “the Thunderbolt” (1389–1402), who extended the Ottoman boundaries to the Danube in the north, Skoplje and southern Albania in the west, and Thessaly in the south, that Hungary and Venice felt, for the first time, the Ottoman threat to their zones of interest as an imminent danger.

In the case of Venice it should be pointed out that as a result of Bayazid’s annexation of the maritime eyluchs of western Anatolia in 1389–1390 the Ottomans had become a threatening sea power in the Aegean, and Bayazid challenged the Venetians on the sea and the Straits by converting Gallipoli into a fortified arsenal and naval base on the Dardanelles and by building a castle, Anadolu Hisar, on the Bosporus. It was these developments that finally led to the crusades of Nicopollis in 1396.

Hungarian designs on the Balkans go back to the Angevin king Louis I “the Great” (1342–1382), who benefited in the period 1362–1364 from the Ottoman advance into Bulgaria by extending his sway over the lands south to the Danube. The Byzantine emperor John V Palaeologus saw Hungary as a powerful ally in his plans to recapture Anchialus (Pomorie) and Mesembria (Nesebur) on the Black Sea from the Bulgarians and to drive the Turks out of Europe. In 1365 Hungarian and Byzantine envoys were at the papal court in Avignon to promote a crusade against the Ottomans, and, in his bull of January 22, 1366, pope Urban V (1362–1370) declared a crusade the avowed purpose of which was the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. In the winter of 1365–1366 the emperor himself made a surprise visit to Buda, the Hungarian capital, to induce Louis to move.34

In the face of the Hungarian-Byzantine threat, Bulgaria saw no alternative but to make peace and an alliance with the Ottomans. The latter supplied tsar John Alexander (1331–1371) with forces or let him use Turkish mercenaries on the Danube against the Hungarians, and on the Black Sea coasts against the Byzantines in the period 1365–1367.

In response to the pope’s call to a crusade the count of Savoy, Amadeo VI, a cousin of the Byzantine emperor, arrived with a crusading fleet of twenty galleys (stronger than previously thought by historians) at the Dardanelles. He captured Gallipoli from the Ottomans late in August 1366; then, passing to the Black Sea, he took Anchialus and Mesembria from the Bulgarians for the Byzantines in October, and finally laid siege to Varna, though still awaiting the promised crusader army of the Hungarian king. The crusading plan to go to the aid of the Byzantines was eventually postponed, and in 1367 Ottoman forces appeared before Sozopolis, which had been conquered by Amadeo VI in the previous year. In 1367 the Bulgarians, with the support of Ottoman forces, also threatened the Hungarians in Vidin, and the Hungarian king had to ask the cooperation of the Wallachian voivode Vlad I (ca. 1360–1372) against them. By then the Byzantines had become more apprehensive of Louis’s crusading plans than of the Turks. The Angevin king’s plans included the conversion to Catholicism of the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans and the capture of Constantinople. The first move by Louis was the subjection of the Bulgarians to his sovereignty, and the establishment of his control in the Vidin area. In 1366 he had created the banat of “Bulgara”, which included Vidin, Orshova, Mühlenbach (Sebeș), and Târnava. In April 1367 the Byzantine emperor hastily made peace with the Bulgarian tsar John Alexander, which displeased Louis. Hungarian possession of Vidin did not last long, and Louis’s crusade project remained only a dream.

It is not correct that after the conquest of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1361 Murad, then still only a prince, had made it the capital city of the Ottoman state. Upon the death of his father Orkhan in March 1362 Murad I had hurriedly come to Bursa (the capital until 1402), and had then moved to defend the Ankara area against the Anatolian emirs of Eretna and Karaman. Lala Shahin, commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces in Rumelia, in cooperation with the frontier begs Evrenos and Hajji-Ilbeg, was responsible for the Ottoman activities in Europe into the 1370’s. Because of the fall of Gallipoli in 1366 and the constant threat from the Byzantine stronghold of Pegas (Kara Biga) on the southern Marmara coast, Murad found it risky to cross over to Europe before 1373. Thus, despite initial advances in the Maritsa valley and toward the Serbians principality of Sever in the south, the

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Ottoman begs remained in general on the defensive. This situation also explains why they chose cooperation with the Bulgarian tsar and why the Byzantines embarked upon feverish efforts to drive the Turks out of Thrace in the period 1366–1371. These Byzantine activities had been preceded by contact through the patriarch Callistus with the despot John Ugljesha, prince of Serres, in 1363–1364, and by intense Byzantine diplomatic activity in the courts of the pope and the Hungarian king to promote a crusade in 1365–1366; they were highlighted by John V Palaeologus’s visit to Italy and conversion to Latin Catholicism in Rome in 1369.

A Serbian army under Ugljesha and his brother Vukasina attempted to take Adrianople in 1371. The Ottoman frontier forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Serbs by a surprise night attack at Chernomen on September 26, killing both brothers. "With the defeat of Maritsa (Chernomen) began the Turkish domination over the southern Slavs," 40 Turkish raiders overran Macedonia and invaded as far as Thessaly and Albania. 41 An interesting document 41 granting protection and exemption from taxes to the monks of the monastery of Saint John Prodrome near Serres attests to the Ottoman influence in Macedonia in 1372/1373. According to the early Ottoman tradition Murad I, on his way to the Dardanelles to support the ghumezes who had informed him of the Serbian attack on Adrianople, had first to stop and reduce Pegae, which threatened his retreat. 42 Thus it can be said that in 1371 the Byzantine-Serbian alliance was a fact, and while the frontier begs of Rumelia had to meet the Serbian army, Murad had to fight the Byzantines at Pegae.

The Ottoman victory at Chernomen seems to have caused alarm at the threat of an Ottoman invasion of Italy. Exaggerated rumors spread about Ottoman plans for conquering Albania and the ports on the Adriatic. 44 The pope invited France, England, and Flanders to unite for a crusade, and wanted the Christian rulers in the Levant, including the Byzantine emperor, to send delegates to a meeting at Thebes to discuss joint action against the Ottomans, but no such meeting took place.

King Louis of Hungary, however, showed his concern by taking an

40 Jireček, Geschichte des Serbien, II, 436; Havelci, Empereor, pp. 188–212.
41 Dąbrowski, "La Conquête turque," Byzninien, cit.
42 Elisabeth A. Zachariadou, "Early Ottoman Documents of the Prodromos Monastery (Serres)," Säkis-Forschungen, XXVII (1949), 1–42.
43 A close critical examination of the early Ottoman traditions has not yet been done; see Landick in Historians of the Middle East, pp. 152–167.
oath to go on a crusade the following year, and asked the Venetians
and Ragusans to build galleys for him. But his intentions were of an
other nature. The Ottoman victory at Chernomeron and ensuing raids
served Louis's old plans to strengthen Hungarian control over the Danu-
brian lands. Louis's "crusade" was actually one against Orthodox "schis-
matic" peoples of Serbia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. By May of 1356, fol-
lowing the demobilization of Stephen Dushan's empire, Louis had
already declared a crusade against "schismatics." Under the king's
protection the Franciscans were zealously pursuing their conversion
efforts in the Balkans. This policy totally alienated the Orthodox popu-
lation and princes in the Balkans from Hungary, and prepared the way
for the Ottomans, who often appeared with their policy of ustimalet
or "reconciliation" as protectors of the Orthodox church and local
princes. Actually the Hungarians and Turks, pressing the Slavic na-
tions from north and south, were helping each other's advance until
the day they faced each other. However, in 1373 Murad at the request
of the Venetian senate sent a force of 5,000 mercenaries against the
Hungarians in Dalmatia.46

After Chernomeron the Serbian princes in Macedonia—Mark Kralje-
vich, the despot Dragash Deyanovich, and his brother Constantine—
agreed to pay tribute and to serve in the Ottoman army. Serres came
back under Greek rule under Manuel Palaeologus, the future emperor,
but the frontier beg Evrenos established a march there under Deli
Bagab, who carried on ghazi warfare against Manuel. Not only the
Serbian princes of Macedonia and the new Bulgarian tsar Shishman,
but also emperor John V after his return from Italy (October 28, 1371),
had to recognize Murad's suzerainty after Chernomeron.47 The emper-
or's visit to Italy and his conversion to Catholicism had failed to bring
about a naval crusade, or secure the cooperation of Hungary, which
was considered the only land power capable of driving the Turks back
to Anatolia. By the time of John V's visit to Europe the Ottomans
seem to have supported an anti-western faction in Byzantium, with
Andronicus IV, the ambitious son of the emperor, at its head. From
then on the Ottoman ruler, as suzerain of the Byzantine emperor,
shrewdly manipulated and profited from disputes for power in the
Palaeologan family, which erupted as civil wars in 1373, 1376-1379,
and 1390.

45 Huber, "Ludwig I von Ungarn," p. 27.
46 RISS, XVII (1760), vol. 176, cited by Herbert A. Gibboun, The Foundation of the Otto-
man Empire: a History of the Osmanci (1299-1453) (Oxford, 1916), p. 149; for early rela-
tions between Murad I and Venice see Thurne, Alpamene, i, no. 423 (1365).
47 Charnasie, "The Strife among the Palaeologoi and the Ottoman Turks," p. 292.
Murad also exploited the fierce rivalry between the Venetians and the Genoese for possession of Tenedos in the war of Chioggia, 1378–1381. In October 1376, when Andronicus promised Tenedos, key to the Dardanelles, to the Genoese, Venice occupied the island. Andronicus captured Constantinople and the Byzantine throne with Ottoman and Genoese support. At the beginning of 1377 he delivered Gallipoli to the Ottomans after ten years of Byzantine possession. Those Byzantines favoring the western alliance and a crusade were against the surrender of Gallipoli, but the populace and senate approved Andronicus’s decision. As a vassal of Murad, the emperor was not actually in a position to block the passage of the Turks anyhow. In the face of the cooperation among Murad, Andronicus, and the Genoese, Venice took John V’s side. But the latter could recover his throne (July 1, 1379) only after promising more favorable tributes of vassaldom to Murad—a military contingent for his campaigns, a yearly payment higher than before, and the surrender of Philadelphus, Byzantium’s last important possession in inland Anatolia.48

The rapid Ottoman expansion was considerably assisted by the defeatism and hopelessness among the Greeks and other Balkan nations. In his criticisms, the pro-western Demetrius Cyclones reflects this psychology by attacking those cooperating with the Turks among the high-placed while, he says, the populace, especially city dwellers in the grip of poverty and shortages, also favored Ottoman rule. The church was openly discussing whether the Turks were preferable to the pope or not. On various occasions the Greek church was unwilling to give up its income from land rents to finance military preparations against the Ottomans. Turkish sovereignty was often presented as an inevitable consequence of divine judgment for the sins of the Christians.49 The Ottomans steadily promoted the same idea, and in their istimale propaganda they promised a peaceful and prosperous expanse under their rule; in general, they delivered what they had promised.

From 1373 on, assured of Byzantine cooperation, the sultan could cross with his army over to Europe without fear of being cut off from Anatolia. The Ottomans were encouraged by international developments in this period. Following the death in September 1382 of Louis

I of Hungary, who had styled himself "king of Serbia, Dalmatia, and Bulgaria", Hungary was in the grip of an internal struggle for succession. Even the Serbian knez Lazar I (1371–1389) in the Morava valley and Bosnia, who supported the Angevins for the Hungarian throne, was involved in the struggle against Louis's successor Sigismund (1385–1437). At the same time, the rivalry between Venice and Hungary for Dalmatia prevented these two powers from acting jointly against the Ottomans for the whole period until 1394. Also the Genoese-Venetian rivalry over Tenedos and the waterways to the Black Sea, which caused a destructive war between the two republics, neutralized those maritime powers in respect to the Ottomans, who had been allied to the Genoese since 1352. The diplomatic revolution leading to the Hungarian-Venetian alliance would come only after the Ottoman occupation of Bulgaria in 1393.50

By the treaty of June 8, 1387, with Genoa, Murad I renewed commercial privileges granted previously by Orhan.51 Genoese documents of the period show that the Ottomans maintained close commercial relations with the Genoese and were visiting Pera. It also appears that the Ottoman Porte did not openly challenge Venice during Murad's reign (1362–1389). The republic continued to purchase wheat from the Ottoman territories (Thrace?) and even hoped to be allowed by Murad to establish a colony at Scutari, just across from the rival Genoese colony at Pera, making diplomatic attempts in 1365, 1368, and 1384.52 In brief, the Ottomans succeeded in maintaining the neutrality of the Italian maritime powers which were in control of the Straits during the period when Murad embarked upon his extensive conquests in the Balkans.

In 1383 Murad, crossing the Straits, established his headquarters in Adrianople and sent an army under the grand vizir Khayreddin Pasha and Evrenos to conquer the rich coastal plains and cities of western Thrace between the lower Nestos (Mesta) and the Struma (Struma). The Ottomans employed their navy under Azeb Beg to cut off aid from the sea. Kavalla (Chrestopolis), Drama, Zichine, and Serres in this region, which had been under blockade for many years, surrendered on terms.53 The raiders extended their activities as far as Albania and the

51. The best analysis of Venetian diplomacy of this period is still Niethammer, Das orientalische Problem 1381–1404.
53. Ibid.
54. The city of Serres was taken only in 1383 but the monastery had already come under the control of the Ottoman frontier forces under Delhi Bahadur in 1372. The Ottoman chronicles
Morea, and Thessalonica and other cities were attacked. After the campaign of 1383, however, the center of the new Ottoman march under Evrenos was Serres, and the Strymon river became the new border. In 1385 a larger campaign in the Balkans was organized under the sultan. The operations were conducted in two directions. An army under the belegarbeg of Rumelia and Evrenos invaded Macedonia and took the plain of Thessalonica; though without success against the city itself, it captured Verra (Fere or Kara-Fere in Turkish sources). Mamarris surrendered and raiders forayed as far as Charles I Tocco’s territory in Epirus.¹³

While the army under the belegarbeg was advancing on the ancient Via Egnatia, the main army under Murad himself followed the famous military route in the Maritsa valley toward Danubian Serbia. He was able to cross the historic pass of the Nishava river and in the autumn of 1385 he captured Nish,¹⁴ only fifty miles from the capital, Krusevets. The Serbian ruler saw no alternative to accepting the Ottoman overlordship under the heavy conditions of dispatching a contingent of one thousand men to Murad’s campaigns and paying fifty oktari¹⁵ (about 140 pounds) of silver annually as tribute. At this time Hungary was too involved in its internal struggle over the succession to intervene.

The course of events leading to the historic battle of Kosovo-Polje is described thus in the earliest Ottoman tradition.¹¹ In 1385 the Karamanids, taking advantage of the absence of Murad and the Anatolian forces, had invaded the disputed area in Hamid which had been conquered by the Ottomans in 1381. In the summer of 1386 Murad’s Ottomans defeated the Karamanid Aladdin Ali in a pitched battle

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¹³ Oriental compilations of the late fifteenth century by Idris and Nušić confuse the chronology and order of events. ‘Aštik Paša-šáde and the anonymous chronicles are more faithful to their original sources. My chronology is based on a critical study of these sources. The date of the conquest of Varna (1877/1881) is confirmed in Christian sources; see Ardlec, Geschichte der Serben, 11, 237, and Søhrensacket, pp. cit., pp. 95-96.
¹⁴ Serbian annals (see Ibrad, Geschichte der Serben, II, 111) give the date as 1386.
¹⁵ 50,000 oktari in Nušić, Gleichemant: Die abendländische Chronik des Mevlana Mehmet Mustafa Nuseiri, J. Thunen: D隙ifund und Tsucheto, 1 (Langen, 1951), 59, but only 50 oktari in Idris.
¹⁶ Nušić, op. cit., p. 71, and Erdelić, Denticarum, pp. 83-87; and Serbian annals on Kosmato and George A. Skrmarčić, Komentar Vlak (Croatia, 1950); Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević von Konstantinopel, hr. Bojin.
at Frenk Yazum, where the Serbian contingent fought on the left wing. 59
Upon the return home of the Serbian contingent, which complained of
harsh treatment in the Ottoman army, Lazar denounced his allegiance
to Murad and tried to bring about a coalition of the subjected Balkan
states against the Ottomans. The defeat at Plochnek on August 27, 1388,
of an Ottoman frontier force under Kavala Shahin, 60 who had invaded
Bosnia in collaboration with Balsha, lord of Scutari, encouraged tsar
Shishman and despot Dobrotich, the Bulgarian rulers, and Tyrtko I,
ruler of Bosnia (1353-1391), to form a coalition with Lazar. This was
followed by an agreement between Sigismund, king of Hungary, and
Lazar, who accepted the obligations of vassalage as under Louis F. 61

In order to secure his rear in his campaign against Serbia, Murad
sent Ali Pasha Chandarli, the new grand vezir, against Shishman and
Dobrotich in the autumn of 1388. Ali, at the head of the forces of
Rumelia, made a swift raid into Bulgaria, and in the spring of 1389,
when Murad crossed the Danubelles, Ali continued operations in Dan-
ubian Bulgaria, where tsar Shishman had taken refuge in Nicopols. 
Tarnovo, the capital of Shishman, surrendered (but was not occupied)
and the tsar finally submitted in Nicopols. Then Ali Pasha joined the
sultan’s army near Philippopolis (Plovdiv; Filibe) and the whole army
marched in the direction of Kossovo-Polje. The Christian lords of Kus-
tendil (Konstantin) and Tumok (Saraj) joined Murad’s army. The An-
tololian emirates, including Karaman, had responded to his call and sent
contingents for this crucial confrontation between the forces of Islam and
Christendom.

The Serbian army included contingents from Bosnia under Vlatko
Vukovich and from Croatia under ban John Horvath, as well as mer-
cenaries or volunteers comprising “Franks, Viachs, Albanians, Hunga-
rians, Czechs, and Bulgarians”. In the western Balkans (Ragusa, Al-
bania, and Bosnia) cannon was known by 1380, and reliable Ottoman
and Serbian sources attest to its use at the battle of Kossovo in the
summer of 1389. 62 The Ottoman victory at Kossovo marks the estab-

59 A contemporary Ottoman source in Pinchot, op. cit., p. 79, dates it at the spring of 1388.
1386. Another contemporary source, ‘Atif Aspiroff, Bajzem u Arsmi, ed. Kepeli (Istanbul,
1928) p. 349, is not clear here in its chronology; it contains complimentary details on Murad’s
exploits in the Balkans.

60 Kavala Shahin is often confused with Lala Sheshet, Begründer von Rumelia unter Murad I.
61 L. Huber, “Die Gefangennahme der Königin Elisabeth und Maria von Ungarn und
die Kämpfe König Sigismunds gegen die Neugestaltete Partei und die übrigen Reicheleute
im Jahre 1386-1399,” Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte, LVII (1885), 523, Jirasek,
Geschichte der Serben, 11, 319.
62 See D. Petrov, “Fire-arms in the Balkans,” in War, Technology and Society in the Mid-
lishment of Ottoman overlordship in Serbia and the beginning of the Ottoman-Hungarian rivalry over this key area between the Balkans and Central Europe. On the battlefield Murad I was assassinated, and Lazar was captured and executed.

Stephen, the new knez (1389–1427), and his mother Militsa under the threat of Hungarian invasion readily accepted the protection of and vassalage to Bayazid I, the new sultan, and her daughter despina (lady) Olivera was given in marriage to Bayazid. Ottoman garrisons were stationed in the important fortresses on the Danube, including Golubac. In the autumn of 1389 Sigmund invaded Serbia and took Borach (Boy) and Chestia in upper Serbia. The following summer Ottoman-Serbian forces fought together against the Hungarian ban. 64

Bayazid had to return to Anatolia in haste since the Anatolian vassal emirs, in alliance with Ahmed Ali of Karakan and Buthaneddin of Sivas (Sebastia), upon learning of the death of Murad I at Kosovo had initiated an uprising. 65 Bayazid was occupied in Anatolia warring against the emirs from 1389 to 1392. During this period he annexed the maritime emirates of Sarukhan, Aydia, and Mentesh in western Anatolia and the old Seljukid emirates of Germiyan, Hamild, and Kastamonu, and extended his control to the Amasya region, where he was challenged by the powerful sultan of Sivas. By his conquests in Anatolia Bayazid established his authority and greatly increased his power, and in 1399 he returned to the Balkans to assert his sovereignty over the Christian vassal states, which had, during his absence, slackened their ties to the Ottoman state and come into the orbit of Hungary and Venice.

The urgent problem for the Ottomans was to reassert control over Danubian Bulgaria. In 1391 with Sigmund's support Mircea cel Bătrân ("the Old"), voivode of Wallachia (1386–1418), had invaded northern Bulgaria as far as Karnobad, while Bayazid was occupied in Anatolia. In late 1392 Bayazid exchanged embassies with Ladislas, king of Naples (1386–1414), a rival of Sigmund for the Hungarian throne. 65 The following summer Bayazid invaded Bulgaria, taking Tarnovo on July 17, 1393, and placed tsar Shishman in Nicopolis as an Ottoman vassal to guard against Hungarian–Wallachian encroachments. Prior to his campaigns into Greece, Hungary, and Wallachia, Bayazid called all the Ottoman vassal princes to a meeting in the winter of 1393–1394.

63 Slatkic, Geschichte der Serben, II, 124.
64 The main source is Amurîbîdî, Suma a Farsar, pp. 383–387, 391.
to make sure of their loyalty and cooperation; 66 the meeting place was Verru, not “Serrai” (Serres) as reported in some Byzantine sources. 67 As the new Byzantine emperor, Manuel II (1391-1425), himself confirms, the appearance of the vassal princes before the sultan was a custom and condition of Ottoman suzerainty.

Bayazid’s next moves were an invasion of Thessaly and the county of Salona on February 20, 1394, and the occupation of Thessalonica on April 21. Bayazid’s insistence on direct control of the strategic cities and areas in the Balkans frightened his vassals.

Though authoritarian in his dealings with his vassals, Bayazid had shown a conciliatory attitude toward Venice after the annexation of the emirates of western Anatolia in the winter of 1389-1390. In May 1390 he reconfirmed the capitulations made under the Aydin dynasty, in response to the mission of Francis Querini. Venice would not have opposed the Ottomans if its commercial privileges and maritime security had been guaranteed. But in 1391 the corsairs of western Anatolia, now under Ottoman control, had begun their attacks against Venetian possessions in the Aegean and the Morea, forcing the senate to take new defense measures and send protests to the sultan. Construction of galleys in Constantinople, Thessalonica, and other ports for the Ottoman navy in the spring of 1392 caused great concern in Venice. Manuel II was then acting as a loyal vassal of the sultan and appeared to be using Ottoman power to block Venetian dominance in the Aegean and the Straits.

As under Umar Paşa half a century earlier, the Turkish navy had once again become an aggressive and threatening power. In the spring of 1392 the Venetian senate gave orders to their “captain of the Gulf” to proceed to the Aegean and attack Ottoman warships on the open sea. The reappearance of the threat of Turkish sea power under Bayazid led Venice to consider reviving the Latin League in the Aegean, with the participation of Lesbos, Chios, Rhodes, and Cyprus.

In the summer of 1392 the Ottoman navy sailed to the Black Sea to cooperate with Bayazid’s army against Sultan Murad of Kastamonu, so Venetian apprehension of an immediate Ottoman attack faded. In 1394 after the Verru meeting Venice welcomed Manuel’s request for aid against the sultan, who wanted to establish full control of Constantinople.

66 See Barker, Manuel II, pp. 912-923.
67 The fact that the meeting-place was Verru, not Serrai (Serres), was first indicated by Karl Hopf, and after him by Silberman, op. cit., p. 95. In the Ottoman sources the date is given (misakenly) as after 790/1391.
The despot Theodore Palaeologus (1382–1407) had become an Ottoman vassal in 1388, in order to gain Ottoman support for his struggle against the Latin barons, and especially for his fight against Venice for Argos. According to the famous inscription of Parori, he said he was ruling in the Morea in the name of the sultan. But when, after the meeting of Verrai, Bayazid required the surrender of Argos and other strategic places in the Morea, Theodore managed to flee to the Morea, where he made an alliance with Venice against the Ottomans by the agreement of Modon on May 2, 1394. He surrendered Argos to the Venetians and then with their assistance captured Monemvasia from the Ottoman garrison.

But the major event leading to the crusade was Bayazid’s invasion of Hungary in 1394. We learn from a later Ottoman document that in that year the Ottoman army under the sultan himself entered Hungary near Belgrade, attacked Slavkamen, Titel, Boszkerek, Temesvar, Carasboca, Caransebeș, and Mehadia deep in Transylvania, and then turned south into Wallachia in the direction of Nicopolis. There Mircea barred the way to the Ottoman army at the mountain pass of Rovine near Argeș, his capital. On October 10, 1394, Bayazid’s army escaped disaster only after a fierce battle at Argeș in which the vassal Serbian princes Mark Kraljevich and Constantine Dejanovich and several Ottoman beggs fell. The sultan crossed the Danube at Nicopolis on ships supplied by tsar Shishman, who was placed there by Bayazid in 1393 when Tarnovo, his capital, was occupied by the Ottomans. Suspicious of Shishman’s secret relations with Mircea and Sigismund,

68. Lorette, "Pour l’histoire du Péloponèse au XIVe siècle (1382-1404)," Études byzantines, 1 (1943), 169–171. Turks from western Anatolia had appeared in the Morea as mercenaries in service since the time of Michael IX Palaeologus (1294–1320). According to Lorette, Ottoman Turks interfered in Morean affairs following their conquest of Thessalonica in 1387. Theodore went to Morada’s court to offer his allegiance in 1389.

69. Ibid., 183–184.

70. Ses Actes au XIe Congrès international d’études byzantines (Istanbul, 1956), p. 220; the original is in the Topkapı Sarayi archives, no. 6374. Apparently it was a report prepared for Mehmed II for a campaign in Hungary in Wallachia.

71. The Topkapı document makes date there was no fortress at Belgrade at this time, and the Bulaq between the Parva and the Gheorghe speaks of the siege of Belgrade for a month.

72. On the basis of a document dated October 1395 concerning a donation made by Helen for the soul of her father, Constantine Dejanovich, G. S. Radulski, “La Chronologie de la bataille de Nicopolis,” Annales des Annales de l’Académie roumaine, vol. V (1928), 156–159, puts the date of the battle on May 17, 1395, the date of Constantine’s death as found in Ottoman annals. But now the Topkapı document provides new details supporting October 1394. On the battle itself Ebert, Dautsch, and, G. S. Radulski, have shown interesting details.

73. According to von Archimbaud, Geschichte Kaiser Sigismunds, I, 99, tsar Shishman had shifted to the Hungarian side.
Bayazid, once across the river, seized and executed Shishman on June 3, 1395, and appointed Vlad voivode of Wallachia. Mircea took refuge in Transylvania in March 1396 and joined Sigismund in Kronstadt (Brasov). Together they descended on the Danube and in May recaptured Little Nicopolis on the north bank, opposite Nicopolis, and installed a Hungarian garrison. The Hungarian army was, however, harassed by Vlad on his way back home.

Thus in 1393–1395 the whole of Bulgaria was annexed to the Ottoman empire, and Wallachia came under an Ottoman vassal prince. On the Danube front Driistra (Silistra) and the Dobruja, long disputed between Bulgarian and Wallachian princes, became the seat of an Ottoman frontier lord. Nicopolis, which was in Ottoman hands, became the key fortress for control of Bulgaria and Wallachia. Farther to the west at Vidin, the Bulgarian tsar Sracumur (Stratsimir) was a loyal vassal of the sultan, and an Ottoman garrison was stationed there. To restore Hungarian influence and control in the area, Sigismund saw that he needed the support of the whole of Christian Europe, and especially of Venice. Just at this juncture Venice, as we have seen, abandoned its neutral attitude and decided to enter the struggle and to support any joint undertaking against the Ottomans.

The Ottoman invasion of Hungary in 1394 aroused genuine concern in pope Boniface IX (1389–1404) in Rome. In October the pope issued, upon Sigismund’s appeal, a bull for a crusade against the Ottomans. On December 23 a Byzantine envoy arrived in Venice requesting aid and urging war against Bayazid. In early 1395 Venice became the center of the negotiations for a crusade. Reversing its cautious policy vis-à-vis the Ottomans, the senate decided to try full cooperation with Hungary. Venice also promised to send a fleet to the Dardanelles to cut off Ottoman communication between Anatolia and Rumelia. Sigismund secured a Burgundian-French contingent for the crusade, but there were rumors in France that John Galeazzo Visconti of Milan, threatened by the French, had exchanged embassies of friendship with the Ottoman sultan. Ladislas of Naples, the rival of Sigismund, was another Italian ruler in contact with “the enemy of Christendom”.

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74 The Topkapı document, no. 6374.
75 Von Aschbach, op. cit., p. 92.
76 The Topkapı document claims that Mircea was a tributary of the sultan prior to the campaign of 1394.
77 Selimo, The Popacy, I, 342-343.
78 Sigismund’s letter to the pope in October 1394, mentioning Bayazid’s advance on Hungary, must have been written before the battle of Ayazli on October 10.
Byzantine-Hungarian alliance was signed in Buda in February 1396 and Venice was informed about it in March.

Without this Balkan background the crusade of Nicopolis cannot be adequately explained. Western participation in the crusade appears to be grossly exaggerated in western accounts. The crusaders from western Europe, “une multitude de chevaliers sans experience, sans ordre,” 80 was apparently quite a small contingent, and yet they intended “to conquer the whole of Turkey and march into the empire of Persia, . . . the kingdom of Syria, and the Holy Land of Jerusalem”.

Vlad of Wallachia, an Ottoman vassal, was attacked from the north by Stephen Lackovich, the voivode of Transylvania, but the Serbs under Stephen Lazarevich joined Bayazid’s army. The Ottoman strategy was to delay the advance of the crusaders by resisting them in the fortified cities, in order to give the sultan, who was at the head of his army besieging Constantinople, time to gather his forces. The crusaders met resistance at Vidin and Rakova in late August and were held up by a stiff defense at the stronghold of Nicopolis (September 8-10). Bayazid surprised the crusaders at Nicopolis, and the ensuing pitched battle ended in a complete victory for the sultan (September 25, 1396), 81 who won fame throughout Islam as a ghazi.

Sigismund, Philippe of Naillac (soon to be grand master of the Hospital), and a few other leaders escaped down the Danube in a small boat, and John of Nevers and several other captive nobles were held for ransom, but most of the crusaders who survived the battle were enslaved or slaughtered by the infuriated sultan. The shocked reaction of western Europe to this disaster led to disillusion with the crusade idea and refusal to participate in similar expeditions for nearly half a century.

Venice took part in the crusade, but the small Venetian fleet of four galleys under Thomas Mocenigo, captain of the Gulf, was instructed not to engage in military operations beyond the northern Aegean and to stay with the members of the Aegean league—Rhodes, Chios, and Lemnos. By his naval preparations at Gallipoli and strict ban on wheat export to Venice, Bayazid had taken measures against the republic. 82

80 Jorga, Histoire des royaumes, Ill (Bucharest, 1937), 362
81 See the discussion of the war of the crusader army in Siamon, The Papacy, 1, 351-353. Delbrück’s estimate of the strength of the Ottoman army is confirmed by the Ottoman anonymous (Paris 1947), Fols. 227-228 “upon the news of the invasion Bayazid hurried to Nicopolis taking with him an army of two thousand select moornas.” Each man had a pair of horses to go at maximum speed. At Tarnovo Bulgarian forces joined the sultan. For details of the battle see Siamon, The Papacy, 1, 353-355.
After Nicopolis Venice had to take more serious steps to protect Constantinople and Euboea.

After his victory Bayazid turned against Byzantium, which he held responsible for the crusade; now its conquest appeared easier than ever. The sultan’s pressure on Constantinople in October 1396 is confirmed by Venetian and Genoese documents, as well as by the Ottoman chronicles. Venice feared that the fall of Constantinople was quite imminent, and hastily sent instructions dated October 29, 1396, to Moreeino to take appropriate measures. Ottoman tradition makes it clear that immediately after the battle of Nicopolis Bayazid turned his army against Constantinople and demanded the surrender of the city. Negotiations were concluded by the emperor’s pledging allegiance, with the payment of a yearly tribute of ten thousand gold ducats and the establishment of a Turkish quarter in Constantinople with a qadi and a mosque. (Our source adds that the Moslems from Göynük and Taraklı-Yeniça who were settled in the quarter were driven out of the city after Bayazid’s defeat at Ankara by Timur [Tamerlane] in 1402.) Apparently the sultan never gave up his intention of taking the city, but temporarily acquiesced to the peace offer of the emperor at a time when pressing problems in Anatolia confronted him.

While Bayazid was occupied in Anatolia, first in conquering Karaman territory and then in fighting against sułhan Burhaneddin of Sivas in the Amasya area in 1397, and the following year in capturing several cities in the Euphrates valley from the Mamluks, Manuel II was busy sending diplomatic missions to try to persuade the courts of France, Rome, and Venice to send a crusade to deliver Constantinople from its fate. In 1397 Venice was seriously concerned about the alleged plans of the ex-emperor John VII to surrender the city, and took naval measures to prevent it. Marshal John Boucicaut’s fruitless expedition (1399) and Manuel II’s visit to European capitals in quest of aid (1400–1402) did not bring about any change in the situation.

83 Ibid.; Thiriot, Alexios I, no. 914.
84 Ibid., nos. 917, 918; but Silbermann, op. cit., p. 145, thanks that references in the documents belong to the period before the battle of Nicopolis; cf. Setton, The Papacy, I, 358. The letter of the viceroy of Paro burned in the Venetians is dated October 28, 1396; for the sultan’s siege of Constantinople after Nicopolis see Adîb Paşa-nâme, op. cit., 67–69; Nothe, op. cit., p. 90.
85 In his letter dated July 1, 1397 (see Burkus, Manuel II, pp. 154–155). Manuel II speaks of three years of hard times in the war against Bayazid I.
86 Ibid., pp. 149–160.
87 Ibid., pp. 136–146.
Manuel's departure for Europe made the sultan furious, and he forthwith demanded that John VII surrender the city. A naval league against the Ottomans comprising the Hospitallers, the Genoese of Chios, and James Crispo, the duke of the Archipelago (1397–1418), was then considered by the Venetian senate. Byzantium's salvation, however, would come from the east. In 1402 Timur captured Sivas, an Ottoman city since 1398, and on July 28, 1402, he defeated Bayazid at the battle of Ankara and made him a prisoner; he died in captivity a few months later, probably by suicide.

Between 1402 and 1413 Bayazid's sons Suleiman (in Adrianople), Mehmed (at Amasya), and Isa (at Bursa) fought for the succession. Their civil war kept them too weak and divided to threaten Constantinople, Venice, or Hungary, which enjoyed the respite without making any serious effort to strengthen their defenses against the inevitable resurgence of Ottoman power. The eventual winner, Mehmed I, ruled for eight more years, but deliberately made no military or diplomatic moves to destroy the unwonted calm.

C. The Struggle for the Balkans, 1421–1451

During the civil war, however, Byzantium had learned the most efficient way to check Ottoman aggressiveness and obtain concessions. At the accession on June 25, 1421, of Mehmed I's son Murad II, who was declared sultan in Bursa at the age of seventeen, Manuel II set Mustafa, Murad's uncle, free in the Balkans, where he was joined by many leaders of the Ottoman forces, including powerful frontier begars.

Mustafa had agreed to return to the emperor Gallipoli, the rich coastal plains of Thrace, Thessaly, and the Black Sea coasts, thus restoring the Byzantine empire to its boundaries prior to Bayazid I's conquests. The Turkish dynasties in Anatolia, which Timur had restored to their principalities, also rebelled against Murad II. The young sultan had to recognize the occupation of Hamid-ru by the Karamanids. Juneyd,
a pretender to the principality of Smyrna, had joined Mustafa in Rumelia. The Ottoman state was again in danger of dissolution.

Under the circumstances, Murad's government at Bursa followed the same conciliatory policy with the Christian states as his father's had in 1413. It was ready to accept all the Byzantine demands, except the surrender to the emperor of Gallipoli and of Mehmed's two infant sons as hostages. Murad made agreements with Serbia and Hungary through his ambassadors as his father Mehmed I had done against Musa, his rival in Rumelia in 1413. Venice approached both sides to make the most of the situation. It wanted Venetian merchants to receive the same treatment that they enjoyed in Constantinople and an export permit for 10,000 modii (about 20,000 tons) of wheat annually from the Ottoman possessions. 94

In the final encounter near Bursa (end of January or early February 1422), Mustafa lost the day as a result of the defection of the frontier bege and of Junej, whom Murad recognized as sovereign in Smyrna. With the Genoese ships brought by John Adorno, podesta of New Phocaea, Murad was able to cross the Dardanelles and capture and execute his uncle in Adrianople. 95

In the spring the victorious sultan came to lay siege to Constantinople. Supported by guns and a navy, this siege, from June 20 to September 6, 1422, was the most serious theretofore made against the Byzantine capital. Venice was alarmed, and took measures to protect its merchant ships trading with the Black Sea ports from Ottoman naval forces. However, the proposal of a naval demonstration against the sultan before Constantinople was rejected by the senate. At this point the cautious doge Thomas Mocenugo (1414–1423) tried to avoid a war against the Ottomans. His bailie in Constantinople, Benedetto Emo, was instructed to offer mediation for peace negotiations between the sultan and the emperor. 96 At any rate, military aid to Byzantium under siege could not be sent before the following spring. But help came to Byzantium from Anatolia. The Germeyanids, Karamanids, and Janjaride responded favorably to a Byzantine diplomatic move for an attack on the Ottoman territories in Anatolia. These Anatolian emirs convinced Ilyas, the tutor of Murad II's brother Mustafa, who was then only thirteen years old and living in Germeyan, to rebel and sent forces to support him. 97 Upon hearing the news, following an unsuc-

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94 Thring, Règences, II, no. 1825, Instruction to Benedetto Emo dated October 10, 1421.
95 Isabey, "Murad II," p. 60.
96 Thring, Règences, II, no. 1834, 1835, dated August 26, 1422.
97 A newly discovered Ottoman source, Osman Ferhat, Zav-di Neftihci (Ankara, 1954), pp. 20, 60 is particularly important for the younger Mustafa's activities; cf. Ducas, in Magalotti.
cessful final assault on August 26, the sultan lifted the siege of
Constantinople.

The Ottoman threat had led Manuel II to seek closer relations with
the west, and in particular with pope Martin V (1417–1431). In response
the pope sent messages to various western rulers requesting aid to By-
zantium, and his legate, the Franciscan Anthony of Massa, arrived in
Constantinople on September 10, 1422, to negotiate church union, but
these negotiations were not fruitful. More practical results were ex-
pected from diplomatic contacts with Venice and Hungary.

Since 1411 Sigismund, "emperor of the Romans and king of Hun-
gary", had championed the deliverance of Balkan Christians and By-
zantium, and since 1416 Manuel II had been trying to reconcile
Hungary and Venice for the purpose of starting a crusade against the
Ottomans. In this effort, Manuel was joined by king Vladislav II Jo-
giello of Poland (1366–1434), who had received the Byzantine ambas-
sador Philanthropenos in August 1420.

Actually, Venice shrewdly made the most of the crisis of 1421–1423.
In the wake of the Ottoman siege of Constantinople, the senate agreed
to strengthen the Byzantine fleet by ten galleys (October 1422). In the
Mora, Venetians sought to take over the remnants of the Frankish
principalities and threatened to join the Greeks in order to hold
the Ottoman forces at the newly constructed Hexamillion wall on the
isthmus. In the spring of 1423 Murad was still threatening the By-
zantine empire. Now free of challenges from his rivals in Anatolia and
his brother Mustafa (late January 1423) Murad sent Turakhan, the
powerful frontier beg in Thessaly, to invade the Morea on May 22,
1423, and destroy the Hexamillion fortifications. Turakhan's cam-

p. 154; Le Goff, Naissance de l'Europe, 1, 334; ibid., "Essai sur deux Prétendants Mosulais," Revue his-
torique du méd-le siècle, X (1933), 12–13.
102 Ibid., p. 349, note 121, see especially "Zirkulärer Rahnschriften" Depicted by the forces sent
by Murad II under Meâdel-çehbe, Murad's brother Mustafa took refuge in Constantinople (Sep-
tember 30, 1422). With the emperor's support he went to Salmyrî (Siwer), apparently hoping
for cooperation from discontent in Russia. But under the attack of the Russian forces, he
retreated to Kepîn (the Nicomedia area) where he was recognized as sultan Nican (Zeino)
opened up his gates to him. Mustafa threatened Nican, and seems to have established his control
over the greater part of Ottoman Anatolia. On the advice of his cousin Yihyî Papaiu, Murad
II sent out seven Ackmamî and attacked Nican in Nicom in winter. Taken by surprise and
besieged by his cousin Eysis, Nican was captured and executed (February 20, 1423). Murad's
forces had to fight against the Jandarli and Karamanlı forces during his action against Mustafa.
paigned was apparently a move to discourage an attack on the rear of the Ottomans, who were now concentrating their forces on Thessalonica, which had been under blockade since the spring of 1422. But, to the disappointment of the Ottomans, Thessalonica, the second city of the Byzantine empire, passed by agreement under Venetian sovereignty on September 14, 1423. Since the city had been under Ottoman rule from 1387 to 1402, and paid a tribute of 100,000 akche to the sultans while under the Byzantine rule thereafter, the Ottomans considered the Venetian occupation a hostile act. The Venetian ambassador, Nicholas Giorgio, sent to make an agreement, was arrested in the winter of 1424, and the Venetians offer to pay a tribute of 1,500–2,000 ducats for the city was rejected. An Ottoman army estimated to consist of five thousand men was holding the city under siege.

The Venetian-Ottoman war for Thessalonica lasted seven years, with dangerous implications for the Ottomans. While on the one hand the republic made several diplomatic attempts to have the sultan recognize the Venetian occupation of Thessalonica in return for some concessions and payment of tribute, on the other hand it tried to initiate a crusade or form a regional coalition against the Ottomans. A Venetian fleet under Peter Lombard was at Gallipoli in June 1424, blocking the Straits to all Ottoman ships.

To divert Ottoman forces, Venice then encouraged Juneyd in the Smyrna area to rise against Murad. The Ottoman sultan had difficult times in his war against this energetic fighter, who attempted to raise the Karamanids and other emirs in Anatolia against the Ottomans. Given this dangerous situation, Murad had to sign a peace treaty with Byzantium (February 22, 1424) which accepted payment of a yearly tribute of 300,000 akche (about 10,000 gold ducats) and the return of lands occupied since 1402 on the coasts of the Marmara, Aegean, and Black Seas except the castles of Mesembria, Dekor, and Zeitounion (Lamia).

In collaboration with Venice, Juneyd planned to send Ismail, an Ottoman pretender, to Rumelia, but Murad again secured Genoese cooperation to blockade Juneyd from the sea. Juneyd’s elimination in 1425 deprived Venice of an efficient ally. In the spring of 1425 the Ottoman-Venetian war flared up on the Thessalonica front. The Venetians occupied Cassandra and Kavalla and at the same time attempted to use a “false” Mustafa as a pretender to the throne. In 1426 the Ot-

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For Timur’s raid into the Marmara see ibid., p. 497, and Peter Thoppum’s account in volume III of the present work, p. 364; of Sana, p. 156; of Sana, ed., III, 269.

tooman corsairs from Palaea (Balat) and Ephesus (Ayasoluk) struck Duboc, Modon, and Coroa while war spread in Albania with the Ottoman siege of Durazzo.

During the crisis of 1421–1424, the Ottoman frontier lords on the Danube and in Macedonia, southern Bosnia, and Albania had been able to protect Ottoman interests in the buffer zones against Hungary and Venice. During this period, while the buffer states—the Serbian despotate, the kingdom of Bosnia, and the voivodate of Wallachia—were forced to accept suzerainty or give up strategic points to Hungary and Venice, the Ottoman frontier lords had supported rival parties or pretenders in these buffer states and intensified their raids into these countries.

Coupled with the energetic stand of the Ottoman frontier lords, the war between Hungary and Venice for Dalmatia relieved the Ottomans of the danger of a “crusade” in the Balkans during this period.

Venice, however, became the principal beneficiary of the changing conditions in the Balkans. In addition to having seized the Dalmatian ports of Zara, Spalato (Split), Sebenico (Shibenik), and Trag (Tragur) from Hungary between 1412 and 1420, the republic had extended its sway in northern Albania had Montenegro following the death of Balsha in 1421. This policy had led Venice into war against Stephen Lazarevich, the Serbian despot, in the years 1421–1423. In this fight Stephen found Ottoman frontier forces an efficient ally, and from them he recognized Murad as his suzerain. By the peace treaty signed on August 12, 1423, however, the despot had to recognize Venetian occupation of Scutari, Alessio (Lech), and Dulcigno. Later, in 1426, the Ottoman frontier lord Ilyas Beg was included in the treaty as a witness or guarantor. This expansion of Venetian control can be considered as a counter to the Ottoman expansion in Albania—the occupation of Crete (Akchaisar) in 1415, and that of Avlona, Berat, and Pyrgos in 1420.

Hungary also exploited the situation by reinforcing its position in Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia in the period 1419–1429. During this period Sigismund was particularly active in extending Hungarian control in the northern Balkans and lower Danubian basin, even claiming sway over northern Bulgaria by supporting a Bulgarian prince’s claim to the throne.

105. Ilyas Beg was his Ilyas, nevskij of Chlitaros near Berat, see Silvestre de Sacy, Histoire de la Bulgarie Arménienne, ii, 279.
Mircea had died in 1418 and his sons Michael and then Dan II recognized Hungarian suzerainty in Wallachia. The situation apparently caused great concern in Murad’s court, and the sultan ordered frontier forces to support Radu II (“the Simple”, or “the Bald”), another son of Mircea, against his brother, culminating in the invasion of Wallachia in 1423.106 Hungarians and Ottomans fought on the Danube as supporters of their respective candidates for the Wallachian throne. Following his attempt at an agreement in 1424, the sultan, now freed of his Anatolian enemies, organized a large-scale campaign against Wallachia and Hungary under the beglerbeg of Rumelia with the participation of all the frontier lords. At the head of his army, Sigismund himself encountered the Ottoman army at Golubac and Orshova, and blocked their way.107 The Venetians in Thessalonica received with joy the news of the Ottoman failure on the Danube.108

Upon the termination of the truce in 1426, the Ottoman-Hungarian rivalry over Wallachia and Serbia escalated. First the Ottomans drove Dan away from Wallachia early in 1427, and Sigismund had to come to reinstate him on the Wallachian throne in the spring. His forces then retook Giurgiu and crossed the Danube. There Sigismund built the fortress Szentgyörgy, and settled German forces as a barrier against the Ottomans. At this point, the death of the Serbian despot Stephen Lazarevich on July 19, 1427, and the dispute over his heritage brought the rivalry of the two powers on the Danube to a point of crisis. Stephen had arranged his succession in favor of George Brankovich, lord of upper Serbia, under Hungarian protection; Brankovich would be a vassal of the Hungarian king, by an agreement signed in May 1426.109 According to the agreement upon the death of Stephen, Hungary would inherit Belgrade, Golubac, and the banat of Machva on the west side of the Danube. Even before the death of Stephen in 1427, the Ottomans had reacted against this arrangement and, by invading George’s lands, had forced him to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, to cede the area between Krushevo and Kossovo, to wed his daughter Mara to

106. Anonymous, "Bedesth-i Âl-‘Otthmân" (Pera, Wilh. and. ML, suppl. turc, 1047), p. 34 tells us that following the execution of his brother Munte in (early 1423) Murad II ordered a massive attack against Wallachia, and that he then made peace with “Duzula” on condition of the payment of a tribute; according to Forgá, Geschichte, I, 391, Ottoman forces advanced as far as Kremnoč (Brosho).

107. Forgá, Geschichte, I, 391. The anonymous "Bedesth" claims an Ottoman surprise attack and victory at Golubac against the king’s forces in 828/1423.


the sultan, and to guarantee cooperation against the Hungarians.\footnote{110} The Ottomans, in return, had promised George military aid against his rival, king Tvrtko II of Bosnia, who had laid siege to Srebrenitsa.

In the summer of 1427, frontier forces under Ishak Beg of Skopje staged a raid into Bosnia, and went as far as Croatia. Under the pressure of the Ottoman frontier forces Tvrtko II had accepted Hungarian protection since 1422,\footnote{111} and now demanded aid. After the death of Stephen in July, the Ottomans and Hungarians moved to invade Serbia to prevent each other from taking over the land. While Sigismund occupied Belgrade in the autumn of 1427, the Ottoman forces invaded upper Serbia, capturing Krusevac and Golubac, as well as the island of “Jan-adasi” (identified as New Orshova) in the Danube. As noted above, Murad had already forced Branikovich, the new Serbian despot (1427–1436), to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, and to pay tribute. But now the despot chose as his heir Frederick of Cilly, Sigismund’s son-in-law.\footnote{112}

When military action around Thessalonica was intensified, the Venetian senate had accepted the necessity of an alliance with Hungary (October 1425). Now not only Byzantium but also Florence\footnote{113} and Savoy, as well as Poland, urged Hungary to reach an agreement with Venice.

Sigismund organized his conquests into two banats (military frontier provinces), Machva and Belgrade, against the Ottomans. Opposite Golubac (Galambóc), now in Ottoman hands, he built the fortress Lászlóvár.\footnote{114} Thus a strong defense line was created against the Ottomans from Giurgiu on the lower Danube to Severin, while Wallachian, Serbian, and Bosnian princes recognized the protection and suzerainty of the Hungarian king. Sigismund once again emerged as the champion of a crusade against the Ottomans. Planning his crowning as emperor in Rome, he declared his determination to reach a full agreement with the pope to achieve peace and unity in Italy so that he could eradicate the Hunnish heresy, and, as an ultimate goal, could fight against the Ottomans and deliver the Holy Land.\footnote{115}

\footnote{110} The main source is Nagler, op. cit., pp. 361–362.

\footnote{111} In 1410 Sigismund returned to Bosnia and was crowned “king of Bosnia and Serbia”; see Strobel, Geschichte der Serben, II, 147.

\footnote{112} previous, op. cit., II, 374. Frederick succeeded his father Hermann II in 1433 and died in 1454.


\footnote{114} previous, op. cit., II, 374.

\footnote{115} For his visit to the Franciscan monastery in September 1427, see Buchmann, Der Kampf, p. 92.
In April 1428 a strong army of twenty-five to thirty thousand Hungarians and six thousand Wallachians under voivode Dan II, as well as Lithuanian contingents, arrived before Golubats. The Turkish fleet on the Danube was eliminated. Murad rushed with fresh forces to the aid of the hard-pressed Golubats, and Sigismund decided not to risk a pitched battle as he had done at Nicopolis in 1396.

A cease-fire for the retreat of the Hungarian army to the west side of the Danube was agreed upon early in June 1428. Continued negotiations eventually resulted in a three-year truce between the two powers. While Sigismund took pains to explain to Venice and pope Martin V his reasons for making peace with Murad, the Ottoman sultan in his turn tried to prove to sultan Barsbay of Egypt (1422–1438) that the peace was necessary and that Serbia and Bosnia were once again forced to recognize Islamic overlordship. 116

The Ottomans now controlled Serbia through their strongholds of Golubats and Kruševevs, as well as Ishak Beg’s forces in Skoplje. Brankovich built for himself a new capital at Smederevo (Semendria) between Golubats and Belgrade, 117 and accepted full vassalage to the sultan—payment of a yearly tribute of 50,000 gold ducats and provision of an auxiliary force of two thousand for the sultan’s expeditions.

Sigismund, taking advantage of the Ottoman crisis and the intensification of the Ottoman pressure on the buffer states, resumed in the period 1421–1428 efforts to realize the plan of a Danubian empire originated by Louis the Great. The struggle resulted in a compromise, or rather a postponement of the question, because of the powerful Ottoman reaction. The Ottomans, when they found themselves in a better position, would resume their aggressive policy in the region against Hungary, and this would give rise to a series of crusading activities in the west, on Hungarian initiative.

Disappointed by the armistice between the Hungarians and the Turks, Venice’s hopes revived when new developments threatened the Ottomans on their eastern borders. During the Ottoman siege of Golubats the Karamans, apparently in collaboration with Hungary, 118 had moved against the Ottomans, forcing Murad to surrender the much-disputed Hamid area. Through the mediation of the king of Cyprus, Janus (1398–1432), Venice entered into negotiations for an alliance.

116. The sultan’s letter is in his Forlóis, op. cit., II, 303–305.
117. The anonymous Radvil gives the date as 231 (October 22, 1427–November 21, 1428).
with the Karamanids. But the most disturbing news for the Ottomans was the campaign of Shahrukh, son of Timur, in Anatolia, which gave rise to great expectations throughout Christian Europe. Since 1416 Shahrukh (1405–1447) had showed his determination to maintain the status quo established by Timur in Anatolia and not let the Ottomans press and annex the Anatolian crusates, those of the Karamanids and Jandarids in particular. The contemporary sources attribute to him a grandiose plan to invade the Ottoman dominions in Anatolia and Rumelia and return to Azerbaijan via Moldavia and Kaffa. But in 1429, when he invaded eastern Anatolia, his immediate concern was to crush the rising power of the Turcoman Karakoyunlu there, which threatened Timurid rule in Azerbaijan.

The common danger brought the Ottomans and Mamluks much closer to each other. Apart from the Timurid threat, the project of a Karamanid-Cypriote-Venetian alliance was against the interests of the Mamluks, who had invaded Cyprus in 1426 and made king Janus a vassal, while the Karamanids were considered to be under Mamluk protection. At any rate, this Mamluk-Ottoman rapprochement would continue in the future, and turn against western Christendom, Rhodes in particular, in the coming decades.

On March 29, 1429, Venice finally declared war against the Ottomans, whose growing naval power and continual attacks on Euboea and other Venetian possessions in the Aegean had become disturbing. By early March a Turkish fleet had appeared before Thessalonica. The senate believed that the Ottomans had decided to finish this dispute once and for all.

During the long struggle for Thessalonica, the Ottoman tactics consisted of naval attacks on the Venetian possessions and merchant marine in the Aegean, while sustaining a long blockade which aimed to force the city to yield by running its trade and starving its inhabitants, a tactic successfully used by the Ottomans against other cities with strong fortifications and large populations since the fall of Bursa.

111. Iorga, Geschichte, I, 406; Atsız, Nmev el amirad, I, 542; the senate’s decision is dated August 30, 1424.
120 Fehd, op. cit., I, 153.
121 Iorga, Nmev el amirad, I, 486–488; the Ottomans succeeded in capturing two Venetian ships; the report is now dated March 29, 1429. Venice, at this time, attempted to use the false ‘Mustafa’ pretense as in the Ottoman theatre, as Thessalonica to enable defections in Murad’s army; see ibid., I, 489–490, dated May 10, 1429.
122. The Ottoman attack on Euboea, Island, and Cyprus in the spring of 1428 was particularly destructive, culmination of the raids of Janus Phala in the previous century; see Sutton, The Papacy, II, 37.
in 1326. As vividly reflected in Venetian correspondence, Venice had to feed the city by sea, mainly from Crete, and eventually the starving populace turned against their new masters. The Ottomans had sympathizers and supporters among the Greeks, especially the Greek clergy.

Venetian tactics were to cut off the Ottomans' passage between Anatolia and Rumelia at the Dardanelles, to support the Karamanids, and to chase the Ottoman fleet away from Thessalonica. In June 1429 the senate offered Sigismund a new project of alliance with emphasis on the occupation of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. During the summer and autumn Murad had to watch with anxiety Shahrukh's movements on his borders in Anatolia, and be content with the raids of his frontier forces in the Morea and Albania, while the Venetian fleet under Andrew Mocenigo threatened Gallipoli.

Shahrukh's victory against the Karakoyunjlu in the battle of Salmas on September 17-18, 1429, emboldened the Venetians, who reminded Murad of the danger from the east. Shahrukh returned to Azerbaijan for the winter, and Murad called the Anatolian forces under the able general Hamza, conqueror of Smyrna, to Europe in February 1430. Thessalonica was taken on March 29, 1430. In his letter to his friend the Mamluk sultan Barsbay, Murad II presented it as a victory for Islam, and considered it as the elimination of a great danger to the Ottoman state.

The fall of Thessalonica came as a surprise to the Venetians; Silvestro Mocenigo was then cruising off the coast of Epirus. In the summer of 1430, while Shahrukh was still in Azerbaijan, the Venetian fleet attacked Gallipoli and cut off all communications on the Straits. Acting on behalf of the sultan, Hamza signed a peace treaty in July 1430 (ratification September 4, 1430). Venice recognized the Ottoman possession of Thessalonica, and guaranteed security for Ottoman communications on the Straits. By agreeing to pay a yearly tribute of 236 ducats Venice also recognized Ottoman overlordship at Patras, where Latio rule was challenged by the Greeks and Turks. For his part, the sultan recognized Venetian sovereignty over its Albanian possessions—Durazzo, Scutari, and Antivari (Bar). Seven years of occupation of Thessalonica and the resulting Ottoman was had cost the republic over 700,000 ducats.

123 Inge, Notes et extraits, I, 490, communications to the capitam-general Andrew Mocenigo, dated May 15, 1429; for the Karamanids see ibid., I, 503.
124 Ibid., I, 494.
125 Ibid., I, 500, note 5.
126 Paridele, op. cit., I, 198.
The capture of Thessalonica marked the resumption of an aggressive Ottoman policy in the Balkans, the first goal being the strengthening of their rule in Albania and Epirus. The despotate of Ioannina (Yanya) was occupied, and Charles II Tocco accepted Ottoman suzerainty over Arta in 1430, while Venice took the Ionian islands of Leucas (Santa Maura), Zante, and Cephalonia under its protection.

In the following year Turakhan made his power over the Morea felt by demolishing the Hexamilion fortifications once again. But Albania would be the main arena of the Ottoman-Venetian rivalry in the ensuing half century. So close to Italy and so vital for Venetian communication with the world outside the Adriatic Sea, Albania received sustained attention and support from Venice, Naples, and the papacy against the establishment of Ottoman rule, and this support—in addition to the particular characteristics of the land and people—was responsible for the long and stiff resistance the Ottomans encountered.

Albania was considered by the Ottomans as a base to invade Italy and by the Italian states as their first defense line and as a bridgehead for a crusade against the Ottomans. During the fifteenth century the papacy's growing concern and zeal to organize crusades against the Ottomans was more related to the direct Ottoman threat to the papal states than to the deliverance of the Holy Land. The Aragonese kings of Naples fought in Albania against the Ottomans for their own security from the 1430's on, and an Ottoman invasion of the Ancona area was felt to be an imminent danger throughout the second half of the fifteenth century. It was, however, the Venetians' naval superiority, as well as their building of strong defense lines on the islands in the Adriatic and Ionian seas and along the Albanian coasts, that really deterred the Ottomans from an invasion and gave a sense of security to the Italians. The Ottomans almost never planned or attempted an invasion of Italy without first eliminating the Venetian factor either by an agreement or by direct occupation of the Venetian bases in the area. Interestingly enough, throughout this period from 1430 on Ottoman diplomacy tried to further its Albanian policy by taking advantage of discordions among the Italian states, between Venice and Milan or between the papacy and Venice or Naples. In any event, the period from 1430 to 1479 witnessed a crucial struggle between Venice and the Ottomans for the control of the Albanian coasts, the first defense line of Venice and Italy.

Thanks to an unusual wealth of documentation on Albania from

the Italian archives for this period, and to the recently discovered Ottoman surveys of the country, we are now able to evaluate the Italian involvement as well as internal conditions of the Albanian insurrections from 1432 on. Following their conquest of Thessalonica and Larissa, the Ottomans made a survey of Albania in 1431–1432. The Ottoman survey book of 1432, which includes additional entries down to the mid-fifteenth century, shows that several Albanian noble families were deprived of part of their lands, which were given to the Ottoman timar-holders, and Albanian clans in general resettled being subjected to Ottoman taxation and the control of a centralist administration. Since the Ottomans could not establish complete control of the seacoast, and since Venetians gave refuge and aid to the rebels, rebellion became endemic in Albania in this period. But the actual situation was much more complex because Albanian lords shifted their loyalty between Venice and the Ottomans according to circumstances. Moreover, as was the case in the Morea, Serbia, and Bosnia, the Ottoman frontier beggs in Albania acted as local lords, and achieved a kind of political equilibrium in the region.

During the Thessalonica war the northern Albanian lord John Castriot, father of Scanderbeg, had accepted Venetian protection, but after the fall of Thessalonica the Ottomans forced him to recognize the sultan's overlordship. The rebellion in southern Albania, apparently a direct outcome of the Ottoman survey of 1432, proved to be much more serious. Under the leadership of local lords Thopia Zenevisti and George Aranuji, whose lands had been given to Ottoman soldiers, a series of insurrections broke out in the coastal and mountainous areas, and Ottoman timar-holding sipahis were massacred. Despite several repressions at the hands of the Ottoman frontier beggs, Albanian rebellion simmered until 1443, when Scanderbeg turned against the Ottomans and took on the leadership of the Albanian resistance.

Emerging at a time when Christian Europe was ardently preparing for a crusade to drive out the Ottomans from the Balkans, Scanderbeg was destined to become the symbol of the crusade (once a Moslem, he had returned to Christianity), and later, after his successful guerrilla warfare against the Ottomans, and defeating four armies under the sultans in 1448, 1450, 1466, and 1467, he would be acclaimed

128 See Valamati, Acta albaniaca nova, vols. XV–XX.
129 The Ottoman survey of Albania dated 1432 is printed in Silvera defteri-4 annoski-4 Ar-
unut, ed. Işık, 110.
130 See Işık, "Armavirlikin Osmanlı Hâkimiyatının yürüyüsmesi ve İsmailzâde Bey İsmailzâde
131 For Scanderbeg see Işık, "Takaninli Beğ," pp. 134–140.
throughout Italy as the defender of the faith and of Europe. In 1450 pope Nicholas V (1447–1455) called on all the Christian powers to assist him. Scanderbeg finally had to acknowledge the suzerainty of King Alfonso I of Naples (March 26, 1451) and agree to hand Croua over to the king’s forces. In 1457 pope Calixtus III appointed Scanderbeg “captain-general of the Holy See.” But historical reality was far from the Christian or humanistic Europe’s image of him. Most of the time he acted as a mercenary or clan chief subsidized by Venice, the king of Naples, or the pope. Also, far from achieving national unity, he restricted his sphere of activity to northern Albania. Once, in 1438, an Ottoman subash of Croua himself, he had rebelled against the sultan in 1443 to recover his father’s domains, when the Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans was on the verge of collapse. Scanderbeg’s ambition was often challenged by other Albanian clan chiefs, resulting in local feuds.

While the Ottomans and the Italian powers, including the papacy, confronted each other in the sensitive area of Albania, the real front of the struggle between Christian Europe and the Ottoman empire was the middle Danube, though these two fronts were often connected, as when in 1434 Sigismund made contact with the defeated Albanian lords. Later, in 1448, John Hunyadi would try to combine his operations in the Balkans with Scanderbeg’s. After the capture of Thessalonica, the Ottoman pressure had increased to strengthen Turkish control of the buffer states of Wallachia, Serbia, and Bosnia. Through his embassy in 1431, Sigismund and in his turn asked the sultan to recognize his overlordship of these countries.

In 1434 the Hungarian king got the upper hand in the struggle for supremacy by receiving to his court the allegiance of the rulers of Serbia and Bosnia, and the king’s protégé, Vlad II “the Devil” (or “the Dragon”, Dracul), replaced the Ottoman favorite, his brother Aldea, in Wallachia. The following year Shahrūkh’s renewed campaign against the Karakoyunlu in eastern Anatolia and the Karamanid attack against the Ottomans were most encouraging news for the king. Shahrūkh invited all the Anatolian emirs, including Murad II, to recognize his overlordship in July 1435. To punish the Karamanids, Murad waited for the return of Shahrūkh with his powerful army to Central Asia.

Sigismund died January 9, 1437, and Hungary plunged into an internal crisis over the succession. A terrible peasant insurrection against excessive exploitation by feudal lords broke out in Transylvania, in the

[137. Forsa, Generations, I, 417.]
spring of 1437, culminating in the battle of Bobaina. Ottoman pressure was one of the excuses to increase the tax burden on the peasantry. The Ottomans thought it was time to attack and restore their power in the middle Danube against Hungary. In 1436, the sultan himself at the head of his army invaded Hungary. According to an Ottoman document, Murad crossed the Danube at the Kamen, near Vidin, bombarded Severin, attacked Mehadza and Mühlbach, and after following the river Maros (Mureș) laid siege to Hermannstadt (Szeben), the center of Transylvania, while his raiders forayed all over the land. He returned through Wallachia and crossed the Danube at Giurgiu. In this campaign the Serbian and Wallachian princes, as loyal vassals, led the Ottoman army. The Transylvanian peasantry profited from the Ottoman invasion to take up arms against their rulers again in 1438.

Believing that Hungarian resistance had collapsed, the Ottomans occupied the Serbian despotate; Smederevo fell August 27, 1439, and the frontier beg Ista of Skoplje laid siege to Yavye (Jayce), capital city of Bosnia, and forced king Tvrtko II to pay a yearly tribute of 2,500 ducats. The Serbian silver mines at Novo Bredo, vitally important for supplying silver to Italy via Ragusa, were captured by the Ottomans, and in 1439 the export of silver to the west was prohibited. In 1440 Murad II, in order to crown his successes, attempted to capture Belgrade, the gate to central Europe, which had been occupied and fortified by the Hungarians since 1427. His defeat at Belgrade and the emergence of John Hunyadi swung the pendulum in the reverse direction. Hunyadi reorganized the Hungarian frontier forces, and, perhaps more important, took into his service Habsburg mercenary troops who with their wegengen burg tactics were to revolutionize warfare in the Balkans. Ottoman raiders, invading Transylvania under the frontier lord Mezid, were crushed in 1441, and the reinforced Ottoman army of Rumelia under the beklerbeg Selaibeddin, which was sent to make up for the defeat in the following year, failed miserably. Hunyadi's victories set off vibrations throughout Christian Europe and heightened the crusading spirit in the west.

119 İsałık, "Rumatium and the Origin of the Crusade of 1444 under the Light of Turkish Sources," Actes du XIXe Congrès international des études byzantines, U (Belgrade, 1964), 159–163.
115 The Ottoman conquest of Novo Breda, a center of silver production, took place on June 27, 1441, see İsałık, Geschichte der Serben, II, 176.
116 Foca Eumemos IV (1433–1447) celebrated the victories making "a vast daughter of the infidels" as signs of God's deliverance for Christians; see Siret, The Papacy, II, 68.
The negotiations for the union of the Greek church with Rome and for a crusade were taken up in Rome more zealously than ever when, in the wake of the fall of Thessalonica, the Byzantines had serious fears of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople. The Golden Horn was then closed off by the chain at its entrance. Emperor John VIII Palaeologus (1425–1448) himself left for Italy on November 24, 1437, to attend the council in Ferrara (and then, from February 1439 on, in Florence) and finally to conclude the union of the Latin Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches. This time high dignitaries of the Greek church, including the patriarch Joseph II, accompanied the emperor. The union of the churches was declared in Florence on July 6, 1439. For the crusade, the real objective of the Greeks, a plan was offered to the council by John Torcello (or Torsello), the emperor's "cham- bellan".137 In their efforts to persuade the west to launch a crusade, the Greeks claimed that to defeat the Ottomans it was sufficient to invade the Balkans with a crusading army of 80,000. In the Balkans, he added, not only would the regular forces of the Serbian despotate, the Greeks of the Morea, and the Albanians join the crusaders, but also Christian soldiers in the service of the sultan, 50,000 in number, would desert to the side of the west. According to Torcello, the bulk of the Ottoman soldiery were not as well armed as the westerners. To sell the project the Greeks further asserted that the recovery of the Holy Land would be an easy task for the westerners after the Ottomans' defeat.138

The union was the decision of the ruling elite, who saw the sole hope for the salvation of Byzantium in full cooperation with the west. It was, however, a decisive step which opened a critical period ending with the fall of Byzantium.139 Thus far the emperors, anticipating the protests of the conservative Orthodox masters and a strong reaction on the part of the Ottomans, had acted with caution on this matter. As soon as John VIII was back in Constantinople, the sultan sent an envoy to inquire about what had occurred in Florence. The emperor tried to conceal the real political objective of the union,140 but as is clear from the contemporary Ottoman sources141 the Ottomans were fully aware of the negotiations for preparation of a crusade against

137 On Torcello see ibid., II, 68, note 108.
140 Ducan, op. cit., iv. Magnesia, p. 141
141 Ghazaradz, Baha ed-Din, pp. 2–4; see also Burkett, op. cit., i, 613–614, and Pana, ibid., ii, 499, 499, 499, 499.
themselves, and from this time on a strong party, mostly from among the military leaders, claimed that unless Byzantium were eliminated there would be no security and no future for the Ottoman state. In Ghazar-vâl Sultan Murad, a recently discovered, well-informed account of the events between 1439 and 1444, the crusades of 1443 and 1444, as well as the Karamanid attacks in Anatolia, are all attributed originally to the activities of Byzantine diplomacy. Though basically reflecting the view of the anti-Byzantine party, the claim is largely confirmed by our western sources, which tell us about activities of Byzantine diplomats in Rome, Venice, and Buda in those years.\footnote{142}

Hungary, exposed directly to Ottoman attacks after the Ottoman occupation of Serbia, was prepared, under the leadership of the regent John Hunyadi, to launch a decisive war against the Ottomans. In their efforts toward this end, the Hungarian aristocracy agreed in 1440 to have Ladislas (Vladislav III), king of Poland, as their king (László IV), provided that he vigorously pursue the struggle against the Ottomans. Hungary found that Byzantium was equally interested in the launching of a general crusade. As early as February 1442 the Byzantine envoy, John Torzello, was in Venice with the mission of visiting Buda, Rome, and other European capitals for the realization of such a crusade.\footnote{143} Once the union was realized pope Eugenius IV (1431–1447) showed great enthusiasm for the crusade. In February 1442 he appointed cardinal Julian Cesarini as papal legate to Hungary; on January 1, 1443, he invited the Christian rulers to a general crusade against the Ottomans, and in May 1443 he named his nephew Francis Condulmer commander of the fleet to cooperate with the crusader army from Hungary.\footnote{144} Although Venice was typically cautious enough not to engage in a direct conflict with the Ottomans, it was supporting the preparations, and agreed to build a crusading fleet of ten galleys when funds were made available.\footnote{145}

Encouraged by the Ottoman reverses in the Balkans and by the Byzantine emperor,\footnote{146} the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg had made raids into the disputed territory of Akshehus (Philometium) and Beysehir in late 1442, and again in the spring of 1443. Murad II forced him to sign

\footnote{142} See Jorge, Notes on crusades, El Orbe, 1399, Index, p. 588, \textit{ex} Joan VIII Palaeologus; Halatschi, The Crusade of Nicaea, pp. 32–82. Halatschi tries to prove that there was no condonation by king Ladislas of Hungary at Szigetvár of the treaty of Adrianople of June 12, 1444 Dobreński. "L’Année 1444," was crucial of Halatschi’s thesis, and Ghazar-vâl Sultan Murad now supplies Ottoman evidence that Halatschi is incorrect; see below, note 149

\footnote{143} Jorge, Notes on crusades, II, 33; Thwait, Héricues, III, vol. 2, 2508.

\footnote{144} Setton, The Papacy, II, 68–69.

\footnote{145} Thwait, Héricues, III, vol. 2, 2508, 2638; Same, The Papacy, II, 75, note 121.

\footnote{146} Conzanielli, p. 4.
a peace agreement after a swift and particularly brutal raid into Karahan in the summer of 1443, and then returned to Rumelia in the autumn. The crusaders’ army under Ladislas, the Hungarian king, John Hunyadi, voivode of Transylvania, and George Brankovich, despot of Serbia, crossed the Danube at Belgrade early in October, when the Ottoman provincial cavalry had been scattered and returned home. The crusading enthusiasm inspired by Hunyadi led a great number of volunteers to join the regular forces of the Hungarian magnates. The whole army, estimated to consist of 25,000 men, included an important mercenary force hired with funds given by the Serbian despot, and, in addition, a contingent of 8,000 Serbian and 5,000 Polish soldiers. As in 1396, the bulk of the army consisted of Hungarians, which demonstrates the fact that the “crusade” was basically a Hungarian undertaking.

The Ottoman chronicle, Ghazavat, clarifies many important points concerning “the long campaign”. In explaining the successes of the Christian army, the Ottoman sources in general emphasize the disagreement and lack of cooperation between the Ottoman frontier forces under Turakhan and the sipahi army under Kasim, beylerbeg of Rumelia. These sources are silent, however, on the most important battle of the whole campaign, which took place at Bolvani in the plain of Nish on November 3, 1443. Here the Ottoman forces mustered under Turakhan and Kasim were defeated in their attempt to halt the advance of the crusaders. Pirot and Sofia soon fell and, according to Ghazavat, Bulgarians welcoming and helping the invading army elected a “vladika” as their head in Sofia. The sultan, who had been in Sofia, had burned down the city before his retreat. In a letter to the Venetian senate from Sofia dated December 4, 1443, cardinal Cesarini proclaimed the “flight of the sultan”.

To protect the Maritsa valley leading to his capital, Adrianople, the sultan fortified all the passes through the Balkan range, and met the crusader army at Zlatitsa pass. Exhausted by cold and hunger, the Christian army was beaten at the battle of Zlatitsa and forced to retreat on December 12, 1443.

In pursuit of the enemy, the sultan fell upon the Christian army at Melkhticha near Sofia on December 24. His attack failed mainly because the crusaders sheltered themselves in their camp, surrounded by war-wagons reinforced by guns. It was this tactic which made possible

147 For a comparison of the information supplied by Ghazavat with western sources, see my notes in the edition of the work (Ankara, 1978), pp. 94-110.
148 Ghazavat, 23-25, states that sultan Murad was present at the battle.
the long retreat under constant attack by the harassing Ottoman forces. On January 2, 1444, at the mountain pass at Kunovitsa, between Pirot and Nish, Hunyadi inflicted a defeat on the pursuing Ottoman army; among the captives was Mahmud, husband of the sultan's sister. The retreating crusader army reached Belgrade on January 25. When he reached Buda safely the king dismounted and went barefoot to the church in gratitude to God. The pope sent a consecrated cap and sword to the king, and throughout Europe the victory was celebrated with great joy and religious fervor. Never before had a Christian army advanced so deep into Ottoman territory. Following the crusade, the Ottoman military structure throughout the Balkans seemed to dissolve as local lords in Ottoman service tried to gain their independence, among them Scanderbeg in Albania and despot Constantine Paleologus in the Morea. Vlad II Dracul turned against the Ottomans and recognized Hungarian suzerainty, thus impairing the Ottoman position in Bulgaria.

During the summer of 1444 there was panic among the Turks in Rumelia and, as Ghazanef put it, the well-to-do were leaving Rumelia for Anatolia. There, however, the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg had renewed his attack and occupied the territory in dispute in the spring of 1444. The sultan had made contact with the king of Hungary as early as January 1444, promising to revive the Serbian despotate as a buffer between the two countries.49 The sultan's wife Mara, George Brankovich's daughter, played an important role in the opening of negotiations in March and April of 1444. Hoping to recover his despotate, Brankovich did everything possible to realize this peace. He attempted to persuade Hunyadi to work for peace by giving up to him his own small domain in Hungary (Vilagos and 120 villages). Actually, Hunyadi agreed to this to gain time to prepare the crusade. "The long campaign" was to be completed in 1444, and the Ottomans driven out of the Balkans. Later, Hunyadi was to be promised the kingdom of Bulgaria. It is obvious that for him "peace" was a war trick.

The Hungarian-Serbian embassy to the sultan concluded a peace treaty in Adrianople on June 12, 1444. The sultan had to agree to the revival of the Serbian despotate, which had been annexed to the Ottoman empire in 1439. The Ottomans even had to surrender Golubac, the principal Ottoman fortress on the Danube since 1427. In return, the king recognized Ottoman rule over Bulgaria. The Hungarians and

49 For the treaty of Adrianople (or Szigetvar) and the period between 1443 and 1451 in general, see Imre, Fájás derev összevonás fejlődése és realizálása (Azkugs, 1954).
the Ottomans both promised not to cross the Danube to attack. The Serb despot was to remain under the sultan's suzerainty as a tributary prince. Vlad Dracul was included in the peace treaty as an Ottoman tributary prince but under Hungarian protection. The sultan solemnly ratified the treaty by oath in the presence of the ambassadors. In order to take the oaths from the king, the despot, and Hunyadi and to implement the surrender of the fortresses in Serbia to the despot, the sultan sent Baha-ud-din Sulayman to Hungary. By the peace treaty Hungary had attained the objectives it had pursued for decades. Beyond this, any continuation of war would have to be a real crusade to eliminate Ottoman rule in the Balkans and rescue Constantinople.

Already, however, on April 15, 1444, the king had given his oath in the presence of cardinal-legate Cesarini to continue the crusade that summer. But there was strong opposition in Hungary to the continuation of the war. In April the Hungarian diet did not approve the preparations for war. Those in favor of peace gave priority to improvement of internal conditions in Hungary and Poland, while the war party believed in the potential success of a crusade and its advantages for the king's position in Hungary. The pope's legate Cesarini and John de' Roguedati, the Venetian envoy in Buda, vigorously supported the partisans of war. Already, in the winter, the Venetian senate had formally notified the king of its resolution to join the crusade and send a fleet to the Straits to cut off Ottoman communications between Asia and Europe; this fleet left Venice on June 15, 1444. At this point Venice expected the imminent collapse of the Ottoman empire, and planned to occupy Gallipoli, Thessalonica, Albania, and even some ports on the Black Sea. The news of the departure of the fleet reached Hungary in July and definitely had a strong influence on the decision to go to war. In his letter dated July 30, 1444, John VIII Palaeologus told the king that it was the most opportune moment to destroy the Ottomans, since Murad II had crossed over to Anatolia, and that the peace treaty had thus served its real purpose.

Despot Constantine in the Morea promised his military cooperation with the crusaders, and had already taken the offensive. Byzantine diplomacy also appears to have been responsible for the cooperation of the Karamans with the despot and Hungary. Within the Balkans Scanderbeg and Ghin Zezervat in Albania, as well as the Albanians and Vlachs in Thessaly, were in rebellion, and king Tvrtko II

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150 Later, in 1453, the Ottomans abandoned the siege of Constantinople.
151 See above, note 142.
152 Isacik, Filifik derga, p. 33.
of Bosnia had recovered Srebenitsa. All these developments during
the summer made the Hungarian court believe that the chances for
success of a crusade could not be better at any other time.
Murad II had crossed over to Anatolia against the Karamanids on
July 12, 1444, but instead of fighting he signed a peace treaty with them
in early August at Yenisehir, giving up the long-disputed area to them.
Then, believing he had guaranteed peace in the east had west by elimi-
nating the main issues of conflict with the Hungarians and the Karamanids, he abdicated in favor of his son Mehmed II, then only twelve
years old, thus leaving all power in the hands of the grand vizir Chandarlii Khahl. A fierce rivalry soon broke out between Khahl and the
futurs of the young sultan for power in Adrianople. The Byzantine
emperor then released the Ottoman pretender Orkhan, who went to
the Dobruja to win over the frontier raiders to his cause. An uprising
of the Hurufi dervishes in Adrianople occurred at the same time, in
the summer of 1444. This chaotic state of affairs in the Ottoman em-
pire was used as a further argument by those in the Hungarian capital
advocating a crusade.
On August 15, 1444, at Szegedin, by taking the oath in the presence
of Balta-oghlu Sultan, the sultan’s ambassador, king Ladislav com-
pleted the formal ratification of the treaty concluded in Adrianople
on June 12. The king did so upon the insistence of the despot, since
otherwise Balta-oghlu would not evacuate and surrender the fortresses
in Serbia. On August 4, 1444, while negotiations continued at Szegedin
on this key point, the king proclaimed under oath a manifesto to the
Christian world about his firm decision to continue war against the
Ottomans. The Venetian senate, however, thought this was not a suf-
cient guarantee, and decided to act cautiously in its relations with the
sultan. It can be concluded that Ladislav, and Hunyadi in particular,
were determined to continue the war against the Ottomans in 1444,
but did not want to jeopardize their diplomatic success of the recovery
of the Serbian despotate for the sake of a “formality”. Besides, card-
dinal Cesarini assured the king that an oath sworn to an “infidel” with-
out the pope’s approval was not canonically binding, and reminded
him of the possibility of excommunication if he violated his solemn
promises for the crusade.

The crusaders’ army, 16,000 men under Ladislav and Hunyadi, crossed
the Danube near Belgrade on September 18-22, 1444. The Serbian

153. Ibid., pp. 1-53; Fall, “Ciriaco d’Annamusa,” pp. 42-43; also, “Antonio de la moza de
Varna,” p. 152.
despot George Brankovich remained neutral. According to Ghazavat the native Bulgarian peasants again cooperated with the invading army. The Wallachian army, 4,000 to 7,000 strong, under Vlad Dracul, joined the crusaders near Nicopolis. The Christian high command decided to capture Adrianople, the Ottoman capital, without wasting time on the way at the fortresses of Vidin, Nicopolis, Tarnovo, and Provadiya (Prayvd), which put up stiff resistance, while Shumen and Petrich were taken by storm. On November 9 the Christian army besieged and took Varna on the Black Sea, where it was to establish contact with the crusading fleet, which included eight papal, six or eight Venetian, four Burgundian, and two Ragusan galleys.134 The fleet was not successful in blocking the passage of the Anatolian army under Murad, who was hastily called from Bursa to assume the high command on October 20, 1444.

The Ottoman army forced the crusaders to a pitched battle before Varna on November 10. All passages for possible retreat of the Christian army were intercepted. At the battle, both wings of the Ottoman army were routed, and then Ladislav with his heavy cavalry charged straight on Murad's camp, where the decisive battle took place. The scattered Ottoman cavalry gathered around the sultan's flag and fought back. "When the king," Ghazavat says, "saw that the Christian troops began to scatter in defeat around him, he was panicked and did not know what to do. Although he tried to rearrange his troops he failed. While he was running to and fro alone one of the Ottoman soldiers struck him a strong blow with a mace, which threw him off his horse. The janissaries and azbea crowded around him and struck him with their axes." Ladislav's death was followed by a general debacle of the crusader army. Hunyadi, however, was able to retreat safely, thanks to his wagenburg tactics.

There is a consensus that Varna was a turning point in eastern European history. In Poland, those opposing the idea of a crusade against the Ottomans got the upper hand,135 and Hungary entered another crisis of succession. Now Ottoman control in the Balkans was reestablished more firmly than ever. Murad II resumed the Ottoman throne in 1446 as a result of grand vizir Khall's maneuvers against his rivals, Zaganur and Shehabeddin, tutors of the young sultan Mehmed II. In order to reassert Ottoman sovereignty, Murad embarked upon a series of campaigns against despot Constantine in the Morea (autumn 1446) and Scanderbeg in Albania (1448 and 1450). Hunyadi did not give up

135 Sueton, The Popes, II, 85-96. On the crusade of Varna see below chapter VIII
136 Mátyácsy, From Florence to Brest (Rome, 1958), pp. 75-76.
his struggle against the Ottomans after Varna. In 1445, while a Venetian fleet under Alvise Loredan came to watch the Ottomans on the Dardanelles, the Wallachian voivode Vlad Dracul, with the support of Hunyadi, reconquered Giurgiu from the Ottomans, and the following year Vlad defeated an invading army under the frontier beg Davud (spring 1446).

In 1448, when Murad attacked Scanderbeg in Albania, Hunyadi invaded Serbia as far as Kosovo, where a fierce three-day battle ended with Ottoman victory (October 17–20, 1448). In this connection, two points should be made: first, by now the Ottomans had learned wagensburg (in Turkish sarbut-jenin) tactics and increased their firepower. Second, since the 1444 agreement of Ventshert the Karamanids had co-operated with the Ottomans; a Karamanid contingent fought against the Hungarians at Kosovo in 1448. Also, in this period, a sense of solidarity and friendship ruled the relations between the Ottomans and the Mamluks, who were both threatened by the Timurid Shāhrukh and by the crusaders. The Mamluks, suzerains of the kings of Cyprus since 1426, tried unsuccessfully to subjugate the Hospitallers of Rhodes by sending a fleet against the island in the summer of 1444.

Perhaps most important of all, the defeat at Varna sealed the fate of Byzantium. The union of the churches and the idea of the crusade suffered a deep setback in all the Graeco-Slavic world. The Greeks and other Balkan peoples accommodated themselves to the idea of living under an Islamic state rather than under the Catholic Venetians and Hungarians. It should be added that by this time the Ottoman state was fully transformed into a classic Islamic sultanate with all its underpinnings, and that an actual social revolution was introduced into the Balkans by a state policy efficiently protecting the peasantry against local exploitation and the dominance of feudal lords and extending an agrarian system based on state ownership of land and its utilization in small farms in the possession of peasant households. As early as 1432, Bertrand of La Broquière, a Burgundian spy, had observed that Murad II had immense resources in his hands with which to conquer Europe if he wished to do so.157

157 *Le Voyage d'Ottomar* (Belgrade, 1958), p. 150: "Il voudroit conquérir la puissante qu'il a au point revenu, voire la puissance qu'il recevroit en la condition, de parois il ney baslera chasse à en conquérir une grand partie."
THE CRUSADE OF VARNA

The defeat of the crusaders under king Sigismund at Nicopolis on September 25, 1396, ended, for almost half a century, any concerted military opposition to Ottoman expansion in the Balkans. The European provinces that had been overrun by the Turks remained tributary.
vassal states, while sultan Bayazid I concentrated on consolidating his control over Anatolia, in which the Ottoman state had emerged as the most powerful among the many Turkish principalities. Consolidation meant conquest of the Selçukids and Turcoman emirates that had
crossed 1269), and Johannes Taniel, ed., Foreskymfie Makedonenesmennos, 1376-1519 (Frankfurt, 1864-1872), for reports of Alaric’s campaigns.

Documentary material relating to Poland has been edited by August Böhm in three important series: Vexillum munimenta historiae Hungariae sacrum illudens (2 vols., Vienna, 1839-1840), Vexillum munimenta Polandiae et S. Historian (6 vols., Vienna, 1866-1864), and Vexillum munimenta Slavorum meridionales historiam illudens (3 vols., Rome, 1865-1875). August Szoekowski


The most important surviving source for the history of Poland in this period is Jan Długosz, Histoire polonaise (2 vols., Leipzig, 1790-1792). Długosz (1415-1460) was secretary to bishop Zygmunt Oleśnicki, a cancellarius apostolicus to Eugenius’s papacy, a view that is reflected in Długosz’s work. Based on the bishop’s request, another historian of Poland, Martin Kremers, wrote a history of Poland inspired by Długosz, De Origine et aetate gentis Poloniarum (Basel, 1539). Kremers was secretary to bishop Peter Cisniorz of Cracow (1538-1545) and then to prince Sigismund Augustus, and in a position to see archival material.

Filippo Brunelleschi’s San Gimignano (1337-1446), called Cialdino Venetian, was educated in Turin and led to Rome when imprisoned in a place against pope Paul II. He lived in the house of Gregory Sempronianus, called Lucas tutor to the prince of Poland, and wrote a life of Oleśnicki and a history of the reign of Venceslaus III, Philosophi Cialdinianei eruditorum historiae sacrae partem in Hungariae et insularis Romanum vestrum per Vladislavum Poloniae et Hungariae regem, ed. Saturninus Vivantinius (Munich, 1493), 19-162, and Irminia Liebenthron, ed., Historia de regno Poloniae (Zakład Narodów Antycznych PAN, 1920), a history of Hungary to 1496, the last thirty chapters of which survive.

A fascinating source of the civil war in Hungary by Elizabeth’s bodyguard in Aus den Dunkelwänden der Heiligen Kastenmaren, 1439-1448, ed. Stephan F. G. Mendler (Leipzig, 1846). Some interesting reports to the Turkish invasion in Transylvania are in Franz Zschirner


The Ottoman sources for this period are sparse, and those which speak of Varan are relatively scarce; see chapter VIII, above. For their context, Kästner wrote a history to Peterman from 1310 to his own time in 1592 entitled Eight Paradisus (Hansard Beitrag) at the request of sultan Selim I. Nebert wrote a history Geschichte alles deutschsprachigen Chronac des 17. Jahrhunderts (New York, 1887), vol. 1, translated by Franz G. von Eickstedt (7 vols., Leipzig, 1931-1955), which

1. See Heinrich, chapter VII, above.
evolved during four centuries of Turkish invasions. Bayazid conquered and annexed the two largest of these states, Karaman (1397) and Sivas (1398), thereby extending an empire that stretched from the Euphrates to the Danube.


For discussions of the political power of Varnay and of Angelov, "Le Traité de paix de Sziget et avec les Turcs (1444)," Revue de Hongrie, VII (1911), 255–268; Jan Duková, "L'Année 1444," Bulletin international de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres: Classe d'histoire et de philologie, suppl. no. 6 (Cracow, 1951); Francisca Páll, "Antonio de la cruzada y de Varna: la cuestión de la paz de Sziget y de su ruptura (1444)," A.R. SIE, XX (1941), 144–158; and Oscar Halecki, The Crusades of Varna: a Discussion of Contemporary Problems (New York, 1941). For his books and reports of Cracow was Páll, "Crusade of King John and the Crusade against the Turks," A.R. SIE, XX (1938), 57–64. For his travels of Alfonso V el sabio see Frédéric Caron, "La Politique de la croisade de Alfonso el Sabio de Carmona," Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane, XXVII (1902), 8–9, 309–320, 555–564, 774–812, and XXVIII (1903), 154–212; Constantin Manacorda, "Alphonso V, roi d'Anjou et de Naples, et l'Alhambra de Soultanber," Mémoires de l'École française en France, 1 (Paris, 1923), 7–135; and ibid. annums by Páll: "Les Racontes entre le Hion
The Islamic world now had two major powers, each claiming hegemony. Timur the Lame (1369-1405) had established his empire in Central Asia and on the Iranian plateau, and as heir of the Il-khanid power claimed sovereignty over Anatolia. The dispossessed Anatolian emirs fled to Timur’s court, appealing for the restoration of their territories and charging Bayazid with violating the faith of Islam by attacking fellow Moslems engaged in holy war. In 1402 Timur moved his army into Anatolia, and Bayazid wheeled to meet him on the Anatolian plateau. At Ankara on July 28 the Ottomans were decisively defeated and Bayazid was taken prisoner, remaining a captive until his death in 1403.

The political situation was suddenly altered radically: the emirates were restored and the remaining Ottoman territory was divided by Timur among Bayazid’s sons Suleiman, Musa, and Isa. The impetus toward further Ottoman conquest was removed for a generation as internecine strife occupied the Turkish princes. Musa eliminated Isa and, in 1411, Suleiman, only to be defeated and killed in 1413 by his younger brother Mehmed I. After the latter’s death in 1421 two claimants surfaced; his son Murad II besieged Constantinople in 1422, but lifted the siege to fight and defeat his “uncle” Mustafa (called “the Impostor”) in 1423, thereby emerging as sultan (1421-1451) of a unified empire.

After the defeat at Nicopolis king Sigismund pursued a defensive policy in the Balkans until his death in 1437. One notable exception to this policy occurred in 1428 when he began fortifying Golubac, intending to make it a Hungarian stronghold and establish control over northern Serbia, nominally a vassal of Hungary, while a civil war raged between rival claimants to the Serbian throne. The Ottomans and

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2 Max Sürchmann, Das osteuropäische Problem zur Zeit der Ermordung des türkischen Reiches nach venezianischen Quellen, 1322-1400 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1923).
garded Serbia as a tributary state since 1389, when Murad I defeated the Serbs at Kosovo Potje. Thus challenged, Murad II led an army against Gotius, which he captured, almost taking Sigismund prisoner in the process. A peace was made which recognized George Brankovich as the despot (1427–1456) of a Serbian kingdom that served as a buffer between the two powers. Sigismund now established Belgrade as the bulwark of Hungarian defense against the Turks, Murad fortified Gotius, while Brankovich established himself at Smederevo, at the confluence of the Danube and Morava rivers. Sigismund concentrated his efforts on fighting the Hunites, who at Domalici on August 14, 1431, decisively defeated a crusading army led by the papal legate, cardinal Julian Cesarini.

When the peace between Hungary and Serbia expired in 1431, Sigismund claimed territory in Serbia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. These small principalities found themselves caught in a conflict between two empires with little chance of continued independent existence. By 1434 Murad had decided on a more aggressive policy in the Balkans. His objective was to expand the Ottoman territory and transform tributary vassal states into provinces of the Ottoman empire, a pattern followed in subsequent expansion. The more immediate objectives of the new aggressiveness were to halt Venetian advances in the Morea (Peloponnesus), occupy the strategic Serbian fortresses as a prelude to an attack on Transylvania, and strengthen Ottoman control over Wallachia. Byzantium still attempted to play the role of a great empire, although the territory of the “empire” amounted to little more than the capital and the Morea. The Ottomans repeatedly besieged Constantinople, but their sieges were doomed to failure since the city could be supplied by sea and the Ottomans had not yet developed a significant naval force.

The Byzantines sought aid from Catholic Europe; however, they realized that little was to be expected from the west until the schism that had since 1054 separated the Latin and Orthodox churches was healed. Moreover, the disunity of western Europe, competing nationalism, and the desolation caused by the Hundred Years War had con-

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3 Josef von Anwbuch, Geschichte Kaiser Sigismund, IV (Hamburg, 1848), 269 ff.; Paul Wittich, "De la Délivrance d'Anicanto à la prise de Constantinople," Revue des études slaves, XII (1918), 1–34, Constantin Sushak, Geschichte der Serben, II (Göttingen, 1916; repr. Amsterdam, 1967), 425, 164. On Sigismund's crusade against the Hunites see Frederick G. Heymann, in volumes III of the present work, chapter XVII.
4 Laubich, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 17 ff., and Werner, Die Geburt einer Grobmacht, pp. 219 ff.
venced the Byzantines that any significant military aid was highly unlikely. The only source from which Byzantium could expect concerted military action was the papacy, so Manuel II Palaeologus had continued negotiations concerning union, sending emissaries to the Council of Constance. With the removal of the Ottoman threat after Ankara, all initiative for union had vanished, and negotiations were postponed. Manuel made few effective diplomatic overtures to the west between 1402 and 1417, though he did send representatives to the Council of Constance, but not to the Council of Pisa. He concentrated his efforts in the east, recovering Thessalonica, rebuilding the Hexamiron wall, and consolidating Byzantine power in the Morea.

The Byzantines could not, however, reasonably expect aid to be sent until union was achieved, an objective that Manuel nevertheless attempted to postpone and otherwise prevent from reaching fruition. He realized that for the Byzantine populace and clergy this was an unacceptable price to pay for military aid, and he warned his son and heir that it was an unattainable objective.

The accession of Murad II meant for Byzantium a period of renewed warfare. Almost immediately Constantinople was besieged, from June 10 to September 6, 1422, but the city could not be taken as long as the Turks could not maintain a naval blockade. In the following year the Turks destroyed the Hexamiron, overran the Morea, and attacked Thessalonica. In a desperate effort to save the city, the despot Andronicus Palaeologus gave it to the Venetians, from whom Murad II, nevertheless, captured it in 1430. And yet the conciliatory gestures of pope Martin V (1417–1431), including the suggestion of convening an ecumenical council that would have met the requirements of the Greeks and defraying the cost of the Byzantine delegates, met with evasiveness in Constantinople. On July 1, 1425, Manuel died and John VIII became sole emperor (d. 1448), and negotiations continued. When Mur-

5 John W. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): a Study in Late Byzantine Sta-


7 On June 15, 1422, Martin V appointed Anthony of Hesse as apostolic vicar to Con-

stantinople. Although he had an audience with Manuel on September 16, by November 14, with Manuel recovering from a stroke, John VIII and the patriarch replied that only an ecumenical council could settle the differences between the churches. On November 8, 1423, these discussions were reported to the fathers of Pisa, and further discussions were postponed. Cf. Gill, op. cit., pp. 227–30.
tin V died on February 20, 1431, a Greek embassy was en route to Rome to discuss a union council. It turned back at Gallipoli when news of the pope's death reached the emissaries.

Eugene IV (1431–1447) continued Martin's policies, and fully accepted the concept of convening an ecumenical council to end the schism and reunite the Latin Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches. In competition with the conciliar prelates of the Council of Basel, who "deposed" him on January 24, 1438, he conducted lengthy and intricate negotiations with John VIII, resulting in the emperor's arrival at Ferrara in March 1438, accompanied by the patriarch Joseph II and other Greek prelates. On April 9 the council, considered by the papacy but not by the conciliarists a continuation of the Council of Basel, was formally opened. Early in 1439 fear of the plague led it to move to Florence, where intensive discussion culminated in a decree of union, signed on July 5 by Latin and Greek participants, including the emperor.

This act of union represented an agreement based on political necessity, which was accepted by the higher Greek clergy. It did not take into account the hatred of the Latin by the Byzantine population and the regular clergy, who would unite successfully to prevent its implementation. Nevertheless, Eugene could point to a very solid achievement, one which tipped the scales decisively in his favor in his struggle with the conciliarists. Thereafter Eugene steadily reestablished papal authority. He could claim the overwhelming acceptance of union by the Byzantine hierarchy, supported by the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, as well as envoys of Alexius IV Comnenus, the emperors of Trebizond, the Georgians, Ruthenians, and Walachians. John left Florence on August 26 and sailed from Venice on October 19, arriving home on February 1, 1440, only to learn of his wife's death and to face strong opposition to union.

In January 1439, well before the formal consummation of union, John VIII had had Isidore of Kiev open negotiations for aid from the papacy and the western rulers. Eugene had responded with a delegation of three cardinals, who promised that the pope would provide the Greeks with transport and with three hundred soldiers and two ships as a permanent garrison for Constantinople. If the city were attacked, Eugene would send ten ships for a year or twenty for six months, and if an army were needed the pope would attempt to have the European rulers send contingents to form a united army. John agreed to these proposals and requested that this agreement be placed in writing and sealed, and that arrangements be made with banks in Venice,
Genoa, and Florence for its fulfillment. All parties to these negotiations realized that if Constantinople were to be adequately defended, both a land army and a naval squadron acting in unison would be needed.

Any land offensive against the Ottomans would have to cross the Balkans, presumably starting from a base in Hungary, which was part of emperor Sigismund’s domains. Sigismund of Luxemburg had acquired a claim to the Hungarian crown in 1385 by his marriage to Maria, daughter of king Louis the Great of Poland and Hungary, and in 1387 had been recognized as king by the Hungarian estates. He had added the title “king of the Romans” in 1410 and that of Bohemia in 1419, though the latter was not accepted by the Czechs until 1436, after a series of unsuccessful crusades against the Hussites. He was finally crowned emperor in 1433. After Maria’s death he had married Barbara of Oliva, who in 1410 bore him a daughter, Elizabeth, the helness to his kingdoms. In 1418 he obtained from the Hungarian estates the promise that they would recognize the right of Elizabeth to the throne and elect a man to rule with her, a stipulation that was to be important during the events of 1439-1440. Elizabeth married Albert V of Hapsburg, duke of Austria, in 1422, and in 1434 the estates agreed to Sigismund’s proposal that Albert should succeed him, though insisting on a formal election at the time of his accession.

By late autumn 1437 Sigismund was in Prague, sick, and realized he was dying. He sent a message to Elizabeth and Albert to meet him at Znojmo in Bohemia, where he planned to hold a meeting of the Bohemian magnates and elicit from them recognition of the couple’s rights to the throne. He reached the city on November 21, gravely ill, and obtained the promises he sought, although a formal election would still be necessary. He died on December 9 and was buried in Grosswardein (Nagyvárad) in Hungary. At his death the imperial throne and...
those of Hungary and Bohemia fell vacant. The papacy now sought to encourage and support the claims of Albert to Sigismund’s possessions in the hope that Hungary, Bohemia, Germany, and Austria would be united, and thereby more effectively oppose Ottoman expansion.

After the burial Albert and Elizabeth went from Grosswarden to Bratislava to meet with the Hungarian estates, which made Albert promise to devote his energy to Hungary and not to accept the German crown without their express permission. He was to reside in Hungary and to keep the border between Austria and Hungary unchanged, lest Hungary become absorbed into the empire. In mid-December 1437 Albert and Elizabeth accepted these conditions and were elected king and queen of Hungary; they were crowned on January 1, 1438. On March 18 Albert was unanimously elected “king of the Romans”, and with Hungarian approval he accepted the German throne on April 29. As for Bohemia, the estates were divided between adherents of Albert and of Casimir, the thirteen-year-old brother of king Vladislav III (Władysław) of Poland. Albert was elected king by a majority of the diet on December 27, 1437, but the Utraquists—the radical Hussites led by archbishop John Rokycana—held a rump election in March 1438 and elected Casimir king.

Albert accepted this throne in Vienna on April 16; then on April 20 the Polish estates accepted the throne for Casimir and opened hostilities by sending two armies into Bohemia in support of his claims. At this time the most powerful person at the Polish court was the bishop of Cracow, Zbygniew Oleśnicki, a devoted conciliarist who worked to have the abuses of the church corrected by the council. He sought the union of Poland and Hungary, under Polish hegemony, but opposed Casimir’s acceptance of the Bohemian throne from the Hussite “heretics”. Albert was crowned in Prague on June 29, and on August 12 defeated the Polish invaders at Krušná Hora. A Polish army of possibly twelve thousand men under Vladislav then invaded Silesia, but was thrown back by the Hungarians under Stephen Rozgonyn, who in October stopped another Polish army which had advanced to within one mile of Breslau. Although the Polish estates led by Oleśnicki urged Vladislav to make peace, his Polish army again invaded Silesia in the early summer of 1439 while the Ottomans were attacking Transylvania and Serbia, convincing Albert and the Germans that the Poles and Turks had formed an unholy alliance. Finally a truce was arranged under papal auspices, since the Ottoman threat had now assumed serious proportions.  

10 See Januarius, Francisci Borussorum regantes, 1, 465, for Vladislav’s appeal for recon-
In the summer of 1438, as the Council of Florence debated theology and Albert was occupied in Bohemia, Murad II crossed into Europe with a large army, intent on subjugating Transylvania. He compelled Vlad II Dracul, the voivode of Wallachia (d. 1446) and a vassal of Hungary, to accompany him with his army. Although unsuccessful in attempts to take Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and Kronstadt (Brasov), the Turks burned and pillaged for over six weeks, and captured, by unreliable contemporary estimates, between seventy and eighty thousand prisoners. 31 Fearing that the sultan planned to attack Serbia and Hungary, Albert invested John Hunyadi with the banal of Szőreyn and the responsibility for defending the border.

Murad then demanded that George Brankovich, despot of Serbia, surrender to him the city of Smederevo, on the Danube east of Belgrade. Brankovich fortified the city but then, realizing that it could not withstand a siege, fled to Ragusa and on to Hungary, leaving his son Gregory to defend the city. At the end of May 1439 Murad invaded Serbia, besieged Smederevo, and sent raiding parties to devastate the territory between the Danube and Temešvár. Albert summoned the royal army and the Hungarian nobles to join him at Szegedin, which he reached on July 29, finding there only twenty-five thousand men. Defections and dysentery reduced their number to six thousand, too few to relieve Smederevo, which Gregory surrendered to Murad on August 29. 12 The sultan decided on a permanent extension of the empire, establishing Bosnia and Albania as Ottoman provinces under a governor at Skopje.

Albert withdrew to Buda and traveled toward Vienna, fatally ill with

31 Deutsche Reichsarchiv, K103-2, 524-525, which gives exactly reports of the Turkish destruction. Vlad Dracul had been Barnabé vornicely by 1436, and Albert continued to address him as a vassal; see Iorga, Foișitorul de românești de la românia orientală, IV (București, 1937), 45-72, and Gustav Gründel, "Die Türkeneinfälle in Siebenbürgen bis zur Mitte des 15 Jahrhunderts," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 11 (1937), 393-412. Albert had been warned by the Ragusan on March 8 that the Turks were preparing an expedition across the Danube, see Gotlich and Thalböck, Diplomatarium, pp. 422-423. Albert, however, continued to dispatch large numbers of troops to the northern border, fearing a Polish attack, cf. ibid, ed., Corpus diplomaticum prunus, 1 (Poznań, 1665), 287-288.

12. Iorga, Geschicht der rumänischer Nation, i (București, 1904), p. 423
dysentery. After writing a will to safeguard the heritage of the child Elizabeth was expecting, he died at Neszmély on October 27, 1439, at the age of forty-two. His preoccupation with securing the crowns of three kingdoms had permitted the Turks to expand their Balkan conquests at the expense of Hungary, and had thwarted Eugenius's hopes for a crusade. The struggles over the succession to the Hungarian throne were to delay the crusade for another five years, and diverted the energies of the papacy to involvement in Hungarian and Polish affairs.

Elizabeth sought to have herself proclaimed regent in Austria and Hungary, but she realized that Bohemia would not accept her nor her future child. On February 22, 1440, she gave birth at Bratislava to a son, Ladislas (V) "Posthumus". After Albert's death the Hungarians had invoked the agreement of 1411 and opened negotiations in Cracow for Elizabeth's marriage to the sixteen-year-old Vladislaw III of Poland, which remained stalled during her pregnancy. Then, on March 8, these negotiations culminated in a treaty recognizing Vladislaw as king Ladislas (László) IV of Hungary, but the thirty-six-year-old Elizabeth refused to accept him as husband or king, and appealed for recognition of her son Ladislaus, whom she placed under the guardianship of duke Frederick III of Hapsburg, Albert's successor as king of the Romans (1440-1452, emperor 1452-1493). Both Ladislaus and Vladislaw were crowned by the rival Hungarian factions, which were respectively supported by the Austrian and Polish armies. As Elizabeth and Vladislaw opened hostilities, Murad II besieged Belgrade, the key fortress protecting Hungary. Under the command of János Thallóczi the garrison defended the fortress for six months, during which the Turks reportedly lost thirty thousand men.

For two years the civil war continued indecisively, with actual warfare limited to occasional skirmishing as each army devastated the lands of its adversaries. Elizabeth steadily lost ground, as her support in Hungary was eroded by the open illegality of her actions and the destructiveness of her German troops and Bohemian mercenaries, while Vladislaw and Olesnicki won her adherents over with acts of leniency and grants of clemency. In the spring of 1441 Eugenius attempted

13 Elizabeth was supported by the voivode Desiderius Lauroméczy and by the Székler scions Michael Kalamá, Frantisek Casely, and Stepanu Romanyans; cf Józefina Kowara, Historia critique regum Hunyadici, Stirpium antiquat, XII (Press, 1797), 924.
15 Kowara, op. cit., XIII, 150, and Davies, Historia pedigria, XII, vol. 759. Elizabeth sold
unsuccessfully to negotiate a truce; on February 12, 1442, with the civil war at its height, he appointed cardinal Julian Cesarini legate to Hungary with a twofold commission: to establish peace and to organize the crusade against the Turks, under the leadership of Vladislav.

After an effort to enlist Venetian support for the planned crusade, and an unsuccessful attempt to meet Frederick III in Vienna, Cesarini joined Vladislav at Buda on May 27, and with Oderski away at Cracow soon became the principal adviser of the young and highly impressionable king. By August he had arranged a ten-month truce and a meeting between the two monarchs to enter into a permanent peace. On November 24 Vladislav and Elizabeth met at Győr, where they negotiated for three weeks under Cesarini's auspices; on December 16 they signed a treaty of peace. Suddenly, on December 24, 1442, Elizabeth died; her supporters claimed she had been poisoned on Vladislav's orders. Cesareni sought to have the treaty accepted by Frederick, who was carrying on the war in the name of Lajos, but not until May 1444 did Frederick confirm it, under pressure from Eugenius. Only then was Vladislav free to turn his full attention to the Ottoman threat.

Following his unsuccessful attempt on Belgrade in 1440, Murad had taken Novo Brdo with its valuable silver mines in 1441, while Turkish raiding parties plundered as far as Belgrade before being defeated by Hunyadi, who pursued them to Smederevo. In 1442 Murad sent Mezid Beg into Transylvania with a large army, which plundered and burned as far as Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and then moved northwestward. On March 18 they defeated Hunyadi near Alba Julia (Weissenburg), killing its bishop George Lepés, but a week later Hunyadi and Nicholas of Ujiak (called Uják) decisively defeated them at Szent Imre, killing

the royal jewels to pay less mercenaries, who plundered everywhere. Kellier, Annalen, II, 232, indicates that on August 3 she pawned the "Immaculate" for 2,500 florins. By December she had borrowed 2,000 florins against her Austrian estates, and by 1442 she had sold Oldenburg to Frederick for 5,000 florins; cf. James G. Edmondson, Hungarian Wars of Magyarization (1530-1566), X, 112-113, and Ignat A. Popeler, Geschichte von Ungarn, ed. Ernst Klein (Leipzig, 1869), 463 f.

17. See Misa, "Julien Cesarini," loc. cit., and the funeral oration of Poggio, which is factual but undistinguished, in Misa, loc. cit. See Cambi, op. cit., pp. 64-62, for the response of the Venetian senate to Cesarini. For the terms of Elizabeth's treaty of August 14 with Nicholas Ban and Stephen Bécher from Montokar (Prensburg).
19. Wenzel, op. cit., p. 227, and Edmondson, The Ottoman Empire, p. 20. See Wilhelm Schmidt, Die Stammung der Hunyadi in Transylvania (Erlangen, 1865). At Vladislav's accession Hunyadi was count of Tamásov; he was named vicearch of Transylvania by Vladislav (1440-1456).
Mezid Beg. Later in 1442 Hunyadi defeated two other Ottoman armies which had been devastating Wallachia. On January 8, 1443, Cesarini wrote to Venice announcing the treaty signed by Vladislav and Elizabeth, the latter's death, and Hunyadi's third victory on December 7.

The legate and the Venetians had been planning, throughout the fall of 1442, a crusade consisting of a land army setting out from Hungary supported by a fleet stationed in the Dardanelles. The fleet's objectives were to cut communications between Anatolia and Europe, protect Constantinople, and join with the crusaders to capture the Turkish fortresses on the Danube while the main Ottoman forces were kept in Anatolia. In the reign of Murad II his European fortresses and cities were normally garrisoned sufficiently to defend the area; however, the sultan's army was kept in Anatolia during the winter months, coming to Europe only for a specific campaign. Thus a crusading army stood a good chance of overwhelming the Turkish garrisons if a naval blockade was established in the Dardanelles, since the Ottomans did not possess a navy to oppose a fleet. Constantinople could always be supplied by sea during a siege and communications with the west kept open. On September 15 the Ragusans offered, in a letter to Cesarini, to arm one galley to join a fleet in support of a land army for the duration of the campaign; they estimated that a fleet of twenty-eight ships would be required to blockade the Dardanelles effectively.

On January 1, 1443, with the civil war ended, Eugenius issued a bull levying a tenth on the entire church in order to raise funds for arming a fleet. On January 2 the Venetian senate wrote to Duke Philip III of Burgundy (1419-1467) requesting aid for the crusade, and on Janu-


22. Iorga, Notas de estudos, III, 185-186, the name was responsible to Cesarini, and pointed out that the tribe was yielding insufficient tribute for the fleet. The vice-chancellor, Francis Comnhard had come to Venice on August 28, 1442, battle, and thus little could be done. The Venetians stated that the delays were detrimental to the Christian cause.


24. Iorga, Notas de estudos, III, 300.

25. Hofmann, Empedokles, XII, 88-79. The bull mentions the glorious victories in Hungary and the opportunity of having a land army and is thus to fight the Turks. The cardinals have agreed to give a tenth of the income from their benefices and Eugenius has given one fifth of his income, from Kordani and "survival communal."
ary 9 Eugenius requested ten galleys from Venice, to be armed at papal expense and sent to the Dardanelles. On April 3 the senate wrote Eugenius, confirming their offer to provide the ten galleys if the pope would pay to have them armed. 26 On May 8 Eugenius appointed his nephew, cardinal Francis Condulmer, legate and captain-general of the papal fleet. 27 On June 14 Eugenius and Alfonso of Aragon and Naples concluded peace and an agreement whereby Alfonso was to send six galleys to the Dardanelles for six months; they were, however, never sent. By July both the pope and the senate realized that preparations for a crusade could not be completed in 1443, and on December 17 Eugenius wrote to Ragusa that he hoped to have a fleet in the Dardanelles by the following summer. 28

In addition to the pope and Venice duke Philip of Burgundy supported the crusade. Since the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396, when Philip's father John the Fearless was taken prisoner, the idea of a military expedition against the Turks had been a recurrent theme of Burgundian eastern policy. In 1421 Philip and the duke of Bedford, John of Lancaster, had sent Gilbert of Lannoy to the east, and in 1432 Philip had dispatched Bertrandon de la Broquère to Palestine, Syria, and Anatolia to report on the military situation. 29 In 1439 John VIII sent his chamberlain John Torcello to the duke with a plan for a war against Murad and the deliverance of the Holy Land.

Philip was also supporting the Knights Hospitaller in defense of Rhodes against the Mamluks of Egypt. In 1440 Murad signed a treaty with the Mamluks aimed at Rhodes. The lack of a navy had prevented the Ottomans from attacking the knights, who could not be placed on the defensive by Egyptian warships. Early that year sultan İskender Az-Zahir (1438-1453) sent a fleet of nineteen galleys against Castelorizzo, an island belonging to the Hospitallers off the coast of southwestern Anatolia. The knights dispatched eight galleys and four smaller ships, and forced the Mamluks to retire. On September 25, 1440, an Egyptian fleet appeared off Rhodes, but soon retired to Cyprus, and

26 Lorsa, Notes et extraits, III, 120-123. Lennard Venier was the Venetian ambassador at the papal court. The previous October 30 the senate had learned of Hunyadi's victories from Vlahot; see ibid, III, 103-106. News of the last victory was circulated throughout western Europe; Haber, "Die Kriege," pp. 199-207.
27 Hufnagel, Epistolee, III, 78-80.
28 Lorsa, Notes et extraits, III, 128-129. On May 20, 1443, the Venetians wrote to Condulmer stressing the importance of having a fleet in the Dardanelles to support the crusading army; see ibid, II, 126-127, and III, 134. For Lennard Venier's letter of July 6 concerning sending a fleet the following year
29 Dario Gamalathes, "Symeonius and the Crusade, 1354-1453," in volume III of the present work, p. 98.
then to Egypt. The knights prepared to repel a second expected attack and appealed to the duke of Burgundy, who sent three ships under Geoffrey of Thoisy. This squadron sailed from Sluys to Bruges, then to Lisbon, where Geoffrey inspected some ships the duke was having built there, then into the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Little fighting occurred, and the squadron returned to Villefranche in mid-1442, Geoffrey having gained some knowledge of the eastern Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, the Byzantine envoy Theodore Carstinas again visited the duke at Chalon-sur-Saône early in 1443 and appealed to him to send warships in support of the planned crusade. Philip responded by sending an emissary to Venice to request four galleys, which he would pay to have armed. He informed Carstinas of this decision and offered to send in addition the three galleys and one galley that were being built at Villefranche and two of the ships that had been sent to Rhodes, making a total of ten ships to form the Burgundian squadron. Thus by the spring of 1443 diplomatic efforts had resulted in commitments for a fleet of twenty-one ships, including one from the Ragusan, seven less than the Ragusan government deemed necessary to establish an effective blockade of the Dardanelles.

As preparations for the fleet progressed, Cesarini sought to have the army mobilized. In early January 1443 and again on April 9 he addressed the estates in Buda, urging them to undertake an expedition against the Turks, who had been defeated by Hunyadi in 1442, and informing them of the tribute levied by the pope to support a fleet. At first the estates declined to take action, postponing a decision until their next meeting in June. During that meeting letters arrived from Ragusa and from Hunyadi in Belgrade, informing the Hungarians that Sultan Murad II had crossed to Anatolia, handed over the government to his young son Mehmed (11), and returned to Buda. Hunyadi advised them that the Rumelian fortresses were lightly garrisoned and that an
army of thirty thousand could drive the Turks out of Europe. These reports led the estates to vote a subsidy and support for a crusade.

The sources for the first "long expedition" are sparse. We have a letter from Hunyadi to Ujfalusi, Vladislav’s report to the doge of Venice, a poem by Michael Beheim, and the chronicles of Callinachus, Długoz, and Chalkocondyles.

Vladislav issued a royal summons to his vassals, and Cesarini and Brankovich left Buda with the royal army on July 22, 1443. Długoz reports that the king spent the rest of the summer arming his men, obtaining horses, and awaiting the contingents he had summoned from Poland and Wallachia. Estimates of the size of the army range from Beheim’s of fourteen thousand to Długoz’s of twenty-five thousand (which is too large), with about six hundred supply wagons. The army moved southeast, probably passing through Szegedin, crossing the Danube at Petrovaradin (Peterwardein), and sometime in October arriving at Belgrade, where they joined forces with Hunyadi, designated by Vladislav as “captaneus exercitus generalis”. From Belgrade the army proceeded southeast to the Turkish stronghold of Kraguyevats, which they captured and burned. Thence the army continued southeast along the Morava river to Aleksinac, where news reached them of the approach of a Turkish force. Vladislav and Cesarini decided to encamp while the two voivodes, John Hunyadi and Ujfalusi, reconnoitered with a force of twelve thousand men.

The voivodes reached Nish, which was held by a small Turkish garrison, and took the city, which they plundered and burned. They learned that three Turkish armies were converging on Nish to meet and march against the crusaders, but succeeded in defeating all three before they could link up. On November 3 word was brought that yet another Turkish force, combined with the remnants of the defeated armies, was advancing past Hunyadi’s left flank toward the royal camp. Hunyadi returned to Nish, where he defeated this fourth attack, capturing Murad’s chancellor and many Ottoman officers. Hunyadi, it is

33 Chrust, Manuskripte zur österreichischen Geschichthe aus Archivum und Bibliotheca (Vienna, 1837), 1-2, 114 ff.
34 Długoz, Historia polonica, XII, ant. 755, "... plenam quantam regno Poloniae et regno Wallachiae..." See the poems of Michael Beheim in Thomas von Kavan’s, ed., Quellen und Forschungen zur württemberischen Geschichte, Literatur und Kunst (Vienna, 1849) pp. 35-36, and Ducas, ed. Thaker, p. 287, for estimates on the number of troops.
35 Klaproth, Dee Königreich, pp. 69 ff. Hunyadi wrote of his captives to Ujfalusi on November 3 when he had returned to the royal camp; see Katan, op. cit., XIII, 231-254. He states that he had twenty thousand men, had captured Nish, and had defeated the force under the Beg,
said, took four thousand prisoners and brought the king nine Ottoman banners as trophies. Vladislav wrote to Venice of victories over Ottoman armies numbering thirty thousand men. We are not sure of the precise dates, but Aeneas Sylvius states that these battles all took place by November 3, 1443.36

Hunyadi returned to camp sometime before November 9, when he wrote to Ujvári. The army now marched southeast from Nish past Bela Palanka and Pirot to Sofia, which they reached in late November or early December. They stormed the city, which they sacked, plundering and burning everything.37

Then the crusaders advanced toward the Maritsa river, through the pass of Trajan’s Door, planning to attack Philippopolis (Plovdiv) and then march down river to the Turkish administrative headquarters in Rumelia at Adrianople (Edirne). Murad, who had resumed the throne and crossed the Straits with a large army, had his troops block the key pass, through which the old Roman road ran to Adrianople. The Hungarians swung east toward the Zlatitsa pass into the Topolnitsa valley, but this pass was blocked by trees and ice and defended by an army under Murad’s son-in-law KHALIL PASHA, beglerbeg of Anatolia.38 The Hungarians attempted unsuccessfully to force the pass, and were halted for three days at the castle of Sloga. The sources agree that the main battle took place on December 24, 1443, lasting all day and into the night. The crusaders used artillery in an attempt to dislodge the Turks, who threw trees, boulders, and ice into the pass and showered arrows down on them. From subsequent negotiations we know that the sultan’s son-in-law was taken prisoner.39 Unable to advance further in winter, short of food and supplies, the crusaders decided to return to Hungary and attempt another expedition in the spring.

As the crusaders returned to Hungary the sultan sent KASIM PASHA at the head of Rumelian cavalry and Anatolian troops to attack the...
crusader army, which they followed over the Istar and the Nishava, joining battle at the Kozovitsa pass. Brankovich was guarding the rear, which the Turks attacked. Hunyadi and Vladislav, who were already through the pass, left the wagons guarded by infantry and joined the battle near the river on the eastern side of the pass. The engagement ended in a complete victory for the crusaders. The battle, the last of the "long expedition", took place on January 5, 1444, under a full moon. Short of supplies and horses, the crusaders burned much of their baggage and wagons before returning to Belgrade, where Hunyadi and his men remained for the winter. He refused Brankovich's request to winter in Serbia and help him reconquer it. Vladislav and Cesarini returned to Buda, where they arrived in February and were greeted as conquering heroes. A service of thanksgiving was held in the cathedral, where a "Te Deum" was sung and the captured Turkish weapons were displayed. The victories were announced to the European princes, long accustomed to hearing only of Christian defeats at the hands of the Turks.

One result of the victorious campaign of 1443 was the successful revolt of the Albanians under George Castriota, known as Scanderbeg (d. 1468). Castriota had been sent from Albania as a hostage to the sultan's court and trained at the military academy of Enderum in Adrianopole, where his accomplishments earned him the title of beg (tacked onto his Turkish name of Iskander as Scanderbeg). He was co-commander of one of the armies defeated by Hunyadi near Nish. After the battle he fled to Albania, where he gathered forces and captured Crola from the Turks. By the summer of 1444 he was leading a revolt against the Turks with the aid of the Venetians and Alfonso V of Aragon, king of Naples. Some historians have claimed that Scanderbeg formed an alliance with Vladislav, but this has been proved false through letters included by Aeneas Sylvius in his work describing the events of Kostovo in 1448 (which Marinus Barletius, who first printed them, confused with Varna in 1444). Scanderbeg was in no position at the time of the second campaign to create any sort of diversion in support of the crusade.

Letters of congratulation and embassies arrived in Buda during the next few months praising the victories and urging the king to undertake another expedition in the spring. The victories had demonstrated

40 Kupelwieser, op. cit., pp. 75-77.
42 Cenac wrote to the Venetians about the victories, and on January 15, 1444, the senate decided to send a secretary to Buda to offer the republic's congratulations, see L. R. von
that Turkish arms were not invincible. The sultan had, however, been able to halt the crusaders by crossing into Rumelia with his army. It was now clear that any future success against the Turks would depend on preventing the Ottoman forces from crossing the Dardanelles, which could be accomplished only by a naval blockade. Without a navy the Ottomans were powerless to challenge such a blockade.

Now work on the galleys was accelerated, with the objective of having a fleet in Levantine waters for the 1444 campaigning season. The victories of the so-called "long expedition" of 1443 resulted in an upsurge of diplomatic efforts to gain military support. On February 8 Ragusa offered to arm two galleys to join the combined fleet, and on the tenth in a letter to Eugenius urged the pope to hasten the arming of his galleys so that they would be stationed in the Dardanelles by summer, when the crusaders were in the field, since this was the only way to halt the transfer of Turkish reinforcements from Anatolia. They also advised Eugenius to urge Vladislav to have his army in the field by the time the fleet would be ready.

On March 3 the Venetian senate learned that Cesarelli and Vladislav had returned to Buda. They appointed John de' Reguardati emissary on March 6, instructing him to proceed there with all possible speed; even his route was specified. He was to assure Cesarelli that the senate had done all in its power to have the papal galleys armed, and had already prepared the hulls and fitted the vessels in its territories. He was to encourage the Hungarians to undertake a second expedition; he was to keep Venice's allies informed of progress on the galleys and to report back to Venice on preparations undertaken in Hungary; and he was to negotiate for the territories requested by Venice when victory was attained.

On March 13 the senate decided to have ten galleys chosen in the

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43 Iorga, Notes 31--336. On January 15, 1444, the senate sent an ambassador to Buda and voted to present the collection of the troops in Venetian territory. On February 3 they urged Constanza to arm these galleys with which he and found; see ibid., III, 149--150. Mean while the Ragusans wrote to Eugenius on February 10, offering to arm two galleys, which would join the allied fleet, and urging the pope to complete the arming of his galleys.

44 Kreitsch, Diplomatarium, p. 326; Gozdz and Turoczy, Diplomatarium, 431--433. The Ragusans acknowledged the pope's letters of November 9, December 13 and 17, in which he solicited support and named Christopher Gianani as legate.

45 Šimek, in, Lutine v unvobljih nepočne tudaj uvedena z uvrstitev republike, III, in Admiratorum spectaculum historiam slavnonum montanum, IX (Zagreb, 1976), 113--116, for the appointment of John de' Reguardati. On March 26 Reguardati was further empowered to present his credentials to Brankovic; ibid., 186--187.
arsenal, armed, and dispatched as quickly as possible, even though funds from the pope had not arrived; Condulmer was authorized to select the commanders for these papal galleys, subject to the senate's approval. On March 21 the Venetians voted to permit Condulmer to spend the twelve hundred ducats collected in Venice on arming the papal galleys. The senate had also ordered the preparation of four galleys for the duke of Burgundy, informing him on March 21 that his envoys had found them ready, and that the ten unarmed galleys were ready for the pope. The senate and the duke were concerned about Eugenius's preparations, and they responded to his inquiries of February 10. With Condulmer in Venice, the senate expressed the hope that their arming would soon begin. The senate knew nothing certain about efforts by any other Italian cities, but claimed that these fourteen galleys would suffice to guard the Danubian. Venice would not promise to send Venetian ships for a predetermined time, although the republic was prepared to offer some of the galleys at sea near Gallipoli. On April 20 duke Philip appointed Waleran of Wavrin captain-general of the "auxiliary army" (i.e., the Burgundian squadron) being sent to Constantinople, and instructed him to go to Venice to oversee the work on the galleys requested by him. Sometime after April 20 he left Bruges with thirty-one Burgundian emissaries with money for sixty days for the trip from Bruges to Venice.

On May 12 the senate wrote to Reguardati in Buda that the papal galleys would sail from Venice in a few days, to be joined in the Levant by Venetian ships. They reported that the Burgundian envoy, Wavrin, had arrived in Venice to oversee the arming of the four ducal galleys and had informed the senate that Philip the Good was having an additional three galleys and one galion refurbished at Nice (more accurately, at Villefranche), to be joined by another warship. The senate instructed Reguardati to urge Vladislav to start the expedition soon, since the time was favorable and the galleys were being completed; however, they could accomplish nothing without the land army that they were meant to support. On the same day the Venetians responded to Cesarii's letters of April 25 and 28 informing them of Vladislav's firm intention to undertake a second expedition in the summer. The senate reported to Cesarii on the imminent departure of the papal, Venetian, and Burgundian galleys.

47. Clooszkowska, op. cit., 1-3, 83-89.
Thus, throughout the spring of 1444 the Venetians were encouraging the Hungarians to begin a second offensive, pressing the arming of the papal galleys, and overseeing the departure of their own ships. After the encouraging news from Hungary the Venetians decided to commit their own galleys, thus engaging the sultan in a full-scale war. They realized that any delay in the departure of the fleet would be disastrous, and so ordered the galleys to sail no later than May 21 under penalty of heavy fine to the patrons, while protesting vigorously to Coquelier the lack of payment for the arming of the papal galleys. 10

On June 4 and 5 the legate informed the senate that the papal galleys were armed, and that some had sailed and others were ready to sail, while two galleys were still awaiting the remainder of their rigging. On June 17 the doge wrote to the duke of Crete, Thomas Ducodo, instructing him to use the tenth collected there to purchase biscuit and bread for the fleet. 11 By June 17 the Venetian galleys were prepared to sail, and the senate instructed their captain, Alvise Loredan, that both he and Wavrin, as commander of the Venetian and Burgundian galleys, would be under Cochlumier’s command. The republic, however, wanted to avoid war with the Mamluks, which would endanger their Levantine possessions, so Loredan was not to attack Mamluk ships at sea; the fleet had been armed for war only against the Turks. Loredan was not to allow the galleys to touch at Rhodes although Cochlumier would probably request them to do so. The galleys were not to attack Mamluk ships encountered in the Dardanelles supporting the Ottomans, nor were the Burgundian galleys to be allowed to go to Rhodes, as had been agreed to by duke Philip. 12

We know from a letter of the senate to Cesarin dated July 4 that Cochlumier sailed from Venice on June 22 with seven papal galleys and eight Venetian galleys; the Burgundian galleys were to leave in two or three days. The senate agreed to Cesarin’s request to send eight or more galleys from those that were to be stationed in the Dardanelles up the Danube to Nicopolis to support the crossing of the crusaders. 13

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50. Jorga, Notas de antro, III, 169–170. On May 25 the senate accused the pope of delaying work on the galleys. The Venetians remonstrated Cochlumier of their efforts, and remarked that the galleys should fly the banner of St. Mark since they were armed with Venetian money.
51. Jorga, Notas de antro, III, 173–175, and Thirion, Négociés, III, 112. The fleet was supported in Fugger by early July, and preparations were under way there for its reception, see Krekel, Dubrovnik, II, 339.
53. Jorga, Notas de antro, III, 175–176. This plan was discussed in Venice before the fleet sailed and had these enormous Wavrin’s support. This was addressed to Cochlumier, who was at Pula.
Venetians again wrote to Reguardati instructing him how to proceed in the negotiations concerning those territories requested by Venice, which included Gallipoli and Thessalonica. The Byzantine envoy, who had denigrated Venice's contributions, was to be reminded that the republic had spent thirty thousand ducats for the papal fleet in addition to six to eight galleys sent under the banner of St. Mark. 54

By July 5 the two Ragusan galleys had been outfitted and were ordered to sail the next day. The great council gave instructions that the funds collected from the clergy of Ragusa were to be given to Con lulmer to be used for provisioning the galleys en route. With victory in the air the Ragusans now put in their bid for territories they wanted. 55

Wavrin left Venice on July 6 with one galle; on July 7 the senate ordered two other Burgundian galleys to sail during the night, while the last was to leave at noon on the eighth. 56 The Burgundian had promised the Byzantine ambassador to send four additional ships, and early in 1443 the duke had appointed Geoffrey of Thoisy and Regnault de Conflans, a Knight Hospitaller, captains of the three galleys and one galley that were at Villefranche. They were to oversee the arming and repair of these ships and sail to the Adriatic to join Wavrin, under whose command they were to proceed to the Dardanelles. 57 At the same time the duke chose Alfonso de Oliveria, a gentleman of the household of the Portuguese-born duchess Isabella, to oversee the arming of the two additional ships at Villefranche.

In the summer of 1444 rumors were in the air of a planned Mamluk attack on Rhodes. The grand master, John of Lastic, appealed to Eugenius, who had the cardinal "of Thérouanne", Jean le Jeune (Johannes Juvenis), write to Wavrin at Venice requesting him to go to Rhodes to aid the knights and then to proceed to the Dardanelles. Thuc the Venetians forbade, instructing Loredan not to touch at Rhodes. Wavrin communicated this to the cardinal of Thérouanne, who wrote to Geoffrey and Regnault directing them to sail directly to Rhodes. They left

54 Ibid., III, 177-178.
55 Ibid., III, 575, and Thoisy, Répétition, III, 114, Kreutz, Diebrowski, pp. 259-140. The Ragusans warned Arsen and Camus and the surrounding areas. On June 3, 1444, the great council wrote to Vladimir and Canerdi about territory.
56. Isera, Notus et notitia, III, 179. John of Wavrin, ed. Haude, v. 39-41. He confused in his chronology; he states that Loredan and Conflans sailed on July 22, instead of a month earlier. He has Wavrin leaving Venice on July 25. For Wavrin's departure date see also his letter in the Archives du Nord, Lille, ed. B4794, 1444, and Lemire, De kruisvaetcher plannen, pp. 40-41
57 Archives du Nord, Lille, ed. 1906, no. 39.266; the appointment was made at Bruges. For a full discussion see Degryse, "De Byzantinische expedities ...", pp. 227-263.
Villefranche in July and sailed along the coast of North Africa to Lampedusa, where news reached them that a Mamluk fleet had attacked Rhodes. The Burgundians sailed to the island, where they engaged the Egyptian fleet and then joined the knights in a successful defense of the city, after which they sailed on September 28 to join Wavrin at Constantinople.55

By July 17 the two Ragusan galleys had joined the papal-Venetian galleys at Modon in the southern Morea, and on August 19 the Ragusan government instructed its captain to remain with the fleet for six months.56 By late August the fleet had reached the Dardanelles, as the Ragusans reported to their ambassador at the Bosnian court on August 20, informing him that the galleys would be at Gallipoli by the end of the month. From the information reaching them the Ragusans thought that more than twenty-five galleys would be in the Dardanelles by early September, and this was an accurate estimate: ten papal galleys, eight Venetian, two Ragusan, four Burgundian under Wavrin, four Burgundian ships under Geoffrey of Tholay, and another two under Oliveria made a total of thirty ships.56 It was a fleet sufficiently large to blockade the Dardanelles effectively and prevent an Ottoman army from crossing.

In the spring and summer of 1444 peace negotiations were begun between Murad II on the one hand and Vladislav, Hunyadi, and Bran­kovich on the other. These negotiations caused apprehension among Hungary’s allies, and have remained a subject of contention not only among contemporary writers but among historians ever since.51

Although the “long expedition” did not achieve a lasting success, it had reversed the almost uninterrupted series of Ottoman victories.


56 Krečić, Đurović, p. 341. On July 16 the Venetian senate permitted the government of Corfu to open negotiations with the Turks and the inhabitants of Aulosa (Volos) and Argyrokastro in order to obtain these places and to offer the Turks pensions if they had already left these castles. The approach of the fleet had caused panic among the Turkish garrisons. Iorga, Notes et documents, III, 179–180.

59 Krečić, Đurović, p. 341.

61 The significant recent literature on the negotiations at Sinope includes Hallock, The Crusade of Varna; Đurović, L’Armée 1444–1445; Pall, “Carloco d’Amanza e la crociera contro i Turci”; Aysal, “Le Traité de paix de Sinope,” pp. 374–392; and particularly Pall, “‘Aubone de la croisade de Varna,’” pp. 144–158, where he convincingly disproves the thesis of Hallock.
In the spring of 1444 Murad was thus under attack from the Hungarians, in Albania, in the Morea, and from Ibrahim Beg in Karaman. While Vladislav and Cesarini were en route back to Buda in January 1444, a Turkish emissary arrived in camp and requested the king to set a date for the reception of an embassy from the sultan. Again in March a Greek monk arrived from Brankovitch's daughter Maria, one of Murad's wives, repeating the sultan's offer to restore her father as despot, and to return his sons Gregory and Stephen, who had been blinded. He found these proposals acceptable, since he urged the Hungarian diet to accept peace when it met in Buda in mid-April.

Vladislav and Cesarini did not want peace and, on April 25 and 26, the legate wrote to Venice that the king and the barons had sworn to them that they would lead another expedition against the Turk in the summer. The senate accepted this assurance and continued with the preparations for the fleet. Nevertheless, sometime in May and June emissaries did arrive in Adrianople from Vladislav, Brankovitch, and Hunyadi, even though the latter was voivode and a vassal of the king. Our sources for these negotiations are the reports of Ciriaco de' Pizzicolli (1391–1452) of Ancona, an Italian humanist who was present in Adrianople at the sultan's court in May and June, and who sent reports to his friend Andreolo Gaustiniani-Busca of Chios, enclosing copies of important official documents.

Around June 12 Ciriaco wrote to his friend that Vladislav's Serbian emissary Stojka Gisdanich arrived in Adrianople with Vitsisio, representing John Hunyadi; Athanasius Frashak, metropolitan of Semendria (Smederevo), and another unnamed envoy; and Bogdan, Brankovitch's chancellor, escorted by sixty horsemen. Gisdanich's credentials were dated April 24—nine days after Vladislav had sworn to lead an expedition—and empowered him to conclude a treaty, which was to be sworn to by Murad in the royal envoy's presence. In his report on these negotiations the papal collector Andreas de Palatio wrote that Hunyadi and Brankovitch were carrying on these negotiations without consulting the king. However, the letters of credence prove other-

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62 Krakic, Budapeszt, p. 332. On March 5, 1444, the government of Ragusa placed a boat at the disposal of a monk who is described as a messenger from Maria. He was to be taken to Spalato (Split) and from there to the deepest gorge; the grand council confirmed this decision on March 6.

63 Venicer, Sec. Secundo, Reg. 16, fol. 97; see Cimarosa Valentinus, Acta Albaniae veteris secundum XIV et XV, XVIII (Busamia, 1974), no. 4862, p. 174, for the senate's reply to Catarini dated May 12, 1444.


65 Lesticki, Codex synodalicus, II, 466, and Diogo, Historia polonica, XIII, col. 704, who repeat the statement "testamentum post . . . in officiium inosculatum regi."
wise. It is probable that Vladislav regarded the embassy as unimportant, as merely a tactic to induce the sultan to leave Rumelia.

Brankovich requested the release of his sons, the return to him of the conquered towns and fortresses, particularly Golubats on the Danube, and the granting of favorable terms to Vlad Dracul, voivode of Wallachia. Brankovich and Vlad were, however, to remain Turkish vassals. Negotiations stalled on the surrender of Golubats, which with Belgrade guarded the routes that armies invading Hungary would take. On June 12 Murad agreed to all the requests and swore to a ten-year truce, appointing Suleiman Beg and Varnas, a Greek, his emissaries to Vladislav to obtain his oath. On that day Murad wrote to Vladislav informing him of his emissaries' appointment and looking forward to a ten-year peace. 66 Murad wanted peace with the Hungarians so that he could move his army to Anatolia, without concern about an attack on his European provinces. By granting generous terms to Brankovich he deprived the allies of the Serbian army, and ruptured the alliance erected by Cesarini.

Ciriaco wrote to the Hungarians of the threat to Murad in Anatolia, and reported the events to John VIII Palaeologus. The Byzantines had planned to create a diversion by attacking the Turks from the Morea, the attack to be led by the two despots, the emperor's brothers Theodore (now lord of Selymbria) and Constantine Dragases, who was the more powerful in the Morea.

In February 1444 Constantine successfully established his power north of the isthmus of Corinth, crossed the Hexamillion, and reduced Bocotia and Thebes. 67 The Byzantines had been encouraged by the victories of 1443, and were alarmed at the news of a peace treaty, but not seriously enough to halt their attack. Only the Ragusans instructed their ambassador in Buda to secure the city's interests in any peace that was concluded. 68

The treaty that had been negotiated in Adrianople on June 12 was concluded in the hope of inducing the sultan to cross to Anatolia, thereby assuring the forthcoming crusade a greater chance of success. Thus was recognized by Ciriaco, who wrote a letter to John Hunyadi that same day from Adrianople, informing him of what had occurred and wishing him success on the forthcoming expedition. 69 Ciriaco and

66. See Hâlecî, The Crusade of Varna, pp. 88–91, for the sultan's letter of June 12, 1444, to Vladislav. The Turks agreed also to return prisoners.
68. Longa, Notas, p. 402.
met the Christian envoys, and still looked forward to a crusade. He did not expect the peace to be kept by the allies, and when he reached Constantinople on June 24 he wrote again to Hunyadi more openly than he had been able to from Adrianople. In this letter he spoke of the peace which Murad had had to accept in order to protect Rumelia from attack while he was fighting Ibrahim Beg. Ciriaco reported that the sultan did not believe the peace would last long. Indeed Adrianople’s defenses were being strengthened. As soon as Karman had been subdued Murad would invade Hungary, and take revenge for the crusaders’ victories. This peace was simply a means by which the sultan could buy time. Again Ciriaco urged the voivode to attack the Turks that year.\(^70\)

The treaty had meant as little to Vladislav, who, throughout June and July, continued to prepare for the crusade. He wrote to the Florentines and the king of Bosnia, Stephen VI Thomas, reassuring them of his preparations for a second expedition.\(^71\) Vladislav had been informed by letters and by the return of his envoy of the agreement concluded at Adrianople, by which he was bound by the letters he had given Giadanich. He was invited to come to Saegedim on August 1, where he would meet the Turkish envoys and swear to the treaty. Vladislav arrived there sometime in late July, and what occurred there is best described in the most reliable contemporary accounts: the report of the Venetian ambassador Reguardati and Cesarini’s report to the senate, which was summarized in the instructions it sent to Alvise Loredan on September 9. Reguardati’s report to the senate confirms Cesarini’s, thereby establishing its accuracy, and both were used by the senate as the basis of the instructions issued to the captain of their fleet. The senate was concerned about the negotiations, Loredan was, nevertheless, instructed to support the crusaders if they should set out. Whatever had occurred the Venetians continued to plan for hostilities against the Turks.\(^72\)

There has been controversy among modern historians about whether or not Vladislav ratified the treaty of June 12 in Saegedim in late July. Some Polish historians have attempted to prove that he did not ratify it and, therefore, did not perjure himself in the manifesto he issued on August 4. Nevertheless, it has been convincingly demonstrated that Vladislav did just that. He ratified the treaty around July 26, then swore

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71. Iorga, II, 404–405 for Vladislav’s letter to Florence on July 2, 1444, and Iorga, II, 407, for the letter of July 24 to the king of Bosnia, on which Vladislav again confirmed his intention to lead the crusade.
72. Iorga, *Notes at sottomia*, III, 185. The text up to Ljublj, XXI, 871–873
a few days later to lead a crusade. Even if Vladislav had not ratified the treaty, this would have broken the promise given in the letter to his emissary Gislanich of April 24, and thus, one way or another, this emotional young king had perjured himself. Other contemporary sources charge that the king had indeed perjured himself, and these sources had unusually good access to persons close to the events.

On August 4 Vladislav issued a manifesto in which he renewed his oath to lead a crusade, naming September 1 as the date on which this crusade would start out. It mentions the closed and sworn treaty and the arrival of the Turkish emissaries who sought his oath. Throughout the events of the spring and summer the king had behaved in a confusing and often contradictory manner. On April 15 he promised the diet to lead a crusade, yet on the 24th he issued letters to Gislanich giving promises to the sultan. By July he assured the Florentines of his intentions to fight, and on the 25th left for Szegedin to receive Turkish emissaries who would obtain his oath to confirm the treaty. Then on August 4 he again swore to lead a crusade.

Hunyadi had used the negotiations as a tactic to induce Murad to go to Anatolia at the head of his army. It also provided him the time to make sure the allied fleet would be in the Straits by the time the land army took the offensive. Eugenius had put together a powerful naval alliance that could effectively mount a blockade, although it was not always certain he was one of its most consistent supporters.

News of the peace caused doubts among the allies. Varvax learned of it from some Turks at Gallipoli. Cesarea put these doubts to rest by writing to Condemal, to whom he stated that peace had not been concluded. On September 3 he wrote to John VIII Palaeologus, who was further reassured by letters from Vladislav and Hunyadi. Cirnaco of Ancona wrote to king Alfons at Naples, and wrote to Cesarea on September 19 informing him of the victory of the Knights Hospitallers over the Mamluk fleet, in which the Burgundians had played a prominent part.

What is certain is that George Brankovich had achieved his own objective through the peace negotiations. He ratified the treaty on August 15, after Vladislav had decided to proceed with the crusade. Murad

73 See Pali, "Cirnaco d'Ancona," pp. 62-63, for the convincing arguments advanced to support the main clauses of the treaty by Vladislav.

74 Assaes Syrian Planumini wrote of the king's perjury; see Wolken, Der sicher/verheir, spatulat 178, 372-374, 186-188. For Warrich's testimony see Hardy, ed., Croniques, V (1844), 41-43.

75 From a copy of Cirnaco's Commentarii adiuvandi in the Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod lex. 3250, fol. 11r-11v, cited by Setten, Papacy and the Levant (1291-1273), 11, 87 nota 22.
had also bought time and had succeeded in splitting the alliance. Branković’s defection resulted in the loss to the Hungarian army of 8,000 men, almost a third of the entire force of the “long expedition”. This loss was to prove a fatal one to the crusaders. He entered Smolencevo on August 22, and soon thereafter his sons were restored to him.\textsuperscript{76} In addition to depriving the crusaders of important forces, the remaining Turkish garrisons were strengthened by the soldiers freed from defending the Serbian fortresses. Some places along the crusaders’ route would now be able to withstand their attack.

The neutrality of Serbia also meant that the crusaders, rather than cross the mountains to Adrianople, would have to take the route down the Danube across Bulgaria to the Black Sea, and from there to Constantinople to join the fleet. This route was protected by well-garrisoned castles and cities, necessitating long sieges and the resulting delays. Once the land forces had joined the fleet then, in conjunction, they would attempt to conquer the Ottoman strongholds.

Throughout the spring of 1444 Vladislav prepared for war and assured his allies of his intentions, in spite of the negotiations. The Hungarian nobles, as we have seen, were summoned to a diet in Buda on April 15 to discuss support for a crusade, for which it voted approval and levied a special tax. Some of the most powerful ecclesiastical and lay magnates agreed to accompany the king. Venice was informed of these events by Regardaia by early May.\textsuperscript{77} However, the negotiations at Adrianople in June and the meeting lo Sengedio in late July delayed the expedition beyond the normal campaigning season, and thereby seriously impaired its chances for success. The sultan crossed to Anatolia on July 12, and thus the delay in the commencement of the expedition had achieved the important objective of removing Murad across the Straits. It had, however, also given him the time he needed to attack Karaman and end the danger there by concluding a peace treaty. The two months of June and July were to prove a serious loss to the crusaders; however, the fleet was in position in the Straits by late July.

Our main source for the route of the crusaders and the climactic battle is Andreas de Palatio, the papal collector of the tithe, who accompanied Vladislav and was an eyewitness to the battle. His letter from Posen dated May 16, 1445, describes these events in detail.\textsuperscript{78} Vladislav was still in Buda on July 24 when he wrote to the king of

\textsuperscript{76} Halecki, The Crusade of Varna, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{77} Iorga, Notas et atque, III, 267-268.

\textsuperscript{78} Printed by Lewoch, Custos apostolica, II, no. 398.
Bosnia. In early July he had planned to have his troops assembled at Grosswardein by the 15th. At Szegedin on August 4 he issued a manifesto designating September 1 for the start of the expedition. His Polish subjects, however, opposed his undertaking another expedition against the Turks. When the Polish diet met at Piotrków on August 26, Oleśnicki led the campaign to have the magnates request the return of the king to Poland. Czarina’s influence over the king meant that a successful crusade would strengthen the pope’s position, a result completely at odds with Oleśnicki’s support of the conciliarists. Moreover, there were serious problems in Poland—a dispute with Lithuania over Podolian territory that he asserted required the return of the king. Vladislav had written to the diet reporting the peace terms offered at Adrianople, and on August 26 the diet sent a message urging him to accept the terms and return to Poland. This the king refused to do, replying to the diet on September 22 en route to Varna. The king was, however, supported by Polish nobles who had accompanied him: Jan Koniecpolski, the chancellor, and Peter of Szczechociny, the vice-chancellor, who together directed the foreign policy of Poland. The decision of the diet did deprive Vladislav of some Polish reinforcements, which were not significant even in 1443.

The commencement of the crusade caused panic in Adrianople. Orkhan, a grandson of Bayazid who had taken refuge with the Byzantines, was freed and went to the Dobruja, where he attempted to raise a revolt against Murad. In Adrianople the sultan’s twelve-year-old son was not able to control events when a power struggle broke out between the grand vizir Chamsarif Khalid and his rivals Zaganiuz and the beglerbeg of Rumelia. Then a fire in Adrianople, caused by rioting of the janissaries, destroyed a considerable part of the city.

From Szegedin the crusaders proceeded to Temesvár and headed southeast, crossing the Danube at Orłowa on September 20 with sixteen thousand knights and two thousand wagons. The army had much the same contingents as the previous year, although depleted by the defection of the eight thousand Serbs.

On September 24 they crossed the Timok river, which formed the frontier with the Ottoman vassal state of Bulgaria, and reached Florentin, then marched to Vidin on the Danube by September 26. It was

79 See Langer, Notes on easterns, II, 407, for the report of the Ragusa merchants at the Hungarian court to their government.
80. Lewicki, Codex quatuorvstae, 1, 148–142. The ansambo reminded Vladislav that they had agreed to his acceptance of the Hungarian throne because of the Turkish threat.
81. Isabell, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 20–21.
82 Dlugosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 880; Langer, Notes on easterns, XI, 168–189.
decided that, because of the time of year and the necessity of joining the fleet, they would not attempt to take the city. The route led east to Nicopolis; to turn south there across the Balkan mountains would have been the quickest, however, the two thousand wagons prevented them from taking this route.

On October 16 the army reached Nicopolis. Since Vladislav did not have sufficiently powerful artillery to attack the strong walls, he contented himself with burning the suburbs. Vlad Dracul, the voivode of Wallachia, had met the king near Nicopolis with four thousand mounted soldiers who were to accompany the crusaders under the command of Vlad’s two sons. He was apparently shocked to realize the smallness of the crusading forces, and Długosz reports that Vlad attempted to persuade Vladislav to turn back by remarking that Murad was able to bring more men on a hunting party than Vladislav had brought for a crusade. Vlad, who had offered no support the previous year, was probably supporting Vladislav as a result of Hunyadi’s efforts at Adrianople to have Wallachia included in the agreements and accorded favorable terms.

The crusaders remained at Nicopolis for two or three days, then followed a Roman road to the coast. It is possible that the army marched along the Danube, crossing the Varna river, turning southeast to Shumen (Szumla) and thence east to Novi Pazar. Callimachus has Hunyadi leading the army with three thousand Hungarians and the Wallachians, followed by the wagons with the king leading the remainder of the troops. The crusaders plundered and burned all along their route, not even sparing the Orthodox churches. On October 24, according to Długosz, Vladislav addressed an offer to the Turkish strongholds of Shumen, Mahomac, Provadiya, Varna, Kavarna, and Galata offering the defenders safe conduct to Adrianople if they surrendered these places without a struggle; he used Turkish prisoners to deliver his messages, which were spurned.

Around October 25, according to Michael Beheim, the crusaders were at Shumen, where they assaulted the city for two days, capturing it the third day. A tower with fifty Turkish soldiers was bitterly defended until the crusaders set it on fire, thereby killing the defenders. Here Vladislav encamped for seven days. He sent a detachment of five hundred men to attack Tarnovo, but three hundred of them were lost in the unsuccessful attack on the town.

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24 Callimachus, cit. Kwiatkowski, pp. 146-147.
25 Michael Beheim in von Karasj, ed., Quellen, p. 133.
On November 4 the crusaders again started out, crossing an arid plateau and reaching a castle (possibly near Kaspiyans) which was taken by storm. The army remained here for two days besieging and then plundering the castle. On November 7 the army arrived at the city and castle of Provadia, which was located atop a high mountain.66 The crusaders opened a breach in the wall through which they gained entrance, capturing the castle and—according to Palaeo’s report—killing five thousand Turks. There Cesarini received a letter from Francis Con- dulmer reporting that the sultan had made peace with the emir of Karaman and on October 15 had crossed the Bosporus with his army, consisting of thirty thousand to forty thousand men.67

En route to the Dardanelles Wavrin’s galleys had stopped at Tenedos (Bozja-ada) to search for the site of ancient Troy,68 arriving at the entrance to the Dardanelles two days later. There Guavin Quiéret, carrying the duke’s pennant, landed and successfully engaged the Turks. Then the Burgundainsi sailed to Gallipoli, where they joined with the papal fleet and where they found cardinal Condestable suffering from fever. Condestable and Wavrin, each with two galleys, sailed to Con- stantinople to meet with John VIII. Wavrin left the Burgundaensi galleys under the command of Guavin Quiéret and Peter Vas, who together with the papal galleys maintained the blockade at Gallipoli. Here in late September they were joined by the galleys from Rhodes under Geoffrey of Thoisy.69 By September 19 the victory at Rhodar was known to Ciriaco at Constantinople. On September 27 he visited the Christian fleet at Gallipoli.

At Constantinople, according to John (Johan) of Wavrin’s chroni- cle, the plan of the blockade was decided upon. The papal galleys, those of Venice, and two Burgundaensi galleys were to patrol between Gallipoli and Lampsacus, in the Dardanelles. Some of the galleys, possibly the Ragusan, were stationed in the Bosporus. Early in October news reached the fleet that the sultan was marching toward the Dardanelles with the intention of forcing a crossing there. Wavrin left the galleys under Vas and returned to Constantinople with Quiéret to confer with the galleys captains stationed there.70 Wavrin and the others realized that the ga-

66 Callionerius, ed. Kustowius, p. 149. Dhogam, Historia pedamana, XII, ed. 802, and Lanunctura, Historiae rumanaeazarizum (Frankfurt, 1592), p. 513, confirm that the city was taken by storm.
67 Estimate of the number of men in the sultan’s army taken from the funeral oration delivered by Pompilo Bruciello, in Misi, Scriptores, N, 374–384.
68 Wavrin, ed. Hardy, V, 38.
leys stationed in the Bosporus were in serious danger of being sunk by cannon which the sultan had had mounted on the Asiatic shore. The strait was narrow enough to enable the Turks thereby to prevent the ships from remaining on patrol there. During Wavrin’s inspection the Turks demonstrated the effectiveness of this tactic by firing on them from the Anatolian fortress of Anadolu Hisar. 31 Queret and Jean Bayart, another Burgundian, returned to John VIII to persuade him of the necessity of having Byzantine troops secure the European shore of the Bosporus: “Il est impossible que galees se puissent tenir au destroit tant que les deux rivages seront occupée par les Turcoz.” So pitiful was the state of the emperor’s resources that all he could promise was two Byzantine galleys; he had no other support to give.

Unable to cross at the Dardanelles, the sultan and his army marched to the Bosporus. On October 15 Khalil Pasha with seven or eight thousand Turkish soldiers, with cannon and artillery, were taken across by the Genoese of Pera in their boats 32 and occupied the European shore of the Bosporus.

On October 16 the sultan arrived at the Anatolian shore with what Wavrin estimates at three or four thousand soldiers and five to six hundred camels. During the night the Turks had moved cannon into place on the European shore, and on the morning of the sixteenth they began bombarding the galleys. The fleet attempted to advance but, being bombarded from both shores, was forced to retire. Moreover, it was hampered by adverse winds and the unwillingness of the Venetians to risk their ships’ being sunk by cannon. Thus, the fleet made no serious attempt to prevent Murad’s forces from crossing. The sultan with his troops then crossed under the walls of Anadolu Hisar, the narrowest point of the strait, where Europe and Asia almost touch. On the evening of the sixteenth a storm arose which forced the Christian galleys into port, thereby enabling the harder Turks to cross over unopposed. The Byzantine galleys, which had attempted to come close to shore, were badly damaged by the cannon. The fleet had waited in vain for two or three months for the arrival of the crusaders. Had Vladislav not delayed crossing the Danube until the third week in September,

31 Wavrin, ed. Hardy, V 47, "... de moy s’en suit a entendre que une collection pourroit tyrer don cant a l’aprite, come a scoverse de la Turquye en Crone, et de Grcie en Basquey, et que journalairement les Turquez en cost chantel tyrment ecovers, que pouvoient per damoz les galees." See ibid., pp. 47–51, for the crossing by the Turks.

but crossed on September 1, the crusading army could have been at Constantinople by October 16 and effectively prevented the Ottoman crossing.

Murad joined his son Mehmed and Khalil Pasha, who had gathered all the available troops in Rumelia, numbering seven to eight thousand additional men. Loredan dispatched a letter to Cesarini, but by the time it reached him Murad was already close to Varna.

Meanwhile, on November 8 the crusaders stormed the castle of Michelisch, perhaps located on the upper Devnya lake about four miles from the sea. Palazzo reports that a detachment of crusaders found and burned on the Kamschyiya river a Turkish flotilla of twenty-eight ships, which were apparently to be used on the Danube. On November 9 the king arrived at Varna, where the city and Galata, Marcopoli, and Kavarna surrendered to him, the Turkish garrisons having fled. Vladislav and the crusaders encamped in front of the city. On the evening of November 9 the crusaders saw the campfires of the Turks about half a mile away. Vladislav ordered the outposts of the camp to be strengthened, all soldiers to remain armed, and a council of war to be called for the early morning of November 10.

Murad had arrived in Adrianople in late October and from there marched to Nicopolis, whence he followed the crusaders; on November 5 he was at Shumen. On the night of November 9 he encamped in the position from which he intended to attack, controlling the heights above Varna with the crusading army between him and the sea. The only line of retreat, to the north, was a wasteland.

The crusaders decided to take the offensive, and formed their line in a crescent stretching from the lake in front of the walls of the city back toward the Black Sea. On the far left was Hunyadi, with five banners of his soldiers and the Hungarian barons. In the middle was Vladislav with his Hungarian and Polish troops. Here where the king's banner flew, together with the banner of St. George carried by Stephen Bathori of Transylvania, some two thousand troops were stationed. The right wing was composed of Hungarian troops under five banners, including Cesarini's. Between the king and Cesarini were stationed the banners of the bishop of Bosnia, Rafael Herczeg; Simon Rozgonyi, bishop of Erzau; and Francis Thallóczy, ban of Croatia. At the far right were John Dominik, bishop of Grosswardein, and some Polish

93. Michael Bozena in Karapet, ed., Quellen, p. 133.
94. Désaguliez, Histoire pontificale, XII, ed. 1883.
95 Palazzo, in Locutio, Cletus aquindinum, 1, 29
troops. Hunyadi kept a reserve force of Wallachians behind the center of the line. The entire line stretched for about five thousand feet and thus was inadequately defended by twenty-five thousand men. The army had only light artillery, which consisted of small-caliber cannon and catapults and which do not seem to have been used in the battle.

Opposite the left wing of the crusaders the sultan stationed the European mounted cavalry under Davud Pasha, to the left of which were the Anatolian mounted troops under Karaja Beg. Facing the right of the crusader line were the asklaljs, irregular mounted troops who served for plunder and fought in a freewheeling manner, outside the discipline of the regular Turkish soldiers, and the azeks, Turkish footsoldiers from the provinces. In the center behind the mounted Anatolian and European cavalry stood the sultan, surrounded by the janissaries. The cavalry were arranged in rectangles, each divided into squadrons. The Ottoman army may have numbered sixty thousand, although it is uncertain how many men the sultan actually had under his command.

For three hours after stationing themselves the crusaders awaited the Turkish attack. The battle began with an attack by the asklaljs and azeks on the crusaders' right wing, which was thrown back by Rozgonyi and Thallóczy. Reportedly at one point Murad contemplated flight from the battlefield, and was constrained by his jannissaries. When the asklaljs attacked, the Anatolian sipahis moved forward; after the first assault failed the asklaljs again attacked, engaging the forces under Thallóczy and Simon Rozgonyi. Then Cesareni and Thallóczy were attacked from the left by the sipahis; their lines broke and they sought the refuge of the wagon barricade. The bishops of Croazwardein and Erlau could not maneuver quickly enough and were caught between the city and the lake. Both attempted to make it across the swampy terrain to Galata and failed; apparently they were killed. The Turks reached the seacoast and the barricade of 2,000 wagons, defended by only two hundred men.

Meanwhile Hunyadi and Vladislav attacked the Anatolian sipahis, driving them back some four thousand feet, killing Karaja Beg, and effectively driving the Anatolians from the field. The camels of the sultan's army apparently frightened the horses of the crusaders, preventing the king and Hunyadi from moving forward. Hunyadi placed Vladislav in his former position, requesting him not to move without his instructions. The left wing of the crusader army was engaged in battle with the Rumelian sipahis. Hunyadi charged to the attack there,

96 Kayserwan, Der Kämpfer, pp. 96-97.
97 Díósgyóri, Historia Poenonica, XII, cols. 804-805.
leaving the king with his household troops as a reserve force. This atta-
cck resulted in a forward movement of the Hungarian force, driving
the entire right wing of the Ottoman cavalry from the field and leaving
only the janissaries with Murad in the center.

Chalcocondylas relates Vladislav's Polish troops urged him to at-
tack the janissaries and not to allow Hunyadi all the glory of victory.98
Vladislav charged into the janissaries, who unhorsed him and beheaded
him, placing his head on a lance held above the army. Hunyadi was
unable to come to Vladislav's aid quickly enough, and when the news
of the king's death spread the army panicked and fled the field. The
wagon barricade may not have been taken until the next day, when
Stephen Bathori was killed. The Turks did not follow the retreating
crusaders; Murad remained for three days on the battlefield and then
returned to Adrianople. Sometimes during the battle or soon thereafter
Cesareni was killed. Various reports of his death circulated; the only
certain fact is that he did not leave the area alive.99 Hunyadi fled and
reached the Danube, where he was taken prisoner by Vlad Dracul, who
released him after some time.

Incredibly, the crusading army had nearly carried the day. Had
Brankovich and his 8,000 Serbs been at Varna with Vladislav, it is pos-
sible that the victory might have been a Christian one. The Turks had
suffered heavy losses, and had turned possible defeat into victory
through the reckless act of the king. Even then the triumph was not
immediately evident when, at the day's end, both armies withdrew to
their camps. Indeed it was reported that Murad was not sure that he was
the victor for three days. But if the Turks had suffered heavily, the
crusaders and been crippled. They could not have withstood another bat-
tle. At Varna the Turks had employed muskets for the first time.100

The failure of the crusade sealed the fate of Byzantium nine years
later. Varna brought the Turks to the walls of Belgrade in 1448 and
to the walls of Vienna in a generation.

98. Chalcocondylas, ed. Dobbs, p. 137
99. Calculations, ed. Kiessling, p. 129, states that Cesareni was killed while fleeing the
battlefield. Warras, ed. Hardy, v. 57, says that Cesareni made it to the Danube where he was
drowned by the Wallachians. Thurner, op. cit., p. 251, says merely that he was killed. On June 1
1443, Antonio Sylva wrote in Guelfic in Zurich to Milan that Cesareni was killed by the Hun-
garians (in Wolken, Der Streßwechsel, LXI-2, 396). Dlugosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 410
says that he was killed by the Wallachians. By November 13, 1444, news of the battle had reached
Vienna, since on that date Antonio Sylva wrote to the dukes of Milan reporting that the fleet
was being assured of orthodoxy. They were, however, not able to keep guard because of a lack
of provisions, and Murad was able to come into Europe with forty thousand men. He reported
that there was no certain news about Vladislav and that Cesareni had been killed (in Wolken
Der Streßwechsel, LXI-2, pp. 487-490).
100. Janczik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 21.
IX
THE OTTOMAN TURKS
AND THE CRUSADES,
1451-1522

A. Mehmed the Conqueror’s Empire,
1431-1481

At the accession of Mehmed II to the throne in 1451 all the enemies of the Ottomans were confident, remembering the desperate condition of the Turkish state during his first sultanate (1444-1446). Ottoman client states in the Balkans and Anatolia, as well as Byzantium,

Besides the works cited in the bibliographical note to chapter VII, above, the following are useful for the period 1451-1482: Robert Schwindel, The Shadow of the Crescent, the Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517) (New York, 1967); Ahmet Nihat, “Neue Arman expose,” in Archiv für Orientalistik und Islamwissenschaft, Vol. 29 (1984), pp. 10-59; Esmail Hadjić, Adven-
tures of a Janissary, (in English, ed. Benjamin Sosh and Ilonka Soschak (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1975) — he was captured in 1453 and returned to Christendom in 1462. T. Späth, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs, ed. Charles Schuchardt (Paris, 1956), Important: for the organization of the Ottoman state under Mehmed II; Carl Göbl, Reformation des osmanischen Türkenreiches: vol. 1, 1500-1520 (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1961); Michael Crieholzer (Kritenvorlesungen), History of Mehmed the Conqueror, tr. Charles E. Kinsley (Princeton, 1956); Johannes Holle, Joh-

On Mehmed the Conqueror see Crocombe and Celenk (above), and Tommas Bag (a high official, close to the sultan), The History of Mehmed the Conqueror publ. with tr. by Halil Inalcik and Radoslav V. Stojanov (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978), the most detailed and authoritative.

1 For the first sultanate of Mehmed II, 1444-1446, and for the period 1451-1453 see Inalcik, Fifth century, pp. 58-156.
issued threats and even launched attacks against the Ottomans. In Anatolia Ibrahim Beg of Karaman not only seized control of several fortresses in the Hamid area, but also encouraged pretenders to intensify their activities in the provinces of Germiyan, Aydin, and Menteshe. Under these threatening circumstances Mehmed II moved to confirm the treaties made during his father's reign with the Serbs and the Byzantines. He agreed to cede Alanya-Hissar (Krushevats) and some other frontier fortresses to the Serbian despot George Brankovich (1427-1456). As for the Byzantine emperor Constantine XI (1448-1453), not only did he take control of areas extending as far as Chorlu, but he also demanded that a yearly payment of 300,000 akças should be paid to meet the expenses of the pretender Orkhan Chelebi, who was sequestered in Constantinople.

Mehmed sent Karaja Pasha to Sofia to counter a possible attack by the Hungarians, while he himself set out with the army in May to deal with the situation in Anatolia. As Mehmed marched eastward the Byzantine envoys made new demands on him, threatening to release the pretender Orkhan Chelebi. By ceding the port and fortress of Alanya, Mehmed sought to make a peaceful settlement with the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg, and had made preparations for a prompt return to Adrianople (Edirne). When the envoys demanded increased wages, he reorganized the corps, giving decisive evidence of his resolution and power. But as a ghazi leader he needed prompt military

back in Turkish on Mehmed; Dökmeci, Akyildiz's Adel Osman, Defter VII, ed Safaeddin Tunç (Ankara, 1954), the most important compilation by an Ottoman historian, Inalikd, Fethiederi Usfuradda Tổllu ve Tüzül, 1 (Ankara, 1954), emphasizing Christian caravans being in Mehmed II's early years; Balbinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and his Times, to Ralph Maudslay ed William C. Hixson (Princeton, 1978), with additional sources on works published after the original 1951 German edition; reviewed by Isalik in Speculum, XXXV (1960), 408-427; and Inalikd, "Mehmed II," in İslam Ansiklopedisi, VII (1955), 506-533.


victories as proof of his ability and his commitment to restoring Islamic superiority in the Balkans.

In order to establish his authority Mehmed and his former tutor Zaganouz resolved to take the offensive. On returning from the Karaman campaign he gave orders to Chandarli Khali Pasha in August 1452 for the construction of a fortress, Rumel-Hisar, on the European shore of the Bosporus opposite Anadolu Hisar, as a first step toward a siege of Constantinople. Thus the city was completely cut off from the sources of its food supply in the Black Sea, and reinforcements to the Ottoman army could pass unhindered from Anatolia.

Chandarli Khali Pasha, a capable diplomat, had already taken steps to ensure Venice’s neutrality by renewing the terms of the Venetian-Ottoman agreement on September 10, 1451, and had accommodated Venetian demands with regard to the question of wheat export, a sensitive issue for Venice. Similarly, a three-year armistice with Hungary had been signed on November 20, 1451, again granting concessions. In the fall of 1452 the Ottoman frontier lords in the Morea took the offensive, but although the Byzantine emperor had sent an envoy to Venice in the winter of 1451–1452 he had been unsuccessful in stiring the west into military action. There was a general belief in Christian Europe at this time that the Ottomans would not immediately undertake the siege of Constantinople.

Actually Mehmed II thought that the grand vizir, Chandarli Khali, presented the greatest obstacle to his plan for the conquest of Constantinople. Chandarli feared that in the event of a successful conquest he would lose all his influence, whereas a major military setback would place the Ottoman state in a dangerous position. The young sultan believed that Chandarli might not fully cooperate with him in his attack. In a war council before the siege, the sultan’s warlike policy was received with enthusiasm by those such as Zaganouz who expected their own power to benefit from the changes which victory would bring. The more cautious party, represented by Chandarli Khali, laid stress on the impregnability of the walls, as well as on the dangers from the west, but the war party, with the sultan at its head, was in the majority and Chandarli had to acquiesce.

During the actual siege, which lasted for fifty-four days (April 6–May 29), these opposing viewpoints would again come to the fore at two critical junctures. The outcome of the siege depended largely on the time factor. Both the Byzantines and the Ottomans were influenced throughout the course of the siege by rumors of the approach of land or sea forces in aid of the city. In the final week of May word that
John Hunyadi had crossed the Danube and that a crusader fleet had set out for the Bosporus was spread among the Ottoman army. These rumors and the sultan’s attempts to secure the surrender of the city through peace offers engendered concern and unrest among the Ottoman troops, who criticized the young Mehmed for “exposing his people and the state to utter destruction by entering into an undertaking whose accomplishment was impossible”. In the war council which was then convened Chandarli again drew attention to the dangers involved in provoking the western world, and emphasized the necessity of ending this dangerous war by reaching some sort of understanding with the Byzantines. Chandarli’s arguments were countered by Zaganuz, who stated his conviction that the Christian rulers would, as in the past, fail to unite for common action, and that even if they were able somehow to field an army the superior Ottoman forces were equal to the challenge. Thereupon, the decision was taken to make a general assault on May 29, and it was left to Zaganuz to organize the attack. The sultan proclaimed it in these terms. “the stones [buildings] and the land of the city and the city’s appurtenances belong to me; all other goods and property, prisoners and foodstuffs are booty for the troops.” Three days of sack were granted.2

The western and the Turkish sources agree that the eventual success of the Ottomans came chiefly as the result of two events: the breaching of the walls by the Ottoman artillery bombardment, and the disputes which arose between the Byzantines and the Latins defending the city after the wounding and withdrawal from the sight of the Genoese supreme commander John Guastiniani-Longo the whole defense collapsed. The Ottoman army entered the city through a large breach made by bombardment in the wall. Emperor Constantine was killed in hand-to-hand combat. The Ottoman and Byzantine sources also agree in reporting that Mehmed the Conqueror (Fatih) felt sadness as he toured the looted city, his future capital. The inhabitants were enslaved and taken away, either into the tents of the army outside the city or onto ships. After he visited Hagia Sophia he proclaimed “to his vizirs and

his commanders and his officers that henceforth his capital was to be Istanbul”.

The conquest of Constantinople opened a new chapter in the history of crusading activities in Europe. Until the death of Mehmed II in 1481, the popes did their utmost to convince the western nations that organization of a crusade under papal leadership was the most immediate and pressing task facing Europe. In this new phase of crusading activities the keynote was that now western Christendom itself was in direct danger from an aggressive Islam and that a crusade, if launched, would defend Europe and its Christian civilization. The immediate goal of a crusade was no longer the deliverance of the holy places but of Constantinople, and the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. In his vow for a crusade Calixtus III (1455–f458) would seek forgiveness for postponing for a time the sacred goal of recapturing the holy places.

The Ottoman success radically altered the strategic situation at the expense of Christian Europe. For western Christendom, perhaps the most important consequence of the Ottoman conquest was the loss of European control of the Straits, which deprived the west of an important strategic advantage, the ability to cut communications between the European and Asiatic territories of the Ottoman empire. Though this strategy had never proved as effective as crusading plans had called for it to be, largely because of Genoese intransigence, nevertheless it had had a restraining effect on the Ottomans. Even more important than its effect on military strategy, Ottoman control of the Straits isolated the Italian colonies on the shores of the Black Sea and left them at the mercy of the Ottomans.

To his plans to build a “universal” empire, Mehmed fully appreciated the strategic significance of the Straits as a check on Venetian seapower. During his thirty-year reign he created a series of defense lines from Tenedos to the Black Sea to make Istanbul invulnerable from the sea. With bases at Gallipoli, İzmit (Nicomedia), and Istanbul, and protected by these strong defenses, his strengthened navy became a real challenge to Venetian seapower and an effective instrument in his empire-building. In 1454 Mehmed sent his navy, fifty vessels in all, to the Black Sea to compel the submission of the states and colonies there. The navy first attacked Akkerma, forcing the submission on October 5, 1455, of Peter I of Aron, voivode of Moldavia, to the sultan with a yearly tribute of 2,000 gold ducats.

As a result of his capture of the seat of the Caesars, Mehmed considered himself their successor, and laid claim to all the territories which the Byzantine emperors and formerly ruled. The inspiration for his
expanded empire may be linked to several sources, including the Turco-Mongol concept of empire and the Islamic caliphate, but we know for certain that the possession of the Byzantine throne carried a great personal significance for Mehmed. In directing his conquests against the Christian world of the west, Mehmed was now able to justify his claim to be the successor to the Roman empire. The idea of founding a “universal” empire always lay behind Mehmed’s plans in his efforts to pursue his conquests and military campaigns and to raise the ruined city of Istanbul to the status of a great and wealthy capital city, sometimes at the expense of the other cities of his realm.

As successor to the Byzantine emperors, Mehmed concentrated his immediate efforts on eliminating, one by one, all the dynasts who were in a position to lay claim to the throne of Byzantium. First he disposed of David Comnenus, the last emperor of Trebizond (1458–1461, d. 1463), next the two despots in the Morea, and then the Cattalus family in Lesbos and Aegina, whose sons had married into the Palaeologan house.

In the concept and methods of Mehmed II’s conquests the outstanding feature is his abandonment of the beylik system of semi-autonomous rule by local magnates and princes in Rumelia and Anatolia in favor of outright annexation, by which he attempted to accelerate the process of establishing a centralized empire. By so doing Mehmed revived the aggressive policy of Bayazid I (1389–1402), which had been abandoned in favor of a policy of compromise during the civil war of 1402–1413 and the sultanates of Mehmed I (1413–1421) and Murad II (1421–1451). The capture of Constantinople had signified the final victory of the group of military men who pursued a policy of war and annexation over the group favoring caution and compromise. It was not until somewhat later in his reign that Mehmed was able to realize his centralizing ambitions in Anatolia, but he proceeded without delay in the Balkans.

Following the old Ottoman policy Mehmed incorporated into the imperial war machine the pre-Ottoman military groups. Both among the tamarot cavalry forces and as separate and intact groups, Christian soldiers played an important role in his army. The proportion of Christian tamar-holders in the Balkan provinces as recorded in the survey registers of Mehmed II’s time ranged from three percent to over thirty percent. The voynikis, who had constituted a group of lesser importance as peasant-soldiers, were present in large numbers in Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Albania, had Serbia. The registers also show that the system of rewarding certain groups with tax exemption in return for service to the state was to a large extent preserved under the Ottoman regime. Mehmed's reason for leaving the local institutions and groups intact in certain areas such as Serbia and Bosnia was his concern to preserve these areas as secure and loyal frontier zones along the borders with Hungary.

During Mehmed II's reign more than at any other time the Ottoman state took on the role of champion in the holy war against the Christian world. He was aware that in the west the idea of European unity and of combining forces in a crusade was embodied by the pope, whom the Ottomans considered their arch-enemy. The cornerstone of Mehmed's strategy was to avoid a crusade from the west, and in particular to escape the necessity of battling simultaneously on two fronts, in Rumelia and in Anatolia.

The fall of Constantinople was looked upon as a major disaster in the west, and stirred up a strong reaction throughout Europe. Pope Nicholas V (1447–1455) was successful in establishing peace and a league among the Italian states in 1454, and invited all the governments in Europe to the preparation of a crusade. There is no doubt that the Ottoman court was well informed about these initiatives. Mehmed quickly moved to sign a treaty with Venice on April 18, 1454, in order to neutralize the republic and ensure that it would not provide the naval support on which success of the crusader plans so heavily depended. Venice, for its part, benefited from the treaty, which recognized its trade privileges within the Ottoman empire, with only a minimal customs fee of two percent for goods entering and leaving the empire. The republic also retained the right to maintain a bailie in Istanbul as a permanent representative at the Porte to look after Venetian interests. By agreeing to pay tribute for their colonies in the Black Sea and in the Aegean, the Genoese also reached an understanding with the sultan. However, the Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes, on the direct orders of the pope, announced that they would never pay a yearly tribute. An Ottoman naval campaign of 1454 into the Aegean under the command of Hamza Beg accomplished little.

It appears that in January 1455, when Mahmud Pasha was appointed grand vizir, a more decisive policy toward the Aegean islands, aimed at direct Ottoman control, was adopted. 4 Mehmed had already declared war against Rhodes and Chios, and now, accusing Domenico Gattiluso,
the lord of Lesbos, of siding with the Chians, he also threatened him with invasion. Lesbos managed to secure a reprieve by agreeing to raise its tribute to ten thousand ducats. Still pursuing the new more aggressive policy, however, the Ottomans occupied Old Phocaea in December 1455 and Asinou toward the end of January or February 1456, in addition to the islands of Imbros and Samothrace, which belonged to a branch of the Gottiliuni family. The Ottoman initiative seems to have been prompted by both a dynastic rivalry over the possession of these islands and Ottoman concern over an attack by the crusader fleet which was being readied by the pope. Under the suave Ismail the Ottoman fleet also occupied Lemnos upon the invitation of the Greek islanders, who rose up against Nicholas Gottiliuni in May 1456. The unsuccessful intervention against the islanders by Nicholas’s brother Domenico, prince of Lesbos, enraged the sultan.

The fate of the northern Aegean islands had become a major concern in the papal court too. After the fall of Imbros and Samothrace the island of Lesbos itself was in imminent danger. Domenico sent urgent appeals for aid to Genoa and the pope. Genoa sent a warship with reinforcements, and Calixtus III gave priority to this issue, giving orders to accelerate the pace of preparations of the papal fleet. Alarmed by the implications of the Ottoman advance for the security of Euboea, Venice considered for a moment the occupation of Lemnos and Imbros for itself. The sultan’s new policy of direct control was obviously motivated by his concern to safeguard his western flank and Istanbul before setting out against Belgrade, as planned for the following spring. Control of these islands was to be one of the principal issues between the Ottomans and Christian Europe for the next two centuries. Actually preparations for such a naval attack had been on the drawing board ever since the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

Despite the peace achieved in Italy by the treaty of Lodi on April 9, 1454, and conclusion of a defensive and aggressive alliance against the Ottomans for a period of twenty-five years among the Italian powers on February 25, 1455, realistic statesmen such as Francis Sforza, duke of Milan (1450–1466), Cosimo de’ Medici in Florence (1434–1464), and

8. Ibid.
Alfonso I of Naples (1442–1458) were not convinced by the exaggerated reports of an imminent Ottoman invasion. Outside Italy in Christian Europe we find the same indifference to the pope’s call for the crusade. While Venice and the papacy were interested in heightening crusading zeal for their own purposes, these potentates coolly considered the Ottoman threat as a check against the ambitions of their powerful rivals in Italy. Their indifference has puzzled modern historians, but in actuality an Ottoman invasion of Italy in 1453 was only a remote possibility, in view of the fact that the Christian powers, principally Venice and Aragon, had a clear naval superiority in the Mediterranean. In addition, Christian outposts in Albania, the Morea, and the Aegean posed a serious obstacle in the way of any Ottoman advance. Also Hungary, which was threatening the Ottomans in Serbia, had become Mehmed’s main concern at this time.

The preparation of the papal fleet, for which the date of departure had been fixed as March 1, 1456, was as usual delayed by various mishaps. The fleet, consisting of sixteen galleys with 5,000 soldiers and 300 cannon,10 was finally able to put out to sea only in mid-June 1456. One goal of the expedition was to divert some of the Ottoman forces from the Hungarian front, and another was to release Chios and Lesbos from their submission to the sultan, and secure their cooperation in recapturing the northern Aegean islands occupied by the Ottomans. In this way the revival of the Christian League against the Turks in the Aegean would be realized.

Chios, however, would not agree to repudiate its allegiance to the sultan and join the papal forces. It had already agreed to pay Mehmed 30,000 ducats in indemnity and to raise its yearly tribute to 10,000 ducats.11 The Chians were anxious not to jeopardize their trade with the sultan’s dominions, which was vital to their existence.

The papal fleet occupied Lemnos and Imbros by agreement and Thasos by force, and left garrisons for their defense. The Turkish navy was absent during all these operations, obviously because it was engaged on the Black Sea during the Belgrade campaign in the summer and because of the mariners’ annual abandonment of their ships in the autumn. Despite a tendency among western historians to minimize the importance of this papal intervention in the Aegean, the sources indicate that it created a grave situation for the Ottomans, especially in view of developments in Lesbos. Upon the arrival of the crusaders’

navy at Mytilene, Domenico and Nicholas Gattilusio, as Critobulus informs us, declared their repudiation of the sultan's authority. Nicholas, who had been expelled from Lemnos by Mehmed, advocated a policy of resistance to the Ottomans. Twelve frigates of the papal fleet stayed on at Mytilene.13

Mehmed sent a powerful fleet under Ismail, governor of Gallipoli and admiral of the fleet, against the Gattilusio in the spring of 1457.14 Judging from the preparations for the Ottoman fleet, it can be said that the sultan had in mind annexing Lesbos as he had the other northern Aegean islands. The papal squadron retreated to Chios. The Ottoman admiral laid siege to the fortress of Molybdo, without result and subsequently left the island, returning to Gallipoli on August 9. Domenico, declaring that the papal navy was incapable of protecting him, turned to the sultan and offered his submission by sending a tribute; in 1458 Nicholas accused him of aiding Mehmed and had him executed. During the course of 1457 both the Chians and William II Crispo, the duke of the Archipelago, had followed in Lesbos's footsteps and agreed to submit to the Ottomans.15

Lemnos and Thasos, still in Christian hands, were put by the pope under the protection of the grand master of the Hospitallers after the return of the papal fleet to Italy in 1458. The Venetians and the Catalans each wanted these strategic islands for themselves, but Calixtus III refused their request. After Calixtus died, the new pope, Pius II (1458–1464), planned to put them under the Genoese.16 At any rate, in 1457–1459 the Latins were trying to create on these islands bases for defense and for attack against the Ottomans, but in 1459–1460 Mehmed occupied them, ending the squabbles. A compromise with the Greek population, who resented the Latin occupation, enabled the sultan to take over these islands easily: he agreed that the despot Demetrius Palaeologus, an Ottoman protégé in the Morea, would take possession of the islands in return for recognition of Ottoman suzerainty, with the payment of a yearly tribute of three thousand ducats. Upon the conclusion of the agreement Zaganuz Pasha, the new Otto-

12 See Critobulus, tr. Riggs, pp. 130–139; Miller, op. cit., pp. 433–436, thinks that the Gattilusio continued paying their tribute to the sultan, but the tribute was taken to the sultan in August 1456 (Debus, p. 254) before the papal fleet arrived at Mytilene in the autumn.
13 Debus, tr. Mogavero, p. 254; Miller, op. cit., p. 434 thanks that the fleet departed in August.
14 The fleet comprised 156 sail and carried cannons and siege engines.
15 For the dates see Miller, op. cit., p. 435; Critobulus, tr. Riggs, p. 139, puts it after the campaign against the Morea in 1458.
16 Miller, op. cit., p. 434.
man admiral, came with the fleet and without difficulty occupied Thasos and Samothrace with the cooperation of the local Greek notables. In 1460, when the sultan conquered the Morea, the four islands and Aenos were granted as an appanage to Demetrius. 17

Despite paying tribute to the sultan to prevent an attack, Nicholas Gattilusio, the new master of Lesbos, took every measure to put the island in readiness while he urgently requested aid from Genoa. The sultan, accusing Nicholas of making secret agreements with the Italians and letting the Catalan corsairs use the island as a base, 18 made a decisive attack on Lesbos in 1462. While the grand vizier Mahmut arrived with a powerful fleet 19 and began the siege of the fortified city of Mytilene, the sultan himself came by land with the main part of the army and made camp on the mainland at Ayazmud in August. The walls were not able to withstand Mahmut's powerful artillery, and once the lower fortress Melanoudion had succumbed, Nicholas surrendered. 20 The whole island was immediately put under direct Ottoman rule. 21 Although a Venetian fleet was closely following the Otto-

17 The main source for all this is Crocubin, tr. Riggs, pp. 147–149, 149, 159–160, who was personally involved in the negotiations. Emphasis should be put on the agreement with the Greeks; the point is made in Miller, Schöning, andrenched M. Seaton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1375), II (Philadelphia, 1976), 223–224, 226. 18. Crocubin, II Riggs, p. 130. 19. According to Ducos, M. Magalatine, p. 361, the Ottoman fleet was composed of 7 warships and 60 galleons and galleys. According to an Ottoman survey of Callipolis dated 1479 (Istanbul, Belediye Library, Codex K no. 579), the Ottoman fleet based there was composed of four types of ships: andrygas (galleys), galatea (galleons),书店 (fetas), and egevele (large ship). Captains of andrygas numbered 32, of galateas 5, of书店 11, and of egevele 59. Transport ships were also called perrone or perroncer. The beak, crew, of the admiral's flagship included 20 arysta or marines, 7 mowers on the military board, and 5 slaves. For more see Augustin Jac. Archéologie marine (Paris, 1840), p. 474; each Andryga included an average of 196 knetre (hammers) and 100 fersina (sails). For the dated tremor mentioned above see Henry R. Kahane and Andreas Tzirtzis, The Lygias People in the Levant: Turkish Navalical Cloud of Julien and Greek Crisis (Urbana, 1958), and Hans A. von Gallus, Katal Krii in Beitrag zur Geschicchte der niedersten Freier (Mes., Boën, 1972), pp. 34–36. 20. Crocubin, tr. Riggs, p. 182. 21. For the reports names and common under Ottoman rule see the regulation of Midilli (Mytilene) published by Ömer Lütfi Barlas, XV. ve XVI. Yeni avrupa meselesi imparator- luktan zafer aksiyonlarım hikayesi ve small cudjere, 1, Kusam (Istanbul, 1943), 332–334; cf. the regulation of Lemnos published by Heath W. Lowry, "A Corpus of Exacts Kuman names for the Island of Lemnos . . .," Journal of Ottoman Studies, 1 (1998), 41–60.
man military operations, it was under orders to avoid direct confronta-
tion with the Ottoman forces. 22

Pius II showed himself just as enthusiastic and determined as Calix-
tus III for a general crusade of all Christian nations “to free Europe
from the disgrace of Turkish domination”. According to Ferdinand
Gregorovius, “the deliverance of Constantinople was the ideal of his
pontificate.” 23 The congress summoned by the pope for this purpose
convened at the time when the Ottomans were in the process of evict-
ing the papal forces from the northern Aegean islands. 24

The news of the fall of the Serbian despotate in June 1459 and the
arrival in Mantua of the envoys from the directly threatened kingdom
of Hungary and Bosnia galvanized a short-lived Christian European
alliance. To muster the forces needed to overcome the now powerful
army of the Ottomans was considered impossible, yet, prompted by
cardinal Bessarion, a Greek refugee in Rome, the decision was taken
to declare a general crusade of European nations for three years start-
ing in 1460. However, before setting out on his campaign against Treb-
izond, Mehmed was able to sign an armistice with the Knights Hospi-
talier of Rhodes.

Meanwhile in Albania the struggle against the Ottomans continued.
Up until 1463, when Venice openly took the Albanian rebels under
its own protection, both the king of Naples and the pope were actively
involved on that front. They provided the rebel leader Scanderbeg with
money and supplies and even sent troops. Before setting out on the
Trebizond campaign, however, Mehmed also negotiated an armistice
agreement with Scanderbeg.

The pope had convinced Hungary, the Ottomans’ major rival in Eu-
rope, that it should participate fully in the planned crusade. Conflict
between the Ottomans and Hungary was inevitable because of the ri-
vality over Serbia. In 1451 when Mehmed II came to the throne the
Serbian despot George Brankovich had seized the fortress of Alinja-
Hunar (Krushevo) and its environs, but on learning of the Ottoman
capture of Constantinople he offered to return it. The sultan responded
by sending an ultimatum in which he laid hereditary claim to all knez
Lazar’s former territories in the Morava river valley including Smede-
revo and Golubac, but promised to give up to Brankovich the Vuchitna-
Lab region (Vilk-ili), which had belonged to the despot’s father, Vuk.

1 22. Miller, op. cit., p. 439. Ottoman eyewitness accounts are given by Evert in Zihni Yeniceri
23 Pataur, op. cit., III, 13, 78.
24 Ibid., III, 85–96.
During Mehmed's campaign into the Morava river valley in 1454, the fortresses of Ortol (Omotricon) and Sifrice-Hisar (Ostrovitsa) were captured by the Ottomans, and the despot took refuge in Hungary. When the Ottoman army withdrew, John Hunyadi from Belgrade and the Serbs in the Kosovo area turned to the offensive in the fall of 1454. Hunyadi devastated the Vidin-Nish area, but the Serbs were beaten in the south.

In Mehmed's second Serbian campaign in 1455 he concentrated his forces against southern Serbia and Vilk-ihi. He took possession of a number of silver-producing towns, Trepcha, Novo Brdo (June 1, 1455), and the Lab valley. The despot's desperate appeal for a crusade did not yield any result and he had to give up all hope of recovering the silver mines of Novo Brdo, the source of his wealth and power. By limiting his demands to the return of Vilk-ihi to the Ottomans, Mehmed managed to reach a unilateral peace agreement with Brankovich to the exclusion of the Hungarians. The despot also agreed to pay a very large yearly tribute and to provide troops.

Once the Serbian despotate was neutralized, Mehmed II prepared a major campaign to assault the Hungarians from Belgrade and invaded Hungary in 1456. Twenty-one cannons, as well as a fleet of several hundred vessels, sixty-four of them galleys, were to be used in the campaign. Although internal dissension and hostility with the emperor Frederick III (1452-1493) weakened Hungary's defense, it received strong support from the papacy with the declaration of a crusade against the Ottomans and the sending of a papal fleet to the Aegean. The fiery preachings of the Franciscan friar John of Capistrano and the arrival of crusaders whom he had recruited from among the populace of Hungary and Germany gave the movement much the appearance of the earliest crusades. Mehmed's huge army caused panic in Italy, where many thought that Hungary could not resist the sultan's attack and that he intended to move his army into Italy after conquering Hungary.25

Although Mehmed's guns demolished Belgrade's defenses and a group of janissaries actually entered the city, Hunyadi was able to bring in reinforcements by breaking the blockade on the Danube (July 14). Thus the general assault was repulsed (July 21) and the sultan was forced to retreat (July 23).26

26 While Catholic sources (see Dubringer, Der Quellenwesen, 242 and Selznik, The Popacy, II, 179-182) give credit for the victory to John of Capistrano and his "crusaders", the Ottoman chronicles (especially Topa, Börek and Séz) confirm the Venetian and Hungarian sources by relating Hunyadi's key role. The Ottoman sources stress that Hunyadi first upset the sultan's
This major victory sent powerful vibrations throughout Christian Europe. Pope Calixtus III wrote that now he looked forward "not only to the recovery of Constantinople but also to the liberation of Europe, Asia, and the Holy Land." The activity of the pope's fleet in the Aegean in 1457 was thought to be a preliminary to the deliverance of Constantinople. Pope Pius II made contact with Uzun Hasan, ruler of the Akkoynulu Turks (1466–1478), and the Georgians in an attempt to encircle the Ottomans from the east.

In 1456 George Brankovich died and a dispute over the Serbian succession brought on a new crisis, with Mahmud supporting George's son Gregory against his brother Lazar II (1456–1458). About this time another dispute which had arose between the two Greek despots in the Morea, Demetrius and Thomas Palaeologus, had confused the situation in the south, so Venice intervened and claimed the Morea as part of its own sphere of influence. In Albania too the situation had deteriorated for the Ottomans in 1457, when Scanderbeg defeated the Ottoman forces in Albaniania. In response to these threats the sultan in the spring of 1458 sent Iskander with reinforcements against Scanderbeg, while he himself set out for the Morea with an army, and he dispatched the pretender Gregory to Serbia with an army under Mahmud Pasha. In response to a number of concessions on the part of Mahmud Pasha the Serbs surrendered a few fortresses in various parts of the country, including Golubac. However, an army under the personal command of the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus (Hunyadi, 1458–1490) in nearby Scanderbeg continued to pose a threat, and Mahmud withdrew his forces to the area around Nish.

At this juncture the sultan, having conquered those areas in the Morea formerly subject to emperor Constantine XI, arrived with his forces in Skopje (İsküb) and met with Mahmud Pasha. Matthias, following his father's example, waited to act until the onset of autumn and the expected annual disbanded of the Ottoman army. Mehmed II,

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27 Ibid., The Papacy, II, 833, note 99: the pope's letter to archbishop Arsenius Porolich at Florence written in August 1456.

however, responded with exceptional measures, and remained in Skoplje until at least November 1458. The king, who crossed the Danube and attacked Tantaliu, was forced by the Ottomans to retreat. In the spring of the following year the sultan himself led an army into the field against Smederevo. The Serbs came to Sofia in June 1459 to surrender the keys to the fortress; the Serbian despotate was once again annexed to the Ottoman empire. Next Mehmed crossed to Anatolia and took Amasra (Amassia) on the Black Sea from the Genoese without a battle.

Pope Pius II received the news of the surrender of Smederevo as an unmitigated disaster for the west, and consequently during the deliberations at the Congress of Mantua in 1459 the launching of a crusade was officially announced. As a result of the establishment of despot Thomas's control over the Morea with western support, Pius regarded the Morea as an excellent base for operations against the Ottomans. The sultan, however, invaded the Morea in 1460 and annexed the entire region, with the exception of a few fortresses on the coasts which belonged to Venice. The capture of Argos by the Ottomans finally convinced the Venetians of the necessity of declaring war (July 28, 1463).

Meanwhile, new developments in Wallachia and Bosnia had made inevitable the outbreak of an open conflict between the Hungarians and the Ottomans. In 1461 Mehmed had sought to regain the allegiance of the voivode of Wallachia, but Vlad III Tepesh ("the Impaler") had responded by allying himself with the king of Hungary instead, and even went so far as to take advantage of the sultan's absence during the Trebizond campaign to attack Ottoman outposts across the Danube. Consequently, in the summer of 1462 Mehmed invaded Wallachia, and appointed in Vlad's place his brother Radu III ("the Handsome"), who was living in the Ottoman palace. The king of Bosnia, Stephen Tomashevich (1461–1463), who espoused the western Catholic cause against the Ottomans, did not hesitate to hand some fortresses over to the Hungarians (1462). But because of the internal religious division his situation was hopeless, and Bosnia too was conquered by the sultan in 1463.

By 1463 this uninterrupted series of invasions convinced the Ottomans' two great rivals, Hungary and Venice, that the time had come for decisive action on their part. At long last the pope's efforts bore fruit, and Venice and Hungary signed a mutual offensive and defensive pact. The pope now believed that the crusade would become a reality. Signing an agreement with Venice and Burgundy, he set May
1464 as the date for the departure of a crusade. A plan was even prepared for dividing the lands of the Ottoman empire among the Christian states in case of victory. It provided that Venice would take the Morea, Boeotia, Attica, and the coastal part of Epirus; Scanderbeg would take Macedonia; the remaining parts of the former lands of the Byzantine empire (mainly Thrace and Thessaly) would be divided between the Greek dynasts; and Hungary would take all of Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Wallachia.

The western powers, promising Scanderbeg financial support, persuaded him to go on the offensive, thereby disregarding the terms of his agreement with the sultan. The major rival to Ottoman power in eastern Anatolia, Uzun Hasan, ruler of the Akkooyulu Turks, entered into negotiations with Venice for a pact against the sultan. As early as the autumn of 1463 the allies began their offensive. Venice took Argos in September and the walls of the Hexamilion were quickly reinforced. A number of towns and cities in the Morea rose up in revolt and sided with the Venetians, and the Muslims remaining in the peninsula had to take refuge in a few fortresses over which they maintained control. On December 16 the king of Hungary attacked and captured the Bosnian capital Vatyse (Jajce). The Venetian fleet patrolled the waters outside the Dardanelles, threatening to strike at any moment.

Mehmed, faced with these threats on all sides, took drastic steps. Despite the fact that winter was already near, he immediately sent Mahmud Pasha with a strong army to the Morea. In order to strengthen the empire’s naval forces he established a new shipyard at Kadioglu Lainami in Istanbul, and in order to assure the safety of Istanbul he ordered that watching fortresses be built on either side of the Dardanelles at Kulidubaha and Sultanaye (Chanakkale). The Venetians were defeated in the Morea, and were once again forced to give up the peninsula to the Ottomans. While the sultan himself was on the way to the Morea to reinforce Mahmud Pasha, on reaching Zeitounion he learned of the successful conclusion of the campaign and changed the direction of his march toward Bosnia. In the summer of 1464 he besieged Vatyse in an attempt to expel the Hungarians but was unsuccessful. On his return to Sofia in September he learned of the Hungarian king’s entry into Bosnia and sent a force under the command of Mahmud Pasha, who forced Matthias to withdraw. Thus Mehmed had achieved success in meeting the allied threats on every front. Pope Pius II, who had hoped to lead the crusader army in person, died at Ancona August 15, 1464, and the crusade collapsed.

During 1465 Mehmed opened peace negotiations with Venice and Hungary because of the need to deal with the confused situation in
Karaman, but no agreement could be reached. In the spring of 1466 he set out against Albania to punish Scanderbeg. After conducting operations against the Albanians in the highlands, he constructed a strong fortress, Elbasan, in the low country in central Albania, as a base against those Albanians who were continuing resistance from their strongholds in the mountains. After the sultan’s departure Scanderbeg, with support troops sent by Venice, defeated Balaban Beg, who was pressing the fortress of Crum, and besieged the newly constructed fortress of Elbasan. Outraged by Scanderbeg’s actions, the sultan himself set out on his second Albanian campaign in 1467. In order to intimidate his enemies, he attacked the Albanians mercilessly and sent raiding parties against the Venetian ports, including Scutari and Durazzo. Thus Albania became one of the principal arenas of the Venetian-Ottoman war. Venice achieved little military benefit from the alliance with King Matthias, but as a result of the agreements reached with Uzun Hasan and Pir Ahmad, the emir of Karaman, it was now possible to mobilize a large land force in Asia against the sultan.

Before Uzun Hasan emerged as an ally, Venice took advantage of the sultan’s Karaman campaign of 1468. In 1469 Venice had sent out its fleet from Euboea and struck repeated blows against the Rumelian coastline. The islands of Lemnos and Imbros were occupied, and the important commercial centers of Aegean and New Phocaea were sacked and burned. Then the Venetian fleet moved on to the Morea and, after capturing the fortress of Vostita, reinforced it as a base for future actions. At this time the Ottoman fleet had been occupied in operations in the Black Sea against the Genoese.

This daring attack led Mehmed to a decision to retaliate with a major blow against the enemy, and he chose Negroponte on Euboea as the target of his attack. During this campaign the Ottomans achieved tactical superiority, and while his fleet monitored the movements of the Venetian fleet, a land force under the personal command of the sultan built a bridge linking the island with the mainland; thus he was able to bring over his army, which succeeded in subduing the fortress on July 11, 1470. The loss of Negroponte aroused great concern not only among the Venetians but throughout the west, and there was general fear that the Ottomans and now established complete control of the Aegean. On Christmas day 1471 pope Sixtus IV (1471–1484) assigned six cardinals to the task of stimulating interest in Europe for the launching of a crusade against the Turks. A pact was signed between Venice and Naples for the formation of a crusader fleet, but the rest of Europe remained aloof.
Aware of the dangerous situation during his campaigns in the east, the sultan tried to neutralize his western rivals by peace offensives. In July 1471 he sent an envoy to Venice to offer peace. Since he insisted on complete control of the Aegean islands, the Morea, and Albania, and in particular on the payment of a yearly tribute, the negotiations broke down in March 1472.

Uzun Hasan, engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the Ottomans, the outcome of which would determine the future of eastern Anatolia, readied himself for battle with every military and diplomatic weapon at his disposal. In the winter of 1470–1471 an Akkoyunlu embassy visited Venice, Rome, and Naples seeking an agreement against the Ottomans. Under the impact of the fall of Negrophente, and despite the sultan's peace offensive in 1471 and 1472, Venice reached an agreement with Uzun Hasan which included the following cardinal points. To aid Uzun Hasan with firearms Venetian ships would bring arms and a small landing party to the coast of Karaman, to be met there by forces sent by Uzun Hasan. After his expected victory Uzun Hasan was to become master of most of Anatolia and make the Ottoman sultan promise to refrain from building fortresses on the coasts and to allow free access for Venetian shipping into the Black Sea. In addition to this, he was to secure the return to Venice of the Morea and Euboia as well as Lesbos. The Venetians assured Uzun Hasan that they were capable of entering the Straits and capturing Istanbul. In the summer of 1472 an Akkoyunlu Karamanid army invaded Ottoman territory as far as Akshehir in central Anatolia, but on August 14 the invading army was routed by the Ottomans.

The large crusader fleet, composed of about 87 galleys from Venice, Naples, Rhodes, the papacy, and Cyprus, had been wreaking havoc along the Mediterranean shores of the Ottoman territories all summer. Adalia (Antalya) was sacked and burned in August and Smyrna (İzmir) on September 13. In the spring of 1473 the fleet, in cooperation with the forces of the Karamanid Kasum Beg, took the fortresses of Corycus, Sgin, and Seleucia (Sıhhiye). The sultan took all possible measures to counter the Akkoyunlu-Christian attack. In the winter he had hastily sent a force of raiders (aktijis) from Rumelia to the area around Sivas, and in the spring he arrived in person with his large army and advanced in the direction of Erzurum against Uzun Hasan. The Akkoyunlu were cut off from communication with the Christian force which landed at Corycus, near Tarsus on the Mediterranean coast.

29 For Uzun Hasan and his struggle against Mohamed II see Woods, The 'Aqquyunlu, p.p. 87-137.
At the decisive battle of Bashkent on August 11, 1473, Mehmed emerged triumphant and imposed harsh terms on Uzun Hasan. The latter was to cede the fortress of Kara-Hissar and to promise never again to violate Ottoman territory.

Mehmed took a defensive stance vis-à-vis Hungary in the period 1471-1473. Despite Matthias's attempts at intervention, the sultan managed to build a strongly fortified castle on the Danube at Shabats (Bögürdelen) to ensure the security of Bosna. In the years after 1471 he sent his raiding forces not against Hungary but against the Austrian lands of Matthias's rival emperor Frederick III, and even sent an envoy to Matthias proposing peace. In 1473 a Hungarian envoy was sent in return but he was kept waiting until the completion of the Uzun Hasan affair, and was not granted an audience with the sultan.

After his victory against Uzun Hasan Mehmed listened to the envoy's demands, which included the abandonment or demolition of the two fortresses on the Danube, the Avala (Havale) ramparts opposite Belgrade and the fortress of Golubats (Gügerömlük). Not only were these demands rejected by the sultan, but he countered with a demand of his own for the ceding of the fortress of Vaykse in Bosna, and ordered a raid against Hungarian territory. In this raid (winter 1474) Mihal-oghlu Ali advanced as far as Varad. Because of his ongoing war with Poland, Matthias was unable to capitalize on the opportunity in 1473, and had to leave the raid of 1474 unanswered. It was not until 1475 that the king was free to launch his counterattack. He captured the fortress of Shabats on February 15, 1476.

Meanwhile the sultan, who was busily making preparations for a campaign against Moldavia, made an offer of peace. Disregarding the offer, the Hungarian king proceeded to build three wooden forts on the Danube for the purpose of gaining control of the Smederevo region. The sultan, upon his return from the Moldavian campaign, immediately set out for Smederevo, disregarding the exhaustion of his troops, and demolished the three forts. Thereafter Hungary was neutralized by Matthias's war against the Habsburgs. Not only did Matthias withhold his support from the Venetians, but he let his father-in-law, the king of Naples, make an agreement with the sultan. But after formalizing the peace with Venice in 1479 the Ottoman raids against Hungary were resumed. While the frontier begs attacked Transylvania the new governor of Bosna, Davud Pasha, accompanied by a large askafi force, crossed the Sava river and carried out extensive raids in Hungary.

From 1474 on the sultan intensified the war against Venice. In 1477
Suleiman Pasha was sent against the Venetian possession Lepanto, but as a result of the timely arrival of naval assistance it was able to resist capture. Evrenuz-oghlu Ahmed blockaded the Venetian fortress of Croia in Albania, and managed to repel naval reinforcements as they attempted to land on the shore. In the autumn of 1477 Iskender Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, led an army against Venetian territory in northern Italy and advanced over the Isonzo and Tagliamento rivers, wreaking havoc on the plain opposite the city of Venice itself. In the following year a similar raid was carried out against Friuli

Finally in April 1478 the sultan himself set out on campaign against the Venetians in Albania. Proceeding directly to Scutari he immediately besieged the fortress, which resisted all the assaults. After cutting off access to it from the sea by a blockade Mehmed returned with the main part of the army. Helpless to save Scutari and fearful because of the recent raids for Venice itself, the republic resumed peace negotiations in December 1478. On January 15, 1479, a peace treaty was signed, bringing an end to this long war; its principal provisions were that Venice agreed to evacuate Scutari and bend it over to the Ottomans, gave up claims to Croia and the islands of Lemnos and Euboea, and agreed to pay a yearly tribute of 10,000 gold ducats in return for which it was to enjoy freedom to engage in commerce.

Since the sultan had by this peace treaty effectively neutralized the major enemy sea power, he was now able to turn his attacks against Rhodes, Italy, and the papacy without worry. The rivalries existing among Naples, Venice, and Milan, as well as their general opposition to the policies of the papacy, played into Mehmed’s hands, and Venice encouraged him to take immediate action against the kingdom of Naples.

In the spring of 1480 he sent Mesh Pasha with a fleet against Rhodes while simultaneously launching Gedik Ahmed Pasha with another fleet against southern Italy, thus opening a new phase in his conquests. After a fierce ninety-day siege starting on May 23, 1480, the Onomans were forced to retreat from Rhodes with severe losses.

Gedik Ahmed, the conqueror of Karman and the Crimea, managed to capture the islands of Leucas (Santa Maura), Cephalonia, and Zante belonging to the Tocco dynasty, and also found an opportunity to meddle in the internal politics of the kingdom of Naples in 1479. In the summer of 1480 he set out from Avlona with a fleet of 132 ships carrying 18,000 men and on August 11 captured Otranto. After reinforcing the fortress and transforming it into a base for operations, he began carrying out raids. The capture of Otranto was regarded as the first step toward the capture of Rome, and the pope fell into a panic,
even thinking of fleeing to safety outside Italy. Gedik Ahmed returned to Rumelia in order to collect fresh troops for renewed attacks, but in the spring of 1481, as he was preparing to cross the Adriatic with reinforcements, the news of Mehmed's death was sent by his son, the new sultan Bayazid II (1481–1512), along with an urgent request for his return to the capital to meet the threat posed by Bayazid's brother Jem Sultan.30 Otranto was quickly retaken by the Neapolitans, and Italy was spared further Ottoman invasions.


B. The Ottomans, the Crusade, and Renaissance Diplomacy, 1481–1522

The death of Mehmed the Conqueror on May 3, 1481, gave rise to an internecine struggle for the throne between his sons Bayazid and Jem. Bayazid II, supported by Ishak Pasha, Gedik Ahmed, and the janissaries, who had rebelled at the death of Mehmed, succeeded in taking control of the capital. Jem's attempts to challenge his brother's control in the years 1481 and 1482 met with defeat at the hands of Bayazid, who had collected the main forces of the empire under his banner. The state of civil war in the Ottoman empire gave rise to great expectations in the Christian world. The papacy was hopeful that the civil war would lead to a territorial division of the empire,31 and it was believed that this was the most opportune time to strike a decisive blow against the Ottomans. After his final defeat at Ankara in June 1482, Jem took refuge in Rhodes, relying on the promise of the Hospitallers that he would be transferred to Rumelia to continue the fight.

Actually the Hospitaller grand master, Peter of Aubeusson, kept him as a prisoner because Bayazid made generous offers to the knights in exchange for their promise to keep him guarded.32 Up until the time of his agreement with the knights of Rhodes (December 14, 1482), fol-

32. Thimmea, Otranto-Salerno, pp. 80–95; obviously Jem was discovered by the knights. See his biography, Vöröski, ed. Mehmed Arif (Istanbul, 1948), pp. 7–8.
lowing the execution of the overhbold Gedik Ahmed Pasha (November 15), sultan Bayazid's position both internally and internationally was weak, as the janissaries, the alemans, and other factions reacted against any continuation of Mehmed II's centralizing policy. The knights of Rhodes immediately began negotiations with the other leaders of the Christian world for the undertaking of a crusade against the Ottomans. There were two courses open to the western powers: they could either follow a war policy and send a crusader army against the Ottomans with John as a figurehead, or else simply use the threat of sending John to check the sultan, forcing him to seek peaceful relations with the west. In effect, the sum of 45,000 gold pieces sent annually by the Ottoman sultan, ostensibly for the maintenance expenses of prince John, acted as a kind of tribute which softened the stance of the western powers and led them to choose the second alternative. Nevertheless, the position of John as a hostage in the hands of European states gave rise to new developments in relations between western governments and the Ottomans.

The Ottoman diplomatic efforts were on the whole successful in realizing their primary aims, which were to prevent a crusade and to keep John from joining forces with either the Mamluk sultan of Egypt or the king of Hungary, the two principal rivals of the Ottomans, who were both in a position to use John in a more effective way against Bayazid. To achieve this goal, the Ottomans made use of diplomatic means as well as military threats, seeking to exploit for their own benefit the rivalries existing among the Christian powers in Europe. During this period the Ottomans did everything in their power to deepen the divisions between the Italian states, encouraging and giving their support to the weaker states in their struggle against the dominant powers in the Italian scene. These weaker states constantly used the threat of Ottoman intervention on their behalf as a check against the incursions of their enemies.

Bayazid confirmed the peace treaty with Venice on January 16, 1482. Several new concessions not present in the 1479 agreement were added at this time, a sign that Bayazid indeed felt the need for continuation of peaceful relations with this maritime power. The advantageous terms granted to the Venetians achieved the effective neutralization of

33 Pfeifferman, Die Zusammenarbeit, pp. 84–90.
34 Bayazid agreed to forego the 10,000-gold-piece tribute paid by the Venetians to Mehmed II and lowered the customs duties for Venetians from five percent to four; see Bomhard, "Nuovi armami greci di Maemosio II," pp. 298–309.
the republic, which was perennially the Ottomans' principal rival on the sea, as the Hungarians were on the land.

Since both the Ottomans and the Venetians were at war with the king of Naples, the agreement took the form of an alliance. From the Ottoman documentation, it appears that Bayazid would even have been content to have Jem in the custody of Venice. The Venetian authorities kept the sultan informed of Jem's movements in Italy and France, and of the progress of the major powers' intentions and plans, but naturally all this was done in such a way as to influence Bayazid's policy in favor of Venetian interests. Taking care to preserve their friendly relations with the Ottomans, the Venetians, as a rule, would not participate in the councils being convened to make plans for a crusade. But they too appreciated the value of the custody of Jem in western hands as a check on Ottoman actions, especially on the sea.

Under the circumstances, the peace agreement concluded in 1484 between Bayazid and Ferdinand (Ferrante) I, the king of Naples (1458–1494), can be considered a further Ottoman diplomatic success. The invasion of Otranto by the Ottomans in 1481 had caused panic in Italy. The news of Mehmed II's death had reached the pope on June 2, 1481. Sixtus IV did not, however, relax his efforts to organize a general crusade against the Ottomans. This crusade was to be joined by all Italy, and, if possible, by the entire Christian world. After recapturing Otranto from the Ottomans on September 21, 1481, King Ferdinand, following the traditional policy of the Aragonese dynasty, set about stirring up a rebellion in Albania. Accordingly, Klada set out from Naples, captured the Albanian coastal fortresses of Himara and Sopot, and established contact with Albanian leaders in 1481. Despite the pope's wish that the crusader naval force which set sail to subdue the Turkish garrison at Otranto be sent on against Avlona, the Ottoman naval base in Albania, his desires were not heeded. By this time the papacy had already made plans to arrange with Venice for the removal of Ferdinand from the throne of Naples. Because of the ensuing war of Ferrara in Italy, enthusiastic invitations for a crusade following the capture of Jem by the Hospitallers produced no result.

Hüseyn Beg, Bayazid's ambassador to European governments in con-
nection with Jem's affairs, reported that the king of Naples was very anxious to make peace with the sultan. Ferdinand enthusiastically acknowledged the receipt of the peace and friendship offers of Bayazid and stressed "the friendship and brotherhood which exists between the two of us". He also added useful information about Jem which he had collected through his spies.

The Ottomans, however, in the winter of 1484, probably as a result of Venetian encouragement, prepared a large fleet, and它 gave rise to the fear of an imminent Ottoman invasion in Italy. Thereupon the pope informed Ferdinand about his move to prepare a crusader fleet and invited the Italian states, excluding Venice, to contribute to the expenses, estimated at 200,000 ducats. Actually, this was a plan to organize an Italian coalition under the pope's leadership, against Venice as well as the Ottomans. Ottoman diplomacy, in its turn, skillfully made use of the fear aroused by the naval preparations to guarantee Jem's firm detention. In the following years the Hospitallers and Venice were able to keep the Ottoman fleet from entering the Aegean by use of the threat of sending a crusader army with Jem. It appears that in those years, Bayazid's great fear was that Mamluk sultan Ka'itbay of Egypt (1468-1496) might gain control of Jem. Bayazid, therefore, made attempts to have his brother assassinated. The grand master Peter of Aubenas, judging from his correspondence with Bayazid, purported to cooperate with this plan in order to obtain extra money from the sultan.

All during this period Bayazid sought particularly active diplomatic relations with all Christian governments involved with Jem and the proposed crusade. He created a spy network to keep himself informed of political developments in various countries of the west. Since the sultan personally conducted all these activities, the seraglio replaced the divan (imperial council) in foreign affairs.

In order to assure himself of Jem's confinement, Bayazid addressed a letter to the French king in which he said: "It has been agreed between us and the grand master that a specified amount of money shall
be regularly sent to him for the livelihood of my brother on condition that he be kept guarded in a safe place within your domains and never let leave for another country. . . . Our hope is that friendship between the two of us be established."43 However, Huseyn Beg, Bayazid's envoy in the west, was not able to see the ailing King Louis XI, who died on August 30, 1483, after which events took a new turn.

At the time of Bayazid's accession to the throne in May 1483, the Ottoman state was at war not only with the king of Naples and the knights of Rhodes, but also with Hungary. Bayazid's first move was to announce a campaign against Hungary and to order his troops to assemble at Sofia under the command of the beglerbeg of Rumelia.44 Actually these activities might be considered as a strategy to combine under his command the military forces of the empire for the impending struggle for the throne. Taking advantage of the situation Stephen "the Great", the voivode of Moldavia (1457-1504), entered Wallachia in the summer of 1481 and marched as far as Turnu on the Danube, raiding the Ottoman territory to the south of the river. In the autumn king Matthias Corvinus of Hungary too gathered a large force along his southern borders (according to his letter, 32,000 men), entered Serbia, and advanced as far as Krusevets.45 Thus said greatly worried the Ottoman government, and the grand vizir Davud Pasha hurriedly returned to Sofia from the battle against Jan 46 Frontier warfare continued in 1482 and 1483.47 The king of Hungary controlled all northern Bosnia, including Vayvaze, and further planned to occupy Herzegovina and establish it as an independent kingdom for his bastard son 48. In the meantime he was awaiting aid from Italy and Germany to complete the large-scale preparations for war against the Ottomans.

Despite Matthias's moves to take Jan into his custody, Jan war transferred to France, whence he later made fruitless attempts to es-

43 TKS, en 6072, in Einbahn, op. cit., p. 186; it must have been written in early 1483. Bayazid was in France in the summer of 1483, and returned to Rhodes on January 28, 1484, see Thoumin, Djem, pp. 119-115.
44. Huseyn Pasha armour, MS. in Istanbul, University Library, 45a.
45 Constantine Jereběk, Geschichte des Serbien, II (Gotha, 1918) passu Amsterdam, 1907), 231
46. Is-h-Kamal, vol. VIII. N.S. I8; Jurgis, Geschichte, II (Gotha, 1919), 367
47 During the period 1484-1483 Turkish raids in the Austrian dominions of Carinthia and Styria were particularly active; see Leopold Knapheiser, Das Kampfes Ungarn mit dem Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, 2nd ed. (Vienna, 1893); Pius Iskald, "Die Entfaltung der Osmanen in die Steiermark," Mittheilungen des historischen Vereins fur Steiermark, IX (1859), 179-202; Wilhelm Nussman, "Die Türkeneinfälle nach Kärnten," Sitzungsberichte, XIV (1855), 84-109.
48 Zinzemoin, op. cit., p. 698-960; Kapelwitz, loc. cit.
cape to Hungary and to enter Rumelia. On their part, the knights of Rhodes took great precautions to assure that Jem would not escape or be kidnapped. The danger of Jem's entering the Balkans through Hungary was ever-present. Bayazid was well aware of the plan through the reports of his spies. With this in mind, he sent a sizable force with orders to build two fortresses on the banks of the Morava river, located on the main route of advance of Hungarian armies through Serbia into the heart of the Balkans. The sultan himself waited in readiness in Sofia until the completion of the two fortresses in the spring of 1483. Finally, in the autumn of 1483, Matthias signed a five-year armistice with the sultan and turned all his military might against the German emperor, whom he accused of attempting to instigate the Ottomans to attack him. After a series of victorious battles he entered Vienna in June 1485. It is noteworthy that during this period the Ottoman frontier warfare against Hungary stopped. It was agreed that raids involving less than four hundred men should not be considered a cause of war.

In fact, Bayazid did not want to be involved in a dangerous war against Hungary, the mainstay of the crusading armies. In order to strengthen his own control over the Ottoman throne, however, he was obliged to initiate a holy war against Christians; the janissaries were exerting pressure on him to declare such a war. He chose to attack the weakest Christian enemy, and made his war objective the principality of Moldavia. In his effort to establish control of Wallachia, Stephen, though an Ottoman vassal, had rebelled and launched an attack against the Ottomans in 1481. But before initiating the campaign, the sultan had to be certain of the Hungarians' neutrality, and therefore made the offer to Matthias of a five-year armistice, no mention being made of Moldavia. Bayazid conducted a successful campaign in Moldavia, and annexed Kilia and Akkerman to his empire (1484).

Matthias, who was fully involved in the west with the war against the emperor, was obliged to renew his armistice with the sultan and to recognize the de facto situation and be content with the sultan's promises that Stephen would be "treated well". The Moldavian voiv...
vode was left no alternative but to turn to Poland for assistance in his struggle against the Ottomans.

In May 1485 Jem had been moved to the Hospitalier castle of Boislany, but early in 1486 the grand master and Innocent VIII (1484-1492) agreed in theory that he should be brought to Italy. In 1487 the pope began serious efforts to bring Jem to Rome as a solution to his domestic problems. The war with Ferdinand had again taken a serious turn, posing a severe problem for the papacy. Ferdinand then tried to present himself as Bayazid II's ally in Italy, giving the sultan his full cooperation in the matter of Jem. From then on, the king steadily informed the Ottoman court on the project of the pope for a crusade with Jem. By pursuing this policy of friendship with the sultan, he protected his lands from the danger of Ottoman raids, thus being able to concentrate his forces against the pope. The plans for cooperation with the Ottomans envisaged by the condottiere Boccocino Guzzi, who had captured Osimo in the papal territory, caused great concern in Rome. Guzzi's first approach the Ottoman governors in Albania, and finally established relations with the sultan in 1487. Word spread that Guzzi was prepared to seize the March of Ancona in the papal territory. Jem's planned place of residence. It seems that Guzzi's offers were not taken seriously in Istanbul. All the same, the pope tried to take advantage of the alarm aroused in Italy by the incident, and to get Venice to move into action against Ferdinand of Naples. The papacy's best chance was to bring Jem to Rome and take command of a crusade participated in by the Christian states of Europe. While the pope, Matthias, and the Egyptian sultan were each striving to get hold of Jem and to use him for their respective political objectives, Bayazid now saw that it was best to keep Jem in France.
In his attempts to obtain Jem, the Mamluk sultan chose as his go-between Lorenzo de’ Medici (1469–1492), apparently because of Lorenzo’s influence in the courts of France and the papacy, as well as his extensive banking operations. In the spring of 1488 Lorenzo Spinelli, one of Lorenzo de’ Medici’s agents in France, offered the French king one hundred thousand gold ducats in the name of Ka’thbey for the delivery of Jem. 58 Since papal nuncios had already been granted permission to take Jem to Rome by the French government, which believed that this was in the best interest of Christendom, the Egyptian and Hungarian requests were declined. In order to fulfill his enemies’ plans, Bayazid had instructed his envoy, Anthony Cistho, to say that he was ready to sign a peace agreement with King Charles VIII of France (1443–1498) and to make peace with the entire Christian world, as well as to pay a considerable sum of money. 59 Moreover, Bayazid offered a military alliance, promising the king and against his enemies. Even more surprising was the Ottoman sultan’s promise to deliver the city of Jerusalem to the French, after its capture from the Mamluks. All of this would be in exchange for the king’s promise to keep Jem guarded in France. 60 The sultan’s offers impressed the king’s council, and orders were sent out to stop Jem on his way to Rome. But in the end the nuncio succeeded in putting Jem aboard a boat belonging to the knights of Rhodes, bound for the papal state. The Ottoman prince entered Rome on March 15, 1489.

Jem’s transfer from French territory to Rome to be put directly under the pope’s custody was considered an Istanbul as the beginning of a crusade, and caused alarm. Bayazid II, sending an envoy to Rhodes, declared the transfer of Jem to Rome a breach of the pact between the Porte and the order, and took a threatening attitude toward the Hospitallers. On the other hand, the negotiations of the Mamluk ambassador in France and later in Rome to obtain Jem to use against the Ottomans were followed with anxiety that this was a greater and more immediate danger.

The Mamluks of Egypt were involved from the beginning in the intense international struggle to obtain Jem to use him in their fight against the Ottomans. Especially after war broke out between the Ottomans and the Mamluks in 1485, Ka’thbey, sultan of Egypt (1468–

60. Thaunay, Dyson, pp. 217–228.
1496), did his utmost to bring Jenm to Egypt. After Jenm's transfer to Rome in 1489, he seemed to prefer to join Ka'irbay, a Moslem ruler, rather than Matthias, for his fight against Bayazid. Even if Ka'irbay could not use Jenm directly in the Egyptian campaign against the Ottomans, Jenm's participation in a crusade from the west would divert Ottoman forces from the Egyptian front. This cooperation between Christian Europe and the Islamic state of Egypt, once the sole protagonist of Moslem holy war against Christendom, indicates that during the fifteenth century, in the east as well as in the west, political expediency superseded strict religious ideals.

Now that Jenm was in Rome, the power and influence of the pope were greatly enhanced, and papal diplomacy became increasingly complex. While Matthias was pressing the pope to deliver Jenm to him as the only power capable of fighting against the Ottomans, the pope declared his decision to convene a congress to be attended by the delegates of all the Christian states in Europe to prepare a crusade. At the same time, the Egyptian ambassador in Rome proclaimed Ka'irbay's willingness to join an anti-Ottoman league, should Jenm be delivered to him, and promised to return all the Christian territories conquered by the Ottomans.

The Türkenkongress, which opened in Rome on March 25, 1490, was the logical outcome of the papal diplomacy of bringing Jenm to Rome. The pope declared that this was the most favorable moment to take action against the Ottomans. It was believed that Jenm was prepared, in the event that he obtained the Ottoman throne through Christian help, to withdraw from the Balkans, even to give up Istanbul. Sultan Ka'irbay of Egypt would be invited to participate in the war against the Ottomans. But with the unexpected death of Matthias Corvinus on April 6, 1490, all the plans for the crusade fell through. In addition, the struggle between Charles VIII and the emperor Maximilian (1493-1519), as well as that between Ferdinand of Naples and Innocent VIII, started up once again.

While the Ottoman war against the Mamluks in Cilicia continued, a crusader attack from the west would have created a most dangerous situation for the Ottoman empire. Ottoman tactics all during the Jenm

61 Jenm's mother Chibeh Khanum, a refugee in Egypt, was urging the sultan through his wife to free her son and bring him to Egypt, see an intelligence from Egypt to Bayazid II: "TKS no. 6006/3, signed by Yikrut; for Chibeh Khanum in Egypt see ibid., and the sultan's letter to 'Abd al-Mahdi 'Abd al-Rahman, ed. Mohammed Mustafa, II (Cairo, 1963), 598.
62 Panizzi, Gesta ecclesiae dei Magne, II (Frascati, 1899), 218-224.
63 Francesco Cogussen, "Il Sultanato Jenm alla corte di Alessandro VI," Popoli, II (1942), 96-103.
crisis were to neutralize the west by aggressive diplomacy, sending envoys with lavish promises, presents, money, and relics on the one hand, and to discourage Christian attack by showing strength by building up a strong navy ready to strike and launching large-scale raids on the Danube and Bosnian frontier on the other hand. Friendly relations were sustained with Venice, whose seapower was thought to be of crucial importance for a crusade against the Ottoman empire.

In the face of the dangerous situation following Jem's transfer to Rome in 1489, Bayazid used the same tactics and found Innocent VIII quite amenable to negotiation. The grand master of Rhodes, Peter of Aulnay, who was the central figure in east-west relations during the Jem crisis, now offered his mediation in drafting an agreement between the sultan and the pope. Bayazid promptly sent his envoy to Rhodes. 44 The prime concern of the grand master and the pope at that time apparently was to neutralize an Ottoman offensive against Rhodes and Italy. Moreover, the pope, always short of money, wanted to receive a regular and substantial income for acting as custodian of Jem Sultan. 45 The earliest document attesting to Innocent VIII's interest in establishing relations with the sultan is dated December 21, 1489.

To negotiate with Bayazid, the pope employed Giovanni Battista Gentile, a Genoese merchant in Istanbul. 46 In a letter dated May 17, 1490, 47 the sultan wrote to Innocent VIII that through the grand master he had learned with great satisfaction of the transfer of Jem to Rome, and that he was hoping that an agreement about his custody would soon be reached with the pope. Later a Genoese Dominican, Leonard of Chaura, who apparently lived in Pera, was employed as an envoy in the pope's relations with the sultan. 48 In the late spring or summer of 1490, Leonard came to Rome in the company of an Ottoman envoy to negotiate the terms of Jem's custody.

Upon the transfer of Jem into the custody of the pope in Rome, the Porte had lost the guarantee under the pact with the grand master of Rhodes that Jem would not be delivered to the enemies of Bayazid II. Innocent, in his turn, needed an agreement with the sultan to receive the yearly payment of forty thousand gold ducats which he was entitled

44. Thaumae, DJen, p. 264.
45. For the pope's financial difficulties see Pastor, op. cit., III, 270-272, 281-285, Thaumae, DJen, p. 187; Pichon, op. cit., p. 89.
46. Hadziger, op. cit., pp. 64-75.
47. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
48. Ibid., pp. 69-71.
to receive in accordance with the concord signed with the French king. Bayazid had chosen for this crucial mission an important man of his court, the kapikı-bashi Mustafa Beg, and was ready to send him to the pope via Rhodes in March. But because of Innocent’s crusade maneuver, the Ottoman embassy was delayed four months, until the Türkenkongress ended its sessions in Rome on July 30, 1490.

Mustafa’s visit to Rome made it possible for Bayazid to establish direct contact with the pope and to disclose the secret practices and pretensions of the grand master. Mustafa’s disclosures proved that Peter of Aubusson was concealing his special agreements with the sultan, which were all secret and verbal, and that he had received much more money than was stipulated in the written agreement. Also, in another meeting between Mustafa and Innocent, in the presence of the cardinals, Mustafa’s clarifications demonstrated that the grand master’s claim that Bayazid II wanted only the Hospitaliers to be the guardians of Jen was not true. It became evident that in all his dealings Peter had regarded Jen as his own personal prisoner rather than the prisoner of the order or of any other authority.

In his letter to the pope, Bayazid II said that he was pleased to learn that Jen had been conveyed to Rome, and hoped that Jen would be maintained at the Vatican on the same terms as the grand master had undertaken his custody some years before. The sultan’s ambassador declared that if the conditions were accepted, which meant the relinquishment of the idea of using Jen in a crusade against the Ottoman empire, the sultan would keep peace with Christendom. Mustafa himself, in the information he gave to the historian Idris, claimed to have made an agreement with the pope, sworn to by oath as is required in the Christian religion, to the effect that Innocent would keep Jen in custody and not let him attack Bayazid’s lands, and that in return the sultan would not harm the pope’s country.

In the secret instructions given by the pope to his envoy, his nephew

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70 The letters were written in Greek, for a Latin version of it see Sutton, The Papacy, II, 411, note 7
71 Haush Haupt, TKS, 91, 91a, 163
72 For many years the Antioch area within the papal state was a target of Ottoman raids, see Iorga, Notes et essais pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XVè siècle, 1478-1500, V (Bucharest, 1915), 157–159, 163–164; J. D. Dallamena, "La Prima fra Oriente e Occidente. Antiochia nel Cinquecento," Quaderni storici, XIII (Aurora, 1970), 25–48. Sutton, The Papacy, III, 397
73 See the text of this important document in Sutton, The Papacy, II, 419, note 10, and 421, note 13.
Chorhno Bocciarh, Innocent gave details of how the “pension” or “tribute” should be paid—in Venetian gold ducats every year on December 1. The pope's dispatch of a nuncio to collect Jem's pension can be considered as a positive indication that an agreement, verbal and secret, was reached between the pope and Mustafa.  

As a result of the agreement made by Mustafa in Rome in January 1491, the Ottoman Porte believed that a crusade was not likely in the near future, and this belief must have encouraged the Turks to resume their aggressive policy against Hungary. The internal conflicts and Maximilian's invasion of Hungary following Matthias Corvinus's death in 1490 had created extremely favorable conditions for the Ottomans to consolidate their position on the Danube. Inactive for a long time, the frontier forces were impatient to resume their raids into Hungary, which they believed was now incapable of putting up serious resistance. The Hungarian ambassador to the sultan, Emrich Czobor, was unsuccessful in his attempt to renew the truce ending in 1491.  

In the same year Bayazid II concluded a peace agreement with Egypt and made large-scale preparations for a campaign on land and sea for 1492. The secret preparations, construction of a large fleet—"eighty sailings including thirty galleys"—in particular, gave rise to speculations in Italy about the real target of the Ottomans. Venice and Naples took defensive measures, and both demanded that, for their common safety, the pope use the instrument in his hands, Jem Sultan. By June the Venetians were reassured about the sultan's plans.  

Suleiman Pasha, the Ottoman frontier lord at Smederevo, had invited the Hungarian ban of Machva, Nicholas of Ujlik, an opponent of King Ladislas VI (1490–1516), to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, and surrender Belgrade, promising to add to his possessions the Ottoman fortresses of Alaja-Hisar (Krujevets) and Zvornik. Bayazid, who himself did not give much credit to the reportedly favorable disposition of the ban, suggested that, in case the ban changed his mind about surrendering Belgrade, the army should change its destination toward the Adriatic Sea to crush Albanian rebels and subjugate Montenegro. When in Sofia at the head of his army, he received the news that the Hungarian ban had indeed changed his mind, and that the Hungarians were united to resist the sultan, so he set out with the bulk of his

75 See Ignaz A. Freuler, Geschichte von Dalmatien, ed. Ernst Klein, III (Leipzig, 1874), 249. 
76 According to a Venetian intelligence report of May 7, 1492; see Setton, The Papacy, II, 425. In horts, 30 cargas, 5 baccas, 80 galleys, and about 200 smaller ships or transporta. 
army to invade northern Albania. On the Hungarian front, raids under the frontier begs Mihal-oğlu Ali and Suleiman Pasha, as well as the blockade of Belgrade, were foiled by stiff Hungarian resistance.

Before he left Istanbul for this campaign on April 6, 1492, Bayazid had shown his intention to keep peace with the pope by sending an envoy to Innocent VIII with 40,000 gold ducats along with valuable relics, including the alleged iron head of the lance which pierced Jesus’s side at the crucifixion, which Innocent had specifically requested through his ambassador Boccardi. The delivery of the 40,000 ducats and the generous gifts was indeed a positive indication of Bayazid’s appeasement policy toward the pope and of the existence of an agreement between the two parties about the custody of Jerusalem and keeping peace.

Venice, the only maritime power able to curb the Ottomans, chose to avoid conflict, and continued to honor the 1479 agreement. It was undoubtedly Venice among all the western powers which best exploited the Jem situation vis-à-vis the Ottomans. While functioning as an indispensable source of information for the sultan concerning Jem’s position in Europe, Venice used the conflict between the Ottomans and Mamluks, nominal suzerains of Cyprus, and in 1489 managed to bring the island under its direct rule. Neither the Mamluks nor the Ottomans, who were at war with each other, were in a position to challenge the Venetian takeover of Cyprus. While the pope was encouraged by the republic to enter into negotiations with the Mamluk Sultan for the delivery of Jem, a Venetian ambassador, Peter Diedo, was hurriedly sent to Cairo to explain to the Mamluk Sultan Ka’b ibn Yazid that the Venetian claim of sovereignty over Cyprus was a move taken only to prevent the island’s falling into the hands of the Ottomans. Furthermore, Diedo claimed that since the Mamluks lacked a fleet to protect Cyprus, Venetian possession of the island would be beneficial to both parties. Venice agreed to all the conditions which had been imposed by the Mamluks on the Lusignan dynasty of Cyprus, including the payment of a yearly tribute of 8,000 gold ducats.

The loss of Cyprus to Venice was, until 1571, an irreparable setback to the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Venice strengthened its position on the vital waterway between Avlona and Italy by forcing the Porte to recognize Venetian sovereignty over the island of Zante by an agreement reached on April 22, 1494. It also strengthened the fortifications of Corfu, key point of the Venetian man-

tune empire. Thus a naval operation against Venetian possessions in
the Morea and the Adriatic Sea, as well as an Ottoman attack on Italy,
was made strategically impractical, and the threat from Avlona, the
only important Ottoman base outside the Dardanelles, was greatly
reduced.

From 1491 on, however, Venetian-Ottoman relations had become
increasingly strained. The rivalry for control of the Albanian and Monte-
negroin coast, as well as the uneasy situation in the Morea, where Ven-
tice controlled the most important ports and naval bases, including
Navarino, Modon, Corfu, Monemvasia, and Naupha, were among
the factors which created an explosive atmosphere. The arrival of the
Ottoman fleet on the Albanian coast and the unexpected invasion of
Albania by an army under the command of the sultan himself posed
a direct threat to Italy and the Venetian possessions in the Adriatic
Sea. A Venetian fleet was sent to Corfu, and the fortifications on the
island were substantially strengthened. The landing of an Ottoman fron-
tier force at Gasha, only fifteen miles from Senj itself, caused alarm
in Venice, and the republic requested that the pope demand, using the
threat of Jem, that the sultan evacuate the fortress. By 1493 the fear
of an Ottoman invasion of Italy brought Venice, Milan, and the papacy
closer together, and a league was formed on April 25. Venice now ac-
tively supported the pope in his crusade effort, and assured him of its
full participation. It even requested that the pope mention in the agree-
ment that Jem would be handed over to Venice. The republic prom-
ised to open hostilities as soon as Maximilian declared war against the
Ottomans, for according to Venetian strategy, Austria had replaced
Hungary as the strongest land power in such a crusade.

The resumption of jihad activities by the Ottomans had annoyed
not only Venice but also Maximilian, who after the death of Matthias
Corvinus in 1490 had emerged as the protector of the Christian lands
in Central Europe. Maximilian, as a result of the large-scale attacks
of the Ottoman frontier forces against neighboring lands on the Dan-
ube, became an ardent advocate of a crusade against the Ottomans. On
the eve of the French invasion of Italy, he even favored the idea
of Jem’s delivery to the Mamluk sultan in exchange for promises to
join the Christian league.

80. Thieme, Dijon, pp. 321-322.
81. Joseph Pflüg, “Die St. Georgsinschriften und Maximilians I. Türkenpläne,” in Fort-
sschrifft Professor Karl Eder zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Helmut J. Moeller-Andelfang (Innsbruck,
1959), pp. 33-55
82. For Maximilian’s instructions to his ambassador to Rome, Marquard Arétscher, see
Thieme, Dijon, pp. 441-446.
Ottoman aggressiveness after 1492 can be explained by several factors. The Ottomans had concluded peace with Egypt in 1491, at the urgent request of the Hafsid ruler Zakariya II of Tunisia, alarmed by the Spanish reconquista. The fall of Granada on January 31, 1492, celebrated as a Christian retaliation for the conquest of Constantinople, gave rise to intensification of the ghazi spirit in the Islamic world in general. Moreover, following the death of Matthias Corvinus and the ensuing internal confusion in Hungary, the Ottomans hoped to capture Belgrade, thus increasing pressure through the frontier forces' operations against the Austrian and Hungarian dominions.

In 1492, during a large-scale raid in Croatia, heavy Ottoman casualties, reportedly ten thousand men, were suffered when the army fell into a trap near Villach. But the successful raid in 1493 under the able general Ya'kub Pasha, governor of Bosnia, into Slovenia, Croatia, and lower Styria was crowned with his victory at Corbova (Kršava) on September 9. In the following year the large-scale raids continued in Croatia and Transylvania, and Paul Kializi, Hungarian frontier commander, made retaliatory raids into Ottoman Serbia. Thus a serious situation had arisen in Central Europe too, about which pope Alexander VI (1492-1503) expressed great concern during his negotiations with the Porte. A truce between Hungary and the Ottomans was concluded only at the beginning of 1495, when Charles VIII's invasion of Italy caused a general reaction against France in Europe. The Ottomans then concentrated their forces against Poland.

In 1494 the pope and the king of Naples had united against the French in an attempt to stop Charles VIII in his invasion of Italy, and had used the threat of Ottoman intervention. Now Alexander's Italian policy was in open conflict with the crusade plan. In response, the pope's adversaries, Charles VIII and the pro-French cardinals, denounced the pope for betraying the interest of Christendom by establishing secreties with the Ottoman sultan. Indeed, the papal policy of attempting to use Ottoman power against its immediate enemies, while at the same time continuing its crusade plans, is a spectacular example of Renaissance Italy's pragmatic balance-of-power diplomacy.

Threatened by a French invasion, the new king of Naples, Alfonso II (1494-1495), now backed by the pope, hurried his agent Camillo Pandone to Istanbul to request military aid, a contingent of six thou-

83 Milan Raphal, Konvot povijest Liše e Kršave (Gospic, 1936); Johann C. von Engel, Staatskunde und Geschichte von Dalmatien, Croatia und Slawenburg (Halle, 1798), pp. 584-587, draws on Ottoman sources—Edris, Ibn-Kammal, and the anonymous scribes.

84 The pope for his part wrote to Baymur II that Alfonso's territories should be spared.
sand Ottoman soldiers. He said he was ready to pay them, that is, to
employ them as mercenaries, a practice employed for centuries by other
Christian governments in Byzantium and the Balkans.

Alexander’s envoy, the Genoese Giorgio Bocciardi, was already in
Istanbul. Using the excuse that he needed money immediately in order
to prepare the resistance against the French invasion of Italy, the pope
requested that the year’s allowance for Jem be sent in advance. The
pope’s envoy told Bayazid that the French king planned to capture Jem,
take the kingdom of Naples, and from there attack the Ottoman em-

See Thomet, Dyer, p. 326. On Ottoman-papal relations in the period 1409–1495 in general, see
also Beintje, The Papacy, 1, 381–402.

Alexander also called on Bayazid as a true friend to put pressure
on Venice to abandon its neutrality and join the resistance against
the French. Bayazid reacted promptly and sent three ambassadors
to Italy to encourage the papacy, Naples, and Venice to resist Charles
VIII. The ambassadors arrived in Italy in November 1494, at the time
when Charles entered Florence (November 17). In Venice, on Novem-
ber 21, the Ottoman envoy, who was anxiously watched by the French
ambassador Philip of Commines, criticized the republic for its neu-
trality and threatened to launch an Ottoman attack on Italy should
Venice refuse to join the resistance.

On November 20 Kauun Chawush, who had been sent with the money
requested for Jem (40,000 gold ducats), accompanied by Bocciardi,
was attacked by French partisans near Ancona. All the money and the
sultan’s letter to the pope were captured. The next day in Florence,
the French king, attempting to rival Maximilian, made a declaration
before his march to Rome that his purpose in this campaign was to
fight the Turk and deliver the holy places, and that his expedition to
Naples was only a necessary first step. In order to humiliate Alex-
ander, the seized letters, five in number, together with Bocciardi’s tes-
timony about the fulfillment of his embassy, were immediately pub-
lished in Florence. The document most incriminating for the head of
the church was the sultan’s letter proposing that the pope assassinate

65. In September Charles VIII invited Peter of Ancona to come to Rome from Rhodes to
give him his expert opinion on the king’s plans for a crusade against the Ottoman; see Thomet,
Dyer, p. 328.


67. Pietro Pontopp, Il marchese di Montecatini e l’oppressione ottomana alla fine del secolo XV
(Munich, 1970); Hans J. Kindig, Salutus Regum? II. Beziehungen zu Markgraf Friedrich II von

Jern and offering 300,000 ducats for the delivery of the corpse to the sultan's men at one of the Ottoman ports. Bayazid also promised that no Christian state would be the subject of attack, and in order to show his good faith, the sultan had even taken an oath on the Koran in the presence of Boccardi. While there is no doubt about the authenticity of the other letters, written in Greek with the sultan's monogram, this particular one, in Latin, is believed by some scholars to be a forgery.

Deserted by the Christian powers, the pope finally had to agree, on January 15, 1495, to all the points insisted upon by the French king, as preliminary to his plan for the crusade against the Ottomans—the delivery of Jern and free passage through the papal territory for the occupation of the kingdom of Naples. Charles VIII entered Naples in triumph on February 22. Three days later Jern suddenly died, evoking the usual accusations of murder; the basis for the containment of Bayazid died with him. Charles abandoned plans for a crusade against the Turks, and turned his attention to his European enemies, but not until 1499 was Jern's body returned to Bayazid by Frederick, king of Naples (1497-1501).

The anti-French coalition of March 31, 1495, looking pope Alexander VI, emperor Maximilian, Venice, Milan, and Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain in a so-called Holy League against islam, was followed by the outbreak of the Italian wars, involving western Christendom in a long internal struggle from which sultan Suleiman I, "the Magnificent" (1520-1566), would benefit by expanding his empire into Central Europe. The new pattern of diplomacy in the west, introduced in Renaissance Italy during the fifteenth century, would in the sixteenth bring the Ottoman empire into the European state system in an alliance with France against the Hapsburgs.

After Jern's death the Ottomans continued to be one of the important elements in the balance of power in Italy. They followed with great concern the progress of the negotiations for an alliance between Venice and Louis XII against Milan, for an alliance between the great naval power, Venice, and France might indeed lead to the realization of a crusade. Bayazid took a supportive attitude toward the anti-Venetian dispositions of Naples, Mantua, and Florence, rivals of the republic. In return for Ottoman military assistance—that is, the

90. Thucyd, Dijes, p. 339; maquet, "ne manquait point áreas en duwte"; for a discussion of the problem see Fasone, op. cit., V, 427-428; Kinzie, op. cit., p. 42; Seton, The Papacy, II, 457
supplying of mercenary forces—these states offered to pay annually 50,000 gold ducats.

The Ottoman government strictly enforced its prohibition of grain export to Venice, which was of vital importance to the republic. Anxious to avoid the outbreak of a war with the Ottoman empire, Venice brought forth several proposals for conciliation. In 1497–1498 the Venetian ambassador Andrew Zanchani offered a yearly tribute of 3,000 gold ducats for the peaceful possession of Cephalonia and Cattaro (Kotor), while agreeing to give up its claims on the territory of Montenegro. However, in confirmation of its sovereignty over the coastal areas in Montenegro, Venice sent out a fleet to the bay of Cattaro in June 1497.92

The Ottomans realized throughout the period of the Jem affair that without a strong navy they could not feel secure in their position in the Balkans and exert an effective influence on the course of events in Italy. After 1489 the Ottomans feverishly pursued their efforts to strengthen their fleet. In 1497 they started the construction at the Istanbul shipyards of two huge köbe (coques or naoves) of 1800 tons, considered to be the largest warships of the time.91 On June 16, 1499, the Ottoman fleet finally set out from the Dardanelles toward Tenedos (Bozja-ada), causing alarm to spread from Rhodes to Egypt and Venice. After the arrest of all the Venetian subjects in the Ottoman dominions, which meant a declaration of war against Venice, it was learned that the real objective of the expedition was the Morea. While a sizeable force was sent as a distraction against the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia and Albania under Iskander Paşa, the frontier commander in Bosnia, another army under the command of the beglerbeg of Rumelia, Mustafa, was simultaneously directed toward Lepanto.

The success of the military operations depended on the ability of the Ottoman navy to repulse the Venetian sea forces and to complete the encirclement of Lepanto from the sea. The sultan himself, on the summer pastures of Greece, impatiently awaited news of the arrival

92. On the Venetian-Ottoman war of 1499–1503 one main source, Marina Savo, I Diritto, 1–III, ed. Guglielmo Durbech (Venice, 1879), has been exploited by historians since Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall and Zinzendorf, and more recently by Sylvia N. Fishur, The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1453–1512 (Urbana, 1946), pp. 51–89, and Sexton, The Papacy II, 511–514. As for the main contemporary Ottoman sources, İdris, BEN-Keşni, and the anonymous Tarih-i Harbe have been used most recently by İnal, op. cit., pp. 276–286. Ottoman biographies dealing with such individual campaigns are listed by Agis S. Levent, Generalmandat (Ankara, 1936), 19–22. A critical use of these sources is still needed.

93. On the sultan's fleet and the two cinque, the Ottoman and Venetian sources give details in particular see von Bunsen, op. cit., pp. 33–40. The Ottoman fleet, 360 or 300 vessels, was larger than the Venetian fleet, but the latter and a greater number of warships.
of the fleet. As the Ottomans had no base in the Morea, the fleet experienced great difficulty and delays in getting supplies and reinforcements along the way to Lepanto. At the sea battle, which took place near the island of Proce (Prodano or Barak-ada) on August 12, 1499, the Venetians were not successful in intercepting the Ottoman fleet, and suffered losses. On three separate occasions the Venetian fleet, reinforced by the French and Rhodian squadrons, attempted to block the progress of the Ottoman navy toward the Gulf of Corinth. From each of these skirmishes the Ottomans emerged successful. On August 25, after thirty-three days of constant pursuit by the allied fleet, the Ottoman sea forces eventually reached Lepanto, and the Venetian fleet withdrew to its base at Corfu. On seeing the arrival of the Turkish navy and the withdrawal of the Venetian fleet, the commander of the place surrendered on August 28, 1499. The victory was particularly significant since it was the first time that the Ottoman navy had been able to challenge the Venetians successfully on the open sea.

The fall of Lepanto caused deep concern about the Ottoman danger in Europe. In the autumn of 1499 pope Alexander VI appealed to the European states to unite for a crusade and in May 1500 ordered the collection of a crusading tithe. In his crusading bull of June 1, 1500, he put stress on the danger of the invasion of Italy by the Ottomans, since he said that the Ottomans now had a stronger navy and had started to seize all the strategic ports on the coasts.94 The Venetians, for their part, were doing their utmost to convince Ladislas, the Hungarian king, to join the crusade and fully to involve the French king Louis XII, their ally (1494–1500), in the Venetian war against the sultan; a French squadron had already cooperated with Venice against the Ottomans in 1499. Venetian diplomats were also trying to induce John Albert, king of Poland (1492–1501), to join the crusade, since as a result of the king’s ambitions in Moldavia, Poland had twice been invaded by large armies under the frontier beg Bahl Beg in 1498. Bayazid thought he could foil the crusading plans by diplomacy, sending one envoy to pressure the Hungarian king to sign a peace treaty and another one to Rome in February 1500 to try to see the pope.95

In the following year, when the Venetians and French made proposals of peace, the Ottomans responded haughtily, demanding the payment of an annual tribute as well as the surrender of Corun, Modon, and Naupha in the Morea. In the face of these excessive demands, Venice sought to convert its war against the Ottomans into a

95 Ibid, II, 524.
full-scale European crusade. Now the pope undertook serious steps for its preparation among the Christian nations, including Wallachia, Moldavia, and even Russia. On his part, Bayazid encouraged Venice’s rivals in Italy and permitted the establishment of a Florentine consul in Istanbul, besides promising a large amount of military aid to Naples—but insisting in return that they surrender Otranto. Thus, after having eliminated the Jem question, the Ottomans unhappily returned once more to the expansionist policy of the time of Mehmed the Conqueror.

In the following campaign season the Ottoman goal was the capture of the fortresses of Modon and Coron in the Morea. As a result of the delays in the arrival of the heavy artillery transported by the ships, the siege of Modon, heavily fortified by the Venetians, was drawn out. Although the siege had begun in March, the fleet did not arrive until July 17; only after its arrival was the fortress surrounded by both land and sea. Despite the intervention of the Venetian fleet Modon fell after a final assault on August 10, 1500. Following the Ottoman capture of Modon, Coron surrendered without resistance a week later.

Upon the arrival of the news of the fall of Modon and Coron, the pope dispatched three legates to European governments to urge them to join the crusade and cooperate in collecting crusading tithes. Alexander was particularly eager to join the French in Naples against King Frederick (1497–1501) for the partition of the kingdom of Naples, so he joined the French-Spanish League on June 29, 1501. The allies declared that the partition was a necessary step to secure peace and unity against the Ottomans, while Frederick put his hopes in the sultan’s intervention and aid Lodovico, duke of Milan, who was also known as the sultan’s protégé, tried to break the Venetian-French alliance by promising Venice his good offices for a peace with the Porte.

A crusader fleet composed of French, Venetian, papal, and Spanish ships set out to the fall and easily seized the island of Cephalonia and the fortress of Navarino (on December 3, 1500), which had been in Ottoman hands since August. The Ottomans were on the alert, however, and had assigned Khadim Ah to guard the Morea while Iskender Pasha attacked the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia.

In 1501 Christian fleets individually undertook raids, causing the Ottomans difficulties. The Venetian forces, attempting to land at Avlona, were destroyed on August 15, 1501, by the Ottomans, who then conquered Durazzo. An allied squadron of eighty ships, including forty galleys, landed forces on Lesbos and began the siege of Mytilene, its capital. This move threatened Istanbul itself. The French ships, twenty-six in number, set sail for the Dardanelles to block the arrival of the
Turkish navy, according to an Ottoman report. The Ottomans experienced great difficulties in bringing reinforcements to the besieged from Anatolia. Besides, since it was outside the regular campaign season, it was hard for the Ottomans to mobilize the navy. Eventually, when a land army under Husek-zade and the beglerbeg of Anatolia reached the shores opposite the island, they found that the enemy had already raised the siege and left the island with their fleet. Meanwhile on May 28 an Ottoman fleet, under the command of the famous seaman Kemal Reis, captured Navarino in cooperation with the land forces. In this battle three galleys and one galleon were captured from the Christians. The Spanish fleet under the command of Gonçalvo Fernandes, raiding the Anatolian coasts, inflicted great damage by burning and plundering. Ottoman sources report that in July 1501 the Christian fleet landed at Chesmeh near Smyrna and slaughtered the population.

It is noteworthy that in these years the Christian nations attacking the Ottoman homeland and the Dardanelles demonstrated, on the whole, their naval superiority and control of the seas. In 1502 this became even more pronounced. While a Venetian fleet was making a surprise attack against Thessalonica and Makri (on the Thracian coast), the main allied fleet—Rhodes, France, the pope, and Venice—made a landing at the island of Leucas (Santa Maura) and seized the fortress. Under these circumstances the Ottomans were well disposed toward Venetian peace offers. In 1502, while Bayazid threatened Venice with the preparation of a huge armada of five hundred ships, his vizirs mentioned to Valerio Marmello, the Venetian bailie, now released from prison, the advantages of peace. At the same time, the Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul was exerting pressure on the sultan for peace, and a treaty was concluded at Istanbul on August 10, 1503.

An agreement with Venice was drawn up in September 1502 and signed December 14, but due to the Ottoman insistence on the return of Leucas and on payment of war indemnity, the final ratification act was delayed until August 10, 1503. In the end Venice agreed to return Leucas and, as in the 1479 treaty, to pay an annual sum of 10,000 gold ducats to the Ottomans. In return, the Ottomans agreed to permit the residence of a permanent bailie in the Ottoman capital and to return the goods confiscated during the war, as well as to give up the island of Cephalonia to the Venetians. The Ottomans, however, retained their conquests in the Morea—Lepanto, Modon, and Coron—and Durazzo in Albania.

96. Tanai, op. cit., p. 220 (TKS, no. 5471, facsimile copy, no. 73).
The conclusion of the peace agreement between the Ottomans and the Venetians met with the disapproval of the pope and the rest of the Christian world. Without Venice the crusade could not be continued. Despite the efforts of pope Julius II (1503–1513) Venice remained faithful to the peace with the sultan. At the same time, following in the footsteps of Timur and Uzun Hasan, Shah Ismail (1501–1524), the founder of the Safavid dynasty in Persia and a formidable rival of the Ottomans in the east, approached Venice for a joint attack against the Ottoman empire. In 1508 the shah’s ambassador to Venice was well received by the doge, Leonard Loredan (1501–1521). While expressing interest in future cooperation with Persia, the doge explained that it was not the time for Venice to break off the peace agreement with the Ottomans.

The next few years were marked by intense diplomatic activity but no major hostilities. The League of Cambrai against Venice (1508) tried to enlist both Hungarian and Ottoman support. The emperor Maximilian I promised Dalmatia to Hungary, but it chose neutrality in Europe and a peace treaty with the Turks, for one year in 1510 and then for five years in 1512. Maximilian declared himself, at the diet of Augsburg in the spring of 1510, the leader of still another crusade against the Turks, but secretly attempted to secure joint action with the Ottomans against Venice, which in turn requested Turkish frontier forces for use as mercenary troops. Neither side achieved its objective.

Paralyzed by a struggle for the succession among the Ottoman princes, and by a terrible insurrection in 1511 of the Turcoman Kizilbash heretics in Anatolia, the sixty-four-year-old sultan Bayazid II had to pursue a peace policy in Europe, making sure that none of the rival powers emerged strong enough to launch a crusade. Shah Ismail of Persia threatened his eastern borders, and, as spiritual leader of a powerful state order, helped incite the Turcoman revolt. Bayazid was thus fully occupied in defending the empire and developing its commercial and economic strength. Having established Ottoman naval power in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, he supported the “Moriscos” of Spain and the Moslems of North Africa against Spanish attacks, sending sea-gazanas who eventually became the Barbary corsairs.

In the Indian Ocean the Portuguese not only terrorized Moslem merchants and pilgrims, but entered the Red Sea and threatened Mecca and Medina. A Mamluk fleet was destroyed by the Portuguese in 1509

at Dru, off the Gujarat coast, and the Egyptian sultan Kansuh al-Ghuri had to accept aid and experts from his Ottoman foes to build a new fleet at Suez to drive the Portuguese out of the Red Sea.  

Bayazid's orderly administration, resembling that of his grandfather, Murad II, rather than that of his father, Mehmed II, earned him the sobriquet 'Adil, "the Law-Abiding," in contrast to his father's "the Conqueror". His son Selim I "the Grim" (Yavuz), despising Bayazid's pacific policies, won the janissaries' support and deposed his father in April 1512. By massive military campaigns he defeated the Safavids of Persia in 1514 and destroyed the Mamluk state in 1516–1517, doubling the territory and financial resources of the empire by annexing eastern Anatolia, Syria, Egypt, and the Hejaz. He thus won the distinction of being the protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and assigned his admiral Selim in 1517 to defend Jeddah against a Portuguese fleet. Selim completed the transformation from a frontier state to a powerful empire, easily a match for the Holy Roman empire of Maximilian I (1493–1519) and Charles V (1519–1556). During his brief reign he paid little attention to Europe, however, and thus does not figure importantly in crusades history.

At his premature death in 1520 he was succeeded by his son Suleiman I "the Magnificent" (or "the Law-Giver", Kanuni; d. 1566), who in true ghazi fashion inaugurated his reign with the conquests of Belgrade (August 30, 1521) and Rhodes100 (December 20, 1522). He was to challenge Charles V successfully both in central Europe and on the Mediterranean, and to consolidate the Ottoman position in the European state system as a secret ally of Francis I of France against the Hapsburgs. Charles would attempt to revive the crusade against both Suleiman and Francis, but this had become a different world, in which the crusading idea was anachronistic and irrelevant, long before its final failure in 1556. The capture of Belgrade and Rhodes may be considered either as the final victories of the Islamic counter-crusade or as the start of a new phase of the continuing struggle between the Ottoman empire and western Christendom.

100 See Inalcik's review of Aymon, Crusader and Fransiscan in the Mamluk Kingdom, in Beikert, XVII (1956), 501–506.


CRUSADER COINAGE
WITH GREEK OR LATIN
INSCRIPTIONS

Throughout the crusades the great eastward movement of armies and pilgrims was accompanied by a heavy and persistent flow of money. This we can judge from the ill-recorded evidence of hoards deposited in the area of the crusading states, and, more generally, from the profound economic and monetary changes in both western Europe and the Levant, of which the crusades were the apparent cause. Each of the crusader states in Syria and Palestine issued in due course its own currency—three of the four on a substantial scale—and other minor and more ephemeral currencies were issued by Frankish authorities in the area from time to time. The direct monetary consequences of the crusades, therefore, were not negligible.

On the other hand, the princes who led the First Crusade came from lands in which money did not yet play a major economic role, a fact reflected in contemporary assessments of the importance of things. Financial matters do not therefore figure largely in the accounts of the

The principal work on the coinage of the crusades is Gustave Schlumberger's *Numismatique de l'Orient latin* (Paris, 1878–1882; rev. Ganz, 1954). This was founded upon and superseded the pioneering work of F. de Sacy, *Numismatique des croisades* (Paris, 1847). Schlumberger's work is one of the great classics of nineteenth-century numismatic scholarship, and it is still the indispensable handbook for the study of the coinage of the crusades, but two factors have made it out of date. The progress of research in Byzantine and related numismatics, particularly in the last period, has resulted in the removal of the Byzantine sphere of several coins which Schlumberger attributed to the Franks; and the discovery in recent years of much new material (the result of growing worldwide interest and trade in coins) has made some coins abundant which Schlumberger thought rare and has produced some altogether new ones.

Schlumberger's book covered the whole of the Latin east. If this chapter were to cover the monetary background of every crusading state to which attention has been given in the volume of *A History of the Crusades*, it would have and to go even further to treat the coinages, for example, of the emerging Spanish kingdoms or of the Teutonic Knights in the Baltic. Even to have covered the coins of the Latin east in the generally accepted sense, including Languedoc, Cyprus, the knights of the Hospital at Rhodes, the Germans in Chios and Lesbos (Mytilene),

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chroniclers. Since, moreover, no mint records of the crusader states are extant, we are largely dependent upon the numismatic evidence, on the surviving coins and the circumstances of their survival, for our knowledge of the circulating medium among the crusaders, and how it changed in the two centuries from the Council of Clermont to the fall of Acre.

There were, as far as we know, no coins struck by the crusaders while they were actually on their way to Jerusalem. Armies have a constant need for money, but they rarely mint it for themselves, and never do so when they are on the move. The money that the crusaders had, therefore, they either took with them, often exchanging it on the way, or received by way of subsidy from the Byzantine emperor, or looted, or acquired in the form of ransom payments.

A. The Money They Took with Them

Before they started on the expedition, the princes made estimates of the traveling money which they would need.1 Peter the Hermit col-

and the Franks in Greece and the Latin empire of Constantinople, would have involved a complete revision of Schünemann and the writing of a work on a much comparable to that of the original.

It has been thought best to limit the scope of this chapter to the money and coinage of the crusaders in the strictest sense, namely to the Latin states in Syria and Palestine from the First Crusade until 1261. This leaves scope for a brief but reasonably complete and summarised catalogue of the coins known to have been issued by the Franks in those states.

For information outside the scope of this chapter, less relating to the monetary background of areas treated in volumes II and III of A History of the Crusades, the reader is referred to Jacques Vrin's contributions on the Latin Orient, published in the second volume of the International Numismatic Confraternity's Survey of Numismatic Research 1660-83 (Copenhague, 1967) and 1966-71 (New York, 1973).

Important public collections of coins of the crusaders are to be found in the Cabinet des Médailles of the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris, in the Department of Coins and Medals of the British Museum, London, in the American Numismatic Society, New York, and in the Israel Museum, Jerusalem.

The author is grateful to those owners of public collections and private owners who have allowed him access to their cabinets. He particularly wishes to thank Mr. John A. Slocum, who has given him not only that privilege, but generous advice and hospitality as well. However, it must also be stated that there is important material which is not for unpublished and which the author has not seen. In the present state of crusader numismatics many of the attributions in this catalogue may have to be revised in the light of fuller knowledge. For information on some miscellaneous financial transactions during the Third Crusade the reader is referred to the "Arco Archive" in 2006's Secondary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts, London, 23rd June 1987, pp. 33-35, which was published too late to be incorporated in this chapter.

1. William of Tyre, Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum, ii, xlvi (RHC, Dec.,
lected gifts from the devout princes of Christendom to minister to the necessities of the poor and needy during their pilgrimage. The wagon containing this entire treasure was carried off by Bulgarian raiders as the pilgrims were on their way to Constantinople.¹

Raymond of Aguilers gives a list of the coins that the crusaders principally used among themselves: “Pictavienses, Cartenses, Manseis, Lucenses, Valentinenses, Merionesi et duo Pogesi pro uno stanorum”—the bullion deniers of Poitou, of Chartres, of Le Mans, of Lucca, of Valentia, of Melgueil, and of Le Puy, these last being worth one half the value of the others.

It is instructive to compare this list, which accords, so far as it goes, with the western coins of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries which turn up in stray finds in Syria and Palestine, with the roll of the leaders of the crusade and the coins which they and their followers used in their homelands. Although there were no kings among them, most of the leaders from France exercised the jus monetae. Within the empire this right was not so widely distributed at that time, but the leaders from Germany and Italy also were closely connected with those who did exercise rights of coining.

These then are the coinages which the leaders issued or with which they were associated at home:

Godfrey of Bouillon and Baldwin of Boulogne: The dukes of Lower Lorraine as such did not issue coins, nor did Godfrey strike any for his territory of Bouillon. In France, however, their father Eustace II struck a scanty coinage as count of Boulogne, and possibly their brother Eustace III did also.²

Bohemond, Tancred, and Richard of the Principate: None of these princes issued coins in southern Italy. However, Robert Guiscard, father of Bohemond and grandfather of Tancred, and Roger Borsa, Bohemond's half-brother, issued extensive coinages in copper and some gold coins also. Their uncle, Roger, struck a similar coinage as count of Sicily.³

¹ See Pictavienses, Cartenses, Manseis, Lucenses, Valentinenses, Merionesi et duo Pogesi pro uno stanorum.
² See Novels I. viii (RHC, Oct., i, 55).
³ Raymond of Aguilers, Historiae Francorum qui assaulted Regiam Jerusalem, i, 1 (RHC, Oct., Or., i, 778). Another MS reads: “Mansis, Lucenses, Valentinenses, Merioneses”.
⁵ Giuseppe Sanboglio, Banconote generali delle monete coinase in Italia (Paris, 1912), iv, viii, ix.
Raymond of Toulouse: Raymond passed as the richest of the crusading leaders. The actual coinage of Toulouse in the name of Raymond himself was not very extensive, but his overlordship included many other mints. The most important of these was undoubtedly that where he exercised the right of coinage as count of Melgueil. Two who took service with Raymond were also possessors of mints of their own. Gaston of Béarn inherited from his father Centulle the mint of Moi laus, which struck (always in the name of Centulle) the most prolific currency in Gascony. Gerard of Roussillon was the heir to a somewhat purer coinage. He succeeded to the county of Roussillon in 1102, and deniers are extant bearing his name; these are mentioned by the name of "rosellus" in a charter of 1112.

Robert of Flanders: The coinage of the counts of Flanders dates from the end of the tenth century, but it was not yet of great extent or importance by 1100. The various coins of Robert himself, and those struck by his countess Clementia of Burgundy as regent during his absence on the crusade, are known in only a few examples.

Robert of Normandy: The coinage of Normandy had much degenerated by 1100. The light and much-debated Norman denier was of only local importance by that time, and was supplemented even in Normandy by the heavier and more highly valued deniers of neighboring Maine and Anjou.

Adhémar of Montier, Bishop of Le Puy: The anonymous coinage of Le Puy was extensively used in Auvergne. These coins, which were of low intrinsic value, passed at one half the value of the denier of Melgueil. The vernacular expression"peigneoise" came into due course to signify a fractional coin, both among the Franks in the east and in the kingdom of France.

6. ibid., II, 218. The coinage of Melgueil remained in the hands of the counts of Toulouse until 1225, when as a consequence of the Albigensian Crusade it was granted by Innocent III to the Bishop of Magnacoume.
7. ibid., II, 160.
10. Poey d'Avrun, op. cit., I, 26-32. For the coins of Anjou and Maine see ibid., I, 199-216.
11. ibid., I, 317-342.
Hugh of Vermandois: The single specimen of a denier in the name of Hugh is of doubtful authenticity. There is, however, a series of anonymous deniers of Saint Quentin, the principal city of the county of Vermandois, some of which date from this period; this was a coinage of moderate importance. Hugh's brother, Philip I, issued a fairly extensive coinage as king of France. 13

Stephen of Blois: The coins of Stephen's county of Chartres and the related issue of his county of Blois formed one of the most important currencies in France at the end of the eleventh century. 14

Baldwin of Hainault: No coins are known for Baldwin as count of Hainault, but he struck a few pieces at Saint Omer, as claimant to the county of Flanders. They are as rare as the coins of Robert.

The coins therefore which Raymond of Aguilers mentions correlate tolerably well with the coinage traditions of the leaders of the crusade. The coins in his list which remain to be accounted for are the coins of Poitou, of Lucca, and of Valence.

The deniers of Poitou were one of the most plentiful coinages of France; the Poitevin mint of Melle was supplied from Carolingian times by the silver mine there. 16 The Poitevin connection with the crusade was always strong, and of course the count of Poitou, William of Aquitaine, was a leader of the abortive crusade of 1101.

The deniers of Valence were, with those of Vienne (also frequently found in Syria and Palestine), one of the principal currencies of the Rhône valley. 16 Valence lay on the main route which would be followed

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12 Ibid., III, 363-364.
15 Ibid., II, 1-30.
16 Ibid., III, 7. For the coins of Vienne see Ibid., III, 36. The association of deniers of Valence with the Latin east is discussed in B. M. Metzner, "Coins of Lucca, Valence, and Antioch," Nürnberger Beiträge zur Numismatik (1960-1962), published 1972, pp. 415-470. Deniers of Valence were also present in the Burghemana hoard recently discovered in Cittda; see Wolfgang Hess, in Mitchercher Jahrbuch der Bildenden Kunst, 3rd ser., XXXV (1964), 252-254. Information on this hoard, which was probably deposited by German crusaders accompanying the emperor Frederick Barbarossa on the Third Crusade, has become available too late for inclusion in the text of this chapter. It will be published in detail by Dr. Ulrich Klaen of the Württembergisches Landesmuseum, Stuttgart.

The biggest single element in the hoard, which is majority of silver, is made up of pfennigs of Philip of Heinsberg, archbishop of Cologne, and some of similar design struck by Frederick himself at his mint at Aachen. A significant portion consists of episcopal issues from Strasbourg and the Lotharingian bishoprics of Metz and Toul, and pfennigs struck at the archbishop of Salzburg's mint at Freising in the eastern Alps. There is a useful contribution from the Swa
by any pilgrim of northern or central France making the pilgrimage by way of Provence or Italy. It will be recalled also that the cleric Bernard of Valence became the first Latin patriarch of Antioch.

The mint of Lucca was one of the four imperial mints of Italy, and the only one situated in Tuscany. Its significance for the crusades is that it supplied the coinage for Pisa, which under the direction of its archbishop Dalmont was the first of the Italian maritime communes to give naval and economic support to the movement.

Briefly therefore it can be stated that of the coins mentioned by Raymond of Aguilers, the pictorial were contributed originally by the Poltevins, the currienses by the followers of Stephen, the mites by Robert's Normans, the assises came with the fleet, the valentines and potes with the Provençals and those who traveled down the Rhône valley, and the morgens were originally brought by the followers of Raymond of Saint Gilles. All are found in Palestine and Syria. 17

There is nothing in the chronicle's list to represent the home coinage of the Lorrainers and the Flemings on the one hand or of Bohemond's Normans on the other. To some extent this may reflect the fact that Raymond of Aguilers was with the Provençal army, but the surviving coins confirm his account. It must be assumed that these others brought less of their own money with them, which would have made them more heavily dependent upon subsidies. In Bohemond's case we may note that his kinsfolk's coinage in southern Italy was mostly copper, which does not usually travel, being reckoned rather worthless far from home.

What the Normans did bring with them, however, was a generation's experience of Byzantine money and minting practice in the outer marches of the empire. Moving in effect from one Byzantine frontiers area to another, at Antioch and Edessa (where they were an important element in count Baldwin's following) they were quick to resume the striking of coins on their own. Their coins, though of the local pattern, were yet not so different from those to which they were accustomed in Italy.

B. The Money They Encountered en Route

The specie which the crusaders first met in quantity was Byzantine coin acquired in the form of subsidies. William of Tyre records how at Constantinople duke Godfrey, one of the leaders, less well provided with funds from his own land, received from the emperor Alexius as much gold coin as two men could carry on their shoulders and ten masses of "de aereis denarius". Fulcher of Chartres, in what may be another account of the same episode, tells us that after the capture of Nicaea "jussit imperator de auro suo et argento atque pallis pro ceribus nostris dari, pedibus quoque distribui fecit de omnibus suis aeneis, quos vocant tarracones." These coins were the copper tetartara, which were placed at the lowest point in the scale of Alexius's newly reformed coinage.

The monetary reforms of Alexius have only recently been elucidated. His coinage embodied a far more sophisticated monetary system than any which the Franks, except probably Bohemond's Normans, had experienced before. It was based upon the gold hyperpyron, 20½ carats fine. The fractional pieces were an electrum coin, valued at one third of the gold, and a billon piece, the aspron trachy or stamilon, valued at one forty-eighth. The copper tetartara were in the system below these three, but their precise value in relation to them has not been established. In the frontier areas, some of the pre-reform coinage of earlier emperors, which included gold coins substantially less pure than the hyperpyron, was still in circulation along with the reformed coinage.

In describing the cost of living during the siege of Antioch in the winter of 1097–1098, the anonymous historian of the First Crusade mentions that the price of a donkey was eight purpurati (hyperpyra) "qui appercebantur ex solidis denario rum". This quotation of an exchange rate which is equivalent to 180 deniers for one hyperpyron, or to 3⅓ deniers for one billon aspron trachy, implies that an exchange market was already well established. However, the first actual record of an exchange transaction between crusaders and Byzantines dates not from the First Crusade but from the Second. Odo of Deuil records:

18 William of Tyre, II, xi (RHC, Occ., 1, 80).
the bewildermanent of his economically unstored countrymen when they were first confronted by the intricacies of the Byzantine coinage. He also suggests that they were given a very bad rate of exchange against their own money. Indeed it would not be surprising if the Franks were cheated from time to time by the Byzantine money-changers. However, when in 1147, under the walls of Constantinople, the pilgrims received one copper statere (by which name Odo must intend the billon aspron trachy of the reformed coinage) for two of their deniers, instead of having to give five deniers as they had done at the imperial frontier and as they were to do again as they crossed Anatolia, it appears that they were treated by the emperor Manuel to an especially favorable rate. In any case they got a better bargain than their grandfathers had at Antioch fifty years earlier.

Underlying Odo's complaint, which is couched in rather obscure language as if the chronicler himself did not really grasp what the issue was, there appears to have been a complete misapprehension on the part of the Franks as to the nature of Byzantine subsidiary coinage. Their own deniers were worth their intrinsic value and no more. The Byzantine billon on the other hand was worth one forty-eighth of a hyperpyron not intrinsically but because a powerful government was to maintain that as its value, which was a much more advanced monetary concept.

At least no misunderstanding arose in the valuation of gold, to the use of which the crusaders took readily, although gold coin was not generally available in their homelands. As they moved east they encountered Byzantine gold of both the reformed and the pre-reform coinage. In William of Tyre's story of count Baldwin II of Edessa, who pledged his beard and tricked his Armenian father-in-law, Toros, into redeeming it for him, the ransom price is stated in gold mihailitae, the debased gold nomisma struck by Michael VII. Later, when Baldwin as king of Jerusalem was ransomed for a sum of one hundred thousand of these coins, William described them as the principal currency of those regions. It was only much later, when Baldwin III was married to Theodora, niece of the emperor Manuel, in 1158, that William mentioned the hyperpyron as making up part of the bride's dowry.

The coinage of the Saracens when the Franks first encountered it was in as much disarray as their political system. Like the coinage of the Byzantine empire it was based upon gold, the silver having been drawn away, presumably by the high value given to it in Latin Christen-

dom, as much as a century before the First Crusade. The most plentiful Islamic gold coinage in the area consisted of dinars struck by the eleventh-century Fatimid caliphs at mints in Egypt and Syria. The Franks became accustomed to give and to receive these coins, to which they gave the name bezants arracanari, as ransom payments and tribute. In due course they themselves came to strike imitations of them.

The only coins struck by the emirs and sultans with whom the crusaders first came into immediate contact were copper pieces for local circulation. There is no evidence that the Franks used these in their own transactions, but it is to be noted that the very first coins that the Frankish leaders struck in their own names were likewise copper coins of low value for local use.

C. The Coins Minted by the Crusaders

The actual minting of coins by the crusaders themselves was instituted shortly after their settlement in the East and continued, with some intermission, until their expulsion nearly two centuries later. Their minting operations may be divided broadly into three phases. The first phase, a period of crude quasi-Byzantine copper coinage in the northern states of Edessa and Antioch, began a year or two after the First Crusade and ended soon after the eclipse of the Normans at the "Field of Blood" in 1119. The second phase, a period of typically Frankish denier coinage at Antioch, Jerusalem, and Tripoli, ran from about 1140 until after Hattin. The last phase, characterized by new monetary experiments and some proliferation of minting authorities, lasted from the Frankish revival until the extinction of the Latin settlements in 1291.

THE FIRST PHASE

The coinage of the first phase is limited to Edessa and Antioch. All the coins are made of copper and are struck on thick blanks. They run

28 Stanley Lane-Poole, Coins of the Turks Turkmens (International Numismatic Orien
in series, starting with clean blanks, but thereafter overstruck one on the other. The inscriptions are in Greek at Edessa, in Greek or Latin at Antioch. It appears that the weight of the coins was not particularly important, since the weight range within each issue is very large.

We cannot tell which were the very first coins minted in the name of the leaders of the crusade. There are coins of both Edessa and Antioch which, on numismatic evidence, must date from before 1104. From their general aspect it seems clear that they were struck more for the use of the native population than for the Franks.

Edessa, of course, was not conquered from the Turks, but was taken over from its Armenian ruler by Baldwin of Boulogne's coup d'état. Its inhabitants, according to William of Tyre, were native "Chaldaeans" and peaceful Armenians ignorant of the use of arms and familiar only with the business of trading.28 The Armenian rulers of the city had not, however, struck coins.

We cannot tell whether the decision to issue coins there was taken by Baldwin I or Baldwin II. Documentary evidence is lacking. The numismatic evidence, so far as it goes, would tend to put the initial date after rather than before 1100, the year when Baldwin I departed to become king of Jerusalem. Yet the decision to institute a currency accords rather well with what we know of Baldwin I—his thirst for sovereignty and his single-minded intention to acquire and efficiently to administer a state in the Levant. Since Edessa, of all the crusading states, was the least dislocated by the shocks of the crusade, it is not impossible to envisage the issue of coins there before 1100.

There is nothing very Frankish about the first Edessene coins.29 By numismatic convention they are called folles, by analogy with the Byzantine copper coins of the period immediately before Alexius's reform, which they much resemble. In weight, in general aspect, and presumably in purpose, though not in type, they also resemble copper coins issued at this time by Turkish amirs and emirs ruling neighboring districts of northern Syria. They weigh mostly 61/4 to 81/2 grams, and they proceed in a succession of issues, each overstruck on a previous one.

This practice of overstriking was normal in the Byzantine empire at this epoch, and is also found in the copper coinage struck by Bohemond's kin in southern Italy.31 We do not know the reason for it.

28 William of Tyre, XVI, iv (RSC, Chr., I, 768).
It cannot be because there were no facilities for making fresh blanks, since in the case of Edessa, at least, the first coins of each series are struck on fresh blanks. Presumably it was an economy measure, since the value of the coins was not high and the issues were frequently changed. From our point of view, the advantage of the practice is that it enables us to set out the issues in the correct order and to date them approximately, but the coins are hard to decipher, and the overstrikes make the later issues quite hideous.

There were at least seven issues (nos. 1-7) and probably more in the early years, though some of these are represented now by only a handful of surviving specimens. The first (pl. 1, no. 1) was struck on clean blanks and in a wholly Byzantine style. It is identified as a coin of Baldwin by the reverse inscription—BAaN in the angles of a jeweled cross.

There follow one more issue in Baldwin’s name (pl. 1, no. 2) and three (pl. 1, nos. 3-5) in the name of Richard of the Principate, Bohemond’s cousin, who was regent of Edessa from 1104 to 1108 when Baldwin II was a prisoner of the Turks. The inscriptions are in Greek. Baldwin’s coin reads XBBK in the angles of a cross, initials which may be taken to signify Χῖλτος βοηθαίος Βαλδίνιος κυρίο. Richard’s legends are all variations on the theme Κύριος βοηθαίος Ριχάρδος, Lord save Richard. A touch of Frankishness begins to creep in with the design of Richard’s third (pl. 1, no. 5): the circular inscription around the cross is common on Western deniers of this period but unknown on the Byzantine coinage.

The next issue (pl. II, no. 6) is anonymous. It could be Richard’s or Baldwin II’s. The type, however, is interesting: it is the first appearance on the crusader coinage of an armed knight. The only precedent for this figure, so characteristic in our eyes of Western military states, and destined to become, in one aspect or another, one of the classic types of the Latin coinage in Syria, is a coin of count Roger of Sicily which dates from about twenty years before. Richard’s successors in Edessa would have been familiar with the Sicilian coin, and the adoption of this type at Edessa may be ascribed to Italo-Norman influence.

Incidentally, what little we know of Richard (his capacity toward his Edessene subjects is almost all that is recorded of him) gives us a possible clue as to the purpose of these frequent type changes, three at least in three years. It seems likely that they were some kind of reve-

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32 Samson, op. cit., no. 376.
33 Matthew of Edessa, Chronica (RHC; Arm., II, 30-31)
une device: we may suppose that coin was called in at intervals and a fee charged for its reuse in a new form.

About the year 1110 the last of the large Edessene coins was struck, a piece (pl. II, no. 7) reverting to a more Byzantine style with a jeweled cross on the obverse and count Baldwin’s name and title in Greek written across the field on the reverse. There was then a change. The weight of the Edessene coinage was reduced to an average 4½ grams and a new series was begun on clean blanks. All these issues (pl. II, nos. 8-11) bear the name Baldwin and the image of the count in armor. The first and most sophisticated shows the count holding a cross in his hand and the inscription ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΙΝΟΚ ΔΟΥΑΟ ΚΤΑΤ, Baldwin servant of the Cross. The later issues, all overstruck, are somewhat cruder. None of them does Baldwin have a territorial title, but they must come from Edessa, since their source is always northern Syrian. The weight reduction may reflect the ruler’s desire to bring his coinage into line with that of Antioch.

There are no coins which can be ascribed with any certainty to the counts Joscelin. The last coins of Edessa, as our knowledge stands at present, belong to a curious issue (pl. II, no. 12) nearly all the surviving specimens of which appear to come from a single hoard, as yet unpublished. They are of copper, but may be alloyed with a little silver. They apparently come in two distinct weights, though the standard of each is so erratic as to admit the possibility that all are of one denomination. The inscription is in Greek: ΚΤΕΥΓΟΣ ΝΙΚΑ, the Cross conqueror, and ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΙΝΟΧ ΧΩΜΙ, count Baldwin. They are struck with neat dies, but on blanks which are often rough and some of which may bear traces of a Kufic inscription.

In most respects, especially in their Greek inscription, their absence of territorial title, and their erratic weight standard, these still belong to the first phase of crusading coinage. In other respects, however—in the thin fabric of the lighter ones, the circular inscription around the cross, and the possible presence of silver in the alloy—they look forward to coins of the second phase. With one possible exception, they are the only Edessene coins to point to this transition.

The exception, a doubtful one, is represented by a single unprovenanced and broken coin (pl. II, no. 13). This, although not certainly part of the Edessene series, is probably best considered here, since it appears to link the last coinage of count Baldwin with the period after he became king of Jerusalem. It is a billon coin and it has a Greek inscription on either side: +ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΙΝΟΧ ΑΣΚΙΟΠΟΘΟΣ in five lines and IX ΧΟ ΝΙΚΑ disposed in the angles of a cross. The title
clearly points to a date after Baldwin's becoming king of Jerusalem, but the fabric and the language of the inscription suggest that it should be ascribed to one of the northern Frankish states. Metcalf and Wilks classify the piece without comment as a coin of Antioch struck by Baldwin during his years of regency in the principality (1119–1126). However, the coin may equally well belong to Edessa, to the eighteen-month interval between Baldwin's consecration as king at Easter 1118 and his investiture of Joscelin with that county in the late summer of 1119. That the coin was struck in the kingdom of Jerusalem is possible but unlikely.

In considering the coinage of Antioch we must recall that the city on the Orontes, unlike Edessa, was once an imperial mint. However, as there is no evidence that the mint was reopened when the city was recovered by Byzantine arms in 969, the issue of coinage there by the crusaders is probably independent of that earlier tradition and should be interpreted as an assertion of sovereignty on their part. The Antioch mint seems never to have been a bone of contention between the prince and the emperor in the long dispute about the prince's status and Byzantine overlordship. It was not, however, until well into the reign of Roger of Salerno that the coins gave the ruler any title; before that their only territorial reference was the image of St. Peter, first patriarch and patron saint of Antioch, which appeared on five of the first eleven issues.

All the early copper coins of Antioch are of the light but erratic weight standard of the later armed-man coins of Edessa. There are some rare issues among them, but as a rule they are more plentiful than those of Edessa. The order of the principal issues is reasonably clear and is established by the pattern of overstruck. Four issues of Tancred (nos. 16–19) as regent for Bohemond I are followed by three of Roger (nos. 20–22) and maybe two of Bohemond II (nos. 15?, 23).

The first of Tancred's coins (pl. III, no. 16) shows a bust of St. Peter, neatly engraved, and a reverse inscription in Greek, Lord save thy servant Tancred. Such use of the local patron saint is found in the provincial coinage of the Byzantine empire; St. Theodore appears on the


35. The inscription allows the hypothesis that this is a coin of Baldwin I, the first Latin emperor of Constantinople, whose head, with the same legend, is engraved on the title page of Réné de Chabannes, Recherches sur les monuments des croisades de l'Empire (Leipzig, 1848). However, the fabric of the coin is quite unlike that of Byzantine coins at the time of the Latin conquest.
coinage of Trebizond at just this time. The parallel is strikingly reinforced by the similarity in appearance of Theodore on the Trebizond coins to the bust of Tancred himself as he appears on his second issue (pl. III, no. 17) at Antioch. This portrait has sometimes been said to show Tancred wearing a turban, and therefore to demonstrate how quickly the crusading princes adopted oriental manners. The prototype of the Greek soldier-saint is a more convincing explanation of Tancred’s bizarre appearance.

Tancred’s third issue (pl. III, no. 18) has the reverse inscription DSFD for Domine Salvum Fac Tancrodam, the Latin transcription of the invocation όποιον θέλεσ, which is found on coins of both Antioch and Edessa. On account of its Latin legend this coin was once ascribed to the principality of Galilee, which Tancred held as a fief of Godfrey of Bouillon before 1100. That ascription is still sometimes made, but it cannot be correct since the coins have been found with others at Antioch and take their due place in the succession of overstrikes, forming the undertype of coins of Roger and of Tancred’s last issue (pl. III, no. 19), a coin of conventional Byzantine aspect with a bust of Christ on the obverse and Tancred’s name in Greek on the reverse.

Roger made three successive issues of copper coins, the first two (pl. III, nos. 20, 21) with Greek inscriptions, the third (pl. III, no. 22) with a Latin one. All share the essentially Byzantine iconography of the early crusader coins, but the first two bear images not used by Roger’s predecessors, the Virgin orans and St. George slaying the dragon. The St. George coin is chiefly remarkable for its reverse legend, which sets out Roger’s title as prince of Antioch. It is the only coin of the first phase to state a territorial title, and it may possibly be interpreted as an example of the assertiveness characteristic of usurpers.

The problems of the early coinage of Antioch center upon the attribution of coins in the name of Bohemond. One of these indeed (pl. III, no. 23), a coin with the reverse inscription BAIMYNΔOC set in the angles of a cross, is not difficult, since it occurs overstruck on coins of Roger. This must therefore be ascribed to Bohemond I and, since it follows hard on Roger’s coins, to the early part of his reign before his arrival in the east in 1126 to take up his inheritance. This close se-
quence is an incidental but not weighty argument against the attribution of the BALDROY HOC AECIOTHOC coin (pl. II, no. 13) to this period at Antioch.

Two other coins bearing the name Bohemond or an abbreviation of it are more difficult to place. One of these (pl. III, no. 14) shows a bust of St. Peter on the obverse and the letters BHMT in the angles of a floriate cross on the reverse. Schlumberger ascribed it to Bohemond I. The main arguments for giving an early date to this rather scarce coin are its primitive style and the arrangement of the brief inscription about the cross, like that on Baldwin’s first coin of Edessa (pl. I, no. 1). There is also the negative argument that this coin is not found overstruck on Tancred’s coins. However, it would be reassuring if a specimen could be found overstruck by one of Tancred’s issues.

For the other coin in Bohemond’s name (pl. III, no. 15) there is even less on which to build a hypothesis. It exists in a single specimen, unpublished until now. On the obverse we find St. Peter again, but neatly engraved in the style rather of Tancred’s first issue (pl. III, no. 16) than of the coin (no. 14) just considered. The reverse inscription is in Latin: BO[AMV]NDVS SERVVS XF. The coin is overstruck, but the under-type is not identifiable.

This may be the immediate predecessor of Tancred’s first issue, or it may come just after that issue, in which case Tancred’s first St. Peter coins must be put back to before Bohemond’s release from his Danish prison in 1102. That, however, would suggest that there was a plentiful issue (no. 16) by Tancred during his first regency, an interlude of two years from which this coin (no. 15) is the sole survivor, and then a resumption of prolific coinage (nos. 17–19) by Tancred with his second regency in 1104. It makes more sense to suppose that all Tancred’s issues followed hard upon each other.

It is tempting, in the absence of further evidence, to relate the new coin to Tancred’s first St. Peter coin, which so much resembles in iconography, in style, and in the meaning, if not the language, of the inscription. However, even if new evidence is discovered which makes it necessary to ascribe it after all to Bohemond II after 1119, still this piece, the most uncompromisingly Latin of all the coins of the first phase, interestingly reinforces the two points which must strike anyone who examines the early coinage of the crusaders. One is the close parallel with the coinage of the Normans in southern Italy, which is also an overstruck coinage in copper given to insouciant alternation between Greek and Latin. The second point is the genuine religious

39 Schlumberger, Administratio, p. 43.
servor which these coins transmitted, counterbalancing to some extent the evidence of the crusaders’ boundless capacity which emerges from some accounts of the crusade: Lord save thy servant Tancred; Baldwin the servant of the Cross; Bohemond the servant of Christ. We are accustomed to the appearance of the saints in the iconography of later medieval coinage, and the Kupz Bohmen invocation is found on the coins of the Byzantine emperor and on the seals, though not the coins, of the Normans in Italy. But even if their inscriptions do contain an element of ostentatious humility which may have had a political purpose, these coins, with their absence of territorial rule, are still impressive. There is something in them of that spirit which allegedly prompted Godfrey of Bouillon to refuse a crown in the city where his God had worn a crown of thorns.

THE SECOND PHASE

During the twelfth century the coinage of western Christendom consisted almost entirely of silver or billon deniers (denari, pence, or pfennige) issued at various weights and fineness by different feudal authorities. One of its characteristics was a tendency to crystallize into what are known to numismatists as “immobilized types” — forms and designs remaining essentially unchanged for decades on end. The principal coinages of France and those of the imperial mints of Italy were prime examples of this.

Coinage in western Christendom was the king’s monopoly if he could enforce it, but if not, not. In France the jus monetae was still widely distributed, a legacy of the breakdown of political cohesion in late Carolingian times. A number of coinages, notably those of the counts of Anjou and Champagne in the north and those of the counts of Toulouse and dukes of Aquitaine in the south, were more important than the king’s own, but royal authority was gradually strengthened, and by the end of the century royal coinage was predominating. In Germany, on the other hand, the imperial prerogative was weakened and dispersed, so that by 1200 the imperial mints were at best competing as equals with those of the great feudatories, notably the ecclesiastical servants of the empire and the secular lords of the march. In northern Italy coinage, to begin with, was largely restricted to the

imperial mints—Pavia, Milan, Verona, and Lucca—but increasingly
the communes either asserted or were granted their own minting privi-
leges. Only in England, in southern Italy, and in the Spanish king-
doms was the right of coinage more or less exclusively held in royal
hands.

Among the crusaders coinage was not exclusively royal insofar as
the *jus monetae* was vested in all four rulers of the Latin states. They,
however, kept it to themselves, permitting even less encroachment by
their barons during the twelfth century than did the king of England.
Nor did the privileges and immunities granted to the Italian communes
within certain cities extend to the operation of a mint. Yet otherwise,
in monetary as in political affairs, the principal outside influences in
the Latin states came from France and the maritime communes of Italy.

It is not in itself surprising that twelfth-century Frankish princes
should have issued silver and billon coinage. That rulers in Syria and
Palestine should do so, however, implied an important reversal of the
economic and monetary trends of nearly two centuries. Such coins were
quite exceptional in that part of the world, and their appearance there
was a sign that in the wake of the crusaders’ conquest silver, the val-
ued currency of the west, was drawn eastward. This was either because
the west was sending heavy subsidies for their support, or because the
Latius established in their new lands economies which, in monetary
terms, were an eastward extension of the system already operating in
the west. Probably both causes were at work, but they worked slowly;
if the crusading princes did not start to issue silver coinage on a regu-
lar basis before about 1140, this was because until then there was little
silver about. Even when regular silver coinage was established, it was
accompanied by far more subsidiary issues of copper coinage than was
ever normal in the west.

It may be that some of the earliest silver coins struck by the cru-
saders were in fact imitations of western coins. It has been argued that
some of the crudest and later varieties of the *denaro* of Lucca, the *luxus*
of Raymond of Aguilers’ catalogue, were actually struck by the Pisans,
and that some may even have been minted in the Holy Land, where
diverse boards of them have been found. The existence of a denier
of Chartres from an eastern source and with a retrograde inscription
possibly adds a little more weight to this theory that the first silver
minted by the crusaders consisted of copies of the coins which they
had brought with them. It raises, however, the important juridical

41 Moreau, loc. cit.
42. This coin, which is unpublished, is in the author’s collection.
question whether they were issued by the Latin princes or minted sub rosa by the Italian communities.

The first denomin of Frankish type and bearing the name of a crusading prince are apparently coins of Bertrand (Bertram) of Tripoli (pl. VIII, no. 65). A very rare anonymous coin of the same type and with the same reverse legend (pl. VIII, no. 66) is also ascribed to Bertrand. Since Bertrand died in 1112, the coins ascribed to him are cutters, struck quite early during what we have called the first phase of crusading coinage and antedating all other Frankish denomin by at least twenty-five years. They cannot therefore be fitted into any neat pattern of monetary development in the Latin states, and they are the more extraordinary in that Pons, Bertrand's more active and longer-lived successor, apparently struck no coins in twenty-four years. Bertrand's coins, which are closely related in type to those which he struck at count of Toulouse before he left for Tripoli in 1109, are represented by only a handful of surviving specimens.

Regular coinage of silver denomin seems to have begun more or less contemporaneously in Antioch and Jerusalem about 1140. The new phenomenon appears to reflect two facts: a steady enough inflow of silver to sustain coinage of this kind and the presence of a Frankish population big enough to demand it.

At Antioch the denier coinage was instituted by Raymond of Poitiers some time after his marriage in 1136 to Constance, the successor of Bohemond II. His issue came after a period of some fifteen years in which there was either no coinage at all, or at most some irregular issues of anonymous copper coinage of thin fabric but otherwise of primitive aspect (pl. IV, nos. 24-26), which may be ascribed to these years on the somewhat inadequate ground that they fit in badly almost anywhere else.

Raymond's new coins (pl. IV, no. 27) have on the obverse a neat profile bust and the circular inscription RAMVNDVS; the reverse simply gives the name of the city ANTIOCHIE around a short cross. A profile portrait was quite exceptional in French coinage at that date, but normal in England, whence Raymond was summoned to Antioch in 1136, and also in Navarre and Aragon, kingdoms bordering on his native Aquitaine.43

Several varieties of Raymond's denier have been noted.44 It was evi-

43 Another possible prototype for the profile portrait is the head of St. Maurice as it appeared on the deniers of Vienne.
dently struck over quite a long period, and maybe at varying fineness. A copper coin (pl. IV, no. 28) is also ascribed to Raymond.

Raymond was succeeded in 1149 by his son Bohemond III. To him are ascribed a series of deniers (pl. IV, no. 30) bearing the name BOAMVNDVS with a profile portrait similar to that on Raymond’s coins in the last phase of their evolution. Their reverse inscription reads ANTIQUSHLA, a change in spelling which may be helpful for the classification of the anonymous copper coinage (pl IV, no. 29; pl V, nos. 35–36). The bare-head deniers of Bohemond continued in issue for some fourteen years, during which there was a gradual deterioration in their execution.43

About 1163 the bare-head coins were replaced by a new issue whose principal feature was a profile bust wearing chain-mail and a helmet marked with a cross. The form of this helmet, with its prominent nasal, is very similar to that shown in two well-known illustrations of crusaders in action dating from about 1170, the mural in the Templar church at Cressac (Charente) and the miniature plan of Jerusalem in a manuscript in the Royal Library, The Hague.44 As a coin type, however, this armed bust is unprecedented.

The helmet deniers (pl. IV, no. 31; pl. V, nos. 33, 38, 39) remained in issue as an immobilized type until the 1220s. At least eight distinct issues have been noted and their relative chronology established, although their precise order is not beyond dispute.45

Both the bare-head and the helmet deniers were accompanied by sporadic issues of minor coinage in copper or very debased billon of varying types (pl. IV, nos. 29, 32; pl. V, nos. 34–37, 40). By a misleading convention these have also been labeled deniers. It is much more likely that they were fractional pieces, mailles or pougeoises, forming part of a comprehensive monetary system.

King Fulk struck a plentiful coinage in his home county of Anjou.46 His followers from France no doubt carried large numbers of deniers angervns to Palestine, where they figure prominently among the finds of Frankish coins.47 Fulk, however, struck no coins of his own as king

46 Henry d’Avranches, op. cit., 1, 264.
47 Metcalfe, “Some Hoards and Stray Finds. . .,” p. 145. See also the story quoted in vol-
of Jerusalem, and quite possibly struck no coins in Jerusalem at all.

If he did, there are two issues of coins which could be ascribed to
him, though both are anonymous. One of these (pl. VII, no. 58) features
a church steeple symbolically towering over two flanking minarets; on
the other (pl. VII, no. 60) a patriarchal cross is set between two palm
branches and stars. Both are scarce, but the recent discovery of a frac-
tional maille or obole for each (nos. 59, 61) suggests that they were
normal and regular issues and not just temporary or emergency strik-
ings. Their weight of about one gram for the deniers and some of their
stylistic features suggest a fairly early date, and their provenance, where
this is known, suggests that they circulated in the Latin kingdom.
However, their rarity and the near-imperspicuity of their inscrip-
tions are more suggestive of the tail-end of a coinage than the begin-
ing of one. Their placing here in the coinage of the crusades is very
tentative. 50

More characteristic of the confident beginning of a new coinage by
a vigorous political power are deniers and oboles with the obverse in-
scription REX BALDWINVS and the Tower of David on the reverse
(nos. 41–44). These are among the most plentiful of all crusader coins,
and it says much for the intractability of crumpling numismatics, with-
out documents or satisfactory hoard evidence, that it is not even cer-
tain whether they were introduced by Baldwin II or Baldwin III. The
more generally held opinion is that the initiative was Baldwin III's,
but it may be that they were started by Baldwin II and continued as
an immobilized type through the reigns of Fulk and Baldwin III. If
this second alternative proved to be the case, the anonymous coins (nos.
58–61) described in the last paragraph would probably have to be pushed
further back in time, making them almost contemporary with the rare
deniers of Bertrand of Tripoli (pl. VIII, no. 45).

The Baldwin coins are divided into two classes, one of coarser style
(pl. VI, nos. 41, 42) and another of neater workmanship (pl. VI, nos
43, 44) whose letter forms incorporate many annulets and curlicues.
The very earliest deniers, of course workmanship, read DE hIERVA-
SALEM instead of DE fERVSALEM on the reverse. 51

50 Arnold Spicer, “Two Rare Crusader Coins of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem,” Numis.
Ch., 7th ser., XVII (1972), 184. For the obole see ibid., “Two Crusader Oboles,” Ibid., CXLIII
(1982), 160

51 The fullest treatment of the Baldwin deniers is in Maunutt. “Coinage of the Latin King-
dom of Jerusalem in the Name of Baldwin,” Numis. Ch., 7th ser., XVIII (1978), 71. They
are also discussed in Yeve, “Monnaies de monnay de l'Orient islam,” Rev. numism., 5th ser., VIII
(1966), 39
Amalric continued the issue of deniers and aboles, and some of his coins also have the same curious letter-forms as we find on some of the Baldwin pieces. Amalric’s coins (pl. VI, nos. 45, 46) read AMALRICVS REX, on the reverse the Tower of David is replaced by a schematic representation of the church of the Holy Sepulcher. They continued as an immobilized type probably until well after Saladin’s conquest of Jerusalem in 1187. It would be surprising in the light of normal medieval practice if Baldwin IV had reverted to the Tower of David type of his namesake and uncle. The hoard evidence, such as it is, contradicts this idea.

The last coins of the Latin kingdom before Hama are copper coins in the name of Guy (pl. VI, no. 49). The type is interesting; a crowned facing bust of the king on the obverse and a domed building on the reverse. Schlumberger identified this building as the Templum Domini (the Dome of the Rock), since its form is quite distinct from the church of the Holy Sepulcher as shown on the Amalricus deniers, while it approximates closely to the Dome of the Rock as it appears today and as it is represented alongside the Holy Sepulcher and the Tower of David on the reverse of the royal seals of the kings of Jerusalem. However, the building on Guy’s coin has an opening in the roof, which was a feature of the Holy Sepulcher but not of the Dome of the Rock. Representations of all these buildings are conventional rather than realistic, and the Holy Sepulcher in particular is shown in a wide variety of forms in documents of the period. The assumption must be that the building more sacred to the crusaders was intended in this instance.

It has usually been assumed that the mint for the coinage of the kingdom was at Jerusalem itself. Yet the existence of two quite distinct styles for the Baldwin deniers points to the possibility of two mints. Acre and Tyre have been proposed in place of the capital, but the question is still quite open. More recently Beirut has also been suggested as the possible mint of an enigmatic late-twelfth-century issue of anonymous copper coins which bear the inscription TVRRI S DAVIT and were once attributed to the siege of Jerusalem in 1187 (pl. VI, no. 48); these coins, which have the Tower of David on the obverse and an eight-
pointed star on the reverse, show characteristics of both Tripoli and the Latin kingdom.

The most extraordinary of all the coins of Jerusalem (if coins they be) are gold pieces struck in the names of Baldwin and Amalric, and possibly even Fulk. They do not fit into the neat pattern of typically Frankish coinage of the second phase. Indeed they fit into no normal numismatic pattern whatsoever, since they survive only in fragmentary form.

A reconstruction of the fragments, some of which are segmental while others are irregularly shaped bits, points to coins of about the size of a dinar. One side has a hexagram and the legend CIVITATIS ; HIERVSALEM; another side has a star device and the legend +SIGNVM BALDVINI REGIS. There are variant inscriptions, one of which seems to include the name AMALRICVS, while another suggests FVLCONIS. This is the only gold which bears the name of a crusading ruler or principality. The practice of cutting up coins in order to make fractional values was not abnormal elsewhere in the twelfth century, but this is the only instance in which the complete pieces do not survive. We may speculate whether they were struck specifically in order to be cut up, and if so, why. As the fragments have almost always been found in groups, it is unlikely that they were intended for scattering as alms.

The twelfth-century coinage of Tripoli was less prolific and less rich than that of Antioch or Jerusalem. It was, as we have seen, exceptional in its early beginnings with the scanty coinage of count Bertrand. Thereafter there was no identifiable coinage for thirty years. Even then, when Jerusalem and Antioch began their heavy coinages of silver, Raymond of Tripoli (we cannot even be sure whether it was Raymond II or Raymond III) made only sporadic issues of small copper and very debased billon coins (nos. 67–69). Only one issue of reasonably fine deniers (no. 70) appears to have been made before 1187, and that was by no means plentiful.

The principal characteristics of the Tripolitan coinage are the large number of anonymous issues and the heavy Provençal influence in the choice of designs. What appears to be the earliest coin of Raymond of Tripoli, a copper souvecre (perhaps) of very erratic weight (pl. VIII,

56 J. D. Brady, “A Firm Attribution of Latin Gold Coinage to Twelfth-Century Jerusalem,” ANS, Nummer Notes, XXIII (1970), 123. This covers only some of the fragments, of which more have since become available. A good selection is in the collection of the American Numismatic Society, New York.
no. 67), has a short cross pattée with an annulet at each end of the cross; a cross resembling this was adopted for the arms of the count of Toulouse. Another early piece (pl. VIII, no. 68), of very debased billon or copper, has on it a paschal lamb with a processional cross. This type was first used by Alfonso Jordan on coins which he struck as count of St. Gilles (1112–1148); 57 a similar coin of Alfonso Jordan’s successor Raymond V (1148–1194) has been found near Tripoli. 58 Finally, the type of the crescent moon and star (no. 69, pl. VIII, no. 70), which was to become the Tripolitan type par excellence and was used for the only good deniers of Raymond III, was closely related to deniers struck by Raymond V of Toulouse and St. Gilles for his marquisate of Provence. 59 The confusing duplication of names as of coin-types is itself a measure of the continuing relationship between Tripoli and the Midi.

One more design commonly found on the coins of Tripoli is the city gate or castell. This, which is not unlike the Tower of David but has a door in it, was presumably derived from the count’s seal, which in common with the seals of many other barons had a representation of a tower on the reverse. 60

The castle coins (pl. IX, nos. 73, 75) are all anonymous, as also are some of the crescent and star coins (pl. VIII, no. 72). It has been assumed that these must have been struck during one of the periods when the count was in captivity, and Raymond III’s long imprisonment from 1164 to 1171 is especially cited as their probable date of issue. Probably those years, when there were heavy issues at Jerusalem and Antioch, were also a period of minting activity at Tripoli, but there is no reason especially to associate the anonymous issues with Raymond’s absence. Anonymous coinage was commonplace in the Levant as in the west in the twelfth century, and in an age of immobilized types, when even the death of a ruler did not necessitate the removal of his name from the coinage, still less need his name be removed because he was confined in a Saracen prison.

In the years before Saladin’s conquest only one baron of the Latin kingdom, the lord of Sidon, appears to have struck a coinage of his own. There are some rare deniers rather doubtfully attributed to Gerard (pl. 1153–1164) (pl. XI, no. 94). More certainly attributable are almost equally scarce deniers of his son Reginald (pl. XI, no. 93), which

57 Ponte d’Avanzo, op. cit., III, 253.
58 The coin (obv., no. 3748) is in the Macan’s collection.
59 Todd, II, 255
60 Schillerberger et al., Sigillographie, p. 98.
bear his name RENALDVS and a castle on one side, an arrow on the other. The castle doubtless derived from Reginald's seal; the arrow was a canting symbol devised for Sidon (Saute – sagetta). These coins probably date from before Hattin, since Reginald lost his barony in the same campaign as Guy of Lusignan lost his kingdom. However, he was subsequently regranted part of his fief by Saladin, and his coins therefore may possibly date from the obscure period which elapsed between this recovery and his death about 1204. Whichever date is correct, and whether he usurped or was granted the right of coinage, his action shows how the barons were encroaching upon the royal power in those years; yet the fact that his was the only baronial mint to be established so early shows in a sense how respected the regalian right still was, in spite of the incapable hands in which it rested for much of the time.

A list of baronies allegedly enjoying minting rights was compiled by Schlumberger. This was based upon a misreading of the Assises, which were in any case too late to be a reliable authority. The right of coin referred to in that document was the right to the use of a lead seal, not the right to a mint.

THE THIRD PHASE

Saladin's conquest of Jerusalem, by taking away so much of the territory of the Latin states, profoundly altered their economy. Thereafter they appear as precarious but wealthy maritime communities, necessarily concentrating on commerce but engaged also in some industry and specialized agriculture. They enjoyed a final birect prosperity during the years of political détente with Saladin's successors, until the approach of the Mongols ruined the commerce of the hinterland on which they depended economically, and the rising power of the Mamluks extinguished them altogether.

Their prosperity was an extension of the increasing economic activity of the whole of Latin Christendom. In this expansion the lead was taken by Italy, and in no field so obviously as that of monetary change and development. The old quasi-imperial coinage of north-

91 Ibid., p. 37
92. Schlumberger, Numismatique, p. 108. The argument that Schlumberger was mistaken in this was first advanced by Raoul Champion de Bréilhac, "Le Droit de coeur dans le royaume de Jérusalem," Syria, XXIII (1942-1943), 244-257.
ern Italy declined in importance as mining rights were granted to the communes, among them Genoa in 1139 and Pisa in the reign of Frederick Barbarossa. The coinage of Venice in particular grew in scope and importance, and in 1201 Enrico Dandolo introduced the silver grosso of 24 denari in order to facilitate the heavy payments for material and wages which the republic was making in the course of fitting out the Fourth Crusade. A monetary development which was crucial to the advance of the commercial revolution in Europe was thus directly linked to the history of the crusades.

Within a few years many other Italian communes, Genoa, Pisa, and Ancora among them, followed Venice's lead in the issue of larger multiple coins. Finally in 1252 Genoa and Florence began to mint gold, a sign that the eastward flow of silver which had marked the earlier phase of the crusades was now matched by a counterflow of gold.

The principal characteristic of French coinage during the same period was the increasing extension of the royal money at the expense of the feudal, a change which was largely brought about by the policy of Philip Augustus; it was in Philip's royal currency, the livre tournais, that major financial business was transacted during the Third Crusade. Not all the feudal coinages were eclipsed, however; and those which survived were, if anything, more plentiful and more vigorous than before. Among them were those of some notable crusaders; the Polievre and Aquitanian deniers of King Richard I, the deniers of Provins and Troyes struck by Count Henry of Champagne and his successors, the coins of Hugh IV, Duke of Burgundy, and those of Hervey of Donzi, Count of Nevers. The coins of Provins and Troyes, which were the currency in which the business of the Champagne fairs was transacted, would have enjoyed a wide circulation in any case, but the abundance of the others may well be connected with the financing of crusading expeditions.

64 N. Papadopoli, Le Monete di Venezia (Venice, 1899), I, iii, see also Donald B. Queller, "A Note on the Re-organisation of the Venetian Coinage by Doge Enrico Dandolo," *Romania* (1929), 167-172.
68 *Shaf, I, 156.
69 *Shaf, I, 314.* The correspondence between those who struck feudal coins in France and those who went on the Third and Fifth Crusades is noted in Cox, *op. cit.* For the German coins that were struck on the Third Crusade see note 66. Two notable German crusaders whose coins are present in the Parthenon hoard are the emperor Frederick himself and bishop Godfrey of Würzburg.
The introduction of heavy silver and gold coinage in France was the work of Louis IX, who in 1266 instituted the silver gros tournois and the gold écu.70 Louis's monetary reform illustrates the curious interaction of the Latin states with France in monetary matters, since about the same time Bohemond VI of Tripoli and Antioch introduced a silver gros of the same weight and fineness as the gros tournois. The appearance of the gros tournois, with its concentric circles of inscription, also seems to derive from that of coins circulating in the east with which Louis and his crusading companions would have been familiar.

The counterpart of these important monetary changes in the west was the reappearance of silver coinage and the relative decline of gold in the east.71 This was heralded by Saladin's resumption of silver coinage at Damascus in 1174-1175.72 The Seljukids (Seljuks) of Rum took it up in 1185-1186,73 and the Christian kings of Cilician Armenia some fifteen years later.74 The Nicaean coinage of Theodore Lascaris (1202-1222) was predominantly silver,75 while that of Trebizond was exclusively so from the reign of Manuel I (1238-1263).76 Only in Egypt did the older pattern persist, with a plentiful coinage of gold dinars and little else until the end of the Ayyubid dynasty in 1252.77

Quite apart therefore from the political upheaval caused by Saladin's conquest, important changes were to be expected in the currency of the Latin states. Nevertheless, for a few years the coinages of Antioch and Tripoli at least continued with little alteration. Both principalities persisted with their "immobilized" coinages, Antioch with the helmet deniers and Tripoli with the star deniers. On the latter the barely perceptible substitution of RAMVDVS (pl. IX, no. 74) for RAMVNDVS (pl. VIII, no. 71) marked Bohemond of Antioch's assumption of power soon after the death of Raymond III in 1187. De-

70. Blanchet and A. Manesson, Manuel de numismatique françoise (Paris, 1916), II (by Manesson), 115, 147 225
71. Watson, op cit., pp. 5-6.
73. Stanley Lane-Poole, Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum (London, 1877), III, no. 92.
75. Henda, op cit., p. 220.
niers of Bohemond, as later abbreviated to BAVEND (pl. IX., no. 76), are the most abundant of all Tripolitan issues. As some of the later helmet deniers of Antioch are also among the commoner varieties of that common type, it seems that both corisses were issued with renewed vigor after 1200. At Antioch an issue of helmet deniers in the name of Raymond Roupen (pl. V., no. 38) signals the years of his control there from 1216 to 1219.

In the kingdom of Jerusalem, Saladin’s conquest and the removal of King Guy temporarily destroyed the juridical basis on which the corisse had been produced until then. Gradually, however, the kingdom was reconstituted; the extent to which the royal corisse too was reconstituted depends upon the interpretation which is put upon the Holy Sepulcher deniers in the name of Amalricus (pl. VII., no. 52).

We have seen that these coins probably continued in issue as an immobilized type through the reigns of Baldwin IV and Baldwin V. It is reasonable to suppose that, like the helmet deniers of Antioch, they continued still longer, possibly until the 1220’s. The best argument for this is that hoards deposited in the 1220’s contain large numbers of them.72 The theory is also supported by the fact that certain coins of John of Brienne (pl. VII., no. 55) are of the same type.

Apart from the Holy Sepulcher deniers, the coin of the Latin kingdom struck after 1187 are rather scanty. Some are anonymous. At one time it was argued that the TVRRIS DAVIT coppers (pl. VI., no. 48) were siege pieces struck at Jerusalem after Hattin but before Saladin took the city, but it has been pointed out that they were struck over a longer period than the theory would allow.73 They do appear, however, to have been struck somewhere in the Latin kingdom in the closing years of the twelfth century, as does an anonymous billon denier (pl. VI., no. 47) with a patriarchal cross on the obverse which reads MONETA REGIS and REX IERI-M. The ascription of this one, however, to the crusaders’ encampment before Acre, when the kingdom was in dispute between Guy of Lusignan and Conrad of Montferrat, is possibly too fanciful.74 Anonymous coinage at this period is not so exceptional that we must necessarily ascribe it to a time of political vacuum. It is probably safer to assume that, when political conditions were critically uncertain, no coins were issued at all.75

74. Schlabach, Monnaies roumanes, p. 91.
75. For the siege of Jerusalem it must be allowed that the amount of Erunc (RHC, Occ.,
The first coins which can be given a definite place in the renascent kingdom are copper pounceiues in the name of Henry of Champagne (pl. VI, nos. 50, 51). These show his modest feudal title, COMES HENRICVS, and, exceptionally for Frankish coins, the denomination and the mint, PVGES D'ACON. Two issues are extant, a fairly plentiful one with fleur de lis reverse (pl. VI, no. 50) and a rare one, represented now by a single specimen, with a hexagram in place of the fleur (pl. VI, no. 51). Both of these motifs are found on the French feudal coinage, but neither, curiously enough, in Henry's own county of Champagne.

There are three issues of coins in the name of John of Brienne (nos. 53-55), the last coins struck for the Latin kingdom in the king's name. All are exceptional in one way or another. Two of John's issues are datable. These are bullion deniers with a crowned facing bust and the prominent mint name of Damietta (pl. VII, nos. 53, 54). John occupied Damietta in 1249. He was at pains to assert his regalian rights there against the papal legate, Pelagius, and his authorization of these coins probably had as much to do with that struggle as with economic requirements. Nevertheless, the coins would have been useful for paying an army which had been campaigning in the Nile delta for eighteen months, and the bullion for them presumably came from the captured city.

The other coin of John (pl. VII, no. 55) has no mint-name, and the type is the conventional Holy Sepulcher of the Amalricus deniers. The importance of this piece lies in its weight, which at 2.70 grams is about three times that of the average denier. Fortunately another and even rarer coin (pl. VII, no. 56) of the same type and weight (but without John's name) gives us the denomination. This coin was a dragma or dirhem, in one sense a forerunner of the dirhems that were to be struck at Acre with Arabic inscriptions, but in another sense the first silver

11, 70) is both specific and circumstantial. Nothing of the kind and the point, having in concert, ordered that the Holy Sepulcher be stripped of its silver covering and that this silver be melted for payment to the knights and support of defending the city. Siouke, "Numismatic Iconography of the Tower of David and the Holy Sepulcher," Acad. Chim. 7th ser., XIX (1979), 128, marshals the arguments for ascribing an identifiable and separate issue of coins to this event, but his article, although instructive on the iconography of the coins in question (nos. 62), falls short of proving the case. There is no reason to suppose that special coins were struck. Indeed, the authorities might be thought to have had other preoccupations than the designing of a new coinage, and it is more likely that the mint went ahead with coins that was already equipped to make, namely, Amalricus deniers. However, either way, it is curious to reflect that some of these coins may be made of silver mined from the very monument that figures on the reverse.

12 But not at all exceptional for Arabic coins.

13 The hexagram (star of David) coin is published by Spier, "Two Rare Crusader Coins," p. 185, who also discusses the origin of the moneda of both issues.
grasso of the Latin Orient. It was struck only some ten or fifteen years after Enrico Dandolo’s Venetian grasso, and antedated almost every other such coin in Italy.

A curious parallel to John’s dirhem, unpublished until now, is found in the coinage of Tripoli. This is a coin of the RAMVND’ star type (pl. IX, no. 77), of fine silver and probably weighing, when struck, something over two grams, or about the same as a Venetian grasso. This coin cannot be dated surely within twenty years, but a date before rather than after 1240 seems likely. Wherever it is finally put, it confirms the view that the late “economic” phase of the Latin states was a time for monetary experiment.

It has sometimes been maintained that in the years after 1187 the regalian rights of the kings of Jerusalem were much weakened and that the “Livre au Roi”94, which appeared to reassert those rights, was in fact expressing a nostalgic yearning for conditions which were gone for good.95 One reason given for this is the proliferation of baronial coinage in these years. The evidence does not support this argument. There was no wholesale usurpation of the royal monopoly of minting. A strict examination of the baronial coinage reduces the number of issuing baronies to three—Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon.

The coinage of Beirut (nos. 84–88) consists of deniers in the name of John of Ibelin and anonymous copper pieces which, to judge from their appearance, are probably contemporary.96 The obverse type of all of them is a castle or city gate, doubtless taken, like the similar type for Reginald of Sidon and the counts of Tripoli, from the lord’s seal.97 John’s coinage was no brief emergency issue: there are two distinct deniers with minor varieties of each, and they are at least as well minted as any other coins of the Latin kingdom. It is an attractive theory to associate this coinage with John’s dispute with the emperor Frederick, but deniers of both types are found in the Kessab and Tripolitan hoards, both of which are associated with the Fifth Crusade, and

94 The only known surviving coin, which is in the author’s collection, is badly chipped. It weighs 1.96 grams, but an original weight of 2.00–2.20 grams is a fair estimate.
95 Livre au Roi, etc (RIG, Laos, 1, 617). The passage reads: “nul livre au Roi, novissime me nummus laborantum, dura 8 mil. par demi an par l’assine.” The minting of coins was a crime punishable by loss of life.
97 But this was not Schnumberger’s judgment; see Schnumberger, p. 115. Nos. 84, 85, and 86 are shown on pl. X.
98 Schnumberger et al., Sylloge Nummus, p. 40.
are thought to have been deposited about 1221. Surprisingly, therefore, since John of Brienne was a strong king who knew his rights and his relations with John of Ibelin were not bad, this coinage seems to have begun and may have ended some years before the lord of Beirut became heavily engaged in constitutional disputes with his suzerain. Whatever the cause of its issue, the Beirut coinage was not continued by John's successors.

The coinage of Tyre is all very late. Philip of Montfort was granted the lordship in 1246 by Henry I of Cyprus acting as regent of the kingdom; Philip was succeeded by his son John in 1270. By the time Philip was invested with Tyre, the lordship accounted for half the total area of the Latin kingdom, and the king's regalian rights were indeed of less account than they once were.

Two issues of coins are known for Philip (pl. X, nos. 89, 90) and two for John (pl. X, nos. 91, 92), all rare and rather ill-struck in copper. Three of them feature a portico with columns. At first sight this appears to be a throwback to an early Frankish coinage type, the so-called temple type of Charlemagne. In practice it is more likely that the building shown is the edicule of the Holy Sepulcher as restored in 1048.

The most extensive, and also the most puzzling, of the baronial coinages is that of Sidon (pl. XI, nos. 93-99). It is not plentiful, but it comprises several different types, most of which are difficult to date. As we have seen, Sidon's coinage started early, but after Saladin's conquest Reginald's coinage probably ceased, and the city was not recovered by the Franks until 1227. Reginald's heir, Balian, was closely associated with the royal government, he was appointed one of Frederick's lieutenants in 1229, and held that position either alone or jointly until his death ten years later. At first he occupied a central position politically, mediating between Frederick and John of Ibe-

99 See Longman, op. cit., p. 173, and Cea, op. cit., p. 55. There must be few coins certainly struck in the Latin states in the years 1220-1230 that it would be possible to give a post-1223 date to both sides, if that were necessary. However, the presence of seven coins of Henry I of Cyprus (1218-1253) in Kossoh, and these absent from Tripoli, argue against the later date for Tripoli. It should be accepted therefore that the Ibelin coinage dates from the reign of John of Beirut.


lin't baronial party, but after 1235 he threw in his lot with his peers.

For some years after Balian’s death his widow Margaret seems to have exercised authority in Sidon. In the only contemporary account of the coinage of Sidon, Jouville93 refers to it as the lady Margaret’s currency. Her son Julian is credited with little political ambition. After he assumed control he found that the lordship’s revenues were not enough to support its feudal obligations, and he turned Sidon over to the Templars in 1260.

It is probably safe to assume that the currency to which Jouville referred, in which Louis made his offering at the tomb of Walter of Brienne in Sidon in 1252, was the coinage of anonymous deniers of reasonably good bullion which read D E N I R D E S E E T E and show an unidentified domed building on the reverse (pl. XI, no. 99). These are the only coins of Sidon plentiful enough to warrant Jouville’s description of them as a proper currency, the only ones also which are fit for a king’s offering.

From this it may be deduced that all the other coins (nos. 93–98) of Sidon are of poor quality. They survive for the most part in such bad condition, and their legends are so garbled, that we can identify them as from Sidon only by the arrow, which first figured on the coins of Reginald. The persistence of this device owes less to continuity than to the aptness of the pun on the city’s name.

All conclusions about the coinage of Sidon must be tentative. It is unlikely that Balian would have resumed coinage in defiance of Frederick’s regalian rights as long as he was actually a royal official giving even half-hearted support to Frederick’s policies. It is unlikely therefore that any of these later Sidon coins were struck before about 1235. The appearance of the good bullion deniers, which in fabric are rather like coins struck by Frederick himself in Sicily, is consistent with their having been minted some time during the two decades 1235–1255. The poor-quality arrow coins and the related issues may be subsidiary pieces dating from the same time, but they are more likely later, the monetary expression of Julian’s financial difficulties.

The modest coinages of Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon comprise the whole story of baronial minting in the Latin kingdom. The attribution of coins to Toron stems from a misreading of certain Montfort coins of Tyre.94 A coin is published (pl. VII, no. 63) for the mint of Jaffa,95 but since it is anonymous and Jaffa was intermittently in the hands

94. Schlanz, op. cit., p. 61.
95. Schlumberger, Numismatique, p. 114.
of the crown, this must be assumed to be a royal issue until proved otherwise. The myth of a more substantial baronial coinage originated partly from these misattributions, but chiefly from Schleumberger’s misinterpretation of the Assizes of Jerusalem and the long list of potential baronial mints which consequently appeared in his standard work on the subject.

Nevertheless, if the baronial coinages of the Latin kingdom in the thirteenth century seem scanty, they should be seen against a background of royal and princely coinage that is far from plentiful. There are no coins of the Latin kingdom in the name of Frederick or of his son Conrad, though Sicilian coins of both of them are common, many bearing the title of king of Jerusalem; and these, to judge from thirteenth-century finds, began to play a significant part in the monetary circulation of the Latin states at this epoch. The most important coinages minted at this time in Palestine were the coins with Arabic inscriptions struck at Acre. There are no coins of Antioch which can be said with certainty to come after the last of the helmet deniers, which date from not much after 1230.

At this late stage most of the circulating medium in what remained of the Latin states was provided from abroad. The increasing importance of Sicilian coinage in the area has already been mentioned. Among Italian coinages, those of Genoa and Venice were also much in evidence. The crusades of the brother and son successively of Henry III of England were the probable cause of the transfer of Henry’s fine silver pennies to the area in fair numbers. Even the new coinage of Portugal, which was a port of call for crusaders coming by sea from northern Europe, found its way into the local circulation. Less surprisingly, the coins of Cyprus were introduced in increasing quantity. Almost no country of western Christendom goes quite unrepresented in the stray finds of coins of this period in the Latin east, but still France predominates, as it did from the time of the First Crusade.

Yet the mints of the Latin states could still display surprising originality. One example of this is an anonymous gold dinar (pl. VII, no. 37) showing the Agnus Dei and an appropriate Latin inscription. Since the coin is not only anonymous, but also carries no indication of where it was minted, it is only because of the oriental provenance of the few surviving specimens that it can be attributed to the Latin states at all.

94. Sambon, op. cit., V, 33, 34.
98. Ibid., pp. 143–146.
99. This coin was published by Gornovan, “A Rare Crusader Denier with the Christus Vincet.
It was probably struck during the reaction against Arabic inscriptions and Islamic professions of faith on the coinage which took place after the visitation of Odo of Châteauneuf and the ensuing strictures of Innocent IV.\(^{100}\)

The most vigorous revival of minting activity in these latter days of the crusading states occurred at Tripoli. After the plentiful issues of BANVMNVS deniers (pl. IX, nos. 74, 76) and the solitary dirhem/gros (pl. IX, no. 77) mentioned above, almost nothing was minted at Tripoli except possibly some anonymous pieces with garbled legends (no. 64) and some rare and debased deniers (no. 78, pl. IX, no. 79) whose late date is indicated by their French inscriptions. Then one of the last two counts, probably Bohemond VI, introduced a substantial gros of fine silver weighing 4.20 grams (pl. IX, no. 80). The first issue of these coins was of entirely traditional Tripolitan type, with an eight-pointed star as the main feature of the reverse. On a second issue (pl. IX, no. 82), by Bohemond VII certainly (the regnal number is stated, for once), the star was replaced by a handsome castle.

The significance of these coins is that the gros was of exactly the same weight as the French gros tournois. The normal presumption would be that the greater prince influenced the lesser in a matter such as this, and that the Tripolitan coin was first issued some time after Louis's reform of 1266. This is still probable. However, the Tripolitan money differed from the French in that each issue was accompanied by an identical coin of half its weight (2.10 grams) (pl. IX, no. 81, 83). We have seen that a coin of this weight, equal to that of a Venetian grosso, was struck at Tripoli some years earlier (pl. IX, no. 77). Some of the initiative therefore certainly lay with the counts of Tripoli, and, once that point is granted, the possibility has to be taken seriously that the larger Tripolitan gros was the prototype for the gros tournois and not vice versa. This would involve counting the smaller coin as the gros and valuing the larger one as a double gros, a reversal of the conventional position.\(^{101}\)

So far as coinage is concerned, Tripoli is the only one of the Latin

\(^{100}\) See chapter XI, below.

\(^{101}\) It is a modern idiom to consider these denominations as "double" or "half". Medieval practice was to refer to a certain value as money of account, such as gros of 8 deniers or gros of 12 deniers. Even so, the medieval mind might work by progression, either from the larger coin to the smaller or from the smaller to the larger. The history of the Tripolitan coinage suggests that this might with the smaller gros and proceeded to the larger. The French on the other hand started with the gros tournois and did not produce a smaller gros until some twenty years later.
states which went down with its colors flying. The Aleppo board, which is thought to consist largely of booty carried off from the sack of Acre, was made up entirely of gold coins from western Christendom. More or less speaking, Acre at the close was a Frankish outpost and nothing more. But the castle coins of Bohemond VII, whose design, the castle and the cross, is so traditional to crusader coinage and so symbolic of crusading life, are among the finest of all the coins ever struck by the Franks in Syria and Palestine. They are also the last. Part of their beauty today lies in the fact that they mostly survive in fine condition. They were not in circulation for long before Tripoli surrendered to the onslaught of the Mamluks.
CORPUS OF COINS

County of Edessa

BALDWIN I (1098–1100) or BALDWIN II (1100–1104)

1. Æ (Pi I)
   Obv. Bust of Christ facing, between IC XC.
   Rev. Jeweled cross on two steps, SΛΝ in angles.
   6.5–8.7 g.
   Numis. Chr., 7-XV (1975), 177, Schlumberger 20 (pl. I, 5).

BALDWIN II (1100–1104)

2. Æ (Pi I)
   Obv. Bust of Christ facing.
   Rev. Long cross on two steps, the arms flanked by two pellets, X Π SK in angles.
   7.2 g.
   Numis. Chr., 7-XV (1975), 178.

RICHARD OF THE PRINCIPATE, regent (1104–1108)

3. Æ (Pi I)
   Obv. Bust of Christ facing, between IC XC, within beaded outer circle.
   Rev. KE | BOH6 | MIKAP | ΔΩ in four lines across the field, within beaded outer circle.
   4.5–8.3 g.
   Numis. Chr., 7-XV (1975), 178, Schlumberger (pl. II, 2).

4. Æ (Pi I)
   Obv. Broad jeweled cross potent, within beaded outer circle. No extrema.
   Rev. KE | BOH6 | MIKAP | ΔΩ in four lines across the field, within beaded outer circle.
   4.6–7.6 g.
   Numis. Chr., 7-XV (1975), 178, Schlumberger (pl. II, 1).
5. AE (Pl. I)
  Obv. Bust of Christ facing, between IC XCV, within outer circle.
  Rev. Short cross within inner circle; KEPHAKAP in outer circle.
  5.0–7.0 g
  Numis. Chr., 7-XV (1975), 179

RICHARD OF THE PRINCIPATE, regent, or BALDWIN II (ca 1108)

6. AE (Pl. II)
  Obv. Armed man standing to left, holding a drawn sword before his
  face and a long shield behind him, all within outer circle. No
  inscription
  Rev. Patriarchal cross within outer circle, large pellets in the middle
  angles of the cross; two arcs ending in trefoils springing from
  the outer circle and ending in the lower angles. No inscription.
  6.3–10.2 g
  Numis. Chr., 7-XV (1975), 179; Schluumberger 13 (pl. I, 1 & 2).

BALDWIN II, restored (1108–1118)

7. AE (Pl. II)
  Obv. Broad jeweled cross potent, within outer circle. No inscription.
  Rev. BADA | OWINO | KOMH (or variant) in lines across the field,
  within outer circle.
  4.6–9.3 g
  Numis. Chr., 7-XV (1975), 100; Schluumberger 19 (pl. I, 3 & 4).

8. AE (Pl. II)
  Obv. Armed man walking to left, holding up a small cross in his
  right hand and with his left hand on the hilt of his sword,
  BAGOVINOCDAO KOCTY, all within outer circle.
  Rev. Long cross fleury standing on floriate base, pellet in each
  angle of the cross, all within outer circle. No inscription.
  3.2–4.2 g
  Schluumberger 21 (pl. I, 7).

9. AE (Pl. II)
  Obv. Armed man walking to left, as no. 8. Inscription placed irregu-
  larly in the field reading downward, BAC before the figure,
  AQH behind it.
  Rev. Cross fleury standing on floriate base; usually a pellet in each
  angle of the cross and a pellet at each end. No inscription.
  2.4–4.6 g
  Schluumberger 21 (pl. I, 8 & 9).
10. **Æ (P. II)**

*Obv.* Armed man standing facing, holding a long cross in his right hand and resting his left on a patterned shield. Inscription reading downward: ΑΑΑΑ to left of the figure, N to right

*Rev.* Short cross, ΒΑΑΑ Ν., each letter placed at one end of the cross.

2.2–4.9 g

Schloemerger 21 (pl. I, 10 & 11).

11. **Æ (P. II)**

*Obv.* Armed man standing facing, with a drawn sword in his right hand and a long cross in his left. Inscription about the figure in the field: Α Α, all within outer circle Δ Ν.

*Rev.* Bust of Christ facing, between ΙΓ ΧΞ

2.4–3.8 g

Schloemerger 22 (pl. I, 12).

12. **Blasus (P. II)**

*Obv.* Short cross pattée with forked left arm and a pellet at each of the other ends, all within inner circle, + ΑΤΑΡΑΚΩΝΙΚΑ within outer circle.

*Rev.* + ΒΑ | ΤΑΟΥ | ΤΙΝΟ | ΜN (or variant) in four lines across the field, within outer circle

0.9–5.4 g. This exceptional weight range may comprise two distinct denominations, one in the range 1.0–2.0 g and the other in the range 3.5–5.5 g.

*Rev. numis.* 3-XV (1897), 533.

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**Edessa or Antioch**

**Baldwin II, King of Jerusalem (1118-1131)**

13. **Blasus (P. II)**

*Obv.* + | ΒΑΑΑ | ΟΥΙΝΟΣ | ΑΤΟΙΟ | ΘΗ

*Rev.* Long cross ΙΧ ΧΞ ΝΙ ΚΑ in angles.

2.38 g. (broken).

*Numis. Chr.* 7-XIX (1979), 136
Principality of Antioch

BOHEMOND I (1098-1100, 1102-1104)

14.  

Æ (Pl. III)  

Obv. Nimbate bust of St. Peter facing, holding a long cross over his left shoulder. Vertical inscription on field: T to left of bust, Q to right, all within beaded outer circle.  

Rev. Long cross fleury standing on floriate base, BH M T in angles, all within beaded outer circle.  

3.3-3.4 g  

Schliemann 43 (pl. II, 4).  

BOHEMOND II (1119-1130)

15.  

Æ (Pl. III)  

Obv. Nimbate bust of St. Peter facing, holding long cross, jeweled at the ends, over his right shoulder, Π to left, all within beaded outer circle.  

Rev. ΒΟΣ | ΝΔΥΣ | ΣΕΡΒΥΣ | ΧΠΙ in four lines across the field, in beaded outer circle.  

3.78 g  

One specimen in private collection  

TANCRED, regent (1100-1102, 1104-1112)

16.  

Æ (Pl. III)  

Obv. Nimbust bust of St. Peter facing, holding long cross over his left shoulder. Inscription in field: ΠΕ to left, ΤΟΣ to right of bust, all within beaded outer circle.  

Rev. + | ΚΕΒΟΙ | ΧΩΤΩΔΥΥ | ΑΟΥΟΥΤ | ΑΝΚΠΙ | + in six lines across the field, within beaded outer circle.  

1.9-6.5 g. A piece weighing 2.55 g. is struck on a scyphate flan.  

Schliemann 44 (pl. II, 6).  

17.  

Æ (Pl. III)  

Obv. Facing bust of Tancred, bearded, wearing a bonnet tipped with a jeweled cross and holding a drawn sword over his right shoulder, ΚΕΒΟΙΙ ΤΑΝΚΠΙ or ΚΕ ΒΟΙΙ ΤΟΣ ΑΟΤΑΟΝ ΤΑΝ, or variant), all within beaded outer circle.  

Rev. Long cross pommée standing on floriate base, ΙΚ ΧΕ ΝΙ ΚΑ in angles, all within one or two beaded outer circles.  

1.6-9.2 g.  

Schliemann 45 (pl. II, 7).
11. Æ (Pl. III)

*Obv.* St. Peter nimbate, standing, his right hand in benediction, his left holding a processional cross. Vertical inscription in field to left of figure, \( \text{EPV} \) to right; all within beaded outer circle

*Rev.* Long cross, \( \text{DSFY} \) in angles; all within beaded outer circle. 2.6-4.3 g.

Schlumberger (pl. V, 1).

19. Æ (Pl. III)

*Obv.* Bust of Christ facing, between \( \text{IC XC} \) within outer circle

*Rev.* Long cross pommée on floriate base, \( \text{TA NK FH} \) in angles; all within outer circle. 1.9-5.7 g.

Schlumberger 45-46 (pl. II, 8).

ROGER OF SALERNO (1112-1119)

20. Æ (Pl. III)

*Obv.* The Virgin Mary erased, wearing a jeweled mantle, \( \text{MMO} \) by her head

*Rev.* \( + | \text{KBOHO} | \text{ELEWIC} | \text{AYAALF} | \text{OTRIP} \) (or variant) in four or five lines across the field, within outer circle 2.4-7.0 g.

Schlumberger 48 (pl. II, 11).

21. Æ (Pl. III)

*Obv.* St. George nimbate, mounted on a horse galloping to right, and spearin a dragon. Inscription in field \( \Theta \) to left, \( \text{GMYOC} \) to right; all within beaded outer circle.

*Rev.* \( + | \text{LOTUP} | \text{NPSTK} | \text{OCANTI} | \text{OXL} \) (or variant) in four or five lines across the field; within beaded outer circle 2.6-5.7 g.

Schlumberger 48 (pl. II, 12)

A specimen in the Bibliothèque nationale weighing 5.05 g. is overstruck on a folio of emperor Leo VI (Schlumberger, pl. II, 13).

22. Æ (Pl. III)

*Obv.* Christ standing, blessing; \( \text{IX XC} \) by his head; all within outer circle.

*Rev.* Long cross with a pellet at each end, \( \text{DRE SAI F} \) \( \text{RO} \) in angles; all within beaded outer circle. 2.3-5.0 g.

Schlumberger 47 (pl. II, 10).
BOHEMOND II (1119-1130)

23 Æ (Pl. III)

Obv. Bust of St. Peter, nimbed, facing, with long cross over his left shoulder. Vertical inscription at field: IIT to left, ET to right of bust.

Rev. Long cross springing from floriate base with pellet at each of the other three ends, BA IT VN AOC in angles; all within beaded outer circle.

26.49 g
Schlumberger 49 (pl. II, 14).

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1120-1150)

24 Æ (Pl. IV)

Obv. Bust of St. Peter, nimbed, facing, holding a long cross over his right shoulder. Inscription on either side of bust: IIT, all within outer circle.

Rev. Cross moline with fleurs or trefoils facing inward in the angles, within beaded outer circle. No inscription.

0.9-1.4 g
Schlumberger 493 (pl. XIX, 1 shows variant with the cross on the apostle's left shoulder).

25. Æ (Pl. IV)

Obv. Armed man holding banner, on horse galloping to left. No inscription.

Rev. Long cross pattée; ANTO in angles.

0.8-1.0 g
Schlumberger 56 (pl. III, 11). This type is probably derived from that of the seal of the prince of Antioch, the earliest recorded example of which is of Raymond of Poitiers (Schlumberger et al., Sigillographie, 33).

26 Æ (Pl. IV)

Obv. As no. 25, but mounted figure to right.

Rev. As no. 25.

0.8 g
Unpublished.
RAYMOND OF POITIERS (1136–1149)

27 A or billon denier (Pl. IV)

*Obv.* Bare head to right, within beaded inner circle, the neck breaking through the circle; + ROMYNDVS

*Rev.* Short cross pattée in beaded inner circle, + ANTIQOCHIE

0.7–0.9 g.

*Numism Chr.*. 7-IX (1969), 255, which postulates five variations distinguished by their lettering and the extent to which the neck breaks through the inner circle.

28 AE (Pl. IV)

*Obv.* Three bars disposed in Y shape, curiously formed AAV in angles.

*Rev.* AN | TIOC | HIE in three lines across the field

1.0–1.3 g.

Schlumberger 51 (Pl. II, 19).

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1140–1180)

29 AE (Pl. IV)

*Obv.* Cross with pellet in each angle, within beaded inner circle; + PRINCPS

*Rev.* Abstract ornamental design incorporating small cross, bar, and loop, all within beaded inner circle + ANTIQOCHIE, sometimes retrograde.

0.2–1.0 g

Schlumberger 59 (Pl. III, 15). The spelling ANTIQOCHIE suggests an early date, but the epigraphy and fabric suggest a date nearer to 1180.

BOHEMOND III (1149–1201)

30. Billon denier (Pl. IV)

*Obv.* Bare head to right, within beaded inner circle, + BOAMYNDVS.

*Rev.* Cross (sometimes with pellet in first angle) within beaded inner circle, + ANTIQOCHIE

0.6–1.0 g.

*Numism Chr.*. 7-IX (1969), 248 ff., which postulates three consecutive issues distinguished by the modeling of the head and the epigraphy, and dates them to the years 1149–1163.
31 Billon denier (Pl. IV)
Ovy Helmeted bust to right, with cross on helmet and chain-mail on neck, crescent to left and five-pointed star to right of head, all within beaded inner circle, + BORMVNDVS
Rev. Cross with crescent in second angle, within beaded inner circle, + ANTIOCHIA.
0.8-1.1 g
_News Cro., 5-XVII (1937), 200-210; ibid., 7-IX (1969), 261. This appears to be the earliest of the helmet denominations and dates from ca. 1163

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1163-1180)

32 A (Pl. IV)
Ovy Helmeted bust to right, with cross on helmet and chain-mail on neck; branches on either side. No inscription.
Rev. Grid of four lines crossing at right angles with a pellet or annulet in each compartment, all within a trellis of eight arches. No inscription
0.3-0.6 g
Schlumberger 59 (pl. III, 17).

BOHEMOND III (1149-1201) or BOHEMOND IV (1201-1232)

33 Billon denier (Pl. V)
Ovy Helmeted bust to left, with cross on helmet and chain-mail on neck, crescent to left and five-pointed star to right of head, all within beaded inner circle, + BORMVNDVS
Rev. Cross with crescent in second angle, within beaded inner circle, + ANTIOCHIA (or ANTIOCHIA).
0.8-1.1 g
_News Cro., 5-XVII (1937), 200-210; ibid., 7-IX (1969), 257-267. ANS, Museum Notes, XVI (1970), 95-109. Eight varieties of this immobilized type, dating from ca. 1163 to ca. 1220, have been classified, distinguished by the style of portrait, punctuation, and epigraphy.

34 A (Pl. V)
Ovy Fleur-de-lis between pellets, within inner circle; + BORMVNDVS.
Rev. Cross with pellet or star in each angle; + ANTIOCHIA.
0.6-0.9 g
Schlumberger 52 (pl. III, 1). This appears to have been the principal fractional accompaniment to the helmet deniers. The several unclassified varieties were perhaps changed part passu with the helmet issues.
ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1200)

35 A (PI V)
Obv. Three-towered castle with double-doored gate, three small
brushes in the foreground. No inscription.
Rev. AN | TIOC | HIX | three lines across the field, the inscription
divided by thin lines
0.6–0.8 g.
Schlumberger 57 (pl III, 12).

36 A (PI V)
Obv. 2 and four pellets in beaded inner circle, + PRINCEPS, some-
times retrograde
Rev. Cross with crescent in one angle and pellets in the others;
within beaded inner circle +ANTIO HIX (or variant)
0.6–1.0 g.
Schlumberger 58 (pl III, 16).

BOHEMOND IV (1201–1232)

37. Billon or A (PI V)
Obv. Cross palle with annulet at each end and pellet in each angle,
within beaded inner circle; + SOXMYNDVS.
Rev. Crescent and six-pointed star, within beaded inner circle, +
ANTIOCHEIA or variant.
1.0 g.
Schlumberger 53 (pl III, 3).

RAYMOND ROUPEN (1216–1219)

38. Billon denier (PI V)
Obv. As no 33, + RV P . INVS
Rev. As no. 33.
0.6–1.1 g.
Numism. Chr , 7-IX (1969), 265.

BOHEMOND IV (1201–1232) or BOHEMOND V (1232–1251)

39. Billon denier (PI V)
Obv. As no. 33.
Rev. As no. 33.
0.6–0.9 g.
Thus last (post ca. 1230) issue of the helmet denier is distinguished
from earlier varieties by its cruder style and lighter weight. It is
unlikely to have been struck much after 1232.
40. **AE (Pl. V)**

*Obv.* B in sometimes beaded inner circle; + BOAMVNDV or BOAMVNDV (some variety reads + ANTIOCHEI).

*Rev.* Cross in inner circle; + ANTIOCHIA (or blundered version, e.g., one variety reads NODIT).

0.7-0.8 g.

Schlumberger 37 (pl. III, 13 & 14)

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**Kingdom of Jerusalem**

**Baldwin III (1143–1162)**

41. **Billon denier (Pl. VI)**

*Obv.* Cross in beaded inner circle, 1 (or +) REX BALDWINVS.

*Rev.* Tower in beaded inner circle, 1 (or +) DE JERUSALEM (variants read IDE JERUSALEM and DE JERUSALEM).

0.95 g. (average).

*Numis. Chr.*, 7-XVIII (1978), 71, *Rev. numis.*, 6-VIII (1966), 92. The two variants seem likely to be the earliest issues.

42. **Billon maials or obole (Pl. VI)**

*Obv.* As no 41; 1 REX BALDWINVS.

*Rev.* As no 41, 1 (or +) DE JERUSALEM

0.45 g. (average).


43. **Billon denier (Pl. VI)**

*Obv.* As no 41, REX BALDWINVS, small lettering, X and A decorated with annulets.

*Rev.* As no 41; + DE JERUSALEM, small lettering, A decorated with annulets.

0.97 g. (average).


44. **Billon maials or obole (Pl. VI)**

*Obv.* As no 43

*Rev.* As no 43

0.48 g. (average).

*Numis. Chr.*, 7-XVIII (1978), 79; *Rev. numis.*, 6-VIII (1966), 92
AMALRIC (1162–1175) and his successors (to ca 1200)

45  Billon denier (Pl. VI)

Obv  Cross with pellets or annulets at second and third angles, all within beaded inner circle; • AMALRICVS REX

Rev  Holy Sepulcher in beaded inner circle; + DE IERUSALEM

0.9 g. (average).
Schlumberger 85.

46  Billon maille or obole (Pl. VI)

Obv  As no 45.

Rev  As no 45

0.4 g. (average).
Schlumberger 85

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1190)

47  Billon denier (Pl. VI)

Obv  Patriarchal cross between X and W. within beaded inner circle, MONETA REGIS.

Rev  Cross in beaded inner circle, + REX IERLM (or IERANM)

0.6–0.8 g.
Schlumberger 91 (pl. III, 27); Rev. numis., 2-X (1965), 297.

48  A (Pl. VI)

Obv  Tower of David, monogram between two annulets or pellets, within beaded inner circle, TV R R I S with annulets or pellets between letters.

Rev  Eight-pointed star within beaded inner circle, + D R V I T

with annulets or pellets between letters

0.6–0.9 g.

GUY OF LUSIGNAN (1186–1192)

49  A (Pl. VI)

Obv  Facing head, crowned and bearded, within beaded inner circle; • REXGVIDOD

Rev  Dome and building within beaded inner circle, IERVSALMOD.

0.9–1.4 g.
Schlumberger 88 (pl. III, 25). Schlumberger identified the building on the reverse as the Dome of the Rock as shown on seals of the kingdom, but the indication of a hole in the dome suggests that the Holy Sepulcher is represented.
HENRY OF CHAMPAGNE (1192–1197)

50 Φ drousero, Acre (PL VI)

*Obv* Cross patera with annulet in each angle, within beaded inner circle; + COGES HENRICVS.

*Rev* Fleur de lis within beaded inner circle; + PVGES DACCON

0.7–1.5 g. A proofcut in the Bibliothèque nationale weighs 0.6 g. Schlumberger 92 (pl. III, 28).

51 Φ drousona, Acre (PL VI)

*Obv* As no. 50

*Rev* Hexagram with a circle at its center and annulets in the angles, within beaded inner circle; + PVGES DACCON

0.8 g

*Numis. Chr.* 7-XVII (1977), 185.

AIMERY OF LUSIGNAN (1197–1205) and his successors (to ca 1220)

52 Billon denier (PL VII)

*Obv* Cross with annulet in first and fourth angles, within inner circle, AMALRICVS REX.

*Rev* Holy Sepulcher, in inner circle; + DE Jerusalem

0.6 g. (average)

Cox (ANS, NNM, no. 59: 1933), p 50; *Rev. numism.*, 4-XXXVIII (1935), 167

JOHN OF BRIENNE (1210–1225)

53 Billon denier, Damietta (PL VII)

*Obv* Head facing, wearing triangular crown with pendants, in inner circle; + IOHANNES REX

*Rev* Cross with annulets in second and third quarters, in inner circle, + DAMIETTA.

0.6–0.8 g.

*Rev numism.*, 4-XXXVI (1933), 173; Schlumberger (Supplement) 6 (pl. XX, 4). This coin and the next attest date from the Franks’ occupation of Damietta in 1219.

54 Billon denier, Damietta (PL VII)

*Obv* Crowned head facing, in inner circle; + DAMIETTA (or variant punctuation).

*Rev* Cross with pellets or annulets in second and third quarters, within inner circle; + IOHENES REX

0.6–0.9 g.

*Rev numism.*, 4-XXXVI (1933), 173; Schlumberger 93 (pl. III, 31)
55 At dragma or dinar (Pl. VII)

*Obv* Cross with pellets of annulets in second and third quarters, within inner circle; + IOHANNES REX

*Rev* Holy Sepulcher, within inner circle; + DE IERUSALEM

2.2–2.3 g. There is a paired specimen (2.6 g.) struck on a scythe flan.

Schlumberger 92 (pl. III, 30). In view of the mint signature on the next coin it seems reasonable to ascribe this one also to Acre.

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1220–1240)

56 At dragma or dinar, Acre (Pl. VII)

*Obv* Cross pattée, sometimes with pellet or annulet in second quarter, within inner circle; DRAGMA ACCONSIS (ACCONEN or ACCONENS).

*Rev* Holy Sepulcher, within inner circle; + SEPVĽCHRİS DOMINI

(Various punctuation).

2.1–2.3 g.

Schlumberger (Supplement) 4 (pl. XX, 3)

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**Kingdom of Jerusalem (?)**

The coins in this section are certainly from the Latin states in Syria and Palestine, but the evidence on which they are attributed specifically to the kings of Jerusalem is by no means conclusive.

57. A' dinar (Pl. VII)

*Obv* Paschal Lamb ambulate to left, holding standard, within inner circle. Inscription in two circles: + AGNVS DEI QVI LLIT, (inside) + PECCATA GVINH

*Rev* Cross with pellet in first angle within inner circle. Inscription in two circles: + XPSTVS VINCIT XPSTVS REG. (inside) + XPSTVS IDPERAY.

3.3–3.6 g.


58 Billon denier (Pl. VII)

*Obv* Cross pattée within inner circle, + SANACACOA (7)

*Rev* Church towering over two flanking minarets. No inscription

0.8–1.0 g.

*Nuncius Chr*, 7-XVIII (1977), 124
59 Billet obole.

**Obv.** Cross patee within beaded inner circle. *a. N A.

**Rev.** Church towering over two flanking minarets. No inscription

0.41 g.

*Numism. Chr.*, 2-II (1982), 160.

60 Billet denom (Pl. VIII)

**Obv.** Patriarchal cross on block between two branches and stars. No inscription.

**Rev.** Cross patee in beaded inner circle; +1 CAVI CIV (or + VICAUSA, retrograde)

0.7–1.1 g.


61 Billet obole.

**Obv.** Patriarchal cross on block between two branches and stars. No inscription.

**Rev.** Cross patee in beaded inner circle. + CAVS.4CIV retrograde

0.35 g.

*Numis Chr.*, 2-II (1982), 160.

62 Billet denier

**Obv.** Tower of David with four flags, two protruding from each side, within inner circle + TVARIT DAVIT (?), retrograde.

**Rev.** Holy Sepulcher, showing rock tomb and edifice, within inner circle; + [SEPVLCHRVM] DOMINII (?).

1.0–1.2 g.

*Numis Chr.*, 7-XIX (1979), 122.

63 Billet denier, Jaffa (Pl. VIII)

**Obv.** Cross patee in inner circle; + DENARIVS

**Rev.** Building with high central tower and lower flanking towers, in inner circle, + BOPPINSIS

0.7 g.

Schlumberger 110 (pl. IV, 29). The question whether this coin was struck by royal authority or that of a count of Jaffa still remains open.

64 Billet denier

**Obv.** Two vertical bars with a small cross above and an annulet below, all within inner circle. + IONOCR or variant

**Rev.** Cross patee with pellet in each angle, within inner circle. Similar inscription.

0.4–0.5 g.

*Numis Chr.*, 7-XX (1980), 100. Schlumberger ascribed this coin to Trpok, and others have followed him, but the evidence for any attribution is slight. It is probably to be dated after 1230.
County of Tripoli

BERTRAND (1109–1112)

65 â® or bunton denier (Pl. VIII)
   Obv. Cross parted within beaded inner circle; + TRINVDVS CO
   Rev. TAS and four pellets within inner circle; + TRIPOLISCIVI
   0.8 g.
   Schluumberger 100 (pl. IV, 1).

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1112)

66. ? denier (Pl. VIII)
   Obv. Cross within beaded inner circle, + TRIPOLIS.
   Rev. TAS and two pellets within inner circle; + TRIPOLISCIVI
   0.8 g.
   Schluumberger 101 (pl. IV, 2).

RAYMOND II (1136–1152) or RAYMOND III (1152–1187)

67. Æ (Pl. VIII)
   Obv. Cross with angle pellets or annulets in the upper angles and
   three in the lower angles, within beaded inner circle, MONETA
   TRIPOLIS.
   Rev. Short cross parted with annulet at each end, RAIMVNDI
   COMITIS (or COMITI).
   0.8–1.2 g. (But there exists an exceptional piece of 2.3 g.);
   Schluumberger 101 (pl. IV, 3). The author is not inclined to accept
   the theory that these coins were struck by Raymond of St. Gilles.

68 Æ (Pl. VIII)
   Obv. Cross with pellet in each angle, within beaded inner circle,
   + RAIMVNDVS COMES.
   Rev. Lamb (or horse?) to left with procession cross behind;
   within beaded inner circle; + CIVITAS TRIPOLIS or + TRIPOLIS
   CIVITAS.
   0.9–1 g.
   Schluumberger 103 (pl. IV, 8); see also Poey d'Avant, II, 253 for the
   related coins of the county of Saint Gilles.

69 Æ
   Obv. Crescent and star of eight rays with pellets between the rays,
   within inner circle; + RAIMVNDVS.
   Rev. Cross with three pellets at each end and scepters in each angle.
   No inscription.
   1.2 g.
   Schluumberger 102 (pl. IV, 5).
RAYMOND III (1152–1187)

70 Billon denier (Pl. VIII)
Obv. Cross with pellets in first and second angles, within beaded inner circle; + RAMVNDVS COMVS. Initial cross and letters RMND5 and C decorated with pellets and/or double bars.
Rev. Crescent and star of eight rays with pellets between the rays, CIVITAS TRIPOLIS. Letters CS and PD decorated as on Obv.
0.9–1.0 g.
Schlumberger 102 (pl. IV, 4).

RAYMOND III and his successors (to ca. 1200)

71 Billon denier (Pl. VIII)
Obv. Cross pattée within beaded inner circle, + RAMVNDVS COMVS.
Rev. Star of eight rays with annulets in angles, in beaded inner circle; CIVITAS TRIPOLIS.
0.6–0.9 g.
Cox (ANS, NNM, no. 59; 1933), p. 55.

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1180–1200)

72 Æ (Pl. VIII)
Obv. Crescent and star of eight rays with pellets between the rays, within beaded inner circle; CIVITAS TRIPOLIS (as variant).
Rev. Long cross, the ends branching into fleurons of three pellets, in the angles sceptres with pellets at the top. No inscription.
0.9–1.3 g.
Schlumberger 103 (pl. IV, 6).

73 Æ (Pl. IX)
Obv. Crenelated gate or castle with double doorway, within beaded inner circle; + CIVITAS (or variant).
Rev. Cross with circle at the center, globules at the ends, and crescents in the angles, set either straight or culture-wise in beaded inner circle, + TRIPOLIS.
0.6–0.9 g.
Schlumberger 103 (pl. IV, 9, 10, 11).

BOHEMOND (IV of ANTIOCH) (ca. 1187–1232)

74 Billon denier (Pl. IX)
Obv. As no. 71, + (or #) RAMVNDVS COMVS.
Rev. As no. 71
0.81 g. (average).
Rev. manus., 4-XXXVIII (1935), 175
ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1200–1230)

75. A (Pl. IX)

Obv. Cross with circle at center, globules at the ends, and pellets in each angle, within beaded inner circle; + CIVITAS
Rev. Crowned tower, in beaded inner circle; + TRIPOLIS
0.6–1.1 g
Schlumberger 103 (pl. IV, 12, 13, 14) This type comprises several varieties, distinguished principally by the conformation of the tower on the reverse

BOHEMOND (IV of ANTIOCH) (ca. 1187–1232)

BOHEMOND (V of ANTIOCH) (1232–1251)

BOHEMOND (VI of ANTIOCH) (1251–1274)

76. Billion denier (Pl. IX)

Obv. Cross pastée within inner circle; + or SAVYND COMS
Rev. Star of six (or sometimes eight) rays with annulets or pellets between the rays, within inner circle, + or . CIVITAS TRIPOL'
0.4 g (average)
Schlumberger 104 (pl. IV, 18) Some varieties have a pellet in the first angle of the cross.

77. A gros (Pl. IX)

Obv. Cross in beaded inner circle; + SAVYND COMS
Rev. Eight-pointed star with annulets in angles, within beaded inner circle; + CIVITAS TRIPOL'
1.9 g (broken).
Unpublished.

78 Billion denier

Obv. Cross pastée, in beaded inner circle, + SAVYND COMS
Rev. Star of six rays, annulets between the rays, in inner circle, + CITE TRIPOL
0.4 g.
Unpublished (Bibliothèque nationale, no. 4154)

79 Billion denier (Pl. IX)

Obv. Cross pastée, in inner circle; + 8-O-COMS
Rev. As no. 78
0.3–0.4 g.
Schlumberger 105 (pl. IV, 25).
BOHEMOND (VI of ANTIOCH) (1251–1274)

80. A gros (of tournive weight) (Pl. IX)
   Obv. Cross pattée in frame of four arches and four angles with drops on the spandrels, all within beaded inner circle; +
   BOEMVNOVS I COMES
   Rev. Star of eight rays with pellets between set in tracery of eight arches with drops on the spandrels, all within beaded inner circle; + CIVITAS I TRIPOL-I
   4.2 g
   Schliumberger 105 (pl. IV, 19).

81. A gros (of Venetian or half-tournive weight) (Pl. IX)
   Obv. As no 80
   Rev. As no 80.
   2.1 g
   Schliumberger 105 (pl. IV, 20).

BOHEMOND (VII OF ANTIOCH) (1274–1287)

82. A gros (of tournive weight) (Pl IX)
   Obv. Cross pattée in tracery of twelve arches, all within beaded inner circle; + SEPTIMUS BOEMVNOVS COMES
   Rev. Three-towered castle in tracery of twelve arches, all within beaded inner circle; + CIVITAS I TRIPOLIS I SYRIE
   4.3 g
   Schliumberger 106 (pl. IV, 21).

83. A gros (of Venetian or half-tournive weight) (Pl. IX)
   Obv. As no. 82.
   Rev. As no. 82.
   2.1 g
   Schliumberger 105 (pl. IV, 22).
Lordship of Beirut

JOHN OF IBELIN (1198–1236)

84. Bullon denier (Pl. X)

Obv. Cross with crescents in first and fourth angles and annulets in second and third, all within beaded inner circle; + IOHS DE IELINO (or DEELINO).

Rev. Twin-towered gate within beaded inner circle; + CIVITAS BERITI.

0.8–1.0 g.

Rev. numis., 4-XXXVIII (1935), 175, 6-VIII (1966), 97; Cox (ANS, NNJM, no. 59; 1933), p. 53.

85. Bullon denier (Pl. X)

Obv. Cross, sometimes with crescent in second and third angles, within inner circle; + IOBARNES.

Rev. City gate, in inner circle; + DE BERITI.

0.6–0.7 g.

Schlumberger 118 (pl. V, 10).

86. Bullon denier

Obv. Cross pattée with annulets in first and fourth angles, within beaded inner circle; + IOHS DYELINO.

Rev. Crescented tower, annulet below, within beaded inner circle; + DNS BERITENS.

0.9 g.

Rev. numis., 6-VIII (1966), 97.

ANONYMOUS (period ca. 1200–1250)

87. AE

Obv. Towered city gateway, in inner circle; + DE BARVTh

Rev. Interface patterns interspersed with pellets. No inscription.

0.6–1.4 g.

Schlumberger 111 (pl. V, 27).

88. AE (Pl. X)

Obv. Towered city gateway, within inner circle; + DE BERTEHSIE (or + DE BEROCOLE)

Rev. Interface patterns interspersed with annulets. No inscription.

0.6–1.25 g.

Schlumberger 111 (pls. V, 12, & XX, 11).
Lordship of Tyre

PHILIP OF MONTFORT (1246–1270)

99 AE (Pl. X)

*Obv.* Cross with pellet or annulet in each angle, within beaded inner circle, + PHILIPÆ

*Rev.* Building with tall steeple between two pellets or annulets, all within beaded inner circle; SIRE-D SVR

0.7–1.3 g


90 AE (Pl. X)

*Obv.* Cross within beaded inner circle, + PHILIPÆ

*Rev.* Portico of four columns, within beaded inner circle; + DE SVR

1.1–1.3 g

Schlumberger 28 (pl. V, 14).

JOHN OF MONTFORT (1270–1283)

91 AE (Pl. X)

*Obv.* Cross within beaded inner circle, + JOHN SIRE

*Rev.* Portico of four columns, within beaded inner circle; + DE SVR

1.1–1.4 g


92 AE (Pl. X)

*Obv.* Cross within beaded inner circle, + JOHN SIRE

*Rev.* Portico of two columns with arched doorway between, within beaded inner circle; + DE SVR

1.2–1.3 g

Lordship of Sidon

REGINALD GRENIER (d. ca. 1204)

93 Dillon denier (Pl. XI)

*Obv.* Tower within inner circle; + RENALDSV.

*Rev.* Arrow pointing left, within inner circle; + SYDONIA

0.11-0.13 g.

Schlumberger 114 (pl. V, 3). This coin is probably to be ascribed to the period before Saladin’s capture of Sidon in 1187, but Reginald survived until about 1204 and by then the Franks had recaptured part of the lordship and maybe controlled the city. A date after 1187, though unlikely, cannot be ruled out for these coins.

ANONYMOUS (date uncertain)

94 Æ (Pl. XI)

*Obv.* Arrow between groups of three pellets, within inner circle; + S R A D

*Rev.* Six-pointed star-like figure with globules at the ends, within inner circle; + S I D O N

0.09 g.

Bibliothèque nationale (no. 4177); cf. Schlumberger (Supplement) 7 (pl. XX, 6). Schlumberger ascribes the coin engraved in this plate, which shows the reverse inscription retrograde, to Gerard, father of Reginald and lord of Sidon in the mid-twelfth century. The inscription on the *obv* of the BN coin is by no means so convincing. Compared with the most reverse legend it appears to be deliberately obscure, and the case for the reading G/RADYS is by no means conclusive. Were it not for the ambiguity of the *obverse* inscription there would be no difficulty in classifying this with the other coins of Sidon with blundered legends, for which the mid-thirteenth century seems the likely date.

ANONYMOUS (after 1220?)

95 Æ (Pl. XI)

*Obv.* Arrow between groups of three pellets, within inner circle, ///SYD///

*Rev.* Holy Sepulcher, within inner circle; inscription illegible ///V///

0.7-1.0 g.

Schlumberger 114 (pl. V, 7).
96. **Ae (Pl. XI)**

*Obv.* Formless building (presumably Holy Sepulcher) surmounted by a cross, within inner circle. *Garbled inscription.*

*Rev.* Arrow between two pellets within outer circle. *Garbled inscription [[[V]**O]]///.

0.7–1.0 g.

Schlumberger 115 (pl. V, 6).

97. **Ae (Pl. XI)**

*Obv.* Arrow between groups of three pellets, within inner circle. *Inscription illegible.*

*Rev.* Six-pointed star-like figure with globules at the ends, within inner circle. *Inscription illegible.*

0.5–1.0 g.

Schlumberger 114 (pl. V, 4 & 5).

98. **Ae (Pl. XI)**

*Obv.* Arrow pointing downward between two crosslets and four annulets, within outer circle. *No inscription.*

*Rev.* Six-pointed star-like figure with globules at the ends, within outer circle. *No inscription.*

0.6–1.2 g.


99. **Gillon denier (Pl. XI)**

*Obv.* Cross puncte in outer circle, + D E N I R

*Rev.* Holy Sepulcher, in inner circle, + D E S E E T E

0.4–0.8 g.

Schlumberger 115 (pl. V, 8).
I. Coinage of the county of Edessa

410
II. Coinage of the county of Edessa
III. Coinage of the principality of Antioch
IV Coinage of the principality of Antioch

413
V. Coinage of the principality of Antioch
VI. Coinage of the kingdom of Jerusalem
VII. Coinage of the kingdom of Jerusalem

416
VIII. Coinage of the county of Tripoli
X. Coinage of the lordships of Beirut and Tyre
XI. Coinage of the lordship of Sidon

420
XI
CRUSADER COINAGE
WITH ARABIC INSCRIPTIONS

A. The Islamic Context
CURRENCY IN THE MOSLEM WORLD

In the Islamic lands, the crusaders encountered monetary systems quite different from the one they knew in Latin Europe, where the only coins until the thirteenth century were small, often debased, silver deniers (pennies). The Moslems, in contrast, used gold dinars, silver dirhams, and copper fals (fals in the singular). Not every part of the Islamic world had coins in all three metals at the same time. Systems varied from place to place, even within the realms of dynasties such as the Fatimids, Ayūbids, and Mamluks, and evolved during the two centuries the crusaders were in Syria.

Some features, nevertheless, were general among the Moslems whom the crusaders met. In the Moslem lands, as elsewhere in pre-modern

For the coinage of the major Islamic dynasties in connection with the crusaders, see, for the Fatimids, George C. Miles, 


This section is by Bolog.
economies, precious metal coins were struck from bullion or non-current coins that were brought to the mint by the government or by private persons. Charges for materials and labor were levied proportionately on the coins struck from the material brought in by the customer. Private persons had to pay a government seigneurage (mint tax) in addition. As a result, the amount of bullion in the coins received by the customer was less than the amount of bullion brought in. In other words, coins were a manufactured product with a value (buying power) greater than an equivalent amount of the raw material from which they were made. The difference in value between coins and the bullion in them was fundamentally a result of the mint charges, but was also affected by such factors as inconvenience of melting, transport charges to the mint, reluctance of individuals to reveal holdings of precious metals, and many other intangible factors which can be summed up as the result of supply and demand in a given place at a given time. As legal tender, only current coins could be used for payments to the government and in most transactions between private parties, and this legal constraint was sufficient to keep their money value above their intrinsic (metal) value. If a coin issue was demonetized (abolished as legal tender), its value would drop to the value of the bullion in each coin, causing a loss to the possessors at the time of demonetization.

In a minting regime such as that described, coins can be exchanged by count only if the proportional variation in weight of individual coins is less than the difference between the value of the raw metal in them and their value as coins. If coins circulate by count, and some coins vary from the normal weight by more than total mint costs, it may become profitable to withdraw these heavier coins from circulation to melt and return to the mint, obtaining more coins with a higher money value from the same amount of bullion. There may be a tendency to set aside heavier coins, with a higher intrinsic value, for savings, while returning lighter coins to circulation, and it may become profitable to clip the edges of coins, retaining the same money value while profiting from the bullion value of the clippings. These practices, if they become common, will result in a general lowering of the average weight of the issue in circulation and thereby force weighing of payments in self-defense.

For a government to force its coins to circulate by count, it must either set minting charges high, creating a large difference between their bullion value and their money value, or control the weight of its coins very precisely. Some Mamluk coinages are known to have circulated

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2 For a fuller discussion of monetary theory relating to pre-modern mints see Gillet P
by count, suggesting that one of the two latter conditions obtained, but in the crusader period most precious metal issues were weighed out in transactions. A payment of 100 dinars, for example, took the form of an amount of coins equal in weight to 100 times the current standard weight of the dinar, an amount which might be more or less than 100 individual coins. The process of weighing was recognized as an inconvenience, but was considered normal. Almost every transaction required a balance, with standard weights supplied or regulated by the government. To alleviate the inconvenience somewhat, coins were often sealed in purses, with a label indicating the content by weight; these purses, if sealed by government agencies or reputable money-changers, could be passed from hand to hand like large-denomination notes today. A form of check, quittance, also was used in payments. It is important to realize, therefore, that while the words "dinar" and "dirham" meant respectively a "gold coin" or a "silver coin", a payment of a certain number of dinars or dirhams meant transferal of that many weight units of the currency in question—the number of coins was immaterial.

Because the intrinsic value of precious metal coins was close—even though not equal—to their monetary value, it would have been impossible for any government to guarantee effectively the relationship of denominations in two different metals. To do so would have meant to buck up the relationship by standing ready to exchange either for the other at a set rate, but this was impossible in practice because of fluctuations in the prices of the metals. (It is impossible even in the twentieth century, as shown by the abandonment by all governments of precious metal coins with a defined legal tender value. The fixed relationships of modern coins and notes are possible only because their intrinsic worth is far less than their nominal value.)

Hermaquin. "Problèmes théoriques et pratiques de la monnaie antiques au maghreb," Annales archaeologiques, X (1972), 1-51

3 The major exception was the new dirham coinage introduced by Saladin in Syria and Egypt in the late twelfth century, which circulated by count at least some of the time. Other exceptions would include most copper coins, which were probably sold by the weight against payment in silver or gold even at a price far above the value of the copper in them, many small transactions in Syrian market towns of Saladin's time refers to a rule that transactions of less than four coins should be by count, and informal payments—no one weighed a coin before giving it as a beggar. On the other hand, no eastern Mediterranean Islamic gold coinage of the period 1082–1150 would have circulated by count, although the western Mediterranean dinar of the type introduced by the Almoravids probably did.

In the Moslem world and almost all pre-modern economies, current gold and silver coins were related in value only by the marketplace, like different national currencies today. Governments could fix values only in certain transactions (for example, in denomminating salaries in one currency while paying them in another) and sometimes might attempt to decree relationships in private transactions, but such decrees were widely evaded and impossible to enforce. In normal times, values were fairly stable, so that people could have a notional rate for the relationship of the dinar and the dirham, but in any substantial transactions involving both coins the exchange rate had to be set by negotiation. The value of foreign coins in local currency was also determined by supply and demand, not by precious metal content; moreover, if payments were made by weight, local weights would have been used to measure foreign coins, so that varying coin weight standards would have no effect on value. To be sure, metal content set a floor value for any coin, but its actual equivalency in local currency was set in the marketplace.

**ISLAMIC GOLD COINAGE**

The major Moslem mints for gold coinage in the vicinity of the crusader states were Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt, and Mosul and Baghdad (named Madīnati as-Salām or coins) in Mesopotamia. A few other mints in the region issued gold occasionally. For gold coinage, the Euphrates was a clear dividing line between two different systems. The dinars of Mosul (pl. XII, no. 1) and Baghdad (pl. XII, no. 2) did not circulate in Syria and did not influence the coinage of the crusaders. The issues of both these mints continued the Seljuk Iranian tradition. For the eleventh and first half of the twelfth centuries, their coins are rather scarce, but after about 1160 the representation of both becomes more continuous, while for the thirteenth century (until the Mongol conquest) the coins of these mints are common, large, well engraved, and quite pure, although completely irregular in weight, a general characteristic of gold coins east of the Euphrates from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries.

Egypt first minted gold coins under Islam in 786 and immediately became one of the principal centers of gold coinage in the Moslem world, issuing dinars continuously and abundantly throughout the Ab-

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bāṣud, Tūlūn, and Ikhshīdīd periods. In northwestern Africa and
Sicily the Fāṭimid monetary system included dinars, quarter dinars,
and small silver dirhams. These coins were distinguished from those
of the Suqqī ‘Abbāsid realms by the presence of certain Shī‘ī inscriptions,
by different weight standards, and especially by a design so ob-
viously different that even illiterates in Arabic could distinguish the
two coinages.

The conquest of Egypt by the Fāṭimid sultans resulted in the intro-
duction of their monetary system there, replacing the previous ‘Abbāsid-style
coinage. Under al-Mu‘izz (in Egypt, 969–973) and al-‘Aẓīz (975–996),
the Fāṭimid dinar was closely controlled in weight, and is said by a
contemporary to have circulated by count; but under al-Hākim
(996–1021) a series of changes began. In A. D. 1000 (1009/10), and then
again in 1004, the design of the dinar was substantially altered. The
coinage of his successor, az-Zāḥir (1021–1036), was at first much like
the last issues of al-Hākim, but new major changes were made in 1020
(1029/30) and 1024 or 1025. Again, the earliest coinage of al-MustaṣṢūn
(1036–1094) is like the third type of az-Zāḥir, but changes in arrange-
ment and content of inscriptions were made in 1040 (1039/9); 1045 (pl
XII, no. 3), and 1048, while in 1049 (1048/9; pl. XII, no. 4) and 1049
(1081/2; pl. XII, no. 5) radically different designs were introduced. Un-
der al-MustaṣṢūn II (1094–1101) in Mubarram 490 (1096/7), another
substantive change was made in the design of the gold coinage (pl. XII,
no. 6). Thereafter Fāṭimid gold coinage was unchanged in appearance
until the end of the dynasty (pl. XII, no. 7), except for the issues of
az-Zāḥir (1149–1154).

The purpose of these new issues is not clear in every instance, and
there is no need to discuss them in detail here, but it can be said in
general that such obvious changes in the appearance of the coinage
were not merely cosmetic, but marked changes in the monetary func-
tion of the coins. Contemporaries, it is clear, regarded the different
issues as different monies, related to each other by fluctuating exchange
rates; put another way, each new issue became the standard current
legal tender, while the previous issue was usable only to pay off debts

6 Egypt may have missed dinars before 736, but they cannot as yet be identified. Dinar
of the late Ikhshīdīd period are scarce today, perhaps as a result of the coinage of gold dinars
after the Fāṭimid conquest, which would have brought most of the previously circulating dinars
to the melting pot (Franz Mayser, Alhādīr al-Masīḥ, ed. Ayman Firat Sayyid, II, Caire, 1901), 164.
8 Franz Mayser, op. cit., II, 65.
9 For example, Gomaa, op. cit., I, 239, citing a Coptic document of about 1060 which dis-
tinguishes between “fine” dinars (the issue of issues of 420–440) and “economic” dinars (the
denominated in it, or for export, or asbullion. The kinds of monetary change that the new types marked might have included changes in the weight standard or metal alloy of the dinars or of the silver dirhams (which were changed in parallel with the dinars), changes in the way standards of alloy or weight were enforced, changes in the terms on which coins were issued from the mint, or changes in the weight standards used to measure out payments. The determination of which of these factors was behind any particular change rests upon a more careful study of Fatimid coinage than has yet been made, as well as a re-examination of the written sources.

Al-Mustansir’s coinage was the prototype for one group of crusader imitations, although most of the imitations do not precisely reproduce any of his coins. Balog and Yvon cite an issue struck from 1043 to 1047 (pl. XII, no. 3) as prototype for their crusader varieties 3–16,10 but there does not seem to be any good reason for this short-lived issue to have been selected in particular. By 3–16 have only four horizontal lines of inscription on the obverse, unlike any of Al-Mustansir’s issues. It is more realistic to say that these imitations merely reproduce, after a fashion, a coin type introduced first in 1043 or 1044 but retained with variations until 1048 or 1049, then reintroduced in 1081 or 1082 and retained until Al-Mustansir’s death in 1094. All the dinars of these years have the words “‘Ali” and “Ma’add” at the top of the obverse and reverse field inscriptions, as do the imitations, but none of the originals have only three lines of inscription below these words as do the imitations. Probably the crusader die cutters attempted to reproduce only the general appearance of the prototype, condensing four or five lines into three. Most of these imitations are extremely barbarous, and their makers could have had no idea of the meaning of the inscriptions they attempted to copy. Very likely the coin they had before them was an example of Al-Mustansir’s last issue, which was struck in Egypt and Syria for about twelve years and ended only some three years before the First Crusade (the type was retained for a few years after Al-Mustansir’s death, but no longer with his name or the words “‘Ali” and “Ma’add”).

The concentric inscription type that interrupted the “‘Ali-Ma’add” type may also have been imitated, but very sparingly if at all. Balog and Yvon list only one such coin in their corpus.11 There may, how-

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11 By 1, a coin to the American Numismatic Society (6000.999.14974); its attribution is problematic (pl. XVI, no. 45); see below, p. 455.
ever, be others still attributed to the Fatimids in various collections. One example might be a dinar of Miṣr, 443, in the British Museum with a gold fineness of only 89.1 percent according to Oddy's measurement. All the crusader imitations of al-Mustansir's issues are attributed in the next section to the county of Tripoli.

The last Fatimid type, beginning in 490 (1096/7), bears the words 'al ghâyâh, "high standard (of fineness)" (pl. XII, no. 6), and this issue, like its predecessor, was initially higher in fineness, probably as close to pure gold as technology permitted at the time, although this standard was not always maintained during the issue's century of life. On the other hand, the 'al ghâyâh coins do not seem to have been struck to any weight standard. This mattered little, since dinars were usually weighed in payment.

It was this type that was most extensively imitated by the crusaders, specifically the issues of the caliph al-Âmir (1101-1130), whose dinars would have been the most common in circulation in the earliest years of the crusading principalities. According to Masalî's chronology (below, pp. 441-444), these imitations would have begun at a date around the middle of the twelfth century and continued until the third quarter of the thirteenth; they are attributed to the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Egyptian rulers took pride in the high quality of their gold coinage, and the mint discriminated against foreign gold coins, even those of nearly the same level of purity. Generally speaking, this high quality was maintained, with few exceptions. Fatimid gold coins are better than 90 percent pure, and most are as pure as contemporary techniques permitted. Nevertheless, it would be gathered from what has been said that the picture of the Fatimid dinar as the "dollar of the Middle Ages", absolutely standard in weight and purity from the beginning to the end of the dynasty, is seriously misleading. Both the weight standard (or the standard of the weights used to measure transactions) and the purity of the Fatimid dinar were changed from time to time; contemporaries were well aware of these variations, but to reconstruct the exact sequence of changes will require a more minute study of the coinage than has yet been made.

Egyptian dinars issued under the Ayyubid sultan Salah ad-Din do not seem


15. For a fuller discussion of these problems see Bruce, "The Function," pp. 86-91.
to be materially different from those of the last Fatimids. The change in government and religion led to some modifications in the inscriptions and small changes in the arrangement, but the basic coin design, with brief central horizontal inscriptions surrounded by prominent circular legends, is much the same (pl. XII, no. 8). It has been asserted that Saladin abandoned standard weight for his gold coinage, but this in fact had happened long before, in 490 (1096/7); if the range of variation of Saladin’s dinars is larger than that of al-Ádil’s, this is probably a result of the larger number of coins available for study. It has also been asserted that Saladin debased his dinars significantly, but some of the low-finesseness coins assigned to him may be crusader imitations. The alleged debasement of the dinar in his reign cannot be confirmed until careful numismatic study has separated his genuine coins from their crusader imitations.16

It was not until the reign of al-Ádil Abū-Bakr I (1200–1218) that any substantive change in the appearance of the Ayyubid dinar is seen (pl. XII, no. 9). In the first year of his reign a new dinar type with long horizontal inscriptions and a single marginal legend was introduced, or rather revived from the eleventh century. The mint alternated between the old and new designs during al-Ádil’s reign, but by the time of al-Ákmil (1218–1238) the new type was definitively adopted and maintained until after 713 (1313/4). Major variations on this type include the introduction of Nashki script instead of Kufic after 622 (1225/6), and az-Zahir Baybars’ use of a lion or leopard on dinars as his personal symbol (pl. XIII, no. 10), an innovation not maintained by his successors. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the changes after Saladin’s time reflected a change in the weight standard, fineness, or other monetary functions of the Egyptian dinar, but the Ayyubid and Mamluk gold coinage has yet to be examined rigorously on these points.

Mṣr, the official name of Fustāṭ, the commercial center of the Cairo metropolis, is the usual mint name on Fatimid Egyptian dinars. In 516 (1122/3), however, unspecifed problems at the Fustāṭ mint led to the opening of an additional mint in the administrative center al-Qāhirah, that is, in Cairo properly speaking.17 After 525 (1130/1) this mint ceased


17 Al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-marwa‘ wa-l-farrar fi dhikr al-khāṣṣ wa-l-dhāhir (Cairo, 1270/1853), 1, 445. An issue of al-tītātīn dated 391 (1003/4) is also known from a mint in Cairo, but this mint apparently operated only in this year for some special purpose.
operation, but in the troubled times of al-Adid (1160-1171) a mint was again opened in Cairo and produced the bulk of its issues. This was apparently the only mint in the city under the Ayyubids and Mamluks. A second regular mint was established in Egypt at Alexandria in 465 (1072/3) and operated regularly into the fifteenth century. A mint also operated in Qus in Upper Egypt from 517 (1123/4) to 539.

In eleventh-century Syria a number of towns had mints for the Fatimids: Aleppo, Damascus, Tiberias, Ramla (which used the name Filastin, Palestine, on coins), Tyre, Tripoli, Acre, and Ascalon. Of these, only Tyre may have minted continuously throughout the Fatimid period, but even there the record has gaps. The first four mints mentioned, all located inland, apparently ceased to operate in the 1060s, probably as a result of the Seljuk conquests in Syria. Production of Fatimid dinars was left to the port cities Tyre, Tripoli, and Acre—the latter issued dinars for the first time just as the inland mints were closing down, perhaps not coincidentally. The last recorded date for Acre and Tripoli is 495 (1101/2) while production at Ascalon began in 503 (1109/10), at the time of Tripoli’s capture by the crusaders, and continued until 510 (1116/7). The last date recorded for Tyre is 517 (1123/4) (pl. XIII, no. 11), just before it was taken by the crusaders (1124). According to a much later Arab writer, the crusaders kept the mint of Tyre open for three years after its conquest, striking coins in the name of al-‘Amir. Dinar Suri, “Tyre dinar,” was the generic Arabic term for the crusader Arab gold coin, but only a small proportion of those imitations actually bear the mint-name Suri. These last three major Fatimids...
and Syrian mints for gold—Tyre, Tripoli, and Acre—are also the most likely locations for the mints that issued the crusader gold imitations.

After the Fatimid dinar mints closed, Moslem Syria had little gold coinage of its own. The mint of Damascus began issuing dinars in 530 (1135/6) and continued for about ten years, striking coins of Fatimid style with the names of the Abbasid caliphs and the Seljukid sultans of the east, but these coins are quite scarce today, suggesting a small issue (pl. XIII, no. 12). In 583 (1187/8) dinars were struck for Saladin in Damascus, perhaps to process the booty from Jerusalem and his other conquests in that year, but no other Moslem Syrian gold coins are known until the reign of Baybars (1260–1277). For the most part, Syrians used imported Egyptian or crusader (Sarri) dinars in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

In addition to the mints listed in Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, there are also a very few Rûm Seljukid issues in gold, from Konya beginning as early as 573 (1177/8), and from Sivas.


24. For the Damascus dinar mint of Saladin see Baing, Ayyubids, p. 77, no. 79. The first Damascus dinar of Baybars, with an (inscriptive date, has recently been discovered in the collection of the Kuwait National Museum. Otherwise, Moslem gold mints in Damascus is known only from the reign of Saladin (1174–1193) onward (ibid., ibid., Saladin, p. 120). The dinars attributed to the first dinars, by Baing, Ayyubids, p. 108, no. 201 (now in the collection of the Kuwait National Museum, where it was renumbered as one of the present authors), is surely erroneous. The mintage is somewhat unclear but is probably 1200–1211 (Alexandria). It is, incidentally, not impossible that the mintage of gold mints be Damascus was a response to the circulation of crusader gold mints in or shortly after 1258.

25. Eygphile Arzoum, Histoire des prix de l'or et de l'argent chez l'Orient médiéval (Paris, 1939), pp. 239–240, and Irvan, op. cit., pp. 91–93, provide general information for the use of Mêrûd and Sûrî dinars. For example, the coinage founded by Mêrûd-Zâm (d. 1274) yielded in the year 604 (1201/2) 9,000 Sûrî dinars per moon (Abd-al-Rahman, Kãhîr al-ruqûdûn fî al-kabûr al-ad-dâwûrûh, ed. Muhammad Hikam Muhammad Ahmad [Cairo, 1949], 1, 231). A waqf, or mawqûf, was a Moslem pious endowment for some sacred purpose, as is usually an example of the use of Sûrî dinars among Mawqûfs which formed the use. Another example, cited by Irvan himself, is a statement of the price of gold in Damascus at 1178/9 in Sûrî dinars. The debate over the use of crusader coins by Mawqûfs has perhaps been overstated. Since Syria had no mint for gold during most of the 12th and 13th centuries, and since it is known that crusader mawqûfs came into the Moslem far from tribute, mawqûfs, and perhaps even trade payments, it can only be assumed that these mawqûfs were used by Mawqûfs in further transactions among themselves. The allusion here would have been preserving such coins for return transactions with the crusaders on landing. Thus in the Mawqûf coins in Egypt and Mesopotamia for trade. It does not necessarily follow that crusader coins preponderated in the gold among the Moslems, and only a small minority of transactions were large enough to make gold coins appropriate.

26. Perakim and Cevrîye Arzou, İstânbul arkeolojisi museoları nostaljik dilindik alıntılar tasvir eden (Istanbul, 1970), no. 1060 (Konya, 573), and pomegran.
ISLAMIC SILVER COINAGE

The eleventh and most of the twelfth centuries have been regarded as an era of "silver famine" for the Moslem Near East, with little or no silver coinage, but this is a misconception, as shown not only by the frequent references in Arabic written sources to transactions in dirhams, but also by the increasing repertoire of silver coins of Egypt and Syria found by numismatists once they began looking for them. It is nevertheless true that the full-weight good silver dirham of the eighth to tenth centuries vanishes from the central Islamic lands in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and it seems that many areas, especially east of the Euphrates, almost totally ceased coinage in silver for some time. The silver coinage of Egypt and Syria that survives from this period is difficult to study for a variety of reasons, and the present state of numismatic knowledge is fragmentary indeed. Only a few generalizations can be made at this time. The region east of the Euphrates can be dealt with summarily: dirhams disappear completely, as far as is now known, in the early eleventh century (except in the farthest east) and do not reappear until the thirteenth century.

The type of small dirham characteristic of Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid era first appeared in Sicily or North Africa under the Aghlabids in the ninth century. This coinage was continued by the Fatimids and introduced by them to Egypt and Syria when they conquered these lands in 969. It is difficult to say if Egypt had any substantial dirham coinage before that date, for only a handful of Egyptian Ikhsidd dirhams are known. As with the absence of late Ikhsidd dinars, the paucity of Ikhsidd dirhams may be a result of the recollection forced at the beginning of the Fatimid period. On the other hand, Egypt had no Islamic silver coinage at all before 787, and Egyptian dirhams are rare throughout the Abbadid and Tala'idi eras.


28 The silver coins of the period are small and may alloyed with copper, making them extremely liable to corrosion, which usually renders the inscription partially illegible. Judging by those that survive, they were not particularly small struck to begin with, since the dies are larger than the vim blanks, or that only a part of the inscription appears on the coin. Sometimes most of the coin surface is blank, with only one or two letters to be made. As a result, only a small proportion of the coins can be attributed with certainty to a specific date and place. These small black-colored bits have often been overlooked or ignored in archaeological excavations, and they are of no interest if all or the whole disappears when, for better or worse, are the main source for numismatic finds from the Near East.
In the reign of al-Hakim difficulties which are not yet clearly understood occurred, ending up in the recognition of A.H. 400 (1009/10), when, for the first time, the gold coinage was changed in appearance during a caliph's reign. It is possible, in fact, that this and the subsequent changes in the design of the gold coinage mentioned above are related much more to changes in the silver coinage than in the dinar. At any rate, the evolution of Fatimid silver coinage in the eleventh century will not be understood until the metrology and silver content of each of the successive types is studied separately. The general picture, however, is one of decline in the fineness of the silver, accompanied naturally by lower exchange rates against the dinar, which remained relatively constant in fineness. At the end of the century, references to dirhams in Egypt are seldom encountered in the written sources, while surviving examples of such dirhams from the late years of al-Mustansir and the reign of al-Musta'in are few.

The new dinar type introduced in 490 (1096/7) was accompanied by a new dirham. The designs of the two denominations are similar, but there was also a change in the fabrication of dirhams. Previously they were thin and circular, probably cut or punched out of silver sheets before striking, but after 490, and until the beginning of the thirteenth century, dirhams were struck on squarish chunks of silver cut by a chisel from a long ribbon-shaped ingot. Usually two opposite edges of the coins can be seen to be cut, but sometimes "longue-shaped" dirhams are found with three rounded edges and one cut, evidently the end of an ingot. This dirham type endured into the Ayyubid are with only the necessary changes in inscription (pl. XIII, no. 16).

Several contemporary descriptions of the Ayyubid Egyptian mint specify that these dirhams were to be 30 percent silver and 70 percent copper.

29 Al-Maqrizi, Igbarithat al-arwarat bi-lamh al-ghurar wa al, Muhammed bin Shams al-Din (Crane, 1940), pp. 15–16, 64–65. The problem arose in 397 according to the first passage, as 399, according to the second, but al-Maqrizi does not say that the change in the coinage began in the same year, only that the siltens continued until the reform. The change in the appearance of the coinage does not occur until 400.
31 Both old- and new-type dirhams are known from the reign of al-Musta'in (a new-type black dirham is published by Bolog). "Les études numismatiques de l'Egypte musulmane. Periodes fatimides et ayyubides, nouvelles observations sur la technique du monnayage," Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte, XXXIII (1951), 7 ff; the ANS has examined (1953.18.1, pl. XIII, no. 14) as well as a dirham of the other type (1971.32.15, unpublished, pl. XIII, no. 13) B. Maymon, op. cit., II, 45, mentions a reform of the dinar in 490, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the new dirhams were introduced at the same time. The change is, probably wrongly attributed to al-Azam's reign by Y. Surot, "Notes sur la numismatique," Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte, XXXV (1953), 601–629.
copper, a statement largely confirmed by a small number of modern analyses. It seems likely that this was the intended fineness from the beginning. The weights of these little coins are quite irregular, ranging from less than half a gram up to more than two grams; for payments, they were weighed against a standard of about 2.95 grams per monetary dirham. The exchange rate during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries was between 35 and 40 monetary dirhams per dinar. In the Ayyubid period, when these dirhams had to be distinguished from other silver coins, they are often identified specifically as "black" dirhams, but this term is seldom used earlier—they are simply called dirhams. A small number of larger round-flan dirhams of twelfth-century Fatimid Egypt survive; these have the same design and inscriptions as the square coins, vary widely in weight (from 2.25 to 3.60 grams), and judging by appearance (which can be misleading) have the same silver purity as the square coins (pl. XIII, no. 15). Probably these should be regarded only as an alternate physical form of the standard dirham with the same monetary value (weight for weight). These Fatimid large black dirhams are not to be confused with the new dirhams introduced by Saladin, discussed below. The latter were a currency separate from the black dirham and intended to replace it. Ayyubid large black dirhams have not been found.

In 622 (1225/6), under the Ayyubid sultan al-Kamil, a change was made in the small dirhams because of certain difficulties with the existing silver issues, but as contemporary sources make clear, the change was only in the method of manufacture. The new "round" or


14 Garett, op. cit., 5, 379-383. It is often assumed that the rate 40 1 corresponds to a rate for pure silver (aswad) dirhams of 13½ 1, this being mathematically incorrect, 40 1 for 30 percent fineness is equal to 12½ 1 for pure silver. An exchange rate of 91½ 1 is attested only for the second half of the 13th century (Ibid, 5, 386-387, 390), on the other hand, 12½ 1 is attested by one document of the twelfth century (Ibid, 1, 387, no. 90).


16 Described by Ibn-Hurrah, op. cit., pp. 83-84, who states that they are to be 30 percent silver. The change may have been a restoration of the black dirham standard, for al-Kamil’s early dirhams are different in fabric and design from previous black dirhams and may have been less fine or otherwise unsatisfactory. Al-Kamil has been unfairly accused of a "continental fraud" because al-Maqdisi, two centuries later, erroneously states that his new dirhams were two-thirds
“globular” black dirhams were made by striking blanks produced by pouring molten alloy over a cone so that the drops fell into water; their fineness, however, was unchanged. These continued to be struck in Egypt until the reign of Baybars. In his reign or later, the older cut ribbon technique was reintroduced. The last known are from the reign of al-Šāhī al-Musta’in (1342–1345). Although the fabric of Mamluk black dirhams is similar to earlier ones, it is not known if their fineness was the same.

In the eleventh century Fāṭimid dirhams were also issued at Syrian mints, apparently according to the same system that obtained in Egypt. Silver minting did not, however, cease in Syria at the time of the closure of the Fāṭimid gold mints mentioned above, although it seems to have diminished considerably. Debased silver coins are known bearing the names of Tughrilg of Damascus (497–522: 1104–1128), Alp Arslan (507–508: 1113–1115) of Aleppo but probably struck in Damascus (pl. XIII, no. 17), and the Būrīd Isma‘īl of Damascus (526–529: 1132–1135), as well as dirhams corresponding to the brief gold series from Būrīd Damascus, 530–540 (1135–1146). Generally the designs of these coins are inspired by contemporary or past Fāṭimid issues, but the names on them are those of Seljūkids, the ‘Abbasid caliphs, and local Turkish Syrian rulers. Their debasement is such that it is difficult to be certain in some instances whether they are intended to be dirhams or copper fals, but at least some are surely billon (heavily alloyed silver). One billon issue of Aleppo, probably of 479–487 (1086–1095), is also known. More of these coins will probably be found as numismatists become aware of their existence, but nevertheless they seem to be excessively scarce and probably were not issued in large quantities. None are known after 541 (1146/7). Neither these nor the preceding Fāṭimid silver issues were imitated by the crusaders, probably because the Franks’ own small debased pennies fulfilled the same monetary function.
Saladin’s conquests in Syria began a new era in the history of the Islamic dirham. He introduced for the first time in two centuries the minting of full-weight good silver dirhams at Damascus, where the earliest recorded date on his new dirhams is 571 (1175/6), the year after his occupation of the city (pl. XIII, no. 18). 41 By the following year, 572 (1176/7), silver dirhams were being struck in Aleppo with the name of the Zengid amir, Isma‘il ibn Mahmut (pl. XIV, no. 20). 42

Saladin’s new dirhams departed from previous Islamic practice in having the main inscriptions on both sides enclosed in a square, which was in turn enclosed in a circle with subsidiary inscriptions in the sectors between the square and the circle. 43 When Saladin took Aleppo in 1183, he introduced full dirhams there as well, but with the central inscriptions enclosed in a hexagram, or “seal of Solomon”, like pl. XIV, no. 21, a coin of his son az-Zahir. 44 Dirhams with one or the other of these designs were struck at several Ayyubid mints in Syria (including, at one time or another, Gaza, Hamah, and Homs) as well as in towns in upper Mesopotamia and beyond, including Akhlat, Harran, Ḥizn Kaif, Manbij, Mardin, Ma‘anafar, Nisibin, and Edessa (ar-Ruha). They were issued by the Artukids as well as by Ayyubid princes, and also by the crusaders, as will be seen (pl. XIII, no. 19, a coin of Damascus, 1242/3, is one of the prototypes for the crusader dirhams). Both the square-type and hexagram-type dirhams were accompanied by analogous half dirhams, which probably circulated at par with the full dirhams (on a weight-for-weight basis) and are not to be confused with the black dirhams of Egypt, a separate currency.

In Shawwal 583 (1187), Saladin ordered the introduction of these dirhams in Egypt to replace the Egyptian black dirhams, intending to relieve the populace of the necessity of weighing dirhams in transactions. The innovation did not succeed, however, possibly because the fineness of the new dirhams (in Egypt) was not consistent: some were pure silver and others only half silver. 45 At either fineness, the

41 Ignatz Kutscher, Nauk Mohaberrated, II (Berlin, 1843), III, no. 406.
43 This design was new for dirhams, but was adapted from the prestigious Mawardi gold dinar of the western Mediterranean.
44 This design was quite new, and was noted by the historian ibn al-Tayy (quoted by Abd al-Satar, op. cit. [Cairo, 1286/1871], III, 47).
45 The variation in fineness probably explains the conflicting reports by al-Maqrizi of the Shumukh ar-raghit fi idhār ar-rumūd, ed. and trans. Daniel Eastach, “Etudes de numismatique et de métrologie musulmanes,” Hommages Tammela, X (1968), 128-129, that new coins were half silver and half copper, but on the Kāthar ar-raghit li-ar-rumūd, ed. Ziyad al-Din (Cairo, 1956) I, 99, the new dirhams are said to be of pure silver. These coins are very
new dirhams with their stable weight might have been acceptable and have replaced the irregular black dirhams as intended, but the populace apparently considered unreliability in alloy a greater disadvantage than the inconvenience of weighing out the black dirhams with their stable 30 percent silver content. The black dirham continued to be issued in Egypt throughout the Ayyubid period and into the Mamluk era, but full dirhams, of Damascus type, were also struck in Egypt under al-'Adil I and from the 1240's until 1260; their fineness is unknown.

In the latter year Baybars introduced a new dirham, analogous in appearance to his gold coinage and with 70 percent silver. This was the standard silver issue of the rest of the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century in both Egypt and Syria (pl. XIV, no. 23). 46

Following Saladin's initiative, silver coinage spread to Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Iran in the thirteenth century. The Seljukids of Rûm produced massive issues of dirhams from Anatolian mints, with a design quite different from Saladin's; Cilician Armenia issued quantities of silver trams; and the 'Abbâsid caliphs began minting dirhams in the 1230's. Under the Mongols, silver coinage became the standard currency of Iran by the end of the thirteenth century, in complete contrast to the situation only a century before. None of these coinages, however, is relevant to that of the crusaders.

**Islamic Copper Coinage**

In general, copper coinage disappeared in the Muslim world in the ninth century, not to reappear until the twelfth or later. Egypt, for example, had no copper coinage after 872. In areas without copper currency, everyday transactions were probably carried out with cut-up dirhams, with standard commodities, or by accumulating transactions at neighborhood merchants until the total bill was large enough to pay with a dirham. In Fâhîsh and Ayyubid Egypt, the small somewhat debased dirhams had a value low enough for everyday minor purchases.

There are, however, exceptions to this general situation. One area

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where copper persisted longer than elsewhere, and returned sooner, was northern Syria. The earliest datable issue in the crusader period bears the name of Rikwan, ruler of Aleppo (1095–1113; pl. XIV, no. 24), but there are many anonymous coins of fabric and style similar to this issue, some of which may be earlier than his reign (pl. XIV, no. 25). 47 These coins are irregular in shape, but most often polygonal, with straight edges; the blanks appear to have been cut from thin sheets of copper with shears. They bear images of various kinds—a lion, elephant, or bird—or complicated geometrical figures. Their inscriptions are sparse and often cryptic. On the basis of provenance and a general similarity of style, they have generally been attributed to the Seljukids of Syria, and perhaps because of Rikwan's name, Aleppo is regarded as their center of manufacture, but until they have been carefully studied, these identifications should be accepted only tentatively. These coins are probably the original qirits, a term that is known first in an account of the death of Rikwan, who left behind dinars of gold, black dirhams, silver coins, and qirits. 48 This notice and others throughout the twelfth and into the thirteenth century suggest that qirits, which means literally "papyrus" or by extension any rough brown paper, came to designate copper coinage in general in twelfth-century Syria. Looking at the coppers of the Seljukids of Syria, one can see how the appellation may have arisen, because either the thin sheets of copper or the thin, often rectangular, coins themselves may have brought to mind sheets of brown paper.

It is not known how long these coins were struck. They were probably replaced by a copper issue of the Zengid Nur-ad-Din (1146–1174) struck on normal round flans with images borrowed from Byzantine coppers, but with his name and title in Arabic (pl. XIV, no. 26). These are generally attributed to Aleppo. Nur-ad-Din also initiated copper coinage in Damascus, with a purely inscriptive issue bearing his name and the caliph's in bold tall script (pl. XIV, no. 27). The mint and date of issue are inscribed in the margin of these coins, but the dates most often are illegible; the earliest so far recorded is 558 (1162/3). 49 This particular Damascus issue was also called qirits and was continued by Saladin and his successors until 611 (1214/5), when it was abolished. 50

48 Ibn-al-Shaykh, quoted in Ibn-al-Furat, Ar-Ri'ah al-abwab wa-l-mashrik, ms. Vienna I, 79 verso (this reference was provided by Professor Claude Cahen).
50 Al Maqqdissi, Sabil, I, 190.
but small copper coinage continued to be called *qirāṣ* in Damascus until at least as late as 720 (1320/1).\(^{31}\)

Since the crusader states of northern Syria also issued copper coins beginning in the early twelfth century, and Latin Europe had no indigenous copper coinage, the possibility exists of some influence between the crusader coppers and the early polygonal *qirāṣ*. The two series, however, are, with rare exceptions, not very similar in appearance. The crusader coppers are adaptations of Byzantine types, while the images on the Moslem coins are neither Byzantine nor Frankish but rather traditional Near Eastern. The crusader coppers are also dissimilar in fabric, being struck on round, probably cast, blanks, although a few true polygonal crusader coppers are known, perhaps overstruck on Moslem *qirāṣ*.\(^{32}\) It is not even clear which series antedates the other, since Miles's tentative attribution of a Moslem issue to the time of the Saljuq Shah Malik-Shah (d. 485/1092) is unconfirmed. At most, it may be that the crusaders conquered a population using copper coins and issued their own coppers to meet an existing economic need. A single reference indicates that the Moslems referred to the crusader coppers also as *qirāṣ*.\(^{33}\)

There are two other important Moslem copper coinages of the crusader era. One, the large image-bearing coppers of eastern Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia, evidently began as a Moslem adaptation of the heavy anonymous coppers of Byzantium, because the earliest issues, under the Dānishmandids Asār b. Ghāzī (1104–1134) and Muḥammad (1134–1140; pl. XIV, no. 28), bear only Byzantine inscriptions and images.\(^{34}\) Later issues have Arabic inscriptions combined with a wide range of different images, including Byzantine images from coins or wall paintings, types copied from pre-Islamic coins (Greek [pl. XIV, no. 29], Roman, Parthian, and Sasanian), personalizations of planets and other astronomical phenomena, and traditional Near Eastern royal images. Such coppers were struck by Dānishmandids, Artuqids, Zengids, Ayyūbids, Rūm Seljuqs, and several minor Moslem dynasties. It has often been suggested that the use of images on these coinages evinces crusader influence, or issuance for trade with the crusaders, but in fact

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\(^{31}\) *Ibid.*, II, 285 where the coins are described as "fuqūṣ which are called *qirāṣ*"; see Ashīlī, *etc.*, cit., pp. 242, 247, 260, and 263 for other references to *qirāṣ* in the 13th century.


\(^{34}\) Emile L. Webster, "A Contribution to Dānishmandid History: the Figured Copper Coins," *ANS, Monumen Notes*, XXV (1950), 133–166.
there are no images derived from Latin Europe, or any other evidence linking these coins with the crusaders. Rather, the large coppers are generally found only in the regions where they were struck, and must have had an important place in the local monetary systems, judging by the abundance of surviving specimens. The large coppers gradually disappear during the thirteenth century, subsequent to (perhaps because of) the introduction of dirhams in their region. 55

Copper coinage was reintroduced to Egypt in 622 (1225) by the Ayyubid sultan al-Kamil. Initial difficulties resulted in several withdrawals of the new currency under the Ayyubids, but by the time of the Mamluks copper fals were an accepted part of Egypt's currency. These Egyptian coppers, however, do not seem to have circulated outside Egypt and have little relevance to the crusaders. 56

B. Crusader Arabic Gold Issues 57

The kings of Jerusalem and the counts of Tripoli struck, in addition to billon deniers of western pattern, gold coinages for their domains. These coins, called bizantii saracenii or bizantii saracenati in the Latin sources, were issued in considerable quantities. From sometime before the reign of Baldwin III (1143-1163) until 1251 these bezants imitated more or less faithfully Moslem dinars, especially those of the Fatimid caliphs al-Mustansir and al-Āmir. The issues of these long-reigning caliphs can be presumed, although there is no useful archaeological evidence, to have been the normal currency in Syria in the first decades after the establishment of the Latin kingdom. After 1251 the inscriptions on the coins were Christian, but still in Arabic. The imitations of al-Mustansir's coinage (prototype, pl. XII, nos. 3, 5) are probably to be attributed to the northern principalities, while the coinage of the kingdom of Jerusalem was exclusively of the type of al-Āmir (prototype, pl. XII, no. 6). The best of the imitations are

55 The best general catalogue and discussion of this series in its historical context is where: The Public Figure: Political Iconography in Medieval Manuscripts. Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1979. 56. Hasmukh Rabie, The Financial System of Egypt, A.D. 1268-1341 (London, 1980), pp. 156-158, 159-160. 57. T. Barber, “Circassian Monetary Policy: Copper,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, XXX (1976), 32-47. 58. Barber, Apparition, pp. 156-160. The argument put forward by Barber and others that these coins were used as small change in Egypt is contested by Bate, “The Franciscan, 59. This section was written by Barber, with additions and modifications by Bate.
elegant and legible, but the inscriptions and dates they bear are those of the prototype and irrelevant to their historical interpretation. Other specimens are blundered and meaningless to varying degrees. The evidence for their geographical and chronological attribution is therefore from finds of these coins in association in hoards; from analyses of their metal fineness, the relative proportions of trace elements in their alloys, and their weight standards; and from contemporary literary texts, Latin and Arabic. 58

The official status of these coins (which have long been recognized as belonging in some sense to the crusader principalities) 59 is proved by documentary sources, in which they are sometimes referred to explicitly as, for example, bezantae auti Saracenati de moneta regis Hierusalem (gold Saracenate bezants of the coinage of the king of Jerusalem). They were intended to circulate within the Latin states, and there is little if any evidence to suggest that they enjoyed an international role, except that they are sometimes found in Cilician Armenia, and finds and literary references show that they were used in the Moslem hinterland of the crusader states, for Moslem Syria had little gold coinage of its own in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The idea that they were widely current in the Mediterranean world, however, is a canard. They were, rather, one element (the other being billon) in a national coinage under tight control.

Although the bezants were imitations, they were not intended to deceive. 60 Their weight standards were less than the nominal Islamic dinar of 4.25 grams, and although Moslem gold coins of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries fluctuated in weight, few drop below 4.0 grams, while the bezants virtually never exceeded that weight. Those who were wealthy enough to use gold coins would have had no trouble in distinguishing the two currencies, which in any case did not normally mingle in circulation. Moreover, the alloy of the bezant was quite different from that of the dinar. Fatimid dinars of the crusader period, including the prototypes of the crusader imitations, were usually as pure as the workmen's skill could make them, while nearly all of the imitations have finenesses of 80 percent or less. The debased alloys of the bezants were in no way either fraudulent or incompetent: they reflected decisions to give the coins a certain intrinsic value.

58 For a more detailed discussion of the evidence for the attributions to be proposed here see Curtius and Mosallaf, op. cit., and Mosallaf, Coinage of the Crusaders, pp. 9–14, 42–44
59 The first to identify them was Henri Lavrux, in 1865; see Biot and Yvon, op. cit., p. 133
For the most part, the alloy variations were parallel in the northern and southern crusader states. From about the middle of the twelfth century the alloy was, by medieval standards, controlled within a perfectly acceptable variation of 1–2 percent, and the bezant deserved its high reputation. It was a far more valuable coin than the silver or billon deniers that were universal in western Christendom, and it answered the needs, no doubt, of a merchant class that would otherwise have found it convenient to use Byzantine or Arabic gold pieces. To the economic historian, the significant aspect of the evidence of the bezants is that gold should have flowed into the mints of the Latin east in quantities sufficient to strike so many coins.

THE GOLD COINAGE OF THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM

The most important evidence for the relative chronology of the gold coinage of the kingdom of Jerusalem is furnished by analysis of the gold content of the bezants. Nearly all the bezants imitating the coinage of al-Āmir can be divided into two groups, one of close to 80 percent fineness and another of about 68 percent. Hoard evidence, as well as the fact that the dated Christian Arabic coinage of 1251 and after is also of about 68 percent fineness, indicate that the latter coins are the later in time. The small remaining body of coins with fineness above 80 percent can reasonably be placed at the beginning of the sequence. Establishing an absolute chronology for these series is more problematic.

The date of the beginning of gold coinage in the kingdom is difficult to estimate. Ibn-Khallikan, a century and a half later (but presumably using an earlier source), records that when the city of Tyre eventually fell to the Franks in 1124 the crusaders continued for three years to strike coins in the name of al-Āmir, at the end of which time they ceased to do so.61 Since no coins of Tyre have survived bearing the year 518, the Moslem date of the capture of the city, and only one is known of the previous year, it is difficult to assume that the crusaders simply continued to strike the Moslem issue current at the time of the conquest, for at least one or two might be expected to have survived. In any case Acre, which seems to have been a more important mint for the crusaders than Tyre, was conquered in 1104, and had had a Moslem mint at least until 1101. It is theoretically possible that the minting of gold by the crusaders might have begun at Acre even before the conquest of Tyre. The earliest evidence from the Latin side

61 Ibn Khalikan, Histories, iv. 42, a. 23.
is a colleganza of July 1142, which makes it certain that crusader bezants were already being struck in the kingdom of Jerusalem before the accession of Baldwin III; it refers to a debt to be paid at Acre in bizancios saracenos bonus et de rege illius terrae de pesa secundum consuetudinem illius terrae (saracene bezants of good gold of the king of that country and of a weight according to the custom of that country).

If, then, the crusaders began issuing gold coins sometime between 1104 and 1142, what were these coins? Among issues identified so far as crusader imitations, there is only one variety which, by reason of its high gold content, is a likely candidate for an issue of the kingdom of Jerusalem in the period before the introduction of coins of 80 percent fineness about the middle of the twelfth century. This is BY 26, a relatively rare group, which amalgamates two very different styles of coinage, one small and compact (pl. XV, no. 30), the other on larger flans, with stiff, thin lettering and a wide empty border between the two circles of the legend (pl. XV, no. 31). Four specimens of the large-flan variety range from 91 to 97.4 percent in fineness, while three small-flan coins are lower, from 82.5 to 88.1 percent. Both styles imitate the coinage of al-Âmîr, but they are rather different from one another in appearance. The tall, elegant script and wide border of the large-flan coins is unlike any other crusader imitations, and indeed unlike the Fatimid prototype; the very earliest issues of al-Âmîr, just after 1101, have a wider space between inner and outer inscriptions than his later dinars, but their script is nothing like the large-flan BY 26. The small-flan coins included in BY 26 are, on the contrary, much like the later crusader issues and resemble also their Fatimid prototypes. Probably the two varieties should be reclassified separately, with the small-flan coins seen as precursors of the Acre coinage of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and the large-flan coins reserved for further consideration. This small handful of known specimens seems insufficient to fill the entire span of years during which they may have been issued. It may be, however, that there were originally many more, and that the adoption of the 80 percent standard was accompanied by a recoinage that called in most of the existing bezants to the melting pot.

The date of the introduction of the 80 percent standard is quite uncertain. The aftermath of the Second Crusade, 1148, seems to be the earliest possible occasion. A later date, up to just before 1165, would

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62 Raimondo Morone della Rocca and Annalena Lombardo, eds., Documenti dei conti monaci veronensi nel secolo XI – XII (Rivista storica italiana, XXVIII (1940)), no. 61
63 More fully discussed in Gordon and Matzall, op. cit., pp. 139–140
fit the numismatic evidence as well, and perhaps accord with the references to *busancios... de moneta regis Hierusalem* which begin in 1161. The date 1165 as *ante quem* is suggested by a document of that year which speaks of *busancios... novos and veteres; the novi are perhaps the 80 percent coins, while veteres are those of higher fineness. It must be admitted, however, that *novi* is a term used over a wide range of dates, and its interpretation is not without difficulties. Still, it seems safe at least to say that the bezants of 80 percent fineness were introduced probably in the reign of Baldwin III, or under Amalric (1163−1174) at the latest.

The date of the reduction in fineness from 80 to 68 percent can almost certainly be put in the second half of the twelfth century, and one historical occasion immediately presents itself as probable: the time of Saladin’s conquests, or about 1186−1188. The events of 1187 and 1188 shattered the Latin kingdom; Guy (1186−1192) evidently found it impossible to issue proper silver coinage, and the financial crisis may have necessitated a change in the gold currency as well. The date is supported by further references in documents of 1190, 1192, and 1194 to “new bezants”. Further possible support is provided by a hoard said to be from Latakia, if this provenance is reliable, for that city fell to Saladin in July 1188 and the hoard contained two coins of the reduced standard along with thirty-nine of the 80 percent standard. It seems likely, therefore, to have been concealed just at the time of danger from Saladin, placing the beginning of the new coinage at least some months earlier.

The coins to be attributed to this phase are BY 25 (pl. XV, no. 32), BY 27a−d (pl. XV, no. 33), BY 27f, BY 20−21 (pl. XV, no. 34), and BY 22−24 (pl. XV, no. 35). All of these are imitations of the coinage of al-Âmir, although the type was standard in Egypt throughout most of the twelfth century. They can be divided, largely on the basis of differences in the ratio of silver to copper as minor constituents of the alloy, into three groups which probably correspond to different mints: Acre and Tyre no doubt account for most of the production, but there are problems in deciding which group belongs to which mint. Perhaps BY 25 and 27 belong to Acre, BY 20−21 possibly to Tyre, while BY 22−24 remain uncertain and may be the product either of the same mint as BY 20−21 or of a third mint. BY 25 is listed by Balog and

65 Gerdins and Mecailf, *op. cit.*, pp. 130−131.
66 The rather complicated arguments for mint attribution are set out in detail by Gerdins and Mecailf, *op. cit.*, pp. 132−136.
Yvon among the "legible" imitations, while BY 27 begins the listing of "imitations grossières", completely illegible, but there is little obvious difference among the many bezants assigned to these two classes. Nor for that matter is there any great visual distinction between the groups assigned to Acre, Tyre, and a possible uncertain mint. They are tentatively assigned on the basis of consistent differences in the ratio of silver to copper as alloying elements, and, in the case of BY 20-21, on the fact that a large proportion of these coins were in a hoard said to have been found near Tyre. 64 The existence of a mint at Tyre at least until 1190-1192 is shown by a Venetian document of a later date referring to its closure or relocation in this period. 65 Probably a definitive classification of these coins can be made only on the basis of a complete die study in conjunction with the results of metal analysis. It seems likely that the bezants of the second phase initially were intended to be of 20 Byzantine carats weight, about 3.74 grams, and to contain 16 carats of gold, 3 1/2 carats of silver, and 1/2 carat of copper, with some falling away from these standards as time went on. 66

68  Metcalfe, Coinage of the Crusaders, p. 43.
69  Guérin and Metcalfe, op. cit, p. 143.
70  See ibid., pgs. 141-142, for full discussion.
tions that Süfi dinars were accepted by the mint at a rate of 60 Egyptian mithqals per 100 Süfi mithqals; 71 that is, a given weight of Süfi dinars was valued at 60 percent of the value of an equal weight of Egyptian dinars (which were assumed by the mint to be pure gold). If we assume that this figure was the final result to the customer, taking into account the 5 percent minting charge which was standard a few years earlier (according to Ibn-Ba‘rak), it appears that the Süfi dinar was raised as if 65 percent gold. This is well within the actual fineness range of phase 3 dinars, and if one assumes also that the Egyptian mint slightly underestimated the fineness of foreign dinars, as appears from Ibn-Ba‘rak’s tabulation, the figure is not inconsistent with an estimated intended fineness of two-thirds gold.

Probably nearly all these are products of the Acre mint, an assumption based on their similarity in weight, fineness, and silver/copper ratio.


72. Ibn-Ba‘rak, op. cit., pp. 50–61, Chronique, “Standard,” p. 161. Echternach's proposal that Ibn-Ba‘rak also refers to the Süfi dinar is in error. The very obscure word that Echternach read “šurī” has been read “šubūh” by two subsequent editors of the text (Palam, editor of the complete manuscript, and Hannay de Wyzewa, who used this passage in his edition of Al-Husayn al-Balā‘i, Al-dawla‘a wa al-mawādu‘ al-dawla‘a wa al-mawādu‘ [Madrid, 1960], p. 59, no. 2); that is, the term “šubūh” is used twice in the text, and the two first lines of the tabulation by Echternach both refer to the same issue, which is an no identified as North African, but crusader. On the other hand, various entries in Ibn-Ba‘rak's list of the values of various gold issues set by the Egyptian house may appear, within some apparent corruption of the text, a reference to the Süfi dinar. This is the case in line ten, editors in the manuscript “šurī” or “šurī” dinar, neither term having any evident antecedent, Palam and Mena, the editors of the text, both suggest emending this term as “šurī”. Meaning dinars struck by a house called Hāfrad-Dīn, the sources at the Zayed annals of 1180 might be met, but these seem to be mentioned already under the term “rubā‘ī.” Echternach suggested a similarity of “šurī” with the word he used “šurī” in al-Nakhaṣi's text, which is an fact Süfi (it is the reference under discussion above). It is barely possible that Süfi under-performed to be transformed by a coiner into “šurī”; the letters s and t are just elided in Arabic, but the rest of the word is the same.

A peculiarity of this passage in Ibn-Ba‘rak, as in one instance, the various figures given by Ibn- Ba‘rak do not jibe. He says that there were sent 10 percent as following, after deduction of the standard 5 percent fine charges, 23 5 mithqals per hundred to the customer. This figure is anomalous because Ibn-Ba‘rak’s listing is in order of fineness; 85 percent should occur near the top of the list, but at the bottom. Moreover, Ibn-Ba‘rak gives the standard value of each of the coins in hand, based on a standard of 40 dinars per Egyptian mithqal, the “šurī” dinar as said to be worth 24 dinars, but this figure is quite wrong if the coin is valued at 85 percent of the Egyptian mithqal. Echternach received mithqal contributions by varying the base in ranging from 10 to 55, but this is opposed by the text’s statement that 38 mithqals were left to the customer. We would passge another conclusion, based on the fact that the 24-dinar ratio given by the text corresponds exactly to a value of 60 mithqals per hundred, the same as the figure found in al-Nakhaṣi for the Süfi dinar. It may be that the original cost of Ibn-Ba‘rak had erred for both a Nabi and a Süfi dinar. The mithqal struck given in the present manuscript are ban unremarkable for the dinars of Mamluk (if now in the correct monetization of the first/third/ Süfi dinar) while the dinar value given could have permmuned originally in the Süfi dinar. The similarity of the two words may well have lead some suppose to confuse the two entries.
to the bezants with Christian Arabic inscriptions, which bear the authentic mint name Acre. One analyzed example of the class BY 20–21 has only a 58 percent fineness, and may represent the phase 3 coinage of the Tyre mint. As suggested, this series comes after the imitations with 80 percent and begins probably shortly before the concealment of the Latakia hoard (1187?). The date may also have been not long before the closure of the Tyre mint (1190–1192), but the new bezants need not have been introduced immediately after the termination of the old, especially considering the sharp break in style between the two. There may have been a period of months or years between the end of one and the beginning of the next, while the crusaders reorganized after the defeat of 1187. As for the termination of phase 3, it is reasonable to believe that it continued until the visit of the papal legate Odo in 1250, because the introduction of Christian Arabic crusader gold immediately afterward makes no sense otherwise.

In the spring of 1250 Odo, bishop of Chateauroux, arrived in Syria in the entourage of Louis IX and reported to pope Innocent IV on the monetary practices of the Franks in Syria. His report has not survived, but the response of Innocent IV is still extant. In it the pope takes notice of the striking of bezants and drachmas (silver coins) by the Christians of Acre and Tripoli with the name of Mohammed and the date of the era of his birth (sic). The practice was forbidden, under pain of excommunication.

Even before Innocent’s letter arrived, Odo, probably with Louis’s support, put a stop to the purely imitative coinage. In response, the mint of Acre began the production of a new type of bezant, much like the old in its general appearance, weight standard, and fineness, but bearing inscriptions in legible Arabic proclaiming Christian instead of Moslem doctrines (pl. XV, no. 37). On one side, the outer margin states the place and date of issue: “Struck in Acre in the year one thousand two hundred, one and fifty, of the Incarnation of our Lord the Messiah.” The inner circular inscription proclaims “Father, Son, and Holy Ghost” and the central inscription continues, in two lines, “one

73. It is quoted by Larmessin, Monnaies d’apres les croisés en Syrie par les croisés (Paris, 1877), pp. 52–53.

74. Sales and Yvrai, "Moneysies," p. 158, take note with Larmessin’s statement that the prototype for these coins is the same dinar of at-Andia that served as prototype for the imitations. They assert rather that the prototype is the "contemporary" Ayyubid gold coinage. This is erroneous; the coins are nothing like contemporary Ayyubid coins except in their survival Arabic script, but this latter feature is only a result of the fact that the inscriptions for the first time are original, not copied from an old prototype, and therefore naturally in contemporary script. Otherwise the design, with a small central field surrounded by two circular inscriptions, is identical to that of the imitations that preceded them.
godhead”. On the other side, the outer and inner circular inscriptions read: “We are glorified by the Cross of our Lord Jesus the Messiah, in whom is our salvation and our life and our resurrection, and in whom is our deliverance and pardon.” On this same side, the central inscription of the imitations is replaced by a cross, and smaller crosses mark the beginnings of all circular inscriptions on both sides of the coin. The year 1251 is the earliest known for this series; none are yet known with the date 1252, but the years 1253–1258 are all represented. If these dates are authentic, it would appear that the devastation of Acre by the war of Saint Sabas brought the minting of gold to an end.

The fineness of these coins seems to be the same as the preceding series, ranging from 62.4 to 68.7 percent. An Italian list of Mediterranean gold coins and their finenesses gives for the deoeli d’Acrae cross a fineness of 16½ carats, or in some manuscripts 15¾ (also 16 meno ½). The former figure, in the earliest manuscript, is equivalent to 68 percent, which seems rather high in comparison to the coins’ average fineness of 65.83 percent. The lower figure, in the next three manuscripts in chronological order, corresponds better at 65.28 percent. Possibly the copyist of the earliest of the extant manuscripts mistakenly substituted et for meno.

The only crusader gold issue which might be attributable to the years after 1258 is the very rare Aguis Dei coinage (pl. XV, no. 38), which is neither an imitation nor inspired by a Moslem issue, but which has the same fineness and silver/copper ratio in the Christian Arabic issues of Acre. It has been attributed by Grierson to Antioch, and to the period of Louis’s stay in Syria, 1250–1254. It seems unlikely, however,

75 The latter phrase has been posthumously attributed by other coinspas, who assumed that the Arabic word dem, “god, divinity, godhead”, was an error for Add, “God”. Considering that the currency of the inscriptions on the coins are perfectly accurate, there is no reason to think that the spelling was accidentally as this was instances.

76 The word جاذبية, “gazabiyya”, in manuscript sources in the Arabic version of the inscriptions by both Louis, op. cit., p. 34, and Baring and Yeve, “Monumenta,” p. 158. Presumably the latter merely copied a typographical error in the earlier work. The deoeli is only a single de

77 In comparison, the corresponding silver coins, discussed below, are known only for the year 1251.

78 Found in six manuscripts ranging in date from an 1130 to an 1480, edited by the late Allan Evans in an unpublished typescript deposited after his death in the American Numismatic Society. The earliest of these manuscripts is Raccadiano 2354, fol. 43°, giving 16½ carats as the fineness of the coin; those with variant forms of the fineness are Distel 1174, fol. 24° (distel ex. 1380 with 15½ carats) and Catel 1, VII, 1137, fol. 24° (distel 1418, with 16 extra ½ carats). The authors are grateful to Dr Allan Stibbs for bringing this material to their attention.

79 Philip Grierson, “A Rare Crusader Demand with the Christus victor Legend,” ANS Museum Notes, VI (1934), 169-170.
that Antioch, which so far as we can judge had never minted gold bezants, would have initiated such a major departure from the traditional bezant at so early a date. Rather than a precedent for the design of the gros tournois and the French écu d’or, might the Agnus Dei issue not have been rather an echo of the latter coin, introduced perhaps at Acre in 1266 or more probably at Tripoli after 1268? There seems no compelling reason against a date after 1266, and the Agnus Dei issue might well be a parallel to the silver gros of Tripoli of that era.  

There are numerous references in the documents and histories to saracenic bezants and Şīrī dinars after 1253 up into the 1280’s, with the latest in 1302–1303.  It seems possible that the crusader bezants, in the absence of any abundant competitor, continued to circulate for some time after their minting ceased. Damascus began to mint gold coins in the reign of Baybars, after 1260, but Mamluk Syrian dinars seem to have been produced only irregularly and in small quantities.

THE GOLD COINAGE  
OF THE NORTHERN CRUSADER STATES  

The coins discussed so far are all imitations or adaptations of a single prototype, the dinars of the Fatimid caliph al-Āmir. All these have been attributed to the kingdom of Jerusalem. There is another group of bezants, copied from the coinage of the eleventh-century caliph al-Mustansir, which seem to represent a regular and substantive series, struck over a long period of time in large quantities, although they are not so abundant as the al-Āmir imitations. These are evidently the official gold coinage of another of the crusader principalities, and the only question is whether they were minted at Antioch or Tripoli, or both. Thirteenth-century documents mention both bisantii tripolitani and bisantii antiocheni, but it is not quite certain — since the territories were under united rule — whether these imply a mint or each place or are merely legal phrases. The analytical evidence makes the hypothesis of two mints unlikely, although it does not rule it out. Stylistically, the al-Mustansir imitations all seem to belong to a single series; numismatists would be at a loss to know how they could be attributed to two mints. Most decisive, at least for the mid-thirteenth century, is the papal letter responding to the complaints of Odo of Châteauroux, for while it forbids the manufacture of imitations in all the crus-

80. Grégoire and Merleau, op. cit., p. 133.  
81. Lewis, op. cit., p. 92
sader territories—Jerusalem, Tripoli, and Antioch—it mentions only Acre and Tripoli as the cities where they were being made. The actual coins used in Antioch, described for legal purposes as bezants of Antioch, were most likely issues of the prince of that principality (who also was count of Tripoli), struck at Tripoli.\textsuperscript{12}

Similarly the bezants sucraciuni d'Armenia that are frequently referred to in notarial acts from the port of Ayas in Cilician Armenia\textsuperscript{14} are, we may be sure, the expression of a legal standard of quality rather than coins minted in Cilicia. Later in the thirteenth century they may even have become merely “ghost monies,” an accounting device for recording sums that were paid in silver currencies.

The prototype for the imitations of al-Mustansir’s dinars, as discussed in the previous section, is not precisely identifiable. They resemble any of several of his dinar varieties with broad central fields containing several horizontal inscriptions.\textsuperscript{14} All the imitations have a semblance, at least, of the words “Ma’add” and “Ali” at the top of the field; these are usually the only words that can be read except by direct comparison to one of the originals. All have an empty band surrounding the field and an outer marginal inscription which is also nearly illegible. They can be divided into several groups on the basis of their gold content, and this classification, as well as increasing barbarity of style, suggests a chronological arrangement from highest to lowest gold fineness, like the bezants of Jerusalem. The hoard evidence, slender as it is, supports this hypothesis, suggesting also that the sequence of reductions was not strictly parallel.\textsuperscript{15}

The earliest gold coinage of Tripoli is probably BY 2, characterized by high fineness and relatively careful workmanship. Unlike the remainder of the al-Mustansir imitations, BY 2 has five horizontal lines of inscription on each side, and stylistically it also stands out. It can be divided into two subvarieties which are similar in their rendering of the letter shapes but with subtle differentiation in style, best seen on the illustration. Among those analyzed by Gordus, the two ANS specimens represent one subvariety, with finenesses of 97.9 (pl. XVI, no. 39) and 86.6 percent, while the Paris specimen, representing the other subvariety (the one illustrated by Balez and Yvou), falls between them.

\textsuperscript{12} Gordus and Mescall, op. cit., pp. 122–133.
\textsuperscript{14} A single coin indicates al-Hamun’s numismatic legend issue; it is doubtful whether it belongs with the other imitations of his dinars. See below, p. 453.
\textsuperscript{15} Gordus and Mescall, op. cit., pp. 128–131.
with a fineness of 92.5 percent (another example of this subvariety, not the one analyzed, pl. XVI, no. 40). It differs markedly from the other two in its ratio of silver to copper. The coins of this group, however, are definitively linked as the products of a single mint not only by certain idiosyncrasies of letter form but also by the presence of three oblique strokes crossing the empty band between field and margin on both sides of the coin. These strokes link this group, in turn, to the remainder of the issues attributed to Tripoli, many of which also have markings in this area (although not oblique strokes).66

The remaining bezants of Tripoli form a fairly homogeneous series. All have only four lines of inscription on obverse and reverse, and many, though not all, have marks of some kind — small circles or dots — in the empty band around the field. Neither the presence or absence of markings nor their arrangement when present seems to have any relationship to differences that can be established on other grounds, but the marks nevertheless may have had some secret significance for mint personnel and others. Although the field inscriptions, except for the words "Ali" and "Ma'add", are complete gibberish, they are nonetheless regular from one coin to the next. For example, the last line of the reverse (arbitrarily defined as the side with "Ma'add") always has a distinctive pattern which can best be described as two vertical wedge-shaped lines, a circle with a tail, a circle, and two more wedge shapes (reading Arabic-fashion from right to left). This simplified rendering of the Arabic becomes more condensed on the latest issues, but its gradual evolution can be easily traced when a number of specimens are examined. From their style one may judge that this is a continuous series of coins from a single mint.

It can be subdivided into four groups. The first (BY 3 and BY 4?) is of relatively finer workmanship. Only two of these were analyzed by Gordus and Metcalf; both were examples of BY 3 with 89.7 and 82.9 percent gold. This level of gold fineness overlaps with the fineness of BY 2 and suggests that BY 3 followed it very closely. Both BY 2 and BY 3 can be seen as analogues of the phase 1 coinage of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and probably can be assigned to the first half, or at least to the first two-thirds, of the twelfth century. BY 4 is associated with BY 3 on the basis of style.

The next group, BY 5-6, resembles BY 3-4 greatly, but there is a distinct decline from one to the next in workmanship. BY 5-6 are classified by Balog and Yvon as the first in the series "monnaies d'imita-

66. Ibid., p. 140. BY 1 is there included with BY 2 as a possible early production of the Tripoli mint, but it cannot be that early, as it has Saladins name on it. See below, p. 455.
tion grossière". One example of each of BY 5 and 6 was analyzed, with 71.3 and 73.6 percent gold, respectively. The number of coins so far analyzed is small, making definitive conclusions hazardous, but if, as seems almost certain from comparison of the engraving of the two groups, BY 3–4 was followed chronologically by BY 5–6, then there was, as in the kingdom of Jerusalem, a change from a higher but irregular standard of alloy to one that was lower but more tightly controlled. It appears probable that BY 5–6 are analogous to the phase 2 bezants of Jerusalem. The change in gold standard may have taken place at about the same time.

The last two groups have in common a much cruder style than the previous issues (Balog and Yvon introduce them as "plus grossière encore") and a considerable reduction in gold content, ranging for the two groups together from 57 to 67 percent, with the first group concentrated around 62 percent and the second about 60.6 percent. On both the letters are much thicker and more abbreviated than before—like the phase 3 coins of the kingdom, these seem to have been engraved with a blunt instrument. The first of these two groups (BY 7–12; pl. XVI, no. 41) can be easily distinguished from the second (BY 13–16; pl. XVI, no. 42) by the presence on the latter of the letters B and T on obverse and reverse in the same position as the words "Ma'addi" and "All" on earlier issues. Some of the B-T bezants also have a small cross on one side or the other, worked inconspicuously into the pseudo-Arabic inscription.81 These two groups can plausibly be assigned to the era of Jerusalem's phase 3, that is, to the period between Saladin's conquests and the edict of Innocent IV forbidding imitations of Muslim coins.

These Tripoli bezants, although lower in fineness than those of Acre, are heavier on the average; it seems possible at least that they were also intended to contain 12 carats of gold, but to weigh 19 instead of 18 carats (with 4½ carats of silver and 2½ of copper).82 These are quite possibly the same became saracino mentioned in the Italian merchants' list previously cited83 with a fineness of 15 carats (62.5 percent) and a value of 12 per ounce (of Florentine florins). This latter relation-

87 There is no significant distinction to be drawn between the B-T bezant with and without the cross, both dies of at least one specimen without cross were used separately in combination with other dies containing the cross (Balog and Yvon, "Monnaies," pp. 142–143).
88 Convis and Massalet, op. cit., pp. 132, 142.
89 Above, note 78. Bimetal moneys of this type were also in another merchants' list drawn by Evans from several manuscripts, of which the earliest is Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Manoscritto 75, fol. 260v, appended by him to 1320; another is that of Pugliesi's Le Pratiche delle mercimonie of 1320–1340 (ed. Evans, Cambridge, Mass., 1936, p. 248). This latter tradition does not give the relationship to the florin.
ship, according to Evans’s calculations, indicates a weight standard of 3.78 grams, since the florin, 24 carats fine, weighed one-eighth of an ounce of 28.33 grams.

The letters B and T have been much discussed, without any definitive conclusion. Most previous proposals are eliminated by the analysis data, which put these coins clearly in the thirteenth century, probably at the very end of the series of imitations. The coins with B and T may, indeed, be contemporary with the Christian Arabic bezants of Acre, issued 1251–1258. 90 This attribution makes it reasonable to conjecture that B and T stand for Boemundus and Tripoli (as found in the obverse and reverse of the Latin silver coins). They are still essentially imitations, it is true, but their inscriptions are so completely barbarous that no real trace of their original Islamic import remains, so they may have been considered permissible within the terms of the papal edict. If they do in fact come from the period after the edict, there is no reason to assume that they ended so precisely the same year as the gold coinage of Acre; Tripoli did not fall to the Mamluks until 1289.

OTHER GOLD ISSUES OF THE CRUSADERS

The arrangement proposed above accounts for the great majority of the surviving bezants: roughly 160 out of about 200 published specimens. There remain a number of coins that seem certainly to be attributable to the crusaders, but cannot be fitted into the two major minting sequences. One such group are the coins in the Latakia hoard which seem to be dinars of Ali ibn Muhammad (an eleventh-century ruler of Yemen) bearing the mint name Zabid and the date 451 (1059/60; pl. XVI, no. 43). Although Balog and Yvon considered these authentic, Miles already in 1967 labeled them imitations which he suspected would eventually be classified as crusader coins. 91 Their presence in a hoard of the late twelfth century, as well as their gold content of 77.2 to 81.1 percent, is sufficient evidence for their identification as crusader issues. The gold content is the same as the issues of the kingdom of Jerusalem in the second half of the twelfth century, but it seems very unlikely that any of the royal mints would have struck a quite different type of bezant. Tentatively, one might suggest that the

90. The two series are found together in at least one hoard, described by Orierson, “Rare Crusader Bezants,” p. 174.
Yemeni imitations were issued by Reginald of Châtillon from a mint at his fortress Kerak. Reginald's strategic ambitions in the Red Sea might accord with the choice of a Yemeni issue as prototype, and his independent character would make him an appropriate candidate to mint the royal minting rights of the young leper king Baldwin IV (1174–1185). Possibly other dinars currently attributed to Yemen in the eleventh and twelfth centuries will prove on reexamination to be crusader imitations also.

Another mysterious group of objects are the cut gold fragments that have been found in several hoards, often in association with full-size bezants. These include both imitations of Fatimid dinars and pieces with Latin inscriptions and geometric designs. These latter are known only as fragments, never as full coins. They have been interpreted as coins of the Latin kingdom from the time of Baldwin III and Amalric, but this identification remains problematic.

It is extremely unlikely that these curious pieces were an official coinage. Although many have a wedge shape with one circular edge, suggesting a fragment cut from a circular disc like a coin, the majority are four-sided or irregular as if cut from strips or plates. They seem to come from a period (contemporary with the second phase of the bezants) when there was a regular and plentiful gold coinage. The alloy of the cut pieces that have been analyzed is from 50.4 to 62.1 percent, lower than in any of the full-size bezants, and their weight is quite irregular, from 0.34 to 1.06 grams. The style and quality of the engraving of the Latin pieces, however, are typical of the royal mints. Several letters can be closely matched on deniers of Baldwin III, pointing to a date before 1167 for these objects. None of the Arabic fragments has been die-linked or matched with any specific variety of the full-size bezants, but the relatively fine style of the small fragments of inscription that can be seen is typical of the bezants of the twelfth century.

94. Gordon and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 156. Another fragment analyzed by Brady, "Hoard," p. 332, and "Analysis," p. 344, had a fineness range of 35.6 to 70.1 percent, lending him to suggest that these are earlier in date does the not fragment from the Manassah hoard.
century (some of the fragments may be pieces of genuine Moslem coins, although none has yet been so identified). There are several examples of fragments with Arabic on one side and Latin on the other, of which one in the ANS is the largest. The latter is apparently of the type with several horizontal lines of inscription characteristic of Tripoli bezants, but other fragments are clearly of the small-central-field type of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Even though these may be a product of one or more official mints, it does not follow that they were intended as coins. It has been suggested that they were made to be used in making payments by weight, to make up small deficiencies, or that they were used for payments of a fraction of a bezant, but this hardly can account for the creation of a large variety of Latin designs which were never struck as full-size coins. Another suggestion, which perhaps makes more sense, is that they were made for sale to pilgrims who wanted to offer gold at a shrine without a substantial expenditure. At the same time, finds of these pieces with bezants in hoards suggest that the fragments had some monetary value. They may be related to the *pezzetti di bisanti*, "little pieces of bezants", with a fineness of 11½ carats (48.96 percent) mentioned in the series of merchants' lists of 1350-1480. The twelfth-century fragments are unlikely to be the same pieces mentioned in the fourteenth-century texts (in any case their fineness is slightly higher than any stated by the lists), but might be their monetary ancestors.

Only the Latin fragments have been studied in detail. The central designs on the majority are a "matrix" or "grid" on the obverse and a "star" on the reverse. These rather complicated interlaced figures have been drawn in full only by Miles. The inscriptions include, on the obverse, BALDWINVS or AMALRICVS (REX), or SIGNUM AMALRICI or BALDVINI REGIS. The most common reverse inscription is IERUSALEM or HIERSALEM CIVITAS, with variants. A number of fragments have letter combinations which cannot be fitted into


96 First suggested by Arthur J. Salaman, "Coins of the Crusaders," Spirit's Numismatic Circular, LXXIV (1966), 32-33; see Muncy, Catalogue of the Crusader, p. 31

97 Edited by Fauch, as cited above, note 78. Pezzetti di bisanti, with a fineness of 12 carats, are also mentioned by the other manuscript tradition, including Pseudo-Geoff, the cit., along with some of Tripoli of 11½ carats (48.93 percent). Another money in the former list is the *rothe grosso croce*, croce brown with a fineness of 11½ carats (48.25 percent), which are listed in only one of the six manuscripts, Deum 1774, the same one that describes the bezants with cross as brown *rothe* and gives the fineness of the latter as 13½ carats.

98 "Some Examples," p. 395; these are only examples, as the designs on the fragments studied here often differ in detail.
the commonly found inscriptions; these may be parts of additional
monetum, or of other names, possibly COMES HENRICIVS or COMES
RAIMVNDVS (Raymond III of Tripoli as regent of the kingdom, 1184–
1186?).

As for the Arabic fragments, the prevailing type is an imitation of
the coinage of al-Āmir, like the full-size bezants of the Latin king-
dom, and the fine style is like the bezants of the twelfth century. The
Arabic fragments are like the Latin ones, however, in that no fragment
has yet been observed to correspond precisely to any known full-size
bezant—that is, it looks as if special dies were engraved to strike the
Arabic fragments just as for the Latin ones (but a rigorous study has
yet to be made). The Arabic side of the ANS bilingual piece (pl. XVI,
no. 44) appears most similar to BY 2, identified as an early issue of
Tripoli, but in truth the two widely separated pontillate circles sur-
rounding the central area are paralleled on no other bezant, prototypical
dinar, or fragment, and the same feature on the Latin side of the piece
is also found on no other fragment. Obviously a great deal of study
and much new material will be needed before it will be possible to speak
with confidence of the full range of designs and inscriptions of these
mysterious little bits.

The remaining imitations not yet attributed are all isolated small
groups or unique coins with no obvious connection to any other is-
issues. These include:

1. BY 1, a coin in the American Numismatic Society (0000.999.14974;
pl. XVI, no. 45), which is unique among all the known imitations in
copying the design of al-Mustansir’s issue of 1048–1062, with three
concentric circular inscriptions and no central field inscriptions. The
inscriptions (which Balog and Yvon ignored as having “aucune signifi-
cation, l’artisan franc n’ayant pas connu l’arabe”) are legible, copied
from the dinars of Saladin during the caliphate of the ‘Abbasid al-
Mustasif (1174–1180). The visual difference between this latter coinage
and the concentric type of al-Mustansir is that Saladin’s coinage has
two short lines of inscription in the center, which the imitation omits.
BY 1 also has less silver than copper as alloying element, quite differ-
ent from any crusader imitation analyzed, and finally its epigraphical
style is unlike that of the other imitations. Since it is clearly not a genu-
ine Moslem coin, it seems reasonable to attribute it to the Franks, but
it may well be an issue of a very short-lived mint, perhaps private, from
a place and time unguessable. Its fineness, 93.3 percent, suggests an
early date, but it cannot be earlier than the accession of Saladin (1174).

99 Muscalf, Coins of the Crusaders, p. 32.
2. A bezant imitating with some fidelity the Egyptian dinars of Saladin with the name of the caliph an-Nasir, struck from 1180 to 1193. The imitation is described but not assigned a number by Balog and Yvon. The alloy of the piece is not known. Its weight is 3.31 grams, within the range of the phase 3 bezants attributed above to the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This is the only imitations of an Ayyubid dinar identified so far. Its existence raises the possibility that other dinars now attributed to Saladin, less crude in execution, might upon reexamination turn out to be crusader imitations, which in turn may explain in part the debasement and irregular, often low, weight of the Egyptian dinar in Saladin’s reign noted by Ehrenkreutz.

3. A number of coins, mostly found in hoards along with bezants, as for example the five “authentic Fatimid” dinars of the Latakia hoard, which can now be confidently attributed as bezants on the basis of the results of neutron activation analysis and a reexamination of the pieces. These bezants are rather diverse, with mint names including Mnek, al-Ikandariya (Alemdag), and al-Mu‘izziyah al-Qahirah (Cairo), and dates including 508, 510, 514, 515, 516, and 518 (1114–1125; all within the reign of al-Amir). Their weights and fineness are typical of bezants of the second phase at Acre. The engraving of their dies is, obviously, sufficiently skillful to fool experienced numismatists, but armed with the knowledge of their deficient weight and alloy, one can see that they do not have the finished appearance of similar dinars of full weight and alloy.

These good-quality imitations seem likely to be attributable to a subsidiary mint of the Latin kingdom, perhaps Tyre, but there is no certainty that all should be assigned to the same mint or era. Once again, further study is needed. These are surely not the only crusader imitations to be found among Fatimid dinars hitherto considered authentic. Oddy’s tables show a number of debased issues, many of which were catalogued as Fatimid by Lane-Poole. It seems likely that most of these are crusader bezants. Of special interest are the low-alloy dinars

103. Oddy, op. cit., tables 3, 4, and 5; Oddy (pp. 107, 189) rules the possibility of a crusader attribution of dinar coins.
of Tripoli with dates around 460 (1067/8); if these can be proven to be imitations, they would represent a new major variety in the beazant series.

In summary, then, the combined evidence of metal analysis, metrology, hoards, visual examination of the coins, Latin documents, and Arabic texts indicates the general organization and evolution of the crusader imitation bezants. Two major series, from the kingdom of Jerusalem and the county of Tripoli, can be identified and put into a reasonably well-defined chronological sequence from the mid-twelfth century until after the middle of the thirteenth. At the same time this new understanding of the history of the crusader bezant raises further questions and problems for numismatic research.

C. Crusader Arabic Silver Issues

Within a generation or two after the arrival of the first crusaders in Syria, they had begun to issue gold coins imitating those of the Moslems and copper coins analogous to those of Byzantium and northern Syria (although with Latin inscriptions), but there were no crusader imitation silver coins in the twelfth century. This is not surprising, for two simple reasons. First, the silver coinage of the Moslem world at the time of the first crusades, especially in Syria, was evidently scanty, consisted of small coins considerably alloyed and low in value, and was unlikely to make any impression on newcomers. Second, and probably more important, the crusaders already had their own silver coinage in western Europe, the penny, also a small and often debased coin. The gold and copper coins of Syria were new to the crusaders, but the little debased dirhams filled no role that could not be played by pennies imported from Europe or struck by the crusaders themselves.

The situation changed radically after Saladin’s invasion of Syria in 1174. One of his earliest innovations was the imitation of minting of full-weight good silver dirhams at Damascus, Homs, Haranah, and Aleppo. Judging by the quantity of surviving examples, Saladin’s new dirham coinage was not issued in large amounts at first, but increased in volume during his reign and under his immediate successors. From the turn of the thirteenth century, Ayyubid Syrian dirhams become quite common. Minting of full dirhams also spread to other Moslem
lands, Egypt, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia. One possible interpretation of the process is that the new dirhams in the late twelfth century took some time to become established as an important part of the monetary system, but as they did so, they created a demand for silver coinage which had the effect of drawing silver to the mints from bullion stocks in Syria itself and from outside. This hypothesis has its importance for the understanding of the crusader Arabic silver coinage, as will be seen.

The Frankish states on the Syrian littoral must inevitably have been drawn into the process of expansion of the use of full dirhams in Syria. It seems reasonable to assume that Ayyûbid dirhams would have come to the Franks in transactions with the Moslems, and that these coins would come to be used not only for return transactions but also in exchanges among Franks—not, to be sure, for the transactions of daily life in the marketplace, but in large commercial dealings. At any rate, it is certain that the minting of dirhams spread not only to Ayyûbid Syria’s Moslem neighbors but also to the crusaders, beginning in 1216. It is also certain that these crusader dirhams were issued in large quantity and had an important economic role.

Who precisely issued these coins, and what exactly their economic role was, are questions the answers to which are less clear. Three major series of crusader dirhams exist, two that imitate Ayyûbid dirhams and one of Ayyûbid type but with Christian inscriptions.¹⁰⁶ The dates on these coins are not those of the prototypes, but follow a regular sequence and seem to be authentic in most cases. The three series follow in chronological sequence without overlapping. Until about 1245, the crusader dirhams are homogeneous as any given time, without sub-varieties, indicating production from a single mint. It seems plausible, therefore, that the dirhams were produced either by an official mint or with official authorization. Since the third series (that with Christian inscriptions) bears the mint-name ‘Akka (Acre), it seems plausible that this was the mint for all the crusader dirhams. In sum, the dirhams, like the crusader gold bezants, seem to have been an officially sanctioned coinage of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The economic role of the dirhams, however, was different from that of the bezants. The bezant, as argued previously, was intended as a

¹⁰⁶ Mauclerc, Coinage of the Crusaders, p. 29, lists two additional series as possible crusader dirhams, possibly as the suggestion of Mr. Stephen Alcock. It should be made clear that series A and D on that page were not misidentified as such by Bessar, “Thirteenth Century Crusader Imitations,” although Mauclerc’s note 8 on page 28 might seem to imply otherwise. No evidence has been presented for the attribution of these two series to the crusaders, or even for the existence of Mauclerc’s series D.
separate currency from the Fatimid dinars it imitated. The crusader dirhams, in contrast, were clearly intended to circulate along with Ayyubid dirhams. The imitations, until about 1245, are visually indistinguishable from their prototypes except by their anomalous dates, which in any case are often not visible because of irregularities of striking. When the date is illegible, it is impossible today to identify any single dirham by itself as an imitation or a prototype; it must have been impossible for contemporaries as well. Unlike the bezants, these dirhams are found in hoards mixed with authentic Moslem issues. 106

There is nothing deceptive or fraudulent in this close similarity. Ayyubid dirhams from different mints, with different designs and inscriptions, circulated indiscriminately together, if board evidence is to be believed, and mixed with these are found also dirhams of another dynasty, the Artuqids, with designs like those of the Ayyubids but with clear inscriptive indication of their origin. Since any dirham with one of the few Ayyubid designs seems to have been accepted at parity, it was rational for the crusaders also to issue their version of this standard coinage. By doing so they could convert silver into coinage without the disadvantage of having to transport it to a Moslem mint and pay mint charges to Moslems. Although the system by which the crusaders regulated the weight of their dirhams was different from the Moslem system, and their average weight was slightly lower, the silver content of a typical crusader dirham was roughly the same as that of the Moslem issues. The only element of deception was the use of Moslem designs and inscriptions to ensure acceptance of the coins. Had the crusaders used distinctive designs, or even the same design with overtly Christian inscriptions, the coins would probably have been treated as a separate currency by Moslems and not accepted at parity. This consideration perhaps explains why the last crusader dirham series, issued with crosses and Christian inscriptions in conformity with the letter of pope Innocent, was short-lived and soon replaced by a revival of the imitative coinage, slightly modified to comply with the papal injunction while passing unrecognized by the Moslems.

The first series of crusader dirhams, as far as is now known, were imitations of the coinage of az-Zahir Ghazi, son of Saladin and ruler of Aleppo from 1186 until his death in 1216. The specific prototype was struck from 598 to 613 (1201–1216, pl. XIV, no. 21). It has the bezagram or "seal of Solomon" design which was standard at Aleppo.

with the main inscriptions framed on a six-pointed star enclosed in a circle. Az-Zahir’s name and titles are in the star on one side of the coin, and those of his overlords, the Ayyubid sultan al-‘Adil and the ‘Abd al-Malik caliph an-Nasir, are on the other. The mint name and date are on the side with az-Zahir’s name in the six small triangular segments between the points of the star and the circle, and the Mameluke declaration of faith is on the other side in the same location. 107 The coinage included smaller half dirhams as well. These include half dirhams with the same hexagram design but with abbreviated versions of the titles of az-Zahir and an-Nasir on the two sides, without al-‘Adil’s name, and also halves struck with full-dirham dies.

Crusader imitations of both dirhams and half dirhams are known, differing from the prototype only in bearing dates after 613 (1216; pl. XVI, nos. 47–48). Every year from 614 to 630 (1217–1233) is represented, and also the year 638 (1240/1). 108 These coins have the mint name “Halab” (Aleppo) and the names of az-Zahir, who died in 1216, al-‘Adil, who died in 1218, and the caliph an-Nasir, who died in 1225. Meanwhile, Aleppo itself produced normal dirhams covering the same span of years bearing the names of az-Zahir’s successors al-Aziz (1216–1236) and an-Nasir (1236–1260), along with the appropriate names of their overlords and the caliph. 109 It is impossible, therefore, that the dirhams with az-Zahir’s name and dates after 613 could have been issues of the Aleppo mint, or official issues of any Mameluke mint.

Their anachronistic dates are the principal basis for the attribution of the posthumous Aleppo dirhams to the crusaders, by analogy with the subsequent crusader issue imitating Damascus dirhams, which also has impossible dates along with, on some examples, small crosses as definitive proof of Christian origin, but the dates are not the only evidence. Further support is provided by statistical study of their meteorology and metal content. The data on which this study was based are as yet unpublished, but can be summarized here. Numismatists determine the weight standard of a coinage issue by the frequency-distribution method, which consists essentially of dividing the weight range of known examples into equal intervals (usually 0.05 gram) and counting the number of coins in each interval. The resulting series can be set out in tabular form or graphed. This technique indicates the mode, that is, the interval including most coins, which is the safest indicator of the mint’s intended weight standard. The distribution of weights also

108. Ibid., nos. 629–654, lists representative specimens of each date.
provides evidence as to the means by which the weights of individual coins were controlled by the mint. The result of such studies on genuine Ayyubid dirhams is always the same: if the number of specimens is sufficient; the number of coins in each interval increases gradually as the weight increases, up to the modal weight range, and then drops off sharply. In other words, there are many coins with less than the modal weight, the presumed weight standard of the mint, and few coins with more. This distribution, which produces an asymmetrical ("skewed") graph, is an indication that the weight of coins was controlled individually by the mint, or else that people culled the coins that they found in circulation. Overweight coins were trimmed down to standard, or remelted and restruck, while underweight coins were allowed to be issued.

Similar studies of the crusader dirhams that imitate Ayyubid issues of Damascus, the attribution of which is certain, produce a different distribution: the graph, depending on the number of specimens in the sample, approaches the shape of the classical bell-shaped curve, with nearly equal numbers of coins above and below the modal interval. This curve is characteristic of mint regulation of weight in mass, with a certain number of coins per weight unit (pound or mark of silver) regardless of the weight of individual specimens. The contrast between the Ayyubid and the crusader dirhams, given that they often circulated together, allows us to deduce that the heavy coins were removed by the mint before entering circulation. In the specific instance at hand, the weight distribution of the dirhams of az-Zahir's lifetime and those of his son al-Aziz both conform to the lightly skewed curve of other Ayyubid dirhams, while the distribution of the weights of the posthumously dated dirhams is quite symmetrical, as on the other dirham issues of the crusaders. The quantitative results of the two studies show that the standard in az-Zahir's lifetime was 2.95-3.00 grams, while the imitations (considering only those up to 630) were issued at an average weight of about 2.83 grams.

As to fineness, 110 analyses of eighteen dirhams of az-Zahir Ghazi and seven of his son al-Aziz Muhammad show that, between the Moslem years A.H. 600 and 625, the standard of fineness at the Aleppo mint was maintained at a very high level, with none of the coins below 97.2 percent silver; sixteen of the twenty-five imitations analyzed were below this figure, ranging in all from 98.6 down to 94.2 percent until

110. The analyses discussed here and throughout this section were made by Professor Adam A. Gordon of the University of Michigan Department of Chemistry, by atomic absorption analysis of artworks. Professor Gordon is not responsible for any of the general interpretations of his data.
626, and between 90.5 and 95.5 percent from 628 to 638. This difference does not prove, in itself, that the imitations were produced by the crusaders, but it makes it unlikely that they were issues of the Aleppo mint. Moreover, this difference in fineness is the clue to the precise beginning of the imitations. One might expect at first that the imitations began during az-Zahir’s lifetime, but judging by the consistent and tightly controlled fineness of the dirhams issued in his lifetime, compared to the lower fineness of the posthumous dirhams, this is not the case—except for the year of his death, 613. Five dirhams of that year were analyzed, of which four were struck with the same dies (proof of origin from the same mint); their fineness range, from 93.6 to 97.4 percent silver, is decidedly lower than that of the preceding dirhams of az-Zahir and the subsequent dirhams of al’Aziz, while at the same time congruent with the range of the posthumous dirhams. It would seem, therefore, that all five coins are imitations; these represent the entire holdings of the ANS for the year 613.

One may conclude that the imitation dirhams began to be struck in precisely the year that az-Zahir died, 613 (1216). 111 In this date lies the clue to the possible reason for the beginning of the imitative coinage. In the early years of the thirteenth century az-Zahir was in alliance with the crusaders, specifically with the counts of Tripoli, Bohemond III and IV. Among his various agreements was a treaty with Venice in 604 (1207/8) which provided that Venetian merchants could have access to the mint at Aleppo to have coins struck from any silver bullion they might bring to the city. 112 This was probably the most convenient and cheapest access to a dirham mint available to the Franks at the time. Indeed, the existence of this clause in the treaty implies that without treaty rights, the Franks had no direct access to Moslem

111 It is not impossible that authentic dirhams of az-Zahir of 613 will be found (he died nearly at the end of that year), but they will be identifiable only by their higher silver fineness, and thus only insecurely because the range of fineness of the two coinages overlaps somewhat.

112. Wilhelm Hoyt, “Ueber die angeblichen Silberstucke der Venetianer in Acon, Tyrun, und Tripolis,” Numismatische Zeitschrift, XI (1979), 239, in the main discussion of this clause of the treaty; see also Irwin, “Supply,” p. 89. Hoyt, whose article in a somewhat obscure publication has been widely ignored, demolishes the assumption that this treaty and others like it gave the Franks the right to operate monies. From this treaty, and another with the king of Cilician Armenia, that gave the Venetians the right to strike coins on the same terms as they did in Acre, Schmittbogen (Monumenta gen d’Occident turc, pp. 137–138) argued that the Venetians not only operated monies in various localities and Armenia itself, but operated the mint in Acre that struck the imitative coinages, both gold and silver. Hoyt demonstrates that those treaties gave the Venetians only the valuable right to make gold or silver at the local mint to be struck into local coinage on imperial terms; otherwise, their bullion would have had to be sold to middlemen. The treaty with az-Zahir, for example, specifies a charge of 5 percent.
munts, leavint them with the alternative of selling bullion for what it would bring to dirhams in the marketplace.

Relations between az-Zahir and the crusaders began to cool in his later years, and the alliance with Tripoli was definitely ended at his death in 1216. Probably the arrangement with the Venetians also terminated at this time. It seems entirely possible that the Venetians, or other crusaders, had become familiar with the dirhams they had been obtaining from the Aleppo mint and decided to begin making their own. It was proposed above, because of the continuity of this series of imitations with the later ones culminating in an issue with the mint-name Acre, that all these imitations should be regarded as issues of the mint there of the kingdom of Jerusalem. If so, it would seem that the Venetian privileges at the mint of Aleppo from 1207 to 1216 had a wide monetary impact for all the crusader states, sufficient to induce the royal mint to take up production of these coins after the termination of the agreement, or that the Venetians depended on these coins to the extent that they insisted on their minting in Acre. Alternatively, however, it must be admitted that the possibility of a north Syrian mint such as Tripoli for the Aleppo imitations is attractive. It cannot be excluded that these dirhams may not be directly connected with the imitations of Damascus coinage that followed them so closely in time.

The first period of issue of Aleppo imitations extended, then, from 613 to 630 (1216-1233). Toward the end of this span of years, in 628 and 629, the fineness of these dirhams had begun to decline, judging by one specimen from each of those years with 90.6 and 93.0 percent silver respectively. The last year of minting in 630 is also the beginning of a general dearth of Modern dirhams until 637, suggesting that silver had become scarce in those years throughout Syria. In 638 (1240/1), however, imitations of Aleppo dirhams appear again, still with the same design and inscriptions (pl. XVI, no. 49). The occasion for this reappearance is suggested by a comparison of the metal content of these imitations with that of the coinage of Damascus in the same year. A feature of silver coins in the pre-modern era is the presence of small amounts of gold, ranging sometimes to more than 1 percent. This occurs because gold is a normal trace element in silver ore, but usually in amounts not detectable by medieval technology. Because it is chemically similar to silver, it is not removed by the refining process. As a

113 Such clauses were frequent in session between Franks and Muslims: see Irwin, loc. cit and Hoye, passim.
result, coins that come from a single source of silver will have a small but consistent amount of gold as an impurity. This may indicate that the coins in question were all made from ore from a single mine or ore vein, but it is of course also true that coins from the same batch of melted silver will have approximately the same level of gold content, even if that silver came from disparate sources. Four Aleppo imitations and nine dirhams of Damascus have been analyzed, and all fell into the same narrow range of gold impurity level, from 0.29 to 0.36 percent for the imitations and 0.26 to 0.36 for the Damascene coins. In no other instance was there such a close correspondence between crusader and Moslem coins. In fact, the range of gold impurity for Syrian dirhams in the Ayyubid era is normally quite wide, ranging from 0.30 to 1.20 percent, with issues of every mint spread throughout this range. This diversity is not surprising, as Syria has no native source of silver and must have imported its bullion from a variety of sources. In this context, the similarity of the imitations and the coinage of Damascus in 638 is remarkable.

There is an obvious historical explanation for this phenomenon: in early 638 (July-August 1240) as-Salih Isma‘īl, the Ayyubid ruler of Damascus, entered into an alliance with the crusaders, which continued in force for a few months only. Under the terms of the treaty, the crusaders were permitted to come to Damascus to buy arms and supplies. It seems likely that it was specifically to provide funds for this “shopping expedition” that the minting of Aleppo imitations was revived, and it would seem furthermore that the bulk of the silver brought to the mint at Damascus in this year was made up of those crusader dirhams. The fineness of the imitations, ranging from 90.5 to 95.5 percent silver, is no worse than that of the coinage of Damascus itself in the same year, from 89.5 to 96.5 percent, but one can imagine that the imitation dirhams, by this time obsolete in type, were discriminated against by the Damascenes, who converted them as rapidly as possible into current coin (possibly the crusaders themselves were allowed to bring silver to the Damascus mint, although this is not explicitly stated).

The second series of crusader Arabic dirhams imitates the Damascus issue begun by as-Salih Isma‘īl in the year of his first alliance with

the crusaders (pl. XIII, no. 19). Both prototype and imitation have the main inscriptions on a square enclosed in a circle at the rim of the coin. One side has the name and titles of as-Salih in the square, with the mint city and the date in the four segments between the square and outer circle. The other side has the name and titles of the caliph al-Mustansir in the square and the Moslem profession of faith in the segments. This issue was struck from 631 (1240/1) until 640 (1242), when al-Mustansir died. As normal in Syria, the issue was accompanied by half dirhams of the same pattern, struck with special half-dirham dies with abbreviated inscriptions or with full-dirham dies.\(^{116}\)

The crusader imitations of this issue closely reproduce the central inscriptions of the prototype, but vary in one way or another in their marginal inscriptions. On the basis of these variations the imitations can be classified into six types, which should be regarded as separate issues and will be discussed individually. Since the distinguishing inscriptions are small and at the edge of the coins, they are easily effaced by carelessness in striking, which was usual at both the crusader and the Moslem mints, and when this happens it is impossible to distinguish visually an imitation from the prototype. Even when visible, the distinguishing characteristics of the imitations are inconspicuous, and were probably not noticed by the people who used these coins. The modern numismatist who knows what to look for can sort out a few imitations and a few authentic prototypes from any large groups of coins of this type, but the rest can be identified as crusader or Moslem only by close comparison of unidentified coins to establish the identities. The majority of known specimens of the

\(^{116}\) All those are listed in Boleyn, Almohads, nos. 401–407, along with dirhams of 635 and 637, but it is thought that these earlier coins really exist, because of the intrusion of crusader imitations into the corpus of dirhams ascribed to as-Salih (see the listing in Boleyn, "Crusader Imitations," p. 403, at least two of the specimens in this list are ascribed by Boleyn as genuine), and because of the similarity of the numerals "635" and "637" as written on these coins. Although as-Salih was ruler of Damascus the same months in 635, it is probable that he, like his brother al-Ashraf Mihd before him, acknowledged al-Kamil as overlord on coins, even though al-Kamil did not recognize his accession, invested the city, and took it from him. No Arabic source mentions that as-Salih issued coins in his own name, and must be thus ho, whereby openly rebelling against al-Kamil, it is unlikely that the coins would have come to terms as they did (Humphreys, op. cit., pp. 232–237). When as-Salih came to power in Damascus again in 637, he acknowledged al-Ashraf IX of Egypt as overlord and at specifically asked to keep his name on the coins (Humphreys, op. cit., pp. 257–258). It is unlikely that as-Salih began issuing coins with his own name until after the overthrow of al-Ashraf IX and the massacre of his enemy as-Salih Ayub on the eighth day of the last month of 637 (Humphreys, op. cit., p. 264). Allowing some time for the news to reach Damascus and for as-Salih himself to decide on a policy, it becomes unlikely that coins in his name began before 638. At least one of Boleyn’s examples for 635, the British Museum specimen, is a crusader nomisma and the readings of the other two have yet to be confirmed. The same Boleyn assigned to 637 would just as well be 639.
sader imitations have been identified and classified through die identifications with fully legible examples.

Type I (pl. XVII, no. 50): this is by far the largest issue among the Damascus imitations, comprising about 65 percent of all identified specimens.381 Dirhams of this type are identical in every respect to the prototype, including the mint identification Dimashq, "Damascus", but they have the dates 641, 644, and perhaps 647,382 which are all after the death of the caliph al-Mustanṣur named on them, at the same time the Damascus mint produced dirhams with the name of his successor. This anachronism is odd, but does not in itself prove a crusader origin for these coins. There are numerous instances of such anachronisms resulting from modern mints from the accidental combination of old and new dies ("muling"), although these are mostly isolated single coins. In the case of the al-Salih imitations of Type I, however, there are hundreds of examples. The attribution to the crusaders is further supported by analogy with other types that have clear indications of Christian origin, by a high incidence of barbarity or illiteracy in the marginal inscriptions, and by metrological and metallurgical differences from the prototype. There are also analogous half dirhams, like the prototype half dirhams.

The various dates of Type I are closely linked by shared dies for the undated side of the coin, suggesting that minting was more or less continuous throughout the years 641 to 644 or 647 (1243–1247 or 1243–1250).383 The dates then might sometimes be fictitious, but it seems obvious that 644 (1243/4) would not be the earliest year found on the imitations if it was not in fact the first year of issue. The reasonable supposition that imitations might have begun while the prototype was still being issued, and thus be indistinguishable by date from the prototypes, is simply not supported by the die evidence, for nearly all the

117. Judging by the number of specimens recorded by Basset, "Crusader Imitations," p. 404 The number of surviving specimens today is largely a result of hoard finds, a single find of a large hoard including a particular issue can change the proportion of overprints. Nevertheless, the number of dies reported for the different types of the Damascus imitations is proportional in most cases to the number of existing specimens, suggesting that the number of surviving coins is roughly proportional to the original size of the issue. The exception is Type V, with a much higher proportion of dies to number of specimens than the others, indicating that this issue may have been larger than its representation in 1974 would indicate.

118. Louther, op. cit., p. 183, read the dates 642, 643, 642, and 643 as well, but these readings are rejected by Basset, op. cit., pp. 406–407, where the questions involved are discussed in full. The dates 641 and 644 are clear and generally accepted by all scholars. The curvilinear script makes the reading 647 speculative.

119. This conclusion lends support to the dates suggested by Louther, but unfortunately all the coins on which he reads these dates have some clearly legible die duplicates that disprove his readings.
coins of this type with dates of 640 and before are interlinked by the use of a small number of obverse and reverse dies, and none of them as yet can be linked to any of the coins with posthumous dates. Moreover, there are metallurgical differences between the coins dated 640 and earlier, as a group, and those dated 641 and after. It would seem, therefore, that as in the case of the Aleppo imitations, the issuers of the Damascus imitations deliberately selected an obsolete prototype. It is not obvious why this particular prototype was chosen, but there may be some connection with the renewed alliance between as-Salih and the Franks of Acre in spring 1244 (late 641).120

The date 647, if it is rightly read, has support from historical circumstances as the terminal date for Type I (and for the first phase of issue of all the Damascus imitations), because it was in late 647 (spring 1250) that bishop Odo of Châteauroux arrived in Syria to find the Franks striking coins bearing the names of Moslem rulers and Moslem religious inscriptions. There are no crusader coins with Moslem dates after 647, or any with the Christian year 1250, suggesting that Odo’s intervention put a stop to all minting for a time.

Types II, III, and IV: all three of these types are known only in small quantities (6, 8, and 2 respectively were known in 1974121). Their economic importance is therefore slight, but they are of interest because their marked divergences from the common Type I issue and the absence of any die links between any of these types raise the possibility that they were issued at different times (which might mean only different workshops in the same city). Type II (pl. XVII, no. 51), which seems to be dated 643 (1245/6, a very problematic reading), differs from Type I only in having differently arranged and very barbarous marginal inscriptions.

Type III (pl. XVII, no. 52) is more interesting. The date 643 on it is almost certain, and the dirhams of this type are characterized by the presence of inconspicuous crosses in the margins. All known die varieties have a cross in the topmost segment of the side with the date, between the two Arabic words for “in the name of” and “God” that precede the statement of place and date of minting. On the other side, all have also an interesting modification of the name of the Moslem prophet in the marginal inscription “Mohammed is the messenger of God.” As modified, the only possible reading of the name is Mikha’il, the Arabic equivalent of the name Michael. Did the die cutters, or

120 Humphreys, op. cit., p. 274; Steven Faraoni, “The Crusader Sestertius, 1243-1291,” in volume II of the present work, p. 548; Gibb, op. cit., p. 305.
their superintendents, really intend to say that "Michael is the messenger of God"? Could this refer to the archangel Michael? Since on some of these coins the name *Mkhl* (which is written in two separate letter groups in Arabic) is divided by a small cross, it would seem likely that the engravers knew what they were doing. Even before Odo, it seems, some Christians were uncomfortable with a coinage that completely aped Moslem practice, or perhaps the date is fictitious and the type to be assigned to the period after the papal interdiction of Moslem inscriptions. This series also was accompanied by an analogous half-dirham issue (pl. XVII, no. 53).

Type IV (pl. XVII, no. 54) is quite anomalous, as the only imitation with modified central inscriptions, shortening one of al-Salih's titles from *'Imad-ad-Dīn wa-d-Dīn* (pillar of society and religion) to *'Imad-ad-Dīn*, a common and perfectly legitimate elision among Moslems. The date is apparently to be read 644 (1246/7). Given that only two examples are known, it is only analogy that supports the attribution of this issue to the crusaders, but unless the date is fictitious, it suggests the existence of a third mint in addition to the main Type I mint.

Types V and VI come after an intervening issue with Christian inscriptions, making it appropriate to postpone their discussion.

Bishop Odo's intervention led to the introduction of a third crusader dirham series with overtly Christian inscriptions and with crosses, corresponding to the similar issue in gold of 1251–1252 described in the previous section of this chapter. The silver coinage had a much shorter life span, limited to 1251 only.121 The relative success of the new bezants as compared to the dirhams may be explained by the different monetary roles of the two currencies. The bezants, which imitated obsolete Fatimid coins, were unlike any contemporary issue and were well known to Moslems as Frankish in origin. The new bezants, therefore, may well have been equally acceptable despite their overtly Christian symbols. The imitative crusader dirhams, however, closely resembled current Moslem coins and were evidently meant to circulate indiscriminately with them (as they successfully did, if heard evidence is to be believed). The new crusader dirhams with Christian inscriptions and crosses could not pass as ordinary Moslem coins, resulting in their rejection by Moslems, or at least in their being discounted against current Moslem dirhams.

Balog and Yvon list thirteen varieties of Christian dirhams and four

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121. A dirham of 1251 and another of 1252 have been mentioned in print, but these readings cannot be accepted (ibid., p. 400). The numeral inscriptions of these coins are curiously engraved and often poorly impressed, making it easy to be misled in reading them.
varieties of the accompanying half dirhams, 123 but the principal division is into three groups: those with a central cross on one side surrounded by a circle, those with a central cross but no circle, and those without a cross (pl. XVII, nos. 55–58). All these bear the same Arabic inscriptions, which are mostly different from those on the bezants. The design is the same as that of the second series of Damascus imitations, with central inscriptions in a square surrounded by a circle and subsidiary inscriptions in the spaces between the square and the circle, a very common type for thirteenth-century Syrian dirhams. On the side designated by Balog and Yvon as the obverse, the inscription in the margin states the place and date of issue: “struck in Acre in the year one thousand two hundred, one and fifty, of the Incarnation (of the Messiah)” (some varieties omit the words in parentheses). The central inscription on this side is not found on the bezants: “one God, one faith, one baptism.” On the other side, the central inscription proclaims “Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: one godhead”; 124 and the marginal inscription states “His is the glory forever and ever, amen amen.” 125 The half dirhams omit the obverse central inscription as well as the mint date formula; instead the reverse central inscription is divided between the two sides and the reverse marginal inscription is repeated on both margins (pl. XVII, no. 58). In addition to these inscriptions and the crosses, these coins are extensively ornamented with a variety of fleurs-de-lys, small emblems, arabesques, and discripical marks drawn from the repertoires of both Moslem and Christian craftsmen.

Presumably because these dirhams were not readily accepted by Moslems, the crusader mint revived the issue of imitations of as-Salih Isma‘il’s coinage of Damascus, but with some modifications. It is probably no coincidence that one type of these renewed imitations bears the date 1253, when Innocent’s letter arrived in Syria; taken literally, it forbade only the emission of coins with the name of Mohammed and his “birth date” (the Moslem year), and thereby opened the way to revival of imitative coins without the objectionable features. These are classified as Types V and VI of the second series. Both replace the Moslem profession of faith in the margin with the simple statement “in the name of God the merciful, the compassionate”, a very common Moslem formula but one to which no monotheist could object. Type V (pl. XVII, no. 59) has the Christian date “one thousand and

124 As with the corresponding gold issue, the Arabic word alsh, “godhead”, has been falsely corrected by previous cataloguers to Allah, see note 75 above.
125 This inscription also has previously been mistranslated; the first word is not Allah, which would result in the meaning “God is the glory”, but simply alsh, “To Him is the glory.”
two hundred and three and fifty", but with the fictitious mint name Damascus, while Type VI (pl. XVII, no. 60) reverts to the original Moslem year of the Damascus imitations, 641. Despite this latter date, Type VI clearly belongs to the same period as Type V, not only because of the shared religious formula but also because of similarities of style in the engraving of the marginal inscriptions on both sides of the coins. Possibly the date 641 was acceptable because it was fictitious, or possibly no one cared enough to enforce the papal injunction on this point. Because there are no die links between the two types, the possibility of two separate mints or workshops is raised again, but the similarity of the types indicates that there was no great distance between their places of manufacture. One would even say that the same die engravers were at work. It is also possible that the dirhams dated 641 came after those dated 1253, and continued to be struck for a while, perhaps until the end of the Christian bezants in 1258, or even later.

In weight standard and fineness, the Damascus-type crusader dirhams were lower than their prototype, the coins of Damascus 1239-1242, but about equal to contemporary issues of Damascus and Aleppo after 1243. The general pattern for all three of these mints (Damascus, Aleppo, and the crusader mint) is similar: weight and fineness decline in the 640's (1242-1252) and decline further after 650 (1252/3). For Damascus, 637-640, the weight standard indicated by the mode is about 2.90-2.95 grams, while for the first large crusader issue, Type I, it is about 2.80-2.85, but the two coupages are closer in average weight, at 2.87 and 2.83 grams respectively. Moreover, the modal weight of the issues of Damascus, 641-647, the same Moslem years as Type I, is 2.85-2.90, much nearer to the crusader standard. In fineness, the crusader Type I coins range from 79.6 to 94.2 percent silver, while the prototypes range from 84.9 to 96.5 and the counage of Damascus in the same years at the crusader issue ranges from 78.6 to 96.7 percent. The crusader dirhams with Christian inscriptions are higher in fineness than the close imitations, ranging from 85.8 to 96.9 percent, but the subsequent imitations, Types V and VI, return to the range of Type I, from 79.5 to 91.9 percent, with only one coin out of twenty above 90 percent. Similarly at Damascus, the four analyzed dirhams after 650 (1252/3) range only from 73.1 to 80.2 percent, while at Aleppo in the same era the range is from 74.4 to 83.2.

Several features of these data are remarkable: the wide range in fineness among all these dirhams, the apparent general decline, and the close correspondence of issues at the three major Syrian mints. Since all these coins are found mixed together in hoards, contemporaries must have ignored the differences between individual coins, but
it would seem likely that the value of all these dirhams was discounted to compensate for the unreliability of weight and fineness. By 1260 the monetary situation had reached a crisis. According to Abu-Shamah, Damascus was flooded with Frankish dirhams reported to contain only 15 percent silver, and the danger that these dirhams would be suppressed caused everyone to spend them as quickly as possible, which made prices rise to extraordinary levels. At the end of the year these dirhams were prohibited and exchanged for current Damascus coin, but at a considerable discount. According to the manuscripts of Abu-Shamah’s history, these dirhams were known as daffiyah or dafiyah, a word which is not understood but which must be a name denoting the origin of the coins, either by place or by issuing authority. It has been emended more than once to yafiyah, “Jaffa”, but it hardly seems likely that a place so small as Jaffa, and so far away, could have emitted enough dirhams to flood the market in Damascus.

The only Frankish silver coins of the time were the Arabile imitations and the Frankish pennies, which might have been called dirhams by the Moslems. It seems improbable that the pennies would have circulated to any extent among Moslems, but as far as is now known, the imitations never dropped so low as 15 percent silver. On the other hand, no crusader imitations of about 1260 have been analyzed, or even identified as such. Type VI, which was attributed above to about the same period as Type V, dated 1253, might still have been issued as late as 1260. The lowest fineness of the eight Type VI dirhams analyzed was 75.6 percent, but all these specimens came from a hoard datable to about 1255, before the time of which Abu-Shamah writes. At present, the identity of the dafiyah dirhams remains a mystery.

At the least, Abu-Shamah’s passage is evidence that crusader dirhams were still being issued as late as 1260, that by that time they had an important role in the monetary economy of Damascus (if not all of Moslem Syria), and that the Moslems were aware that these coins came from the Franks but used them anyway. The importance of the crusader dirhams is not surprising. A preliminary die study of the crusader issues has counted so far 94 obverse and 110 reverse dies for the imitations of Aleppo dirhams, and 142 obverse and 142 reverse dies for the Damascus imitations. The current consensus among numisma-


127 The passage and its analogues in other Arab texts are discussed in more detail by Irwin, op. cit., pp. 94-95. Also a mystery are the Baqti dirhams of 1260 mentioned by a historian cited by Irwin.
tists estimates a possible production for a single die of ten to twenty thousand coins, suggesting at least one to two million Aleppo imitations and about 1,400,000 to 2,800,000 Damascus-type dirhams. These are conservative estimates, because it is likely that many dies remain to be discovered, and the number of dies does not include those for the half dirhams of each series. Also, the dies of the dirhams with Christian inscriptions have not been studied and counted. Assuming an average weight of about 2.6 grams, and an average fineness of 95 percent for the Aleppo coins, the silver content of the Aleppo imitations would amount to about 2.5 to 5 metric tons, while for the Damascus coins, with the same average weight but an average fineness of only 85 percent, the total issue would be about 3.4 to 6.8 metric tons of silver.

These figures should not be taken with great seriousness, considering the many assumptions that went into their calculation, but it seems safe to say that at least five to ten metric tons of silver went into the making of the crusader Arabic dirhams. This silver did not come from Syria, which has no mines. Some of it might have come from Anatolia, imported by the crusaders through Cilician Armenia, and some might also have come from Byzantine territory, but it seems reasonable to deduce that the bulk of this silver came from western Europe. There is direct evidence for movement of silver from Europe to Syria in the form of coins found in the latter region, and indirect evidence to the existence of special taxes collected in many European countries for the support of the crusaders and in documents referring to the export of silver. It does not necessarily follow that all the silver that supplied the thirteenth-century Islamic revival of silver currency came from Europe, but it does seem clear that the crusader imitations of Ayyubid silver currency must have contributed substantially to the stock of silver in Medieval Syria.

There are in addition a few other crusader Arabic coins that can only be mentioned here. These exist in only one or two specimens, and have not been studied beyond their first publication by Balog and Yvon. Two examples are known of an issue of bilbon, BY 49, which has on one side an equal-armed bared cross with small wedge-shaped figures, described as crosses, in the four quadrants, and on the other side an Arabic inscription that has been read durhu bi-Quds, "struck in Jerusalem". The reading is not entirely certain, but the language of the inscription together with the cross is perhaps sufficient evidence

for the attribution of these two little coins to the crusaders; they might have been tokens of some sort rather than true coins. Somewhat similar is a unique copper coin, BY 50, with an equal-armed cross, the branches ending in fleurs-de-lys, and on the other side an Arabic inscription read as "struck in Acre". Again, the reading is not completely satisfactory. One further copper, BY 51, has been struck with dinar dies; it is probably a counterfeit.
LIST OF COINS ILLUSTRATED

All coins are in the cabinet of the American Numismatic Society, and are its property except as noted: UM = University Museum, Philadelphia, HSA = Hispanic Society of America, New York City.

THE ISLAMIC CONTEXT

2. Madinat as-Salam (Baghdad), 613 (1216/7), dinar. 1002.1.455(UM).
3. Miṣr (al-Fustâj), 438 (1046/7), dinar. 1002.1.925(UM).
5. Miṣr, 482 (1089/90), dinar. 1002.1.961(UM).
7. al-Mu‘izzliyah al-Qāhirah (Cairo), 565 (1169/70), dinar. 1002.1.1024(UM).
8. al-Qāhirah (Cairo), 571 (1175/6), dinar. 1002.1.1028(UM).
10. al-Iskandariyah, 662 (1262/3), dinar. 1002.1.1(UM).
12. Dimashq (Damascus), 531 (1136/7), dinar. 1969.98.1.
14. (Egypt, 1097–1101), dirham. 1953.48.3.
15. Miṣr, 556 (1160/1), dirham. 1965.9.1.
16. (Egypt, 1180–1193), dirham. 1917.615.1329
17. (Damascus, 1113–1115), dirham. 1936.72.1.
20. Ḥalab (Aleppo), 572 (1176/7), dirham. 1951.108.4
21. Ḥalab, 602 (1205/6), dirham. 1931.1.6.
22. al-Qāhirah, 586 (1190/1), dirham. 1917.615.1328.
24. (Syria [Aleppo?], 1095–1113), fals. 1967.249.3.
27. (Damascus, 1146-1174), fals. 1971.89.41.
28. (Sivas, 1134-1142), fals. 1002.1.411(UM).
29. al-Jazirah (Mosul?), 575 (1179/80), fals. 1002.1.663(UM).

CRUSADER ARABIC GOLD

30. BY 26, small flan; GM 7. 1969.78.1.
31. BY 26, large flan; GM 1. 1933.45.3.
32. BY 25; GM 17. 1969.78.2.
33. BY 27d; GM 43. 1957.114.19.
34. BY 21; GM 83. 1924.69.16.
35. BY 23-24; GM 94. 1969.78.4.
36. BY 27e; GM III. 1950.70.2.
37. BY 40; GM 133. 1917.215.627.
38. Agnus Dei; GM 183. 1952.115.4.
39. BY 2, variant; GM 9. 1965.87.4.
40. BY 2. 1962.125.6.
41. BY 12. 1978.64.644.
42. BY 15; GM 170. 1901.57.4533(HSA).
43. Yemeni type, GM 105. 1957.114.2.
44. bilingual fragment. 1981.36.1.
45. BY 1; GM 8. 1900.199.14974.

CRUSADER ARABIC SILVER

47. "Halab", 619 (1222), dirham. 1972.75.16.
53. "Dimashq", [643 (1245/6)], half dirham. Bates half dirham Type II. 1971.76.334.
55. 'Akkā, 1251, dirham. BY 42. 1925.163.2.
56. 'Akkā, 1251, dirham. BY 45. 1954.121.1.
58. ‘Akkā, 1251, half dirham. By 44a. 1942.23 1152.
XIII. Islamic gold and silver coinage
XIV. Islamic silver and copper coinage

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XVII. Crusader silver coinage
This gazetteer has been prepared to fill a variety of functions. Every relevant place-name found in the text or on the maps is here alphabetized and identified, variant spellings and equivalent names in other languages are supplied, and the map location is indicated. Thus it not only serves as an index to the maps and a supplement to them, but is itself a source for reference on matters of historical geography and changing nomenclature.

In the gazetteer, alphabetization is by the first capital letter of the form used in maps and text, disregarding such lower-case prefixes as al- and such geographical words as Cape, Gulf, Lake, Mount, and the like. The designation "classical" may mean Greek, Latin, biblical, or other ancient usage, and the designation "medieval" generally means that the name in question was in common use among speakers of various languages during the crusades, or appears in contemporary sources.

On the maps may be found nearly every place name occurring in the text of this volume or of volume V, since the same maps appear in both volumes. Exceptions include a few places whose exact locations are unknown, a few outside the regions mapped, several in areas overcrowded with names, and some of minimal importance or common knowledge.

All maps for this volume have been designed and prepared in the University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory under the direction of Onno Brouwer, assisted by David DeBaise. Base information was compiled from U.S.A.F. Jet Navigation Charts at a scale of 1:2,000,000. Historical data have been supplied by Dr. Harry W. Hazard (who also compiled the gazetteer) from such standard works as Sprüner-Menke, Sieber, Andree, and Baedeker for Europe, Lévi-Provençal for Moslem Spain, Rubió i Lluch and Bon for Frankish Greece, and Hornemann, Ducaud, Deschamps, Cahen, and LeStrange for the Near East. Additional information was found in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (old and new editions) and *Islam Anwsklopedie*, in Yāqūt and other Arabic sources, in The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World, on Michelin and Hallweg road maps, and of course in the text of this volume.
Aachen (German), Aux-la-Chapelle (French): city—E 2b5: 2, 3
Abysinian, region—see Ethiopia.
Achaea (Latin), Achāia (classical Greek), Akhaia (modern Greek): district of northern Greece—L 2h2: 4
Acra; Piraeus (classical); Saint Jean d'Acrc (medieval); 'Akka (Arabic); *'Akka (Israel): city, port—L 1l3: 1, 7.
Adana or Sarayla (medieval); Arslan (classical); Antalya (Turkish): port—K 1c4: 1, 3.
Adizes (classical); Arzouma (Armenian), Turkish: city—L 3e3: 1, 6.
Agrigentum (classical); Akko (Arabic); 'Ask (Hebrew): city—N 1l3: 12, 13.
Adriatic Sea; Hadranopolis (classical); Euphrane (Turkish): city—P 2d4: 1, 3, 5.
Adriatic Sea; Hadria or Marc Hadrianum (Latin)—C 1h3: 2, 3, 4.
Aegean Sea; Aegina Pelagos (Greek); Maxi Agesilaus (Latin); Yeg Deeran (Turkish)—I 1e: 1, 3, 4, 5.
Aegium, town—see Vouliagmeni.
Aenas or Arimas (classical); Eneas or Memas (medieval); Elaz (Turkish): town—J 2d5: 3, 5.
Aetolia (Latin); Aetōlia (classical Greek); Aetolia (modern Greek): district of central Greece—L 2b2: 4.
Afghanistan, region, now a nation, east of northern Persia—Q 12c5: 12, 13.
Agoras (Greek): Greek Orthodox monastery—K 1f1: 8.
Agulhers (medieval); Aigaulte or Aiguilhe (French): village just north of La Puy—E 4c5: 2.
Aigues-Mortes—see Aigues Mortes.
Ain Abil (Arabic): well of Godath, Godath or Well of Harod (medieval), 'En Harod (Israel): village—L 1f3: 2.
Aix-la-Chapelle: city—see Aachen.
Akka; Akka (Greek): village—K 1c5: 8.
Akka-Burges; Akka-Burges or Burges (Turkish): village near Kostu-Dere (J 2d5: 5).
Akcha-Limeus; Acka-Limeus (Turkish): port north of Gallipoli (J 2d5: 5).
Akkal or Ahtal (Turkish); Akkal or Khail (Arabic); Klis (Armenian): town—M 3e3: 1.
Akka; 'Akka: city, port—see Acre.
Akkenman (medieval); Velgorov Dnestrovski (Russian): port—K 1d4: 1.
Akuran or Sara-Berke (Tatar): town, now unimportant—N 2c5: 13.
Akkabib; Aqča (Turkish, white city), Philomedi (Latin), Philomèdie (medieval Greek): town—K 2e2: 1, 3.
Alasut; Alamsät (Persian): fortress in Tchad—O 1d4: 12.
Alanya (Turkish), Samsunlives or Cansulives (medieval), Alāya or 'Ālīya (Arabic): town—K 2d4: 1, 3.
Alapchir: town—see Philadelphia.
Alba Fula (Latin), Wessemburg (German), Gyulafehrvar (Hungarian); Alba Iulia (Romanian): town—H 4d3: 3.
Albani (medieval); Shoqëri or Shoqëri (Albanian): region and of Epirus, now a nation—H 1f3: 4.
Albany (Italian); Alarmed (Greek): town, probably fictitious (or error for Elis). 
Albania (Greek): battlefield—H 3c4: 4.
Aleksandrov; Aleksandra (Serbian): town 17 miles southwest of Niš—L 2b2: 3.
Aleppo (Arabic), Bereen or Chalybea (classical), Haleh (Arabic), Haleh (Turkish): city—L 3e4: 1, 6.
Alexandria: town—see Leba.
Alexandrette (medieval); İskenderun (Turkish): port—L 2d4: 6.
Alexandrette, Gulf of, Simon Lensis (classical); İskenderun Körfesi (Turkish)—L 1e4: 6.
Alexandria (classical), al-Iskandaryah (Arabic): city, port—1S14: 1, 3.
Afas (medieval); possibly Ales (formerly Alma), 25 miles NW of Nineus (E5d2: 2).
Alphens (Latin), Alphes (classical Greek), Charon (medieval), Ailiff (modern Greek): river—1E3: 4.
Alp (mountain range)—FGc: 2, 3.
Alance (French), Alanza (Latin), Elasa (German): region west of the upper Rhine—Fe 2, 3.
Alnohugo town—see Ephesus.
Anadu (Italian): port—G5d5: 3.
Anatolia (Latin), Anvar, Alma, or Elma Daği (Turkish): mountain range—1.2d4 6.
Anatolu (Turkish), Anatolus (classical): port—K3d4: 1, 3.
Annyma (Turkish), Anamma (classical): town—1Ma5 1.
Ankawa (classical), Ance or Diyar Bahr (Arabic), Diyarbekir or Diyarbekr (Turkish): town—M13 3.
Ankora (French): city—E3c: 2.
Anadolu-Haux (Turkish): castle of Anatolia; fortress—J5d4: 5.
Anapha, Anaphi (classical Greek), Nasthe (medieval Italian), Anadi (modern Greek): island—I6d4: 5.
Anatolia: Asia Minor (Latin), Romen or Rumi (medieval), Anadolu (Turkish): region south of the Black Sea—JKL3c: 1, 3, 5.
Anahita (Latin), Anillo (medieval), Aktboll (Turkish), Pamoriye (Bulgarian): port—J5d3: 5.
Ancacam (Italian): port—G4d2: 2, 3.
Andalusia, al-Andalus (Arabic), Andalucia (Spanish): region of southern Spain—CBE: 2.
Andreas, Cape, or Cape Saint Andrew; Le Chief (medieval); at top of Cyprus—K5c5 5.
Andrassy (classical), Andros (medieval Italian), Andros (Turkish), Andros (modern Greek): island—1Se5: 3.
Angoulême (French): town—E1c: 2.
Anjou (French): region of SW France—D5c: 2.
Ankara (Turkish), Ançiya (classical), Ancyra (medieval) town, now city—K1af 1, 3.
Antalya: port—see Adalia.
Antioch, Antiochia (classical), Antakya (Arabic): Antakya (Turkish): city—L2e4 1, 6.
Antivari (Italian), Anastasiana (Latin), Bar (Serbian): port—H5d3: 3.
Apulia (classical), Puglia or Puglia (Italian): region of SW Italy—H7d: 3.
Aquitaine (French), Aquitania (classical): region of western France—D6c: 2.
Arbaa (classical), Janira al-Arab (Arabic); peninsula region east of the Red Sea—LMNgh: 1, 6, 7.
Aragon, Aragon (Spanish), Aragón (Italian): region of NW Spain—DEd: 2.
Anat Sea; Aral’skoye More (Russian)—PQc: 12, 13.
Arcadia (classical), Messene (medieval), Akrainidia (modern Greek): district of southern Morea—1E3: 4.
Archipelago (from Greek Amphion Pelagos): islands of the Aegean Sea (Ude: 5).
Athena region—see Thrace, Basta.
Antre (French): town 10 miles NW of Boulogne (E2d5: 2).
Argos; Curruce de Argos (Rumanian): town—1Sc5: 3.
Argos or Argolis (classical), Argolis (modern Greek): district of western Morea—D4e: 4.
Argeia (Greek), Argo (modern Greek): district of western Morea—E3: 4.
Arles (French), Arles (classical): city—E5d2: 2.
Armenia (classical), Hayastan (Armenian), Ermenistan (Turkish): region north of Lake Van—Map: 1
Armenia, Cilicia: Kangalos—Key: 9.
Arzuni: Cape: western tip of Cyprus—Key: 8.
Arzuno: town—see Paphos.
Arzzi: Apollonia-Saracena (classical), Arzzi (medieval), Arzzi (Arabic), Tel Arsha (Israel): town, now abandoned for Herzliyya—Key: 7.
Arta (medieval), Asimaras (classical), Arta (modern Greek), Narda (Turkish): town—Key: 3, 4.
Artaik (Arabic), Arta (classical), Arta (medieval): town, now unimportant—Key: 6.
Artes (French): district of southern France—Key: 2.
Asamala, Asimakowa (biblical), Asagalla (Arabic), Tel Ashqelon (Israel): port, now abandoned for modern Ashqelon—Key: 1, 7.
Asia Minor (classical): region equivalent to western Anatolia.
Asi (Italian), Hasta (classical): town—Key: 2, 3.
Athens, Athina (classical Greek), Ateni or Saron (medieval), Athinai (modern Greek): city—Key: 3, 4.
Athena, duchy—Key: 9.
Asturias, Asturias: castle—see Chaves-Palencia.
Aatos, Mount: Ayaos Creo (modern Greek), Greek Orthodox monastery—Key: 4, 5.
Atlantic Ocean—Key: 2.
Atika (Latin), Atiki (classical Greek), Atiki (modern Greek): district of eastern Greece—Key: 4, 5.
Augusta (French): town 44 miles west of Lissos—Key: 2.
Augusta (German): city—Key: 2, 3.
Austria, Osterreich (German): region west of Bavaria, smaller than modern nation—Key: 2, 3.
Aurignac (French): region of southern France—Key: 2.
Aurunsa (French): town—Key: 2.
Avala or Havala (Serbian): mountain 9 miles south of Belgrade—Key: 5.
Avignon (French), Avano (classical): city—Key: 2.
Avila: Avila (classical), Ávila de los Cantábricos (Spanish): town—Key: 2.
Avraca (medieval), Avesta (classical), Varam (Italian), Viroé or Vlorë (Albanian): port—Key: 3, 4.
Axile: port—see Anchialus.
Ayas (medieval), Lajanese (Italian), Yamartalk (Turkish): port—Key: 6.
Ayasoluk town—see Ephesus.
Ayastac (Turkish): port—Key: 1.
Aydin (Turkish): district of western Anatolia, equivalent to classical Lydia—Key: 5.
Aydinlik (Turkish): port—Key: 5.
Azerbaijan, Aserbaidschan or Aserbaidschan (Persian): region of new Persia and adj.
Transcaucasia—Key: 1.
Azwor port—see Thas.
Azov, Sea of; Azovskoe More (Russian)—Key: 1.
Babylon, Habibola (classical), Rabbiolah (Arabic): town—Key: 6, 7.
Babelon town—see Peshtamal.
Babula, castle—see Sapor.
Bagdad, Bagdad (Arabic): city—Key: 1.
Bagdad town—see Bagdadh.
Balcares (Spanish): island group—Key: 2.
Balkan Mountains—Key: 3, 5.
Balkans: peninsula region east of the Adriatic Sea.

Baikush, Lake—coast 12, 13.

Baltic Sea—Holland: 2, 3.

Bar, port—see Antwerp.

Barbas (French): unidentified town, probably fictitious.

Barbary: the coast of North Africa.

Barbastro (Spanish), Barhashtr (Arabic): town—E3d3: 2.

Barcelona (Spanish), Barcino (classical), Barcino (Arabic): city, port—E3d4: 2.

Bari (Italian), Barana (classical): port—H2d4: 3.

Barletta (Italian): port—H2d4: 3.

Barth port—see Botou.

Basel (German), Basle or Bale (French): city—E3c3: 2, 3.

Bashkent or Kara Hissar (Turkish): battlefield—L5c1: 1.

al-Batran, town—see Botou.

Bavaria, Bayern (German): region of southern Germany—C2: 2, 3.

Beaune (French): district of SW France—D2: 2.

Beaufort: crusader castle—see Bellfort.

Beauvais-sur-Dordogne (French): town and monastery 4½ miles west of Cahors (E3d1: 2).

Beauvais: town—E3c1: 2.

Betanv (Hungarian): town 54 miles SW of Szegedin (T3d4: 3).


Belgorod: Bezhitsa (classical), Bazar (Arabic), Baruth (medieval): port—L1f2: 1, 4, 7.

Beja Pljevlja (Serbian): town—L3d2: 3.

Bellfort or Beauvois (medieval), Bashq Armun or Qara ash-Shaqui (Arabic: fort of the rock): crusader castle—L1f2: 7.

Belgorod-Dnestrovski: port—see Akkerman.


Bellopolis or Belo Polos (medieval): monastery—K4e5: 8.

Benvenuto (Italian), Beneventum (Latin): town—G3d4: 3.

Berat (Albanian), Puleksepolis (classical), Bellagranum (medieval): town—H5d5: 3, 4.

Bergamo (Italian): town 28 miles SW of Milan (F3c3: 3).


Bethany, al-Azariyyah (Arabic), Elmath (Egypt): obbey and fort—L1f4 7.


Bet She'an (Israel): town—L1f3: 7.

Beyoglu, port—see Pera.

Beyshahri, Beyazir (Turkish): town—K2e3: 1, 3.

Bilix or Bilya (Turkish), Pisica (Latin), Piştep (medieval Greek): town—J3d1: 3, 5.

ni Bilix' (Arabic: the hollow), Cilico-Syris (classical), Bekan (modern): district of central Lebanon—L1f2: 6, 7.


Brotli, town—see Memlin.

Black Sea, Marc Euxinos (Latin), Kara Deniz (Turkish), Chernoye More (Roman)—J5ld: 1, 3, 5.


Bolshaya district north of Groznyevo—Kc: 3.

Bodrum or Borkum (Turkish), Balicarnassos (classical), Petromus (modern Greek): town—J3e3: 5.

Bocota (Latin), Boiotian (classical Greek), Vanusa (modern Greek): district of eastern Greece—E4e2: 4.

Bohemia, Czecky (Czech): region north of Austria—G3c2: 2, 3.

Bouisauri (French): castle near Ambrozum.
Bokhara, city—see Bukhara.
Bolotnik (Turkish): village 9 miles S of Gulpolli (J2d5: 5).
Bolton, town 13 miles N of Durham (D12b1. 2).
Bolgar, town—see Bulgar.
Bologna (Italian): city—G12d1. 2, 3.
Bolivari (medieval): castle now Niah (I2d2: 3).
Bombay, city and port—S3d2: 12, 13.
Borocha, Borov (Turkish), Bor (Serbian): town 30 miles WSW of Vinid (I5d2: 3)
Bordeaux (French), Burdigala (classical): city, port—D5d1. 2.
Bosnia, Bosnia (Serbian, Turkish): region west of Serbia—Hc: 3
Bosporus (classical), Kasandza Baljani (Turkish): Black Sea coast—J5d4: 1, 3, 5
Botron (medieval), Botrys (classical), al-Basroun (Arabic) town—L1f: 6, 7
Bouillon (French): town—F3c: 2, 3.
Bourceau, arrondissement—see Le Bourg.
Bourges (French): town—N3c: 2.
Bourgogne (French): region—see Burgundy.
Borgo ada Island—see Pantodon.
Brabant (French, Flemish): district east of Flanders—E2b: 2, 3.
Bracara (French): village 10 miles NW of Braga (J5c2: 2)
Brandenburg (German): district of northeastern Germany—G1c: 2, 3.
Brașov (Romanian), Pressburg (German), Pozsony (Hungarian) city—H3c2: 3.
Braunschweig, city—see Brunswick.
Bremen (German): city, port—F4b2: 2, 3.
Brescia (Italian): city—G5c: 3.
Breslau (German), Wrocław (Polish): city—N3b: 3.
Brifoise-en-Vexin (French): village 20 miles NE of Troyes (E3c2: 2)
Brittany (Italian), Bretonia (Latin): port—H3d5: 3.
British Isles, England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland and smaller islands
Bruges (French), Brugge (Flemish): port, new city—E4b4: 2.
Brunswick, Braunschweig (German): city—G6b: 2, 3.
Ruse: city—see Ruse.
Hadar (Hungarian), Optu (German): city, new port of Budapest—H5c: 3.
Bagdad (medieval) south—K5c: 6.
Bagia, Saida (classical), al-Diyarbak (Arabic), Bougie (French) town—F4d: 2.
Bokhara, Bukhara (Persian), Bukhara (Arabic): city—Q5e: 12, 13.
Bulgaria, Greek, Bulgaria (Russian, formerly Uspenskoye): town, new village—N3b: 3
Bulgaria, Morava (classical), Bulgariya (Bulgarian): region south of the lower Danube, larger than modern nation—J5d1: 1, 3, 5
Burgundy: Bourgogne (French): region of eastern France, extending farther south than now—F1c: 2.
Bukhara: see Bukhara.
Bursa (Turkish), Prusa (classical), Brutus (medieval): city—J5d5: 1, 3, 5
Bysbol (town)—see Abdullah.
Byzantium, city—see Constantinople.

Caesar (French): city—D5c: 2.
Caesarea ad Aegyptum or Maamca (classical), Kayseri (Turkish): city—L1a: 1
Caesarea Maritima or Phasaelis (classical), Cesarea (medieval), Qasr (Arabic), Qesari (Israeli): port, now abandoned for Sedat Yvan—K5f: 7
Caffa, port—see Caffa.
Cahors (French): town—E2b: 2.
Cairo: al-Qahrah (Arabic: the victorious); city – E2E5: 1, 3.
Calabria (Italian): region of SW Italy – Efc: 3.
Calamata town – see Kalamata.
Camposanto (Italian): hallowed sep. of Rome (G3d4: 3).
Camaklale; town – see Sukmaliye.
Candiolo port – see Alanya.
Canciù, island – see Crete.
Candia (medieval), Heraklion (Latin), Iraklion (modern Greek): port – 3He: 3.
Carina (classical), Khania (modern Greek): port – 1Sc5: 3.
Canina (medieval), Bullia or Byllia (classical), Kaine (Albanian): town, now num
porient – H5d5 4.
Capistrano or Caspritano (Italian): village 75 miles SW of Rome (G3d4: 3).
Cappadocia (Italian): town – G5d4: 3.
Carrara, Carea (Rumanian): town – 1Sc5: 3.
Carrakova, Caraceva (Rumanian): town 23 miles SW of Carrara (1Sc5: 3).
Carlo – region – see Menteshe.
Carinthia; Karnten (German): region south of medieval Austria – Gc: 2, 3.
Carpath, district – see Karpaz.
Carpathia, Carpates (classical), Karpaty (Czech, Polish), Carpathi (Romanian): moun
tain range – 1Ec: 4, 3.
Cashagen (French): village near Sarlat, 32 miles NW of Cahors (E2d1: 2).
Cassander, Palleté (classical), Kassandria (modern Greek): peninsula – 1Sc1: 4.
Castellorizo; Magnes (classical), Mías (Turkish), Kasalromeo (Italian), Kastellorizo
(modern Greek): island – J5d4 1, 5.
Castile, Castilla (Spanish), Qurestah (Arabic): region of north central Spain – Dda 2.
Catalonia, Catalunya (Spanish), Catalunya (Catalan): region of NE Spain – Ed: 2.
Cathy region – see China.
Cattaro (Italian), Kotar (Serbian): port – H4d3: 3.
Caumont sur-Durance (French): village 3 miles west of Avignon (E5d2: 2).
Celije town – see Ciby.
Central Asia: region extending from the Aral Sea to Mongolia.
Cez, Keda (classical Greek), Ded (medieval), Zin (Italian), Moerdj (Turkish), Ên
(modern Greek): island – 1Sc3 4, 5.
Cephalonia (Latin), Kefallinia (classical Greek), Kefallania (medieval Greek), Ke
fallina (modern Greek): island – Hez2: 3, 4.
Cerigo (Italian), Cythera (Latin), Kythira (classical Greek), Kitiona (modern Greek):
island – Ue3: 3, 4.
Cernica; town – see Kyrenia.
Cesare; port – see Caesarea.
Cetina city – see Split.
Cevta (Spanish), Sevna (classical), Salchah (Arabic): port – C3e5: 2.
Chalcedon (Latin), Khalilshamé (classical Greek), Khalikthoun (medieval Greek), Kudaköy
(Turkish): town – J5d5: 3, 5.
Chalcis: port – see Negropontes.
Champagne (French): region of NE France – EF: 2.
Charbon river – see Alpes.
Charlot (medieval): town near Muni (H5d5: 4).
Chartres (French): city – E2c2: 2.
Château Périns (French); Atlit (Hebrew); 'Ajlín (Arabic); 'Atlit (Hebrew); crusader castle—K333. 7.
Châteauroux (French); town—E204. 2.
Châtillon-sur-Loing (French); town, now part of Chatillon-Coligny, 32 miles west of Auxerre (E4c3: 2).
Chernouk, Çernouk (Bulgarian); Çernek, Çernek, or Sır Şendil (Turkish); destruction of the Serbs), Ornómen (modern Greek); battlefield—J34d. 3, 5.
Chechen part—see Khetose.
Cheboksar, Çepçe (Turkish); town—J32c. 5.
Cheste (Serbian); town 10 miles sw of Krusevac (H1d1: 3).
Chiavari (Italian); town 36 miles nne of Genoa (F4d1. 3).
Chornji, Çatyr (medieval); region of northwest Asia—W/Cc/2: 12, 13.
Chosha (classical); Sce (Latin); Sakia (Turkish); Khios (modern Greek); island—J3a2: 5.
Chosha, Ç圻ha (Turkish); Tezehum (Latin); town—J34d. 5.
Chorás (medieval); modernized name of Chiasca, possibly Corcyra (K504. 1).
Christopolis, port—see Kavalla.
Cibica (classical); region of southern Anatolia—K1e: 8.
Cilije, Celje (Slovene); town—H1c4: 3.
Circasia; region north of western Caucasus—L1d: 1.
Cirencover town 27 miles nw of Bath (D3b4: 2).
Cîteaux (French); abbey—F3c3: 2.
Ciçe town—see Zeitenburz.
Civitoc (medieval); Chiasca (classical); port, now abandoned—35d3: 3, 3.
Clairvaux (French); abbey—E5c2: 2.
Clarens (town)—see Clarens.
Clari (medieval); Chermy-Souma (French); town 37 miles east of Arnauts (E3c1: 2).
Claramont (French); town, now part of Clermont-Ferrand—E4c3: 2.
Cluny (French); abbey—E5c4: 2.
Cologne (French); Colonia Agrippinensis (Latin); Köln (German); city—F2h5. 2, 3.
Communes or Communes (French); Kameon (Flamish); town 30 miles nw of Lille (E4b3: 2).
Compiègne (French); town 33 miles east of Beauvais (E3c1. 2).
Compostela or Santiago de Compostela (Spanish); Campus Stellae (Latin); Shant Ynik (Arabic); town and shrine—C4d3: 2.
Constantin (French); Konstant (German); town—F5c3. 2, 3.
Constantinople; Byzantium or Constantinopolis (classical); İstanbul (Turkish); city—J3d4. 1, 3, 5.
Carbova (medieval); Krëvë (Serbian); region of western Croatia.
Carbova, Corbula (Spanish); Quirëabh (Arabic); city—D3e: 3.
Carf, Coryca (Latin); Kerkirë (classical Greek); Corfu (Italian); Kérkira (modern Greek); island—H5c3. 3, 4.
Cork, Korinthos (classical Greek); now Patras Kénthos; Old Corkhill; city—B3e: 3, 4.
Corkhill, Gulf of; Korinthikós Kónos (modern Greek)—B2c. 4.
Corkwall, region of sw England—CDB. 2.
Coren (medieval); Korény (medieval Greek); Koréni (modern Greek); port—12c4. 3, 4.
Corinca, Cyprea (classical); Cezèk (modern Greek); Le Couver (medieval); Koros (Turkish); port—K5c4. 1.
Cov, Co throws (medieval Italian); Stanoko (Turkish); Kós (modern Greek); island—J3e5. 5.
Courtsey (French); village 32 miles wsw of Auxerre (E4c3: 2).
Cracow (Czesowia (Latin)), Krakow (Polish): city—H5b5. 3.
Cres (French): village near Blanaue, 13 miles east of Rogozušte (E1c: 2)
Cretan (medieval), Krits (medieval Greek), Kreta (modern Greek), Kriti (modern Greek): island—Kef. 1, 3
Cres (Greek): Krea (Serbian), Kretica (Turkish): town—H5d4. 3, 4.
Cyklades (classical), Kikladhes (modern Greek): island group—Kef. 1, 2.
Cypus (Latin), Kypros (medieval Greek), Ktiria (Turkish), Kypros (modern Greek): island—Kef. 1, 2.
Cyrene (classical), Būsqul (Arabic): region west of Egypt—Kef. 3, 2.
Cyprus (classical), Kiprot (Turkish): town, now abandoned—33d5 3, 2.
Dalmatia (medieval), Dalmacija (Croatian): region east of the Adriatic Sea, equivalent to classical Illyria—Kef. 3.
Damascus (classical), Damascu or ad-Shuhum (Arabic: the left): city—L2: 2, 1.
Danubia, Donau (German), Duna (Hungarian), Dunav (Serbian, Bulgarian), Dunărea (Romanian): river—G5e2, J3g2 1, 2, 3.
Dardanelles, Hellespontus (classical), Çanakkale Boğazı (Turkish): strait—32d5 3, 2.
Dbobbly town—see Devol.
Dead Sea, Bahir Lū (Arabic: sea of Lū), Yem Hameletah (Hebrew)—L3f4 1, 2.
Delhi, Delhi (Hindi), Delhi or Dehli (Persian): city—Tjg2: 12, 13.
Denmark, Danmark (Danish): region of Scandinavia, then including southern part of modern Sweden—F10e 2, 3.
Delphi (medieval): Soudion—34d4 5.
Devul (French): town 11 miles north of Paris (E1c: 2).
Devon: town 13 miles east of Bath (D3d4. 2).
Devnya, Laka—J3g2 5.
Devol, Drobol or Drobolka (medieval): town, now abandoned—H1d5 3, 4.
Dobratsch town—see Damotrain.
Diosdavasur castle—see Saint Hilarion.
Dijon (French): city—Fic: 3, 2, 3.
Dilmn town—see Salmas.
Dimashq city—see Damascus.
Diu port—Silh5 13.
Diyar-Bakr (Arabic): region of the upper Tigris—Fic: 3.
Diyar-Bakr, Dýarbêkîr town—see Amilau.
Donetse; Donets (classical), Donet (Russian): river—E3c: 1.
Dniester; Tymf (classical), Dnestr (Rumanian), Nistru (Rumanian), river—J5c4 1.
Dobrogea: region east of former Danube—Jd. 1, 3.
Dol-de-Bretagne (French): town 79 miles SW of Cass (D5c: 2).
Domálica (Czech), Tank (German): town—G3c: 3.
Donze or Donzy-le-Pré (French): town—E4c: 2.
Dorišlaw (classical): town, now abandoned in favor of Eskinaschar—Kleb. 3.
Douai (French): town 12 miles north of Lille (E4b: 2).
Douro (Portuguese), Duero (Spanish), Dýervirth (Arabic): river—C3d4: 2.
Drama: town—15d4. 3, 4, 5.

Dreux (French): town 21 miles N.W. of Chartres (E3c2: 2).

Driaca (medieval), Durnuca (classical), Siliace (Turkish), Siastra (Romanian), Silistra (Bulgarian): town—13d1. 3.

Dubrownik: port—see Ragusa.

Dulcius (Italian), Ulmum (Sorbian): port—H3d4. 3.

Durazzo (Italian), Epidamnum or Dyrrachium (classical), Dray (Turkish), Dürres (Albanian): port—H3d4. 3, 4.

Durham: city—D4d1. 2.

Ebro (Spanish), Tbrus (Arabic): river—D4d3. 2.

Edessa, Koiliss or Richia (medieval), ur-Rubi’ (Arabic), Urfa (Turkish): city—L4c3 1, 6.

Edirne: city—see Adrianople.

Eger: city—see Erlau.

Egypt: Misr (Arabic): region of SW Africa—J1a: 1, 3.

Eleasa (medieval), Athanaia (Turkish): town—H3d4. 3, 4.

Elbe (German), Labe (Czech): river—G2b2: 2.

Elle: Elia or Elida (classical Greek), Illia (modern Greek): district of SW Morea—D2b: 4.

Ems: river—see Limk.

England, Britannia (Latin): region—D2c.

English Channel, La Manche (French)—CIlc: 2.

Enkastro (Greek): Greek Orthodox monastery in Cyprus, location uncertain.

Enos or Eunus: town—see Aias.

Ephesus (classical), Apollonopolis (medieval), Arsmaluk (Turkish): city, now unimportant—13e3: 3, 5.

Epirus (Latin), Epoleos (classical Greek), Epireos (modern Greek): region west of Thessaly—f1e: 3, 4.

Eratina (Turkish): district east of Ankara—K1.

Erlau (German), Eger (Hungarian): city—H4c3 3.

Erzerum, Theodosiopolis (classical), Erzin (Armenian), Erzurum (Turkish): city—M2a1 1.

Eszenjan (Turkish), Aramysa (classical), Arsamsh (medieval): town—L5c1. 1.

Estamos: port—see Perna.

Estosi: city—see Thessos.

Ethiopia or Abyssinia, Byzopia (Arabic): region of E. central Africa—not in region mapped.

Euabos (classical), Evripos (medieval Greek), Nagrope (Italian), Egeria (Turkish), Evvia (modern Greek): island—14c2: 3, 4, 5.

Euphrates (classical), el-Purt (Arabic): city—N1f4: 2; 14c4 6.

Falkenberg; Fouquetembues (French): village 24 miles N.W. of Boulogne (E2b5. 2).

Famagusta; Armokoutzos (classical Greek), Pambagia (medieval Italian); port—K3c1, 3.

Fécamp (French): abbey, town, 38 miles N.W. of Rouen (E2c2: 2).

Ferrara (Italian): city—G3d2: 2, 3.

Fethye: port—see Makri.


Fuziun, region—see Palestrina.

Flanders, Walcheren (Flemish): region of northern France and Belgium—E2b. 2.

Florac or Florin (medieval), Fioren (Italian): abbey, town, 47 miles N.W. of Comuna (H3c1: 3).


Florentia (Bulgarian): town—L3d1. 3.
Foggia, Foča, port—see Phocaea.

Fontes (French): district east of Clermont (E4c5: 2).

France: region, smaller than modern nation.

Frankfurt am Main (German): city—F4a5: 2, 3.

Frank-Zara (Turkish): battlefield—K3e3: 1.

Friesack (German): town 65 miles NE of Cilly (H1c4: 3).

Friesland (Dutch, German): region of northern Netherlands and NW Germany—F2: 2, 3.

Friburghi (Italian): district of NE Italy—Ge: 2, 3.


Gades (see Cadiz).

Gades (Bulgarian): suburb of Varna (F3d2: 5).

Gahf, Hagaif (Israel): region of northern Palestine—L1f3: 7

Galilee, Sea of, or Lake Tiberias; Bilhares Taberytah (Arabic), Wawa Kesaret (Israel)—L1f3: 7

Galilopolis (medieval), Galilopolis (classical), Galibolu (Turkish): town—J2d5: 3, 5.


Gatha (medieval): unidentified port 15 miles from Senn (G3d1: 3).

Gatirria, castle—see La Castria.

Gata, Cape: southern tip of Cyprus—K4f1: 8.

Gem (classical), Gades (medieval), Gharazah (Arabic): town—K3f4: 7.

Gazaria, peninsula—see Gicina.


Greece, Genoa (Italian), Geneva (Italian): city, port—F4d: 2, 3.

Georgia at Gurja (medieval), Sukariwvi (Georgian): region east of the Black Sea and south of the Caucasus—M4c: 1.

Germany, Alamannia or Alamania (medieval), Deutschland (German): region of north central Europe—F4b: 3.

Germiyan (Turkish): district of west central Anazalin—J5e: 5.

Gibraltar Straits of, at Zugdidi (Arabic)—C3e5: 2.

Grlas (Romanian), San Giorgio (Italian), Szentgyörgy (Hungarian): town—J1d: 9

Grievos: Chiostra or Chios (medieval), Kyllene (Latin), Kyllene (classical Greek), Kilini (modern Greek): town—J2e3: 4.

Golden Horn: Chioscoeras (classical), Halic (Turkish): bay between Constantinople and Pera (J4d4: 5).

Golubetz, Golubac (Serbian): town—L2d: 3.

Golymin (Turkish): town—K1d5: 5.

Granada (Spanish), Igbarisa at Charmsalah (Arabic): city—D2e9: 2.

Green, Cape—K5f1: 8.

Greece; Hellas (Greek), Gracca (Latin): region west of the Aegean Sea, smaller than modern nation.

Grosswarten (German), Nagyvárad (Hungarian), Oradao (Romanian): city—J2e3: 3


Guardia (Spanish, Portuguese), Waad Azhdah (Arabic): river—C4e2: 2.

Guines or Guines (French): town 16 miles NE of Boulogne (E2b5: 2).

Gujarat or Gujarast: district of western India—Sc: 13.

Gurjana city—see Urgesch.

Gurghiu town—see Sucevita Gorgaș.

Cisap (Hungarian), Emsb (German): town—H3c3: 3.

Habsburg: castle—see Habsburg.

Hafa, Caphon or Caffa (medieval), Haifa (Arabic), Haifa (Israeli): port—L1f3: 1, 7.
Hamath; Hammat (French), Heneghoven ( Flemish): district east of Artois — EF 6: 2, 3
Halab, Haleb city — see Aleppo.
Halicarnassus: town — see Bodrum.
Hamah; Epiphania or Hamath (classical), Hamah (Arabic): city — L.225: 1, 6.
Hamid (Turkish): district of same central Anatolia — IC: 3
Hangchow or Hang-chow (Chinese), Quanzu (medieval) city, port — CC 183: 19
Hapsburg; Habsburg (German): castle on Drugg, 29 miles east of Basel (F 3: 3).
Harod, Well of — see 'Am Jahn.
Harra or Haran (Turkish), Cariaia (classical), Harran (Arabic): town — L.564: 1
Hautville (French): village 55 miles west of Caen (D 3: 2).
Hebron (classical, Israeli), Harea or Khalil (Arabic), Saint Abraham (medieval)
Heilbronn (German): town 22 miles north of Ascham (F 3: 5).
Hejaz, al-Hijaz (Arabic): region of western Arabian — L.56: 1
Hellenopolis: ruins — see Didyma.
Heracleum, port — see Candia.
Hermantnados (German), Szabad or Nagytechno (Hungarian), Sibiu (Romanian):
town — L.155: 3.
Hermone, Mount, al-Jabal ash-Shaikh or Jebul ash-Thalik (Arabic, the holy, or snow-
Herzegovina, Herzegovina (Serbian), Hersek (Turkish): district sw of Montenegro —
H.3.
Hijaz region — see Hejaz.
Himara or Himara (Albanian), Chianio or Chianio, Chiaram (Italian): town — H.56: 4.
Hira or Heresia (medieval): fort on Mount near Danube.
Hira, al-Akrad, fortresses — see Krak des Chevaliers.
Hira, Kaife (Arabic), Cersans Copula (classical), Hammeres (Turkish): town — M.263: 1.
Hohenstaufen (German): castle, now destroyed, 73 miles south of Würzburg (F 3: 3).
Holland (Netherlands): region north of Brahmi — L.22: 2, 3.
Holy Land — see Palestine.
Homs, Emesa (classical), Homs (Arabic): city — L.211: 1, 6
Hoveden (medieval) or Hoveden: town 80 miles north of London (D 4: 3).
Hungary; Magyarorszag (Hungarian): region of central Europe — H.11: 3.
Iannina or Ioannina (medieval): Yeni (Turkish), Ioannina (modern Greek): town — I.16: 3, 4.
Ibelin (medieval), Ibelin or Jemmala (classical), Yebul (Arabic), Yavne (Israeli):
village — L.56: 2.
Icazum city — see Cuzco.
Istanbul: Lamorda (medieval Italian), Istanbul (Turkish): island — J.56: 5
Inn, Ermel, or Venet (Russian): river — UC: 12, 13.
India, region of southern Asia — R/17: 12, 13.
Indian Ocean: M/38: 12, 13.
Indo-China: peninsular region of s Asia — Y/3: 12, 13.
Ijen Sea — H.26: 3.
Iran, Iran (Persian): modern nation comprising most of medieval Persia.
Ireland, Hibernia (Latin), Eire (Gallic): island — C 2.
Isskar or Iskier (Bulgarian): river flowing past Sofia to the Danube — L.56: 3.
Isternia, port — see Alexandria.
Istria (Italian), Sofo (Croatian): coast east of Aquileia — G 3: 3.
Istanbul city — see Constantinople.
Jaffa or Joppa, Yafa (Arabic), Yafu (Italian): port, now joined to Tel Aviv — K55: 3, 7
Jaffa: town — Yaffo.
Jaffa: town — see Jaffa.
Jericho: Arjeh or ar Rifa (Arabic): town — Lif6: 7
Jerusalem: Héroseolyma (classical), al-Quds ash-Sharif (Arabic), Weruchalayim (Israel): city — L63: 1, 7
Jellyville (French): town: 37 miles wsw of Toal (Fbic: 2).
Joppa: port — see Jaffa.
Josaphat: valley — see Jezreel.
Jubail (Arabic: small mountain), Ybba (classical), Gibelet (Middle Eastern): town — Lif6: 1, 6, 7.
Kadiköy town — see Istanbul.
Kaffa or Kafa (medieval), Theodosia (classical), Pskovsk (Russian): port — L116: 1.
Kalocsa (Hungarian): town — H40: 3.
Kamchika (Bulgarian): river — J63: 5.
Kamen (Bulgarian): river flowing into Danube nw of Vidin (J63: 3).
Kangarla, town — see Sultanlyoub.
Kara Hisar: battlefield — see Beshkent.
Al-Karak: Fortuna — see Kerak.
Karakorum (Tibetan), Hailin (Chinese): city, now abandoned — Y63: 12, 13.
Karaman (Turkish): town of south central Anatolia — K: 1.
Karaj: Karaj or Karavi (Turkish): district of nw Afghanistan — Je: 5.
Karasu-bad or Karsabad (Bulgarian): town: 32 miles west of Aschabia (J63: 5).
Karsilik region — see Caucasus.
Kars or Karnes (Greek), Karshen (medieval): peninsular district — K55: 5.
Kaspishan (Bulgarian): village: 12 miles east of Sharaman (J63: 5).
Kastoruna (Turkish): Casto Corneus or Kastorouno (medieval): town — K64: 1, 3.
Kayseri city — see Casyers.
Kenter or Karamed (medieval), Barlikarya (Turkish): port — J63: 5.
Kerak: Khr distans (classical), Krak des Monétas or Krak of Moab (medieval), al-
Karak (Arabic): fortress, now town — Lif6: 1, 7.
Kerat port — see Vescovia.
Kesikus: Kesikus (Armenian), Kesikus (medieval), Kesikus (Arabic), Kaimam (Turkish): fortress, now town — L63: 4, 6.
Kateen town 2 miles east of Damascus (D-63: 2).
Khanbaha (Mongolian), Chu, Yenking, or Changpao (classical Chinese), Cambaluc (medieval), Peking, Pe-chang, Beiping, or Peiping (modern Chinese): city—Bible 12, 13
Kharpa or Harpat (Turkish), Kharpat (Armenian), Hsin Ziyà or Zaid (Arabic): fortress, now town—L5c5: 1.
Kherson or Cherson (medieval Russian), Chersonesus Horace (classical): Kor-
sum (Slavic): port, now ruined (not modern Kherson on the Dnieper)—K4d1: 1
Khwarizm, Khwarizmkh or Khwairizm (modern Greek): battlefield—K4f: 8
Khurasan, Khurásán (Persian): region of see Perse—PQc: 12, 13
Kiev (Russian): city—K3b: 3.
Kiša (medieval), Kilya (Islamic): town—J5c3: 1, 3
Kulaš (Turkish): town—J5d3: 5.
Kütah Ahmetzâ (Turkish): tribal region in northern Anadolu—Kd 10, 11
Kebina or Palanka (medieval): fort on Kebina opposite Hram.
Kėyali (Turkish): district town Nicosia—Jd 5.
Kör: city—see Cologne.
Koksoq (medieval), Kókkos (modern Greek): fortress—K3f: 8.
Korya (Turkish): Lomara (classical, medievel): city—K3a: 1, 3.
Kosovo: Kosovó (Serbian): town—J2d3: 3.
Kosovo-Polje: Kosove Polje (Serbian: field of blackbirds): battlefield near Kosovo—(I2d3: 3).
Kosor: port—see Cattaro.
Kuşçu Deve (Turkish): port—J2d5: 3.
Kragujevac, Kragujevac (Serbian): town—I3d1: 3.
Kraik de Montréal (medieval), ash-Shubak (Arabic): fortress, now village—L1f: 1.
Kraik of Mokha, or des Mombias. Fortress—see Karak.
Krajków: city—see Craców.
Kroja, town—see Krobalance.
Krunstadt (German), Dragov (Romanian): town (recently called Stalin)—J1c5: 3
Krushevtsi, Krushevac (Serbian), Alan-Hisar (Turkish): town—L2d2: 3.
Kusovitsi: Kusovcici (Serbian): town and mountains near Nish (I2d3: 3).
Kurdistan, Karshul (Persian, Arabic): region between Armenia and Persia—
MNA 3.
Kütseczi, Konstantin-III (Turkish), Kyuzhadi (Bulgarian): town—J4d3: 3.
Kutoc Home (Czech), Kusunberg (German): town—H1c: 3.
Kykkos (Greek): Greek Orthodox monastery—K3c5: 8.
La Broyère or La Bro(c) quarre (French): village 63 miles nw of Toulouse (E2d2: 2)
La Castra (medieval), Castria (modern Greek): castle—K4e5: 8.
La Cava (Italian): castle in of Nicomia (K4c5: 8)
La Montjoie (French): hill overlooking Jerusalem (L1f: 7).
La Sola, town—see Salerno.
Lak (Serbian): river flowing NE of Vojvodina.
Lacsani (Latin), Lakásánna or Láxáníká (medieval Greek), Lakona (modern Greek):
district of see Morea—E3d4: 4.
Lajezzer port—see Ayas.
Lampedusa (Italian): island—G3c5: 3.
Lampone (Armenian), Namezn (Turkish): fortress—K3e5: 1.
Lampsacus (classical), Lápsaki (Turkish): village—J2d5: 5.
Lancaster, city—D1d1: 2.
Lansbernh—and—see Cos.
Langres (French): town - F3c 2, 3.
Languedoc (French): region of southern France - E4c 2.
Lannoy (French): town 9 miles NW of Tournaï (E4b5: 2).
Laodicea: port - see Latakia.
Laon (French): town - E4c1: 2.
Lastic (French): village near Saint Florent, 39 miles west of Le Puy (E4c5: 2).
Lazlovar (Hungarian): fortress opposite Golubac (12d1: 3).
Latakia; Laodicea ad Mare (classical), al-Lahiqiyah (Arabic): port - L3c 1, 6.
Lausanne (French): town - F3c 2, 3.
Le Bourg en Bresse (French): mountain in Vaud region canton, Ardeban, near Rothel, near Rhone (E5c: 2).
Le Cap: see Cape Andrada.
Le Cap: port - see Corcco.
Le Mans (French): city - B3c 3, 2.
Lebanon, Mount, Jabal Libanon (Arabic): L3f1: 6, 7.
Lefkada (medieval Greek): town - K4f1: 8.
Lefkoniko; Lefkimmi (modern Greek): town - K4e5: 8.
Lemnos island: see Limnos.
Lenno, Lennois (medieval Greek), Stallmannes (medieval), Limnos (modern Greek): island - H1c 2.
Leon, León (Spanish): region of northern Spain - C3d: 2.
Leontis: river - see Liger.
Lepanto (Italian), Neapostis (classical), Ipactos (medieval Greek), Naupaktos (modern Greek): port - H3c2: 3, 4.
Lusbon (classical), Mytilène (medieval Greek), Metelinos (medieval Italian), Midilli (Turkish), Leros (modern Greek): island - I2d: 3.
Leucan or Leucan (classical), Lucania or Sessa Marina (medieval), Levkos (modern Greek): island - I1c 2, 3, 4.
Lige or (recently) Liège (French), Luik (Flemish): city - F1b5: 2, 3.
Lillie (French), Rysmel (Flemish): city - E4b5: 2.
Limnos, Limnos (medieval Greek), Lemni (modern Greek): port - K4f1: 1, 8.
Limoges (French): city - E3c5: 2.
Limetz: Lissa (Porringian), Ushbina (Arabic): city, port - C1e2 2.
Limoux (French): town 45 miles SW of Romen (E3c1: 2).
Lithuania, Lituania (classical): region east of Poland, larger than modern state - D3: 3.
Livadia, Lebanon, or Livadia (classical), Levidion (modern Greek): town - I2c2: 5.
Livonia; Livland (German): districts in or Riga - I1a: 3.
Lodr (Italian): town 10 miles NW of Milan (F5c5: 3).
Loire (French): river - E3c3: 2.
Lombardey: Lombardia (Italian): region of NW Italy - F2c 2, 3.
Lorraine (French), Lothringen (German): region of eastern France - E2c 2, 3.
Lorraine, Lower: district of northern Belgium (EFbc).
Lozhe, Low Countries, Netherlands, and part of Belgium.
Lübeck (German): city, port - G3b2: 2, 3.
Lucena (Italian): town - H4b4: 3.
Lucca (Italian): town - H4b4: 3.
Lusignan (French): town - E3c 2, 2.
Luxembourg or Lëtzebuerg: Luxembourg (French): region, now independent, south of Belgium.

Lydda (classical), Šama Ga散热 (medieval), al-Lamudi (Arabic); Lod (Israel): town—K3d4: 7

Lyd. district—see Abydus.

Lyon; Lëyon (French); city—E5e5: 2.

Malki: town—see Mmimih.

Maceloma (classical), Makedonion (modern Greek); Makedonija (Serbian): region west of Thrace—E1i: 3, 4, 5.

Machaerus or Makbara (Greek); Greek Orthodox monastery—K4f2: 8.

Machiav: Macau (Portuguese); Macao (Chinese); Macau (Spanish); district south of River Kazu (H4d1, 3).

Macon (French): town—E5e4: 2.

Madras, city; port—U1m2: 12, 13

Maasander (classical), Maas River (Turkish): river—J4e3: 5

al-Maghreb: region—see North Africa.

Maguerek (French): port, now unimportant—E4d2: 2.

Mahoracz (Bulgarian): fortress between Provadiya and Shumen.


Mainz (German); Mayence (French); city—F4b5: 2, 3

Majavafira; Martyropolis (classical), Marchéfira (Arabic), Miyafjarla (Greek), Mikačakul of Slavon (Turkish): town—J4e2: 1.

Majorca; Mallorca (Spanish), Maydakah (Arabic): island—Ea: 2.

Mahr (medieval), Mahr (Turkish): port—J5e4: 1, 3, 5.

Malatia, Malatya, city—see Malatoca.

Malmö; Malmo (Swedish): town 90 miles west of London (D3d4: 2).

Malmy, Malmsa; fortresses—see Malmnsa.

Malta; Mlta (classical), Mlkah (Arabic): island—E5e5: 3.

Manastirk (classical), Mancastir (classical), Manis (Armenian), Mias (Turkish): town—L3d4: 1, 6.

Mangy; Mmnoji (Arabic), Hierapolis (classical), Membli (Turkish): town—J3d4: 6.

Mangare; Greek Orthodox monastery in outskirts of Nicomedia (K3e5: 3).


Mantua; Mantova (Italian); city—G3e3: 3.

Marnzgirt; Manzgerti (West) or Manzgerti (East Armenian), Malagist (Turkish): town—M3d4: 4.


Maras (Armenian, Turkish), Germania (classical), Maraz (Arabic): town—I2e3: 1, 6.

Marcepolis (ancient): town near Varna (J3d2: 3).

Marina (Turkish), Maralb (Arabic): town—M5e3: 1.

Marschaan, valley east of Tyflerus (K3e5: 6).


Marinburg (German), Malburk (Polish): fortress, now town—H5b1: 3.

Maritsa, Rebrus (classical), Evros (medieval Greek), Meriç (Turkish): river—J3d5: 1, 3, 9

Marie (French): village 14 miles west of Laon (E4c1: 2).

Marmara, Sea of; Propontis (classical), Marmara Denuzi (Turkish)—J4d5: 5.

Maros (Hungarian), Maroços (classical), Mureş (Romanian): river flowing by Alba Julia—J3c: 3.

al-Margab: fortress—see Margat.

Marrakesh; Marrakesh (Arabic): city—C2f4: 2.

Marcellus, Namas (classical Greek), Mene (Latin), Marseille (French): city, port—F4d2: 2.
Martarana (medieval), Martirano (Italian): town — H262: 3.
Marv, city — see Merv.
Masau (Italian): town 28 miles NW of Pisa (C362: 1).
Matapan, Cape; Penthaurum (Latin), Methymna (medieval Greek), Akra Talmoros (modern Greek): town — B44: 4.
Mayence: city — see Mainz.
Mediteranean Sea — D/L42: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8.
Megara-Agora (medieval), Makedones or Megas Koun (Turkish): town — J245: 5.
Mehadia (Romanian): village 12 miles north of Orheiu (341: 3).
Meissen (German): town — G40: 2, 3.
Mequem (French): medieval county around Maguelone, 7 miles east of Montpellier (E462: 2).
Melathene (classical), Melitone (Armenian), Melatina (medieval), Melatina (Turkish): city — J462: 1.
Melilla (French), Metallia (classical): town — E162: 2.
Melnik (Bulgarian): battlefield about 12 miles west of Sofia (J463: 3).
Menar: town — see Acros.
Menefke (medieval), Muge (modern Turkish): region of western Anatolia equivalent to classical Caria — J6: 3.
Meren: region — see Crete.
Merv or Marv (Persian), Maryana (classical): city — Q363: 12, 13.
Mersin (district), see Adana.
Mesopotamia (medieval), Miszov (Turkish), Messobor (Bulgarian): town — J343: 3, 4.
Messene, Messene (medieval Greek), Messene (modern Greek): district of SW Morea — J264: 4.
Methana (Italian): port — H162: 3.
Meteora: island — see Lesbos.
Metz (French): city — P24: 2.
Meviana (French): town 23 miles east of Paris (E542: 2).
Meknes (French): town, now attached to Charleville, 30 miles SW of Rheims (E52: 2).
Michelitsch (Bulgarian): castle west of Varna (J343: 5).
Micon: island — see Mykonos.
Midi (French): southern France (D452: 2).
Milan; Milano (Italian): city — F556: 2, 3.
Millipotamos (Greek): unidentified locality on Crete.
Mira: town — see Maspeth.
Mhti: region — see Egypt.
Mistra (medieval), Myzithara (medieval Greek), Mistras (modern Greek): town — E34: 4.
Modon (medieval), Methoni (medieval Greek), Methoni (modern Greek): port — J264: 3, 4.
Moldavia, Bogdul (Romanian): region east of the Carpathians — J3: 3.
Molybdos (classical), Molyvados (modern Greek): port — J166: 5.
Mons (Latin), Monti (Serbian): town — B44: 3, 4.
Montenegro: Mount (classical Greek), Montenegro (medieval), Montenegro (modern Greek): fortress, now town — J464: 3, 4.
Montevarchi district — see Montefiridolfi.
Montaigu-sur-Champeaux or Montauban-le-Blanc (French): castle 10 miles SW of Clermont (E4d: 2).
Monte Cassino (Italian): abbey—G6d: 3.
Monte (di) Frenti (Italian): town—G3d: 3.
Montevecchio (Italian, black mountains), Cima Coira (Serbian): district north of Al-
bania—H1d: 3.
Monteferrato (French), Monserrato (Italian): district of SW Italy—E4c: 2, 3.
Montfort (French), Sturmfelsburg (German), Qal'at al-Qurain (Arabic): castle—L1f: 7.
Montréal (French): site around Krak de Montréal—L1f: 5.
Mora (Serbian): river—L2d: 3.
Moravia (medieval), Palaeomermos (Latin), Palaeomonos or Morana (medieval Greek),
Morfou (medieval), Omorphiou (Greek), Köprük/Kumukli (Turkish): village—
K4c: 3.
Morocco; al-Maghrib al-Aqsa (Arabic: the farthest west): region of NW Africa—
Cdf: 2.
Morphou, Morfo (modern Greek): town—K3c: 1.
Moyai; al-Musul (Arabic), Musul (Turkish): city—M4d: 2.
Mühlbach or Mühlbach (German), Sobia (Russsian), Szamos (Hungarian):
town—K4c: 3.
Mykonos (classical), Micyma (medieval Italian), Makaos (Turkish), Mikonos (modern
Greek): island—Bc: 3.
Mytilene: island—N4b: 3.
Mytilene, Mytilene (classical Greek), Mykene (medieval Greek), Mytilini (modern
Greek): town—J2c: 1, 2, 3.
Nabulus; Shechem or Nablus (classical), Nablus (Arabic): town—L1f: 7.
Nagyszand: city—see Gomorrahian.
Nairac (French): village at Le Blanc, 33 miles east of Poissy—M1c: 2.
Namur: island—see Antwerp.
Namur (French): town—E5b: 2, 3.
Naples; Napoli (Italian): city, port—G5d: 3.
Naupactus: port—see Lapanto.
Nauplia (classical), Nauplia (modern Greek): port—L3c: 4.
Navarino (Italian), Pylos (classical Greek), Zonkion (medieval): port, now superseded
Navarre (French), Navarra (Spanish): region of northern Spain—Dc: 2.
Naxos; Nicolaia (medieval Italian), Naxos (Turkish), Naxos (modern Greek): island—
J3c: 5.
Near East: region from Egypt to Persia and Turkey to Aden.
Neo-pontos: island—see Euboea.
Neo-pontos (medieval Italian, black bridge), Chalcis (classical), Chalkis (modern
Greece): port—M3c: 3, 4.
Nejd; Najd (Arabic): region of central Arabia—MNg: 1.
Nestos (Greek), Nestus (Latin), Kaka Su (Turkish), Mesta (Bulgarian): river flowing into the Aegean opposite Thasos—15d4. 5.

Neusiedl (Hungarian): town 37 miles sw of Bratislava (HSc3 3)

Nevers (French): town—E4e4. 2.

Newburgh, town—D2a4. 2.

Niccese (classical), Iznik (Turkish): town—J5d5: 1, 3, 5.

Nica (French), Nizza (Italian): port—F3l2: 2.

Nicomedea (classical), Izmir (Turkish): town—J5d5: 1, 3, 5.

Nicopoli (medieval), Nikesh (Turkish), Nikopoli (Bulgarian): town—J5d2: 1, 3.

Nicola, Levkas (medieval Greek), Nicola (modern Greek): city—K4e5: 1, 8.

Nijmegen (Dutch): town—F4b4: 3.

Nile; Bahir as Nil (Arabic): river—K3g4: 1; K1j4: 3.

Nimes (French): city—E5a2: 2.

Nish, Nil (Serbian), Nil (Turkish), Nissus or Nissa (classical): town—J3d2: 3.

Nisava, Nisava (Serbian): river flowing past Novi Sad into the Morava—J3d2: 3.

Nisibin or Nusibin (Turkish), Nisibin (classical): Nisibin or Nusibin (Arabic): town—M2d3: 1.

Nogent-sur-Marne (French): town 7 miles east of Paris (E3c2: 2).

Normandy, Normandie (French): region of northern France—D8c: 2.

North Africa, al-Maghreb (Arabic): the west; region from Morocco to Cyrenaica, north of the Sahara.

North Sea—DEFols: 2, 3.

Novara (Italian): town—F4c3: 3.


Novi Pazar or Nisza (Serbian), Nisza (Latin): town—H1d2: 3.

Novo Brdo (Serbian): town 20 miles east of Kosanze (E3d3: 3).

Noyon (French): town 29 miles west of Lille (E4c: 2).

Nuremberg: Nürnberg (German): city—G2c3: 2, 3.

Oder (German), Odru (Czech, Polish): river—H1b3: 2.

Oldenburg (German): city—F4b2: 2, 3.

Omoł (medieval): fortress in the Morava valley (id. 1).

Onmophila, village: see Morfita.

Osnabrück: city: see Grosswettern.

Orange (French): town 13 miles north of Avignon (E5e2: 2).

Oreus (Latin), Óreos (modern Greek), Oreus (modern Greek): town—J4e2: 4.

Orléans (French): town—E2c3: 2.

Ormontes (classical), al-ʿAšš (Arabic: the rabahsinos), Pari (medieval): river—L1c5: 1, 6, 7.

Orșova, Orșova (Romanian): town—H3d1: 3.

Osmán (Italian), Austros (classical): town 9 miles south of Ancona (G4d2: 3).

Ostia (Italian): port, now village—G3e4: 2, 3.

Ostrivita, Ostrovol (Serbian), Sînirg Hînest (Turkish): fortress 30 miles north of Zara (H1d1: 3).

Otranto (Italian): town—H4c5: 3.

Otranto (French: Oversos), Ultrasore (Latin): the Latin border in Syria and Palestine.


Paderborn (German): town—F4b4: 2, 3.

Padua, Padova (Italian): city—G4c5: 2, 3.

Palatia (medieval): Mileto (classical), Mileto (Turkish): port, now abandoned—J3c3: 3, 5.

Palermo (Italian), Palermo (Arabic): city, port—G4e2: 3.

Palestina (Italian): town — G3d: 3.

Palamyra or Palmyra (classical), Tadmur, now Tadmur (Arabic): caravan town — L4f: 6.


Paphos (medieval), PPhos (modern Greek): town — K3f: 1, 6.

Pars (French): city — E3c: 2.

Paroni, Paróri (modern Greek): village 1 mile east of Mistra (I3e: 4).

Paxàs (German): town — G4c: 2, 2, 3.

Patmos, Patmos (Italian), Patmos (Turkish), Patmos (modern Greek): island — J3e: 5.

Patar (medieval), Patras (modern Greek): port — I2c: 3, 3, 4.

Pavia (Italian): town — F3e: 2, 2, 3.

Pedionaria, Pedionaria or Podionia (modern Greek): town — K3f: 8.

Pegea (town): see Ruca.

Peking: city: see Khambaluq.

Pelopennésus: peninsula — see Moray.

Pérola (Spanish): castle near Villafranca del Páramo, 25 miles west of Barcelona (E3d: 4).

Pérotis (Greek): monastery — K4e: 5.

Pha or Phanor (medieval), Hainê (Turkish): port — I4d: 3, 5.

Phézée (French): district west of Chauny — E1c: 2.

Philocersus (classical), Bergamo (Turkish): town — J3e: 3, 5.

Peris (classical), Irán (Persian): region of sw Asia — NOC: 11.


Perugia (Italian): town — G3d: 3.


Perzisch (Bulgarian), Petrich (medieval Greek): castle — I3d: 4, 3, 5.

Peteroskoum (classical), Penrith (German): town — H5f: 3.

Petrovaradin (Serbian), Petrovaradin (German): town — H5f: 3.

Philadelphia (classical), Amiens (Turkish): town — I4c: 3, 3, 5.

Philipopolis (classical), Plovdiv (Bulgarian), Filibe (Turkish): town — I3d: 4, 3, 3.

Philomarum: town: see Akabahehr.

Philistis (modern Greek): village — K3f: 8.

Phoca (classical), Foca (Italian), Foça (Turkish): port, now abandoned (or now — J3e: 3, 5.

Phocaea, Phocaea (Italian): town — F3c: 2.

Fon del Carpeno or Pian dell Magnone (Italian), Piana de Cernpi (Latin), Plano-carpeno (medieval): village 9 miles west of Perugia (G3d: 3).


Pit (French): village about 40 miles sw of Bordeaux (D3d: 2).


Piret (Bulgarian), town — I3d: 3.

Pir (Italian): port, now city — G5d: 2, 3.

Plantocarpus: village: see Pian del Carpeno.

Plochnik, Plochun (Serbian): battlefield (5 miles west of Nish (I3d: 3).

Plovdiv: town: see Philippopolis.

Pulka, town: see Le Puy.

Podola, region south of Modrávica — Jc: 3.

Portum (French): town — E1c: 2.


Poland, Polska (Polish): region east of Germany — H1b: 3.

Polonia, fort: see Koblenz.

Polt (medieval), Animoć (classical): town — K3e: 5.

Pomerania, Pommeren (German): region of sw Germany — GHH: 2, 3.
Portomirye—see Anchialus.

Pontevedra (Spanish): district of western Peninsula—E3i 2.

Porto (Italian): village 13 miles SW of Rome—G3d4 3.

Portugal, Lusitania (Latin): region west of southern and central Spain, now a nation—C6c 2.

Posen (German), Poznań (Polish): city—H2b3 3.

Pothamnos, Potamios (modern Greek): village—K3f 3.

Prague, Praha (Czech): city—G5b5 2, 3.

Prespa, Lake; Drymios Lacos (classical); Drymilia Limné (modern Greek); Prespeauko Limni (Serbian)—K3f 3.

Przemyslburg; city—see Branibosne.

Proe (Serbian), Prokna (Italian), Barakada (Turkish): island—12e3 4.

Provdilna (Bulgarian), Provden (medieval), Proval (Turkish): town—J3d2 5.

Prounc (French): region of on France—E5f 2, 3.

Provins (French): town 40 miles NE of Troyes—E5c2 2.

Prusse, Prussien (German), Prusy (Polish): region of on Germany—H1b 3.

Ptolemais (medieval Greek), Ptolemais (modern Greek); village—K4c6 3.

Pskov (Russian), Pleskau (German): city—14a3 12.

Puglia or Pugliese region—see Apulia.

Pylos port—see Navarino.

Pyranus (classical), Chabah (Armenian), Kiyhan (Turkish): river—L3d4 6.

Pyranus, Pyrenées (French), Pirineus (Spanish): mountain range—D5d 2.

Pyrgos (Greek): town—12a 4.

Pythion or Pichion (Greek), Egri-Kutali-Durgaz (Turkish): town 20 miles south of Adrianoce—J2d4 5.

Qu'ani ash-Shaqqi: crusader castle—see Heliopolis.

Qus (Arabic), Apollonopolis Parmo (classical): town—K3g 1.

Rab (town)—see Győr.

Ragusa (medieval), Dubrovnik (Serbian): port—H4d 3.

Rahova or Rahova (medieval), Orankhov (Romanian): town—14d2 3.

Rama, Rama or Ramza (medieval), in Ramlah (Arabic): the sandy: town—K514 7.

Rascha, Rashka: town—see Novi Pozar.

Razgorna (Italian): town—G3d 2, 3.

Red Sea; al-Bahr al-'Ammar (Arabic)—L6b 1.

Regensburg (German), Ratboca (medieval): town—G3c 2, 3.

Rethmou (medieval), Calamos or Rethymnon (classical), Rethimnon (modern Greek): town—J3e 3.

Rhodes: Rhiza (Greek), Rhodos (Latin), Rhodos (modern Greek): city, port—J3e 1, 5.

Rhodes; Rhodes (classical Greek), Rhodos (Latin), Rodos (Turkish), Rodi (Italian), Rhodos (modern Greek): island—L6t 1, 3, 5.

Rhodope; Rhodope (classical Greek), Rodopi (modern Greek), Rodopi (Bulgarian): mountain range—J3d4 5.

Rhône; Rhône (French): river—F5c5 2.

Riga, Riga (Letish): city—J3a 12.

Rodi, Rodez (French): town—E5d 2.

Rohatyn or Rohatyn: city—see Edeza.

Romania: region—see Anicia.

Romans-sur-Isère (French): town 11 miles north of Valence—E5d 2.
Rome; Roma (Italian); city—G3d4. 2, 3.
Rosetta, Rashid (Arabic); port—K14; 1.
Rouen (French); city—E12; 2.
Rousillon (French); district north of the eastern Pyrenees—E3d3; 2.
Rouen (Norman); village 26 miles north of Yvesvres (L2c3 3).
Rubuck (Flemish); village 33 miles west of Lille (E4b5; 2).
Rumania; region; see Anarchia.
Russell-Hiaw (Turkic); castle of Russelhiak; fortress—J5d4; 3.
Russo-Serbia; Russia (Turkish); Ottoman territory in Europe—E1de; 11.
Russo-Romania (medieval); Romania (Romanian); region of eastern Europe—IKL1Mc; 1, 3.
Ruthenia (medieval); region of eastern Europe, not equivalent to modern (till 1945)
Czechoslovakian province—L1e; 3.
Sahara (Italian); district 35 miles north of Rome (G13d4. 5).
Sahara; region; see Sahara.
Sagitt. port; see Sisam.
Sahara, as-Saḫārah (Arabic); desert—D6P016g; 2, 3.
Saint Abraham; town—see Habsan.
Saint Albanus; Verulamium (Latin); town 30 miles west of London (D5b4; 2).
Saint Andrew; Cape; see Cape Andrew.
Saint Berun (French); abbey; 17 miles east of Boulougne (E2b5; 2).
Saint George; town—see Lydda.
Saint Gilles-du-Gard (French); village 10 miles west of Arles (E3d2; 2).
Saint Hilarius or Diedonius (French); Aylas larion (modern Greek); castle—K14b; 2.
Saint Jean d'Arc; city; port; see Jarc.
Saint Nicholas; town; see Sabin.
Saint Nicholas; Aylos Nikolos (modern Greek); village—K13f; 3.
Saint Omer (French); town—E3d5; 2.
Saint Pol-sur-Thernoise (French); town; 34 miles north of Amiens (E3c; 2).
Saint Quentin (French); town; 26 miles southwest of Lyon (E4c1; 2).
Saint Simon (medieval); As-Sammin (Arabic); Slaymeyde (Turkish); port—L1de; 6.
Saint Theodosius, Dair Ibn-Uthman (Arabic); Greek Orthodox monastery—L14e; 7.
Saint Trois (French); town—F7d; 2.
Saint Ursaine (French); abbey; 42 miles southwest of Tournai (F5c2; 2).
Salir (German); Sangaran (classical); river—K1d; 1, K1d5; 5.
Salamanca (Spanish); Salamantina (Arabic); city—C5d5; 2.
Salerno (Italian); port—G5d3; 3.
Salisbury; city—D6b4; 2.
Salmas, Selma, or Selanestrum (medieval); Salmas, Dilmu, or Shahrur (Persian); town—M3d2; 1.
Salone or La Salie (medieval); Amphilos (classical); Amfisos (modern Greek); town—D3e; 3, 4.
Salva (Arabic); Salamlik; city—see Thamalmecca.
Sali (Arabic); town—L1f3; 7.
Salisburg (German); city—G4c3; 2, 3.
Samaria (classical); district of northern Palestine—L1f3; 7.
Samarkand, Samarqand (Persian, Arabic); city—R2c1; 12, 13.
Samothrace; Samothraka (classical Greek); Sameothraki (modern Greek); island—L1d5; 5.
Sangarias; river; see Sakarya.
San Germano Vescovese (Italian); village 22 miles southwest of Monteferrat (F4c5; 3).
San Gimignano (Italian); town 12 miles northwest of Sienna (G3d2; 3).
Sanok (Polish); town—B3d; 3.
Santorin; island; see Lesvos.
Santiago de Compostela, sheme—see Compostela.
Saone (medieval), Sályum or Sálima (Arabic): crusader castle—L2e5.
Sarákina (classical), Zaraqina (classical), Sarakina (Spanish), Suriq (Arabic): city—D5d4: 2.
Sarai or Sarai-Batn (Turk), Sarki (Persian: palace): town, now abandoned—N3e3.
Saral-Berke: town—see Aksum.
Sardinia: Sardegna (Italian): island—Föle: 2, 3.
Saramako: city—see Karamako.
Saros Bay, Saros Kari (Turkish): bay north of Gallipoli peninsula (J2d5: 3).
Sarukhan (Turkish): district of western Anatolia—Kö: 5.
Sārus (classical), Salan (Armenian), Seyhan (Turkish): river—L1e6: 6.
Satala, port—see Adana.
Satlino: city—see Athens.
Sava or Savo (Croatian), Sav (German), Sáva (Hungarian): river—H4d1: 3.
Savoie, Savoie (French): region of se France—Föle: 2, 3.
Saxony, Sachsen (German): region of northern Germany—Gö: 2, 3.
Scandina: port—see Aleysna.
Scandinavia: region comprising Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.
Schwaben, region—see Swabia.
Scoi, island—see Chios.
Scrabben: town—see Sop贻.
Scuari (Italian), Chrysopolis (classical), Üsküdar (Turkish): port—J5d4: 3.
Scuari (Italian), Scdri (classical), Szkodar (Albanian): port—H5d3: 3.
Sebiania: city—see Sivas.
Selenuco (Italian), Šibenik (Serbian): port—H4d2: 3.
Selin, town—see Mühlenbach.
Sena: port—see Senig.
Senz (Italian): town 30 miles out of Rome (G3d4: 3).
Seine (French): river—E3c2: 2.
Seleucia Trachea (classical), Salagia (Armenian), Silifke (Turkish): port, now town—Kö: 1.
Salmas, town—see Salmas.
Selembria (medieval), Selvë (Turkish): port—J4d4: 5.
Sennedria, town—see Smederevo.
Seni (Serbian), Sengi (Italian), Zeng (German): port—G5d1: 3.
Serbia, Srbija (Serbian): region east of Danubia—Hic: 3.
Sera (medieval), Sérna (modern Greek): town—G4d4: 3, 4, 3.
Seara, Lahu (Kuman), Gökçe Gölü (Turkish)—Ndö: 1.
Serrai (Kurmanian): district north of Omahova—Kost: 3.
Seville, Hispalis (classical), Sevilla (Spanish), İhlibeyik (Arabic): city—G3e3: 2.
Shabala, Şabac (Serbian), Bogdanecea (Turkish): town 40 miles west of Belgrade (H1d3).
Shahzar (medieval Arabic), Larnas (classical), Sallos (modern Arabic): fortress, now town—L2e5: 6.
Shajof (Armenian): castle—see Belfast.
Shah-Sulayman: fortress—see Krak de Montréal.
Shumen, Šumenská (Bulgarian), Sümü (Turkish): town, now Kolevograd—J2d2: 3.
Sibeni, port—see Šibenik.
Sibiu, town—see Hermannstadt.
Sicily, Sicilia (Italian), Sisifiyah (Arabic), Transcaria (medieval): island—Ge: 2, 3.
Sidon, Saginna (medieval), Saida (Arabic): port—L1e2: 1, 7.
Siebenburgen, regnum—see Transylvania.
Sienna (Italian): town — Gh2: 2, 3.
Sigh (Turkish): fortress on the coast of Cilicia (Je: 6).
Sigouni or Evroul (modern Greek): Bastion (medieval Greek) — K3g: 1
Silcha, Schlema (German), Slatk (Polish), Slezak (Czech): region north of Moravia — H1v: 3.
Sillice: port — see Sestrija.
Selcetia or Sikstra; town — see Drezna.
Silviu, port — see Selymbria.
Silvans: town — see Mahalya.
Silves (Portuguese), Shîb (Arabic): town — C3e: 2.
Smita, Sina' (Arabic): province — K1g: 1
Smit, Most, or Moua: Horse; Inbal Mena (Arabic: mountain of Moses) — K4g: 1
Simonopolis; Slavopol (medieval Greek), Simop (Turkish): port — L1d: 3, 1.
Sis (Armenian, medieval), Kesaz (Turkish): town — L1e: 3.
Sitta or Senna (Greek): town — J2c: 3.
Sivas; Sebastia (classical), Silves (Turkish): city — L3d: 1.
Skopiye, Škupski (Turkish), Skopje (Serbian): town — J2dd: 3, 3.
Slavograd (Bulgarian): castle near Zlataora.
Slavonice (Serbian): village 13 miles SW of Belgrade (L1d: 1), 3.
Slavonia, district east of Croatia — Hc: 3.
Slovenia, region now of Croatia — Gh1: 3.
Sluys (Flemish, Dutch), L'Échille (French): port, now town, 10 miles SW of Draguignan (E4b: 2).
Smederevo (Serbian), Semendria (German): town 24 miles N of Belgrade (L1d: 3).
Smirna (classical), Iznik (Turkish): city, port — F3e: 1, 3, 5.
Sofia; Sárétika (classical), Triadicia (medieval Greek), Sredia (Serbian), Sofia (Bulgarian): city — I4d: 3, 3.
Soll (Greek): town, now abandoned — K3c: 6.
Scop (Bulgarian), Srbistouch (medieval): town — J5d: 3, 3.
Socopolis (medieval), Apollonia (classical), Strumica or Uluborlu (Turkish), Sexopolis (Bulgarian): town — J3d: 3, 3.
Spain; Hispania (classical), España (Spanish): region south of the Pyrenees.
Spalato (medieval), Split (Serbian): port — H2dd: 3.
Sparta or Lakedaimonia (Latin), Sparta or Lakaidaimonia (classical Greek), Spárí (modern Greek): town — E3e: 4.
Sporades; Sporádes (modern Greek): island group — H1r: 3, 4, 3.
Srebrnica, Srebrenica (Serbian): town 73 miles SW of Belgrade (L1d: 3).
Sredieni Gora (Bulgarian): mountain range — L1d: 3.
Stallmene: island — see Lemnos.
Stanchio or Stankal, island — see Con.
Starkenberg: castle — see Minden.
Straubing (German), Straubing (French): city — F3c: 2, 2.
Strymon; Strymón (classical Greek), Strýmós (modern Greek), Struma (Bulgarian): river — I4d: 4.
Styria, Steiermark (German): region of southern Austria — Ghc: 3.
Sudan, as-Sudan (Arabic): the Negro lands; region south of Egypt — JKh: 1.
Suez; as-Sawâ (Arabic): port — K3g: 1.
Sultaniye (medieval Turkish), Çanakkale (modern Turkish): port — J2d: 5, 5.
Sultaniye, Sultaniye (Persian), Kangouran (Mongol): town — N4e: 1.
Štir port — see Tyre.
Suzdal (Russian): city — M3d: 12.
Swabia, Schwaben (German): region of SW Germany — Fc: 2, 3.

Syria (classical), ash-Shām or Şeriyah (Arabic): region east of the Mediterranean – Le: 1

Szczecin (Polish): town – H568: 3.

Szekesfehérvár (Hungarian): city, near Szeged – H568: 3.

Szekszárd (Hungarian): town – H568: 3.

Szeged (Hungarian): city, near Székesfehérvár – H568: 3.

Széchenyi (Hungarian): thus: town – see Giunta.

Szécsény (Hungarian): district roughly equivalent to Severin (1ed. 3)


Tagliamento (Italian): river flowing into the Adriatic; lies 12 miles east of Cassile – C136: 3

Tagus (classical), Tajo (Spanish), Tejo (Portuguese), Тагус (Arabic): river – C36: 2

Tamis (medieval), Тамис (modern): town – H568: 3.

Taranto (Italian): port – M343: 3.

Tarsus (classical, Turkish), Дарас (Armenian): city – K564: 1

Tashkent; Tashkent or Tashkand (Armenian city – K564: 12, 13

Taurus (classical), Таври́дская Горка (Turkish): mountain range – Le: 1

Tauris town – see Domatula.


Tbilisi; city – see Tiflis.

Tekke (Turkish): region of sw Anatolia, equivalent to classical Pamphyliam – Je 2.

Tel Bithnah: Tell Bashar (Arabic), תלבנeah (medieval), Тель-Башар (Turkish): fortresses – L34: 6.

Tembris or Tmbria (Greek): village – K564: 3.

Temesvár (Hungarian): district of western Romania – Icz: 10, 11.

Temesvar (Hungarian), Тимисоара (Romanian): town – I36: 3.

Tengchou (medieval), Тейан (Mongol): district of Mongolia – AAD: 13

Thebes, Θέβαι (classical Greek), Θηβαι (medieval), Θήβαι (modern Greek): city – L34: 3, 4.

Théra (Greek): island – H568: 3, 4

Theben (French): village 29 miles east of Boulogne – E326: 5, 2.

Thessalonaiki (medieval), Тесалион (classical), Sołounia (Macedonian), Θεσσαλονίκη (Greek), city, port – L34: 3, 4.

Thessaly; Θεσσαλία (classical), Vitsalmia (medieval), Thrakií (modern Greek): region of northern Greece – Le: 3, 4.

Thiony-la-Bercheur (French): village 30 miles wsw of Dijon – L34: 2.

Thrace; Thracia (Latin), Θρακή (classical Greek), Θράκη (Turkish), Тракия (Turkish), Thraki (modern Greek): region south of Bulgaria – Icz: 3, 3, 5

Thuringia, Тюринген (German): region of central Germany – Icz: 2, 3.

Tiberius (classical), Тиберий (Arabic), Тебирия (Israeli) town – L34: 3, 4.

Tiberias, Lake – see Galilee, Sea of.

Tibet, region: north of India – UY34: 12, 13.

Tiflis; Tiflis (Persian), Тифлис (Georgian): city – M343: 1.

Tigris (classical), دجلة (Arabic), Дюле (Turkish): river – H364: 1.
Tiran: see Emboué.

Timok (medieval); Sara (Turkish); Zajecar (Serbian); town 30 miles N.W. of Vidin (132d: 3).

Tinc or Thina: see Thino.

Timisoara (Latin); Timișoara (Turkish); Timopoulo (Bulgarian); town—131d: 1, 3, 5.

Tito (Serbian); village 29 miles N.W. of Belgrade (131d: 3).

Toldeo (Spanish); Toledo (classical), Talhunah (Arabic); city—131e: 2.

Tompotina (Bulgarian); river flowing port Philippopolis (133d: 5) to Maritam.

Tor (French); town, probably fictitious.

Toroc (medieval); Tower Rouge (French); unattested place, probably in Spain

Troy (medieval); Fromés (French); town—131c: 7.

Troya, Amraschina (classical), Amirsina or Tureia (Arabic); port—131f: 1, 6.

Troyes (French); Doros (classical), Tauracenv (Arabic); town—131c: 2.

Toul (French); town—131e: 2, 3.

Toulouse (French); Dormyal (Flamenish); town—131e: 2.

Tournai (French); Domuzle (Flemish); town—131e: 2.

Tours (French); town—131c: 2.

Trajan’s Door: Kopoulas Derbend (Bulgarian); pass 40 miles N. of Sofia (143d: 3).

Transylvania, Siebenburgen (German), Erdély (Hungarian); Ardeal (Romanian); region of medieval Hungary—131c: 1, 3.

Traù (medieval); Trogir (Serbian); port—132d: 3.

Trabzon. Trapezus (classical), Trapezunt (medieval), Trabzon (Turkish) city, port—133d: 1.


Trepca, Trepca (Serbian); mora 24 miles N.W. of Krasovo (132d: 3).

Trévise (Italian); town 15 miles N.E. of Venice (133c: 3).

Trié (German); Thiene (French); city—131e: 2, 3.

Trieste, island, see where.

Tripoli; Oea (classical), Trašeul al-Ghur (Arabic); port—131f: 3.

Tripoli, Tripolis (classical), Tarabulga (Arabic); city, port—131f: 1, 6, 7.

Troy (classical); town—see Tirona.

Troy (French); port—see Troy.

Troya, Iliria, Illyria, or Troia (classical); site of ancient city, at village of Hisarkale—131b: 3.

Troyes (French); town—131e: 2.

Tunis; Tunis (Arabic); city—131e: 2, 3.

Tunisia, Ufriyiyah (Arabic); region of North Africa—131f: 2, 3.

Turkey;Türkiye (Turkish); modern nation, comprising Anatolia and parts of Thrace, Armenia, and Kurdistan.

Turgu (Romagnian), Drubetia (classical); town, now Tarnu-Suveric—131d: 3.

Tarcsa; Toscana (Italian); region of classical Italy—131d: 2, 3.

Tarsesium (Latin); town, now abandoned, 12 miles S.E. of Rome (134d: 3).

Tyre; Tyr (classical), Sīr (Arabic), Tyr (Israel); port—131f: 1, 7.

Tsing, island—see Czea.

Tsourian; town—see Chora.

Tzycype (classical), Jimir or Çinikale (Turkish); port north of Gallipoli (132d: 3).

Ujéj (Croatan), Bok (Turkish); village—131e: 3.

Ukraine; Ukraina (Romagna); region of S.W. Russia—131c: 1, 3.

Ucje; port—see Dukergin.

Upper Egypt: region along the Nile south of Cairo—131g: 8.

Utra; city—see Edessa.

Urgench (Romagna), Urgeneç (Turkish), Urguney (Persian), al-Farghānîyah (Arabic), now Kusnya Urgench; city, now abandoned for Novo Urgench—131d: 13.

Ustiklar: port—see Scutari.
Valence (French); town—E5d1: 2.
Valencia (Spanish); Balawan (Arabic); city, port—D5e1: 2.
Valona; port—see Avlona.
Van (Lake), Van (Otom) (Turkish)—M5e2: 1.
Varni, probably Vieni (Hungarian); Vojnici (Croatian); Warnsdorf (German); town—
50 miles east of City (H1:4, 3).
Vardar (medieval), Axios (classical); river—E3d4: 4.
Varna (medieval, Bulgarian); port, formerly called Thalass—J3d2: 1, 3, 5.
Venezia; Venezia (Italian); city, port—G3c5: 2, 3.
Verdun (French); town—F1c3: 2, 3.
Vermandois (French); district of eastern Picardy (E3: 2).
Vera (modern); city—G2c3: 2.
Verni (medieval), Veria (modern Greek); Fere or Kum-Fere (Turkish); town—
J3d5: 4.
Via Egnatia (medieval); road across Itally from Durazzo to Constantinople—H1d: 4, 5.
Vidin (Bulgarian); town—J3d2: 3.
Vienne, Winchester (German); city—H2c2: 3.
Vimose (French); town—E5c3: 2.
Vintimile (French); district of sw France, now called Dauphiné—E3: 2.
Vilages, Villages (Hungarian); Šarja (Romanian); village 40 miles west of Temesvár—
L2c5: 3.
Vilk (Serbian); district around the Ljub valley.
Vitach (German); town—G3c4: 2, 3.
Villefranche sur Mer (French), Vieste (Italian); port—F3d2: 2.
Villehardouin (French); castle near Troyes (E5c2: 2).
Vizela, Wiesa (Polish), Weisel (German); river—H5b3: 3.
Viebro (Italian); city—G3d3: 2, 3.
Viry-en-Artois (French); village 25 miles south of Lille (E4b3: 2).
Vivar or Viver or Viver (Spanish); town—E5e1: 2.
Vlachia region—see Thessaly and Wallachia.
Volga (Russian), Vol; Don (Turk); river—N3c4: 1.
Voitsin (medieval Greek), Venetia (medieval), Venița (modern Greek); town—J1c2: 3, 4.
Vosporo (medieval), Kerch (Russian); port—L2c5: 1.
Vostis (medieval), Aegium (Latin), Alyon (modern Greek); town—J3d2: 4.
Votrich; Vlătina (Serbian); town 15 miles north of Komorov—L2d3: 3.

Wales; Cambria (Latin), Cymru (Welsh); region west of England—D3: 2.
Wallachia, Vlachia (medieval), Wallachia (Romanian), Eilak (Turkish); region north-
of Bulgaria—J1d: 1, 3.
Warwick, town—D4b3: 2.
Waverley (French); town 16 miles north of Tourans—E4b3: 2.
Wiesenburg; town—see Allua Judica.
Wessex; region of southern England.
Wihan; city—see Vienne.
Winchester; city—D4b4: 2.
Worms (German); town—F1c2: 2, 3.
Wroclaw; city—see Breslau.
Wuerzburg (German); city—F5c1: 2, 3.

Yangchow or Yang-chou (Chinese); city, port—M3c3: 13.
Yança (Bulgarian); river—J1d2: 3.
Yatza; Yaza (Serbian); town—H3d1: 3.
Yemen, El-Yaman (Arabic); region of sw Arabia—MNü: 12, 13.
Yengiskor, Yenisey (Russian); town, north of Carkaysa, 1 mile south of Arkara (K3e1. 3).
Ypres (French), Ieper (Flemish); town 17 miles NW of Lille (E3b5. 2).

Zahid (Arabic); town—E4g2. 42.
Zaitun (medieval), Thiensung or Chun-chuang (Chinese); port—D3h1. 12, 13
Zaječar; town—see Timok
Zante (Italian), Zacynthos (Latin), Zakynthos (modern Greek); island—H2e1. 3, 4.
Zara (Italian), Jadara (classical), Zadar (Croatian); port—H1d1. 3.
Zaragoza, city—see Saragossa.
Zec; island—see Cocos.
Zeitounion; Lashe (classical), Græmna or Cith (medieval), Zitoune (medieval Greek),
Laodike (modern Greek); town—F3c2. 3, 4.
Zichen (Greek); town—E4d1. 4, 5.
Zlatina (Bulgarian); town 3 miles north of Zlatoust.
Zlatina (Bulgarian); town 42 miles east of Sofia (E4d1. 3).
Znojmo (Czech), Znana (German); town—F2c2. 3.
Zonkina, port—see Navarino.
Zvornik (Serbian); town—H3d1. 3.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Introductory Note

A bibliographer is a prisoner of circumstances. This applies to many aspects of his activities and starts with completeness. I did not try to achieve it in this bibliography because it would have meant to duplicate, and more than duplicate, my 1960 Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge, which would not have served any practical purpose, even if space limitations had permitted. On the other hand, while reference must be made to my earlier volume, this bibliography had to be somewhat more comprehensive in scope because the chapters of the six volumes give much more consideration to North Africa, Spain, Prussia, and Bohemia than I did there. Apart from including sections on the wars in these countries, I have attempted to make the bibliography more comprehensive for the more modern publications. In other words, from the older literature on the subject I have selected only those books and studies which seem to me to be either standard works in the field or, at least, of considerable importance to it. Another criterion for inclusion has been that works should be included which would lead the researcher easily to much of the previous literature concerning this or that special subject within the general topic. Thus, a book such as Gustave Schlumberger et al., Sigillographie de l'Orient latin (1943), made it possible to exclude almost everything written on the seals of the Latin east before that year. I know, however, that my criteria for the inclusion of less recent works of research are to some extent arbitrary; I must again plead as an excuse the restrictions imposed by considerations of space, which no editor can allow without limits, as well as the fact that this general bibliography had to reflect to some extent what individual authors had cited as source material and scholarly literature in their chapters. If they felt that such titles merited citation, I was to a certain extent bound, not that I would have disagreed with them very often, but this meant that I had to make sacrifices in other places where I was completely on my own.

I have made two previous bibliographical efforts in the field of the crusades, and, for literature up to about the year of publication of each, I should like to refer the reader to them for more detailed information: (1) Hans E. Mayer, Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge (Hanover, 1960), containing publications approximately up to 1958, and continued, as a bibliographie raisonnée, by (2) Hans E. Mayer, "Literaturbericht über die Geschichts der Kreuzzüge: Veröffentlichungen 1958–1967," Historische Zeitschrift: Sonderheft 3 (1969), pp. 641–731. I had intended to provide the next installment after another ten years had elapsed. Before they had done so I was asked by
the general editor, Dr. Kenneth M. Setton, to join in this international venture, and I gladly agreed to his request. This bibliography, then, also constitutes the second continuation of my Bibliographie of 1960, although the new is mixed with a generous selection of the old. With regard to significant new publications since 1967, I have attempted to list them through 1982 with sundry (but not systematically collected) additions of more recent publications. I hope that the bibliographical material put together here will be of value to students of the field.

There are a number of other and more specific dilemmas of a bibliographer with which everyone who has done this kind of work is familiar, and I shall not try to give an exhaustive list. While middle names of authors are normally given only as initials, every effort has been made to extend the first given names of authors who use only their initials. It is English scholars in particular who seem to be elusive on this point, presenting me with a number of “unbreakable codes”; I apologize for this slight inconsistency and inconvenience. Another problem was that of reprints and translations: I have listed them where they came to my knowledge, but no systematic effort has been made to be comprehensive in this respect because both reprints and translations are very hard for the bibliographer to trace, as they are not reported broadly enough in the review sections of scholarly journals or in periodic bibliographies.

A special case is that of the Collected Studies series of Variorum Reprints in London. Thanks to the firm’s catalogues, issued twice a year, they are quite easy to track down, and a good number of them are pertinent to this bibliography. They gave me an unexpected opportunity to alleviate the space problem. Generally speaking, in the cases of such individual collected studies, be they published by Variorum or another publishing house, or of collective volumes of papers, I have included only the volume as a whole, not the individual papers. But no rule should be followed without exceptions, so I have dispensed with this principle in the cases of some authors whose work is particularly important to the subject of the crusades. The most notable exceptions are Claude Cahen, Joshua Pratcher, Jean Richard, and Kenneth M. Setton. If in their cases only the volumes of collected studies had been listed, the bibliography would not have shown the extent of their outstanding contributions to the field.

I shall only mention but not discuss the problem of transliteration from oriental languages (and also from Slavonic ones with a Cyrillic alphabet or from Greek). Every bibliographer knows that there is simply no solution to this problem which would yield consistency. The History of the Crusades does have a standard transliteration system
for Arabic, etc., but this was useless for me if I was dealing with a book where Arabic words had already been transliterated on the title page according to the French or German or another fashion. I could no longer change this, but I trust that orientalists will understand this predicament. This leads me to another problem which is not oriental in character at all, but somewhat irritating. Some names of authors appear in their publications in various forms, which is not surprising where transliteration enters the picture once more. I enter them under a standardized form, with specific variants in parentheses, as “Ostrogorski (here, Ostrogorsky)” or “Hopf, Carl (here, Charles)”.

The titles of sources and of certain specialized categories are arranged according to subject matter. This is not always easy because some titles could as easily be classified in one section as in another. But I had to make a choice, as I could not list any titles twice. I have put such titles into those sections to which they seemed to be most pertinent. The system of arrangement by subject matter is maintained from the big sections to the small subsections and the development of the system can easily be followed in the headings of sections and subsections. The latter are sufficiently small to abandon, within each subsection, the arrangement by subject matter in favor of an alphabetical arrangement which will impose no hardships on the reader. However, it seemed to be more appropriate to list the papal documents by successive pontificates rather than alphabetically by the names either of editors or of popes.

Titles of secondary works are listed alphabetically by author (or by editor if there is no author listed), and chronologically for each author; all are cross-indexed by primary subject matter. Titles without author or editor named are listed at the end, followed by selective cross-indexes of subjects and of co-authors, editors, and translators. A list of abbreviations for periodicals or series occurring frequently in this bibliography will be found appended to this introductory note. Dr. McLellan and I supplied almost all the bibliographical materials and we are responsible for any errors contained therein. Dr. Hazard is responsible for the way these materials are here arranged for presentation as well as for several additional entries (as to Dr. Norman Zaehner) and for the indexes. He is also responsible for the editorial decision, based on the Chicago Manual of Style and followed throughout all six volumes of this work, to capitalize in French, Italian, and Spanish titles the second word of a title, if the first word is a definite or an indefinite article.

It would have been impossible for me to compile this bibliography if I had not had the help of Dr. Joyce McLellan. She checked and re-
checked the titles to be included within the larger framework of preparing my old Bibliographie for a possible new edition. Her accuracy was as much to be admired as her persistence. She justly appears as co-author of this bibliography, and my sincerest thanks must be extended to her here, all the more so since I have completely lost track of her whereabouts. My thanks are also due to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for having provided the funds for Dr. McLellan to work with me. Our joint thanks are due to the staff of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich, which never failed to respond to our frequent requests, many of which were not easy to accommodate.

Hans E. Mayer
Abbreviations Used in Bibliography

Abb. GötL: Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der Akademie (eberer, Gesellschaft) der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen

ABS Aikns: Journal of the British School at Athens

AF Prod.: Archivum PROOEDICUM

Am. Hist. Rev.: American Historical Review

AO Lat.: Archivum de l'Oratoire latin

AOSMM: Annales de l'armée suisse militaire de Malte

Arch. Rom.: Archivo romano

BC Hell.: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique

BÉCH: Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes

BIBL HÉ: Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes-études

BÉPAR: Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome

Bibl. Arch.: Bibliothèque archéologique et historique

Bibl. AHN: Biblioteca biblio-bibliografica della Terra Santa o dell'Oriente Franese

Byz. F: Byzantinische Forschungen

Byz. Z: Byzantinische Zeitschrift

Cah. Chim. Méd.: Cahiers de civilisation médiévale

Cath. HR: Catholic Historical Review

CD inédits: Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de la France

Col. URC: Columbia University Records of Civilization Sources and Studies

CRAIBL: Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres

CSH Byz.: Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae

Dumbarton Oaks Papers

DRH Cr.: Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades

Eng. HR: English Historical Review

Fonti St.: Fonti per la storia d'Italia

Fonti SV: Fonti per la storia di Venezia

Forsch. DG: Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte

Göt. Nach.: Nachrichten der Akademie (eberer, Gesellschaft) der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 1. Philologisch-historische Klasse


Hist. Z: Historische Zeitschrift

HJ Göttw.: Historisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft

H of C: A History of the Crusades (the present work: see Setton 1955)


JAA: Journal amenaqah

JESHO: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient

J Med. H: Journal of Medieval History

MAIABL: Mémoires de l'Institut national de France, Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres

Mod. AA: Medieval (eberer, Medieval) Academy of America

Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'École française de Rome
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