MĀDHVA LOGIC

BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE PRAMĀṆA-
CANDRIKA WITH AN INTRODUCTORY OUTLINE OF
MĀDHVA PHILOSOPHY AND THE TEXT IN
SANSKRIT

BY

SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA, M.A., Ph.D.
LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
AUTHOR OF "THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS"

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PREFACE

The accredited authority on Mādhva Logic is Jayatīrtha, and his celebrated work, the Pramanapaddhati, is the authoritative logical text of the Mādhvas. The Pramanacandrikā is a shorter work and follows the Pramanapaddhati closely, reproducing the language of the Paddhati in many places and acknowledging the Paddhati as its authority at the end of every section. The Candrikā however has the merit of being a clear presentation both of Mādhva and other rival views. The present translation, it is hoped, will give a clear idea of Mādhva logical theory and its points of agreement and disagreement with the theories of other schools. The Introduction which gives an outline of Mādhva Philosophy will also be of use in understanding and correctly appraising the Mādhva viewpoint.

Jayatīrtha is supposed to have flourished towards the middle of the fourteenth century. According to one estimate he must be placed between 1317 A.D. and 1380 A.D. Since the author of the Candrikā refers throughout to Jayatīrtha’s Paddhati as his source-book, and always with profound respect, he may be taken to be one of Jayatīrtha’s younger contemporaries.
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He must therefore have flourished either at the latter half of the 14th or the beginning of the 15th century.

My sincerest thanks are due to my colleague, Dr. Satcowrie Mookerjee, for seeing the Sanskrit text through the Press. He has however departed from the original Mādhva Vilāsa edition (now out of print) in two respects. In the first place, he has divided the work into chapters—an evident improvement in form. Secondly, he has changed the text itself in some places. As I am unable to accept the correctness of all the changes he has made, some of the passages as they occur in the original Mādhva Vilāsa edition appearing to me to be quite in order, I leave the whole matter to the judgment of my readers.
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INTRODUCTION

Mādhva philosophy is the conceptual formulation of the religious attitude of devotion or Bhakti and rests on the idea of an essential distinction between the devotee and the object of his worship. As the philosophic interpretation of the Vedanta teachings it is therefore not merely revolutionary but also heretical. Its dualistic metaphysics and its conception of the Lord as the efficient and not the material cause of the world are a direct negation of the monism of the Upanishadic teachings. It has thus been repudiated by Vedantists themselves as a gross caricature of the Vedanta doctrines, particularly by the Śankarite Advaitins who reject even qualified non-dualism as inconsistent with Vedantic Absolutism. Mādhvaism thus stands to orthodox Vedantism as Sufism does to Islamic Monotheism. If pantheistic Sufism is the worst heresy of Islamism, no less is Mādhva Theism as an interpretation of Vedanta monism.

The central conception in the Mādhva metaphysics is the idea of an eternal and unsurmountable gap between the Lord and the world of inanimate objects and sentient souls. The Lord is the highest reality and has independent being. The world and the individual souls are
all dependent on the Lord, but are not existentially one with Him. The Lord thus is the efficient and not the material cause of the world (cf. Nyāya). The world depends on the Lord, but also has being outside Him. So also have the jīvas or individual souls who are subservient to the Lord and are his eternal servants. Thus the distinctions between the Lord and the world and between the Lord and sentient souls are not merely essential but also eternal.

The main points of the Mādhva Philosophy are summarised in a Sanskrit sloka the purport of which we give here in English:—

The Lord (Hari) is the highest reality (para-tattva). The world is real. Difference is real. Individual souls are the servants of the Lord (Hareranucarāh). They are distinguished by superior and inferior excellences. Liberation is the experience of untainted innate bliss. Bhakti or devotion together with the Lord’s grace is the means to liberation. Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony are the sources of knowledge. In regard to the Lord the Vedas are the sole evidence. The Vedas are eternal and impersonal.

The above clearly brings out the wide divergence of the Mādhva and the Sankarite views. For the Sankarite the world is a false appearance in the Absolute and is devoid of strict reality. For the Mādhvas the world has reality, though not the self-dependent reality of the Lord. For
the Sankarites, distinction is an indescribable false appearance in the undifferenced reality of the Absolute. Hence the distinctive reality of the world is an eternally cancelled appearance in Brahman. For the Mādhvas, distinction is not only real but also eternal. Hence the five distinctions between the Lord and the inanimate world, between the Lord and the individual souls, between one individual soul and another, between one inanimate object and another and between an individual soul and an inanimate object are both real and eternal.

This brings us to the Mādhva view of the nature and constitution of the world and its scheme of the padārthas or knowables. Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who recognise seven kinds of knowables, the Bhāttas who recognise five (the seven of the Nyāya-vaisesikas minus visesa and samavāya) and the Prabhākaras who recognise eight [five of the Nyāya-vaisesikas barring abhāva and viśeṣa, plus samkhya (number), sādṛśya (similarity) and Sakti (potency)], the Mādhvas recognise ten kinds of padārthas, viz., (1) substance, (2) quality, (3) action, (4) generality, (5) individuality, (6) the qualified substantive (visista), (7) the composite whole (amsi), (8) Power or Sakti, (9) Similarity and (10) Absence or Negation.

Of these, substances are of twenty different kinds and comprise (1) The Supreme Soul or the

Qualities again are of 41 different kinds including the qualities of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas as well as such other excellences and deficiencies as serenity, steadfastness, gravity of mind, fear, shame, strength, self-restraint, endurance, valour, magnanimity, etc.

Actions again are either moral or non-moral. Moral actions are objects of approval or disapproval. Non-moral action is physical motion.

Generality is either eternal or non-eternal. Individualities are innumerable and are the bases of all differentiation and distinction.

By a qualified substance is meant a substantive specified by an adjective.

Composite wholes are again either limited in size or of unlimited extent.

Sakti or power is of four kinds, viz., inherent power, adventitious power, the power that is
unthinkable, and a word’s power of meaning or referring to an object.

Similarities are innumerable and are functions of single objects as determined by their relations to other objects. Thus though a similarity holds between one object and another, it is a function only of one and not of both.

Absence is of four kinds, *viz.*, Antecedent Absence, Emergent Absence, Absolute Absence and Reciprocal Absence. Of these the first are other than the locations they characterise. Not so reciprocal negation. It is the same as its locus, the negation being non-different from the entities which negate each other. Further it is either eternal or non-eternal. As negation of eternal entities it is eternal, as negation of non-eternal entities it is non-eternal. This follows from such negation being non-different from the entities which so negate each other. Absolute negation is the negation of what never, nowhere exists. It is thus the negation of the unreal or the imaginary. Though the entity which it negates is unreal, the negation itself as the absolute absence of the unreal is real. Thus absolute negation is the real absence of the absolutely unreal.

The Mādhva view of the Lord and the individual soul presents many points of contact with, as well as of divergence from, the Nyāya view. As with the Naiyāyikas, the Lord, according to the Mādhvas, is the efficient and not the material cause
of the world. The Lord further is independent, all-pervading and is the subject of such qualities as omniscience, etc. Lakṣmī is the power of the Lord. The jīva or individual soul, on the other hand, is atomic (contrast Nyāya), is existentially separate from, though dependent on, the Lord, is ignorant, in bondage, etc. Further the jīva stands to the Lord as reflection (pratibimba) to the original. Through the knowledge of the Lord the karmic potencies of the jīva wear away, and this prepares the way to liberation. Bhakti together with the Lord’s grace is the cause of Liberation which consists in the experience of pure, inherent bliss. Prakṛti or primordial nature is the cause of bondage and is the root of beginningless nescience. Nescience itself is a positive category and is the source of the two kinds of ignorance, viz., ignorance as regards one’s own nature and ignorance as regards the nature of the Lord.

The Mādhva view of the twenty kinds of substance includes, it will be noted, not merely the nine different kinds of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas but also those of the Sāṅkhya Philosophers. Elementary Ākāśa of the Mādhvas, e.g., is the same as the Ākāśa of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, while unchanging Ākāśa is only the space or dvik of the latter reintroduced under a different name. Thus we have all the nine of the latter, viz., the five elements, besides space, time, mind and self. But in addition to these we have also some of the
Sānkhyā metaphysics. For example, Prakṛti, the Gunaś, Buddha, Ahamkāra, mind, the senses (indriya), the infrasibles (mātra corresponding to tanmātra), etc., are all Sānkhyā padārthas. To these of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika substances and the Sānkhyā padārthas, the Mādhvas add some of their own such as Avidyā (Nescience), Pratibimba (Reflection), the Alphabetical Sounds and Darkness.

As regards gunaś as qualities, it will be noted that they are not the same as the three gunaś which are substances. The gunaś as qualities are attributes while the three gunaś are substantive reals. The gunaś as qualities, it will be further noted, include not only the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika qualities but also many moral attributes of the soul such as serenity, mental gravity, magnanimity, etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas will regard these latter as compounds of certain primary qualities of the self such as pleasure, pain, attraction, aversion, etc.

The Mādhva classification of actions into moral and the morally indifferent or neutral also shows a clear departure from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas willing is a quality of the soul and not an action—a quality presupposing attraction or aversion as its condition and as such being the object of moral judgment. In Mādhyamism however willing is regarded as a kind of acting and therefore as a species of the genus which includes physical motion as well.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of generality is also
similarly modified by the Mādhyavas. The Naiyāyikas consider nityatva or eternality to be part of the definition of ‘generality,’ so that a ‘generality’ which is not nitya is no generality. The Mādhvas reject this view and subscribe to the conception of nitya and anitya generalities. Thus Brahminhood, manhood, etc., are non-eternal generalities, since their individual substrates are non-eternal. A man may become a Brahmin through the practice of penance and self-mortification just as contrariwise one may lose Brahminhood through misdeeds. So also manhood may be lost in a subsequent birth, it being possible for a man to be reborn as an animal in a subsequent rebirth. Thus we must suppose non-eternal generalities in such cases. But a generality like that of individual self-hood (jīvatva) is eternal, for no jīva ever ceases to be.

And what is true of generality also holds of particularity. Here also we must recognise, according to Mādhvas, both eternal and non-eternal particularities. Thus the particularity of an eternal spirit like the Lord is itself eternal, while the particularity of a non-eternal thing like a jar is non-eternal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas will say that the particularity of a non-eternal thing being due to the particularities of their eternal constituents, no separate particularity for the whole as a compound need be assumed. But this view does not appeal to the Mādhvas.

In place of the samavāya relation of the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣikas, again, the Mādhvas will have the two *padārthas* of the *viśiṣṭa* or qualified substantive and the *amśi* or composite whole. These two between themselves comprise, according to the Mādhvas, every case of the so-called constitutive relation of *samavāya*.

*Sakti*, power, and *Sādṛśya*, similarity, are not admitted as distinct *padārthas* by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They are however recognised as such by the Prābhakara Mimāṃsakas and the Mādhvas agree with the Prābhakaras in this respect. *Sakti*, however, according to Mādhvas, includes, besides the power in words to refer to their meanings or objects, the unthinkable power which exists in the Lord alone in its completeness and only partially and in different degrees in other beings, the adventitious power which is generated in an idol or image through the inspiring influence of the worshipper's devotion and the inherent or innate powers of things. Similarity again is eternal or non-eternal like generality and particularity. Thus the similarity of *jīvas* or individual souls and other eternal substances such as the Lord is eternal, but the similarity of non-eternal things like jars, cloths, etc., is itself non-eternal.

As regards *Abhāva* or Absence, the Mādhvas hold that it has reality though the *pratiyogi* or counter-entity of the absence in some cases is *asat* or unreal (*e.g.*, in absolute absence). For the Naiyāyikas however *Abhāva* has *padārthatvā*
or objectivity but not sattva or reality. Abhāva presupposes reality (bhāva) being adjectival to it, but is not itself reality. Thus reality (bhāvatva) appertains to the six positives or bhāva-pādārthaḥs, the first three (substance, quality and action) being real through the universal of being inhering in them (sattāyogena sat) while the second three (generality, particularity and inherence) being real through relation to that in which reality inheres (ekārtha-samavāya). For the Mādhvas however, 'absence' or negation is a form of sattva or reality just as is 'presence.' According to them, pādārthas include both the real and the unreal, the latter being a pādārtha or knowable without reality (e.g., sky-flower, hare's horn, etc.). Reality again is either independent or dependent reality, the former being the Lord Himself and the latter including all positives (bhāvāḥ) and all negatives (abhāvāḥ) other than the Lord. Thus negation, according to the Mādhvas, is a form of dependent reality though the entity negated in the case of absolute negation is the unreal or the imaginary. The Mādhva, the Śankara-Vedanta and the Nāya-Vaiśeṣika views of absence thus present many interesting points of agreement and difference. For the Sankarites 'absence' has objectivity like its opposite 'presence' and as such presupposes the reality of the consciousness in which it appears. It however does not affect the latter just as the snake-appearance does not affect the nature of the rope
which is its substrate. Thus absence as objective appearance presupposes a substrate of reality but is not adjectival to the latter. For the Naiyāyikas however absence as objective not merely presupposes reality but also determines or characterises it. Hence absence though itself not a form of positivity yet both presupposes and infects the latter. For the Mādhvas however ‘absence’ is itself a kind of dependent reality to be distinguished from the kinds which positively fill experience.

We shall now close our survey of the Mādhva Philosophy with a brief statement of the distinctive features of the Mādhva Logic.

Pramāṇa, according to the Mādhvas, is either kevalapramāṇa or Anupramāṇa. Kevalapramāṇa is the knowledge which has prāmāṇya through itself as valid knowledge of objects. Anupramāṇa is pramāṇa as the conditioning process or activity which gives rise to self-validating knowledge. Thus kevalapramāṇa is pramāṇa or valid knowledge regarded as being its own pramāṇa or evidence (cf. Rāmānuja, Prabhākara), while Anupramāṇa is evidence through conditioning or causing the resulting self-evidencing knowledge.

Anupramāṇas are of three kinds, viz., Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony.

Of these, Perception is of seven kinds, viz., the five kinds of external perception by the external senses, internal perception by the mind and perception through the Witnessing Intelligence
which is the seventh kind of Perception. *Smṛti*, Recollection, is a form of internal perception: it is an immediate presentation of the past through the instrumentality of the mind. The impressions or residual traces of the past experience are the connecting link between the past experience and the present mental function. The recollection is the insertion of the past into the present (cf. Bergson).

The Mādhva view of witnessing knowledge (*Sakṣijñāna*) as a form of perception is peculiar. The knower itself acting as an instrument of knowledge is the Sakṣi or Witnessing Intelligence, and the knowledge which results through the instrumentality of the latter is perception. The objects of such perception include the intrinsic nature of the self, the self’s properties or attributes such as pleasure, etc., avidyā or nescience, the functions of the mind such as the cognitions of the external sense (which are also cognised by the mind), pleasure, pain, etc. Thus what other schools will regard as objects of internal perception are here regarded as being perceptions of the witnessing subject. But as perceptions such witnessing cognitions will be generated events and will thus lack the timelessness involved in the witnessing consciousness of temporal mental events as temporal. This is why Sankarites deny that the witnessing consciousness is a kind of pratyakṣa or perception. According to Sankarites
it is primary (anubhutirūpa) but is not a generated cognition being nitya or timeless.

As regards inference, the Mādhvas hold that the vyāpti which mediates inferential reasoning may be one of four kinds, viz., samavyāpti (a symmetrical invariable relation—corresponding to Hamilton’s U propositions), viṣamavyāpti (an asymmetrical invariable relation—corresponding to A propositions), of the form of mutual exclusion or parasparaparihāra (corresponding to E propositions), or parasparasamāvesa, mutual overlapping, along with parasparaparihāra, mutual exclusion [answering at once to the three propositions, (i) In some case at least where A is, B also is, (ii) In some case at least where A is, B is not, and (iii) In some case at least, where B is, A is not. The relation, e.g., between ‘being a male’ and ‘being a cook’ illustrates this form.] Further, according to the Mādhvas, co-presence of the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya) either temporally or spatially is not necessary for valid inference. Hence the existence of the probans in the subject of the inference need not be always insisted on. When, e.g., one infers rain on the top of the hill from the perception of the fullness of the rivers at the base, the mark or hetu is the “fullness of rivers,” and that which is inferred by means of this mark, i.e., the sādhya or probandum, is “rain.” But the place or locus where ‘rain’ is inferred, i.e., the pakṣa or subject
of the inference is the hill-top, while the mark or hetu, *viz.*, ‘fullness of rivers,’ is observed not on the hill-top but at the base of the hill. Hence the Mādhvas conclude, what is necessary for producing valid inference is not the observed copresence of probans and probandum, nor the observed existence of the probans in the inferential subject, but observation of the mark in any suitable place and time (*samucitadesādīvoṛtī*). The mark in the above inference exists in the present time while what is inferred therefrom, *viz.*, ‘rain’ belongs to the past. Similarly the mark is observed at the base while the rain which is inferred belongs to the hill-top.

It may be pointed out however that this is no innovation of the Mādhvas and cannot be regarded as one of the Mādhva contributions to logical theory. The point was anticipated by the Mīmāṃsakas long before the Mādhvas. Pārthasārathi in the “Nyāyaratnamāla” discussing the nature of vyāpti rejects the view that as a condition of inference it implies the copresence of the hetu and the sādhyā as an indispensable condition. Smoke, *e.g.*, which is rising up in the sky above proves fire not in the sky above but on the ground below. What is necessary therefore for inference is not spatial or temporal copresence of hetu and sādhyā but simply fixed relation or niyama between them. Thus the way in which a thing is cognised in fixed relation to something else, in that way
INTRODUCTION

does it produce the cognition of its correlate when cognised again (cf. "Nyāyaratnamāla" p. 57, Chowkhamba edition, 1900). The so-called Mādhva contribution in this respect is therefore nothing but a re-statement of the Mimāmsāsaka view.

The Mādhva rejection of vyatirekivyāpti as a condition of inference is also no innovation of the Mādhvas. The same view is also taken both by Mimāmsakas and Śankarites long before the Mādhvas, and the Mādhva view in this respect is only a reproduction of earlier views. The Mādhvas however may legitimately claim their classification of inference to be an improvement on earlier logic. Thus, according to them, inference is either from cause to effect or from effect to cause or from one thing to another not related to it as cause or effect. For the Buddhist such non-causal relation is nothing but the relation of co-essentiality between genus and species (tadātmya). But Naiyāyikas hold that there are other such relations besides co-essentiality. The Mādhva view of non-causal inferences combines in itself both the Buddhist and the Nyāya viewpoints and has thus the merit of being a simplified solution of the different issues.

As regards Āgama, or authoritative verbal testimony, the Mādhvas hold that it is both personal and impersonal. Thus the Vedas are authoritative evidence though devoid of a personal source. But so also are the personal communications
recorded in the Mahābhārata and other sacred works. In connection with Āgama, the Mādhvas discuss the question whether words mean common characters or denote individuals, and the Mādhvas decide for the dual character of the objective reference with the reservation however that in the case of nouns or substantives the primary reference is to an individual or individuals, while in the case of adjectives, verbs, etc., it is some attribute or character that is primarily meant. The psychology of learning word-meanings is also discussed by the Mādhvas in this connection, and the view which they advocate in this respect is that the process of learning word-meanings consists in a course of parental guidance by means of uttered words accompanied by gesture-indications of the objects meant. The Mādhvas reject the Nyāya view of naming as a process of upamāṇa based on the instruction of elders.

In regard to validity and its opposite invalidity, the Mādhvas hold independent views though apparently agreeing with the Mimāmsaka theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity. Thus intrinsic validity, the Mādhvas argue, is intrinsicality in respect of utpatti (origination) or intrinsicality in respect of subjective acceptance or recognition (jnāpti). Intrinsicality in respect of origin means that the validity arises from the same conditions as the cognition itself which it characterises. And intrinsicality in respect of
subjective recognition means that the agency that cognises the cognition is also the agency that cognises the validity of the cognition. Now as regards intrinsicality in respect of origin, the Mādhvas agree with the Mimāmsakas and reject the Nyāya view of an additional efficiency in the causal conditions as a condition of the validity of the valid cognition. As regards subjective recognition of the validity, the Mādhvas hold however that intrinsicality here arises from the fact that the witnessing Intelligence that cognises the cognition is also the agency that cognises the validity. This is a clear departure from the Mimāmsā view, according to the Mimāmsakas (Bhāttas) neither the cognition nor its validity being cognised by any witnessing Intelligence, both being cognised inferentially by the self from the mark of knowaness in the object. As regards invalidity again, the extrinsicality in respect of origin consists, according to Mādhvas, in its arising from the presence of certain defects in addition to the conditions of cognition, while extrinsicality in respect of invalidation or subjective rejection consists in the cognition itself being cognised by one agency, viz., the Witnessing Intelligence, and its invalidity being cognised otherwise, i.e., inferentially from the mark of its practical failure. This also is an evident departure from the ordinary Mimāmsā view according to which invalidation comes either through
the perception of defects in the causal conditions or through the consciousness of discrepancy with other experiences.

It may be added here that the Mādhva theory of falsity comes nearer the Buddhist than the Nyāya or Sankara-Vedanta views. Thus the Mādhvas reduce the false to the level of the imaginary and the unreal so that what the illusory experience apprehends is an absolute nought and not any elsewhere, elsewhen reality (as Naiyāyikas say), nor any indescribable positivity without reality (as Sankarites say). Further, correction as absolute negation is the cancellation or rejection of this absolute unreality. Thus absolute negation is the negation of a sheer nothing and not that of an elsewhere, elsewhen real something as Naiyāyikas say. For the Naiyayikas negation is always the exclusion of a real something from some real locus so that a negation of the unreal is sheer non-sense. The Judgment: "The square-circle is not" is, according to Naiyāyikas, equivalent to the Judgment: "The square is not a circle," though expressed differently. For the Mādhvas however the object of absolute negation is the unreal or the imaginary so that the Judgment does not assert the exclusion of circle from square (as Naiyāyikas say) but expresses the absolute unreality of a square which is a circle as well.
MĀDHVA LOGIC
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF THE
PRAMĀṆACANDRIKĀ
PART I

Reverence to the God with the Horse’s neck, the God who has Lakṣmī as his consort and who incarnated Himself in Rāma—the God of Hanumāna, in Kṛṣṇa—the God of Bhīma, and in Vedavyāsa—the God of Mādhva. Oṃ Hari.

Having touched the lotus-feet of the Lord of Lakṣmī and also those of my Guru or Preceptor, I proceed to write this ‘Pramāṇacandrikā’ for the easy comprehension (even) of young, immature learners.

Everybody on this earth desires that happiness alone shall be his lot and that not even the smallest unhappiness shall ever mar his life. This is the mokṣa or liberation that is sought by all. Since this freedom or liberation comes only from the knowledge of the absolution and independence
of the Lord and the dependence or subservience of everything else, it behoves every seeker of this freedom (mokṣa) to understand all things in this way as being essentially subservient to or dependent on the power of the Lord who is independent and absolute. Thus the commentator observes, he that realises all these that are dependent as being subject to the control of the Lord becomes liberated from the bonds of the empirical life. The knowledge of the dependent and the independent however comes from valid cognition and this is the reason why this particular treatise has been undertaken with the object of ascertaining the nature of valid cognition. Even though the master Jayatīrtha has elaborately expounded the distinguishing marks of valid cognition and the rest in such works as the Paddhati, etc. (Pramāṇapaddhati), yet, inasmuch as these works are not easily intelligible to persons of feeble intelligence on account of the deep and thoughtful language in which they are expressed, this treatise has been undertaken with a view to make the doctrines intelligible to these readers of average intelligence. And thus this undertaking is not superfluous even though it discusses most of the topics already discussed in these other works and gives besides a brief account of some of the objects of valid cognition as well.

Since the (scientific) knowledge of Pramāṇa and other allied things presupposes the trio of
statement (uddeśa), definition (lakṣaṇa) and examination (parīkṣā), the definition of statement and the rest is therefore first of all set forth.

Uddeśa is the statement or verbal indication of the subject-matter by means of its name only. In this definition the word ‘uddeśa’ stands for what is defined and the rest constitutes its definition, viz., the words ‘verbal indication of the subject-matter by means of its name only.’ This procedure (in regard to the thing defined and the definition thereof) will also be observed in all other cases (of definition) that will come up later on. If we say that a sound as such is a verbal indication, the babbling sound of the Ganges will rank as a verbal indication and thus our definition will be too wide. To exclude such cases we include the word indication in our definition. A verbal indication implies indication by alphabetical sounds (and not by sounds as such which may include non-alphabetical sounds such as the babble of a river). But if we stop here and say that an alphabetical sound as such is a verbal indication, the alphabetical sounds ‘the son of a barren woman’ should pass as a verbal indication. Hence to exclude such nonsensical combinations of alphabetical sounds the word ‘subject-matter’ (in ‘indication of the subject-matter’) has been included in the definition. (The words ‘son of a barren woman’ are not indicative of anything and therefore indicate no
subject-matter.) But if we stop here and accept 'verbal indication of the subject-matter' as a logically complete definition (of utdeśa), the 'caw' 'caw' of the crow will pass as a statement or Uṭdeśa. (The 'caw' 'caw' of the crow is a combination of alphabetical sounds and it also indicates something that really exists, viz., the crow's voice.) Hence the words 'by the name' in the definition which mean 'by the words of the sacred language.' Even so, the definition is too wide applying as it does to a sentence like 'The earth has the character of smell' which amounts to a definition (and not to a verbal indication of the subject-matter only). To exclude such cases, the word 'only' has been added (in 'by the name only'). The meaning is: the name which indicates the subject-matter in a statement is not used with a view to bring out the distinguishing marks of the subject-matter. (The name is used only to indicate the subject-matter and not to define it.) In the case of the sentence 'The earth has the quality of smell' which amounts to a definition, though the subject-matter is indicated by means of the words (names) of the sacred language, yet, since the words have not been selected without reference to the marks which distinguish or define the subject-matter, the sentence cannot rank as a mere statement. Hence our definition of statement (as given above) is not too wide. Hence we conclude: a
statement consists in the indication of a subject-matter by means of such words (names) of the Sanskrit language as do not refer to the marks which distinguish or define the subject-matter in question.

Some hold that the word 'only' has been added (in the above definition of Uddeśa) with a view to exclude only such definitions as 'The earth has the quality of smell.' For (according to them) an Uddeśa is a statement of the subject-matter without reference to its specifying or uncommon properties. Thus in the sentence (which is, in effect, a definition) 'The earth has the quality of smell,' since the subject-matter is indicated by reference to an uncommon property, viz., the possession of odour, the condition of indication of the subject-matter without reference to any uncommon property of it is wanting, and thus our definition (as not applying to it) is not too wide. It cannot be said that in the case of the earth and other things, statements in this sense are impossible in so far as such statements will have to indicate their respective subject-matters through the uncommon properties of earthiness and the rest that distinguish them. For what is meant (by a verbal indication without reference to the uncommon properties of the subject-matter) is merely that the statement should not contain any reference to distinctive or uncommon properties other than those
that constitute the bare property of being the subject-matter in question.

This however is not a correct interpretation of our definition, for the definition as thus interpreted will apply to sentences which are in the nature of definitions such as ‘The earth has the property of earthiness’ and thus will be too wide. (‘The earth has the property of earthiness’ is a verbal definition and not a statement of a subject-matter.) The sentence ‘the earth has the property of earthiness’ indicates a subject-matter (viz., the earth) without reference to any uncommon properties other than those that constitute the bare property of being the subject-matter in question (i.e., the property of earthiness).

(Having explained the nature of Uddeśa, we now proceed to define Laksana or definition.)

A defining mark (laksana) is an attribute that exists only in the thing defined (and not in anything else). This means that a defining mark is an attribute that exists in every instance of the thing defined and does not exist in anything else. Thus in the case of the cow, the ‘possession of a dewlap’ serves as a defining mark as it exists only in (all) animals that are cows and does not exist in animals that are not cows.

If we say that an attribute as such is a defining mark, the ‘possession of undivided hoofs’ will pass as a definition (of the cow) and thus
our definition of a defining mark will be too wide. (Possession of undivided hoofs is an attribute, but it is not an attribute of the cow which has cloven hoofs.) Hence we insist on the existence of the attribute in the thing defined.

If we stop here and rest content with saying that a defining mark is an attribute that exists in the thing defined, then the ‘possession of mixed colour’ will pass as a definition of the cow and thus our definition of a defining mark will be too wide. (Mixed colour exists in some cows but not in all cows and therefore cannot be a definition of the cow.) To exclude such attributes (as do not exist in every instance of the thing defined) we say the attribute (that is, a defining mark) must exist in every instance of the thing defined.

But this also does not suffice, for ‘possession of horns’ may pass as a defining mark (of the cow) as thus interpreted and thus our definition becomes too wide. (Possession of horns cannot be a defining mark of the cow, for though this attribute may exist in every instance of a cow, yet it exists also in other animals such as the goat, the dear, etc.) To exclude such attributes (as exist both in the thing defined as well as other things) we say the attribute (that is, a defining mark) must exist only in (all) the instances of the thing defined (and in nothing else).
What, then, is the purpose or end (prāyojana) subserved by the knowledge of a defining mark? The purpose or end subserved by the knowledge of a defining mark is the differentiation of the thing defined from all other things of a homogeneous or heterogeneous nature as also the correct use of terms (without a too wide or too narrow meaning). A thing is said to be homogeneous (sajātiya) with the thing defined when it is specified by the next higher class that subsumes the defined thing under itself. (This means that the homogeneous is a species coordinate with the thing defined and subsumed under the same immediately higher genus.) A thing is said to be heterogeneous (vijātiya) with the thing defined when it is not specified by the immediately higher genus that subsumes under itself the character of the thing defined. Thus in the definition of the ‘cow,’ ‘the essence of being a cow’ or ‘cow-ness’ constitutes the character of the thing defined. The immediately higher genus comprehending this character (of ‘cowness’) is ‘animality.’ Therefore the horse and other animals which are characterised by this generic character of animality are homogeneous (sajātiya) with the ‘cow.’ (Contrarywise,) the jar and other things which are non-characterised by this generic character (of ‘animality’) are heterogeneous (vijātiya) with the ‘cow.’ By ‘an immediately higher genus’
or 'next higher genus' is meant a genus which while not including any higher class inclusive of the thing defined is yet inclusive of the thing defined. Thus in the example of 'animality,' since the class of animals is inclusive of the class of cows without including the class of material objects which also includes the class of cows, the animal-class must be understood as the immediately higher genus in relation to the cow-class. These considerations (concerning the nature of the next higher genus) leave no room for the objection that all things being included under one all-inclusive class, *viz.*, the class of knowables and the like, are all homogeneous with one another and that therefore there is no real heterogeneity anywhere. (Since all things come under a common all-inclusive class, *viz.*, the class of knowables, they must all be said to be of the same class or genus, *i.e.*, homogeneous. How then can you sensibly talk of the heterogeneous and of one thing being heterogeneous with another? The answer to this objection is furnished by the definitions we have given above of the homogeneous and the heterogeneous as based on the concept of the next higher genus. When a thing is included under the next higher genus or class of the thing defined, it is said to be homogeneous with the thing defined. When a thing is not so included, it is said to be heterogeneous.) In this way in all other defini-
tions the homogeneous and the rest are to be understood.

(Having explained the nature of a valid logical definition, we shall now proceed to explain what constitutes the opposite, i.e., an invalid definition or non-definition.)

An invalid definition or non-definition is the negation of a logically valid definition. Hence it is the negation of "that which, existing in every instance of the thing defined, is non-existent in things other than the instances of the thing defined." As a negation, it is of the nature of a negation of a qualified thing. A qualified negation or a negation negating a qualified thing may be of three kinds, viz., (a) a qualified negation negating the thing qualified, (b) a qualified negation negating the qualification of the thing, (c) a qualified negation negating both the thing qualified and the qualification of it. (An invalid definition is a qualified negation, because it is the negation of a valid definition which consists of a substantive and an adjectival part, the substantive portion being 'that which is non-existent in other things' and the adjective qualifying it being 'while existing in every instance of the thing defined.' Thus a non-definition, as being the negation of this substantive qualified by the adjectival portion, is a qualified negation.) Thus the non-definition
"The cow is an animal possessing horns" is a qualified negation negating the substantive part of a valid logical definition. (It negates the condition that 'the defining mark must not exist in anything other than an instance of the thing defined.' 'Possession of horns' is existent also in animals which are not cows.) Again the non-definition 'The cow is an animal possessing mixed colour' is a qualified negation negating the qualification (that characterises a valid definition). (The qualification 'existing in every instance of the thing defined' is negated in this case as every cow does not possess mixed colour.) Lastly, the non-definition 'The cow is an animal possessing undivided hoofs' illustrates a qualified negation negating the substantive as well as the adjectival part of a valid definition. ('Possession of undivided hoofs' is present in animals that are not cows and absent in cows. Thus it negates the substantive 'absence from other things' and also the adjective 'existing in every case of the thing defined'.)

(Having explained the nature of a logical definition and its opposite, we shall now proceed to explain the nature of parīkṣā or examination.)

Examination or sifting of evidence (parīkṣā) is mentally reflecting on the cogency or otherwise (of the evidence that has been adduced). Too wide use (ativyāpti) consists in the use of a defining mark that exists in things
other than the thing defined. Too narrow use (avyāpti) consists in the use of a defining mark that does not exist in a part of the extent (i.e., in some instances) of the thing defined. Absurdity (asambhava) consists in the use of a property as a defining mark that does not exist in any instance of the thing defined. That which is defined by the defining mark is called the lakṣya or thing defined.

(Let us now proceed to define the subject-matter of this work, viz., Pramāṇa.) Pramāṇa as such (i.e., pramāṇa in general as distinguished from any particular kind of pramāṇa) may therefore be first of all defined here. Pramāṇa (we hold) is that which agrees with the nature of the object (known). This means that the essence of pramāṇa consists in making the cognitum an object (of cognition) in the form in which it actually exists. There are many things to be said here, but as this treatise is meant for young learners and as (more) intelligent people may know all these from the work called the Paddhati, therefore they are not mentioned here.* The same observations hold

* The Pramāṇapaddhati observes that pramāṇa is here so defined as to apply both to the cognitive process and the knowledge that results therefrom. The cognitive process conduce to the apprehension of the cognitum as it actually exists and is called Ānupramāṇa. The resulting knowledge also apprehends the cognitum as it actually exists and is called kevalepramāṇa.

(Pramāṇapaddhati, Mādhva Vilāsa Edition, p. 9.)
also in respect of other matters that will come up later on (in this treatise).

In the above definition of Pramāṇa, since the property of apprehending the object is common to valid as well as doubtful and erroneous cognitions, the qualification ‘in the form in which it actually exists’ has been included. If we had defined Pramāṇa merely as that which abides in the form in which it actually exists, then our definition would apply also to the cogniser and the cognitum (since these also abide in the form in which they actually exist), and thus will be too wide. Therefore we say: it must apprehend the cognitum as well (and not merely that it should abide in the form in which it actually exists). Here ‘apprehending the cognitum’ means ‘apprehending the cognitum immediately as well as mediately’ (through the help of a cognitive process). Hence our definition as applying also to the cognitive processes of perception and the rest (as also to the knowledge that results therefrom) cannot be said to be too narrow. Nor can this be said to be an illegitimate extension of the meaning of the term Pramāṇa, for such extension is quite unexceptionable (inasmuch as the term Pramāṇa is, as a matter of fact, used in both the above two senses of the cognitive processes and the resulting knowledge).

The subject who cognises a valid cognition
is called the *cogniser* or knower. The object that is cognised by a valid cognition is called the *cognitum* or object known. Knowledge of the object as it actually exists is called valid knowledge or valid cognition. If valid knowledge were not defined as a form of knowledge, our definition would be too wide as applying also to the processes which are only instrumental in the production of valid knowledge.* Similarly, if valid knowledge were not defined as apprehension of the object *as it actually exists*, our definition would also be too wide as applying to doubtful cognitions and the rest.

What, then, is the essence of a doubtful cognition (*samśaya*)? It may be said that it cannot be said to consist merely in an indefinite apprehension for this amounts to a mutual dependence (a circular definition). Thus (one may argue) in so far as a certain cognition is a definite apprehension the definition of a doubtful cognition as mere indefinite apprehension amounts to a circular definition inasmuch as a certain cognition is the other of a doubtful cognition and a doubtful cog-

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* A distinction is drawn between *Pramāṇa*, valid knowledge, and *Pramāṇa*, the instrument of valid knowledge. *Pramāṇa* signifies both the source of the knowledge and the knowledge itself (as correct apprehension of the object). But *Pramāṇa* means the knowledge only and not its instrumental means. Thus *Pramāṇa* must be distinguished from the processes of intellection that bring about the result of valid knowledge, but *Pramāṇa* may be used alike for the cognitive processes and the knowledge that results therefrom.
nition (defined as indefinite apprehension) is likewise the other of a certain cognition. This argument, we hold, is not a sound one. An indefinite apprehension is in reality the correct definition of a doubtful cognition. There is no circle involved in this definition (as is contended by the opponent). For by the term ‘indefinite apprehension’ is here meant a cognition that appears clothed (bathed) in the numerous mutually incompatible forms that manifest themselves in (float on the surface of) one single thing. If we had defined doubtful cognition as that which is a cognition our definition would be too wide as applying also to the case of the (certain) cognition ‘There is a jar here.’ Therefore we say ‘it must be clothed in many forms.’ Even so however our definition would be too wide as applying also to composite or collective cognitions such as the simultaneous cognition of a man and a post, or of a jar, a piece of cloth, a pillar and a pitcher, etc. To exclude such composite (certain) cognitions we say ‘there must be one single thing’ (in which the different forms are apprehended). But even then our definition remains too wide as applying to cognitions like ‘This tree is of the Simśūpā species,’ ‘The jar is a substance,’ etc. (In these also there is cognition of different forms in a single thing.) Therefore (to exclude these), we say ‘the different forms must be mutually incompatible.’
But even so, our definition remains too wide as applying to erroneous cognitions like ‘This is silver.’ (In the case of the cognition of silver in the locus of a mother of pearl, there are two incompatible forms, *viz.*, the form of mother-of-pearl and the form of silver, and these forms refer to one single thing, *viz.*, the mother-of-pearl, and yet the illusion of silver in the mother-of-pearl is not a doubtful cognition.) To exclude such erroneous cognitions we say (not merely that there should be numerous incompatible forms but also) that, ‘the numerous incompatible forms should also manifest themselves as incompatible.’ (In the case of the illusion, the form of silver manifests itself while that of mother-of-pearl remains non-manifest to the cogniser.) Thus (since in the doubtful cognition) the different incompatible forms are held also to present themselves as incompatible forms (referring to one single thing), our definition is not open to the aforesaid objection (of being too wide).

Some hold that this doubtful cognition arises, with the absence of its solvent as an auxiliary condition, from five different causes, *viz.*, (1) (cognition of) a common character, (2) (cognition of) an uncommon character, (3) (cognition of) contradictory characters (in one and the same thing), (4) positive cognition (of certain objects), and (5) non-cognition (of
certain objects). A doubt arising from the perception of a common character is illustrated in the case of the perception of a certain tall stature which is common to a man and a post. The perception of this common character calls forth a simultaneous recollection of the two forms of 'man' and 'post' in the perceiver's mind as the result of which there arises in the latter a desire to ascertain the true nature (of the thing perceived, i.e., a desire to ascertain whether the object perceived is 'a man' or 'a post.') In the absence, however, of perception of the crucial test, viz., the curved hollow which is peculiar to the trunk of a tree or the possession of a head, hands, etc., which is peculiar to a man, there arises a doubt in the form of a mental oscillation (between the two alternatives in the form) 'Is that a man?' 'Or, Is that a post?.' A doubt arising from the cognition of an uncommon character is illustrated in the following case. The cognition that sound is a quality that belongs exclusively to Ether (Ākāśa) awakens a doubt, in the absence of a perception of the solvent, as to whether it is an eternal or a non-eternal quality. A doubt arising from the clash of contradictory views is illustrated in the following case. The man who discovers that the Vaiśeṣikas teach that the sensibilities are constituted by the elements but that the Sāṅkhya teaches that they are not, and at the same time
cannot find the means of deciding between the rival views is thrown into doubt as to whether the sensibilities are constituted by the elements or not. A doubt arising from a positive cognition is illustrated in the case of a man who first discovers the underground water in the act of sinking a well. The discovery of the water throws him into a speculative doubt (as to the real source of the water), and he thus enquires, for want of a solvent, as follows: ‘Has the action of digging only made manifest the water which has been existent all along but remained non-manifest? Or, has it made the non-existent water start into existence? The following, lastly, illustrates the case of a doubt arising from non-apprehension. The man who learns from hearsay that there lives a ghost in the banyan tree yonder and yet finds none when he comes near the tree is thrown into a mental uncertainty as he does not cognise the solvent. He thus enquires: ‘Is the demon not perceived because of its power of making itself invisible? Or, is it unperceived because it does not exist?’

Others hold that positive cognition and non-apprehension (as causes of doubt) being only modalities of the ‘common character’ (as a cause of doubt), doubtful cognition must be said to have three causes only (and not five as stated above). How is ‘positive cognition’ to be regarded as a modality of the ‘common
character' that is supposed to be a cause of doubt? In this way. There is positive cognition of a jar that exists in a dark place when a lamp is lighted and the surrounding darkness is dispelled thereby. There is also positive cognition of a jar that did not exist previously till the potter has operated on the lump of clay and brought a jar into being. (The positive cognition is thus a character that is common to an existent and a non-existent thing and thus raises doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the object in the mind of the cogniser). How is non-apprehension a modality of the 'common character?' In this way. There is non-apprehension of the existent such as the non-perception of God as well as of the non-existent such as the non-perception of the hair's horn. (Thus non-perception as appertaining alike to the existent and the non-existent raises doubt as to the existence or the opposite of the object non-perceived.)

But the true view is that the so-called 'uncommon character' as well as 'the clash of contradictory views' being really modalities of the 'common character,' there is only one cause of doubtful cognitions, *viz.*, the cognition of a common character. The way in which these (*viz.*, 'the uncommon character,' 'the clash of doctrines,' etc.) are to be regarded as comprised in the 'common character' should be understood
in the manner they are shown to be so comprised in the work called the ‘Paddhati.’

(Having explained the nature of doubt we now proceed to explain the nature of erroneous cognition.)

An error (viparyaya) is a cognition consisting in the conscious certitude that a thing exists just where as a matter of fact it does not exist. If we define an error simply as a cognition, our definition will apply also to doubtful cognitions (which are also cognitions), and thus will be too wide. Hence we define error as a cognition which amounts to a certain knowledge or conviction. This excludes the cases of doubtful and uncertain cognitions. But since valid cognition is also as much self-confident as invalid cognition or error, we define error as a cognition that apprehends a thing where in reality the thing does not exist. This distinguishes an error or invalid cognition from valid cognition and thus our definition is not too wide. But even thus our definition fails to exclude the cases of doubtful cognitions. A doubtful cognition (though lacking in certitude or decisiveness) also apprehends a thing where it does not exist. Hence we say, an error is a certain cognition. Even thus however our definition remains faulty as applying to the case of valid cognitions as well, e.g., the cognition, ‘the tree is in contact with the monkey.’
The contact does not exist in all parts of the tree. (Therefore contact is asserted in respect of an object which is devoid of contact in some of its parts). Hence we insist on the word just in our definition, i.e., we say an error cognises a thing just where the thing does not exist. Such errors arise from faulty perceptions, fallacious reasonings and defects of verbal communications. The illusion of silver in the locus of a mother-of-pearl is an illustration of error arising from faulty perception. An error of reasoning is illustrated in the case of the man who under the influence of blinding dust imagines he perceives smoke and on the basis of the illusory smoke infers the existence of fire in a place where fire does not exist. Similarly, when on the strength of the lying report of an untrustworthy man one believes that there are five different fruits lying on the banks of a neighbouring river, we have a case of an error arising from a faulty verbal communication.

An objection however may be raised here. We have defined Pramāṇa as consisting in making the object of cognition to be cognised in the form in which it exists (actually). But the definition may be objected to as being too wide applying as it does to the case of ‘memory’ also (which is not usually recognised as a Pramāṇa). Our reply is: this is not so, for scripture testifies to the fact that ‘memory,’ ‘perception,’ ‘tradition’
and 'inference' are to be regarded as the pramāṇas or valid sources of knowledge in regard to such things as (dharma) merit and the like, by all those who desire liberation. Thus we have the testimony of scripture showing that memory is a form of valid knowing.

Some philosophers define pramāṇa as the karana or instrumental cause of pramāṇa or valid cognition. An instrument as such (according to them) is not a pramāṇa, otherwise any instrument such as an axe would rank as pramāṇa. Hence the definition of pramāṇa as an instrument of valid cognition (and not as a mere instrument). Similarly the epithet 'valid' is also necessary as without it the definition would apply to non-valid and erroneous cognition and thus be too wide. Lastly, the word instrument is also necessary as without it the definition would tantamount to an absurdity and also be too wide as applying to the consequence or result that follows from the instrumentality of valid knowing.

We however do not accept the above view as we consider the definition too narrow as not applying to the result of valid knowing. (Our view is that the word pramāṇa signifies the knowing act as well as the result of knowledge that arises therefrom.)

Others define pramāṇa as that which is pervaded by pramāṇa or valid knowledge.
This also is not a tenable position. Every knowable object is validly cognised by the Lord. Hence every knowable such as the jar and the like is pervaded by the Lord’s valid knowledge. Thus every knowable answers to the above definition of pramāṇa or valid knowing as that which is pervaded by valid knowledge. Thus the definition is too wide as applying to knowables (and not merely to knowing acts).

With a view to escape from the above difficulty, others modify the above definition as follows:—Pramāṇa is that which being either a substrate or an instrument is at the same time pervaded by valid knowledge.

Even thus however the definition is not faultless. The mention of the word ‘substrate’ in the definition is without rhyme or reason. Even granting that the Lord is regarded as a standard of validity, it cannot be said that this in itself is a sufficient reason for introducing the word ‘substrate’ in the definition. For the word pramāṇa is derived by means of the suffix lyut, and, according to the rules of grammar, the suffix lyut applies only to the instrumental, the locative and the nominative absolute. There is no rule for its application to a nominative as such, i.e. (as in the present case), to the agent, nominative or subject of valid knowing. (The Lord is regarded as the standard of valid knowing only as the absolute knower, i.e., as the agent or
subject of absolute knowledge and not as its substrate or instrument.)

It may be argued that even though the Lord as knower is the subject of knowledge, yet He also is the substrate or locus of such knowledge, and thus may very well be the meaning of the word pramāṇa. But even this argument does not bear examination. The Lord as knower is an agent of the knowing act and not its substrate or locus in the strict sense. For what is a locus or adhikaraṇa? A locus is that which is the ādāra or container of the agent acting or the object acted on and is at the same time the āśraya or substrate of the action itself. (The Lord cannot be the substrate of the knowing act of which He is the subject.)

Others (the Prābhākaras) define Pramāṇa as anubhūti, i.e., as the apprehension of a fact. By anubhūti they mean cognition other than recollection or memory. According to them, anubhūti cannot be defined simply as ‘other than recollection,’ for in this case the definition will apply to objects of cognition like the jar and the rest (which are other than recollection). Nor can it be defined simply as ‘cognition,’ for in this case the definition will apply to ‘recollection’ (which is not an independent source of knowledge according to Prābhākaras).

But the Prābhākara definition of Pramāṇa is open to the following objections. In the first
place, it is too wide as applying to doubtful cognitions (which are also forms of apprehension or anubhuti other than recollection). Secondly it is also too narrow as not applying to memory (smṛti) and the social codes derived from the Vedas. (Smṛti means recollection as well as the social codes based on the Vedas and their teachings. The latter are analogous to recollection which is based on an original primary presentation. The Mādhvas accept smṛti as pramāṇa in both these senses.)

(This closes our discussion of the definition of Pramāṇa. We now proceed to discuss its different varieties.)

Pramāṇa is of two kinds, viz., (1) Kevalapramāṇa, i.e., self-contained, absolute knowing, and (2) Anupramāṇa, i.e., valid knowing as the instrumental cause of self-contained, absolute knowing. This enumeration is based on the order of importance. (Kevalapramāṇa being of superior importance is first mentioned.)

Kevalapramāṇa means knowledge that agrees with the nature of the object known. The words ‘agrees with the nature of the object’ dispose of uncertain and doubtful cognitions, while the word ‘knowledge’ disposes of perceiving (and other intervening processes). (Kevalapramāṇa is the resulting knowledge as distinguished from the processes leading thereto.)
There are four kinds of Kevalapramāṇa (i.e., four kinds of self-sufficient, self-contained knowledge):—(1) the knowledge of the Lord or Īśvara, (2) the knowledge of the Lord’s Consort, *viz.*, Lakṣmī, (3) the knowledge of the Sage or Yōgin, (4) the knowledge of the Non-Sage or Ayōgin.

The Lord’s knowledge is the knowledge that rests on, *i.e.*, presupposes, itself only. The fact of its ‘depending on itself only’ distinguishes the Lord’s knowledge from that of the Lord’s Consort. (The Consort’s knowledge, while depending on itself, also depends on the Lord’s knowledge.) The fact of its being ‘knowledge’ distinguishes it from the Lord Himself whose knowledge it is. (This is aimed at the Shankarite theory according to which Brahman is nothing but pure self-revealing Intelligence. The Mādhvas distinguish between the Lord Himself and the knowledge which the Lord has of Himself and all other things.) Or, we may say, the Lord’s knowledge is knowledge that embraces all that appertains either to the Lord Himself or to that which is other than the Lord. The Lord’s knowledge cannot be defined simply as knowledge, for in this case the definition will be too wide as applying to the Yōgin’s knowledge as well (which is also knowledge of a sort). To exclude the latter, the definition stresses the words ‘that embraces all, etc.’ (The Yōgin’s knowledge is not all-embracing
as is the Lord’s). Further, the word ‘knowledge’ prevents a too wide application of the definition to the perception of the Lord. The Lord’s knowledge is invariably in agreement with the nature of the object known, constitutes the essence or svarūpa of the Lord, is without beginning and without end.

The Consort’s knowledge is knowledge that depends on, i.e., presupposes, the Lord’s knowledge only. If the Consort’s knowledge had been defined simply as ‘knowledge,’ the definition would have been too wide and applicable to the Lord’s knowledge as well. To exclude the latter, the words ‘depending on the Lord’s knowledge’ have been added. Since dependence implies a distinction (between the dependent and that on which it depends), the possibility of confusion (between the Consort’s knowledge and the Lord’s knowledge) is precluded. But mere dependence on the Lord’s knowledge does not fully define the Consort’s knowledge. The knowledge of Brahmā and others is also characterised by this dependence on the Lord’s knowledge. To preclude such extension of the definition (to the knowledge of Brahmā and others), the word ‘only’ has been added. (The Consort’s knowledge depends on the Lord’s knowledge only, but the knowledge of Brahmā and others depends both on the Lord’s knowledge and the Consort’s knowledge.) Further, the word ‘knowledge’ in the definition serves to
distinguish the Consort's knowledge from the Consort herself. Or, we may say, the Consort's knowledge is the non-reflective knowledge of all objects other than the Lord Himself. Here the word 'knowledge' by itself fails to distinguish the Consort's knowledge from knowledge like that of ourselves. Hence to prevent such too wide application, the words 'of all objects' have been added. Even then the definition has a too wide application to the Rju Yogan's knowledge. (The Rju Yogan also has a reflective knowledge of all objects). Hence the word 'non-reflective.' The Rju-Yogan has only a reflective knowledge of objects. Again to say that 'the Consort's knowledge is the non-reflective knowledge of all objects' does not distinguish it from the Lord's knowledge (and thus the definition as so worded remains too wide). Hence the further qualification 'excepting the Lord Himself.' But the words 'non-reflective knowledge of all objects and no such knowledge of the Lord Himself' would be absurd and self-confuting. Hence the words 'other than' (i.e., non-reflective knowledge of all things other than the Lord Himself). Further, the word 'knowledge' in the definition distinguishes it from the Consort's perception (i.e., the process of perceiving which leads to, or results in, knowledge). The Consort's knowledge is also invariably in agreement with reality, is the essence
of the Consort herself and is beginningless and eternal.

The Yogin’s knowledge is the knowledge that has attained to special perfection or excellence through the power born of the practice of yoga or mental concentration. It is of three kinds, viz., (1) the Rju Yogin’s knowledge, (2) the Tāttvika Yogin’s knowledge, (3) the Atāttvika Yogin’s knowledge.

By Rju Yogin is meant a jīva or individual soul who is capable of the spiritual excellence of Brahman. The Rju Yogin’s knowledge is the reflective knowledge of all objects other than the Lord Himself. As the mere words ‘the Rju Yogin’s knowledge is knowledge’ will not prevent a too wide application of the definition to our knowledge as well, the words ‘of all objects’ have been added. As even then there is a too wide application to the Lord’s knowledge, the word ‘reflective’ has been incorporated. As thus simply the definition entails an absurdity, the knowledge being a reflective knowledge of all objects and yet not a knowledge of the Lord Himself, the words ‘other than the Lord Himself’ have been added. This knowledge is of two kinds: (a) knowledge which is the essence or nature of the Yogin himself, and (b) knowledge which is only a mental state of the Yogin. Of these, knowledge constituting the Yogin’s essence is beginningless and eternal, while knowledge as the
Yogin’s mental state is beginningless only as being comprised in a (beginningless) flow or stream (of states). Both these however are invariably in agreement with the nature of the objects (known).

The Tāttvika Yogins are the supernal beings (with godly qualities) other than the Rju Yogins and full of the conceit of true knowledge of reality. Merely saying that ‘the Tāttvikas are the gods with self-conscious knowledge of reality’ would have involved a too wide application to the Rju Yogins (who also have self-conscious knowledge of reality). Hence the words ‘other than the Rju Yogins.’ Merely saying again that ‘the Tāttvikas are other than the Rju Yogins’ would have involved a too wide application to the gods or spirits who are non-Tāttvikas. Hence the words ‘with self-conscious knowledge of reality.’ Since there are also ungodly beings (other than Rju Yogins) who also have self-conscious knowledge of reality, therefore the words ‘with godly qualities’ have been added. The Tāttvika Yogin’s knowledge is that which being beginningless does not, even by way of reflection, embrace all things other than the Lord. Merely saying that ‘the Tāttvika Yogin’s knowledge is knowledge’ would have entailed a too wide application to the Lord’s knowledge. Hence the words ‘does not embrace all things.’ Even then there would have been a
too wide application to the Consort's knowledge. The Consort's knowledge is non-all-embracing in so far as it does not extend to the Lord Himself. Hence the words 'other than the Lord.' Even then, there would have been a too wide application to the Ṛju Yogin's knowledge, for the Ṛju Yogin's knowledge does not embrace all things other than the Lord in the absence of reflection. Hence the words 'even by way of reflection.' Even then, however, the definition would have a too wide application to the non-Tāttvika Yogin's knowledge. Hence the words 'being beginningless.' It also is of two kinds, viz., (a) knowledge which constitutes the svārūpa or essence of the Tāttvika Yogin, and (b) knowledge which is external (i.e., relates to external objects). Of these, 'essential' knowledge is in agreement with reality, but 'external' knowledge is occasionally false, i.e., not in agreement with the nature of things.

The non-Tāttvikas or Atāttvikas are the Gods and Sages practising Yoga who are other than the Ṛju and the Tāttvika Yogins. The non-Tāttvika Yogin's knowledge is that which, having a beginning in time, is characterised by slight or partial ignorance in respect of objects other than the Lord. Merely saying that the non-Tāttvika Yogin's knowledge is knowledge would have entailed a too wide application to the Lord's knowledge. Therefore the words 'characterised
by ignorance' have been incorporated. Even then there would have been a too wide application to the non-Yogin's knowledge. Hence the word 'slight or partial.' Even then the definition would have entailed an absurdity, for the non-Tattvika's knowledge in respect of the Lord is tainted by immense (and not slight) ignorance. Hence the words 'other than the Lord.' Even then there would have been a too wide application to the Tattvika Yogin's knowledge. Hence the words 'having a beginning in time.' This also is of two kinds, viz., essential knowledge, and external knowledge. The rules as to their truth or untruth are the same as in the previous case. The beginninglessness and the beginning-in-time of the Tattvika and the non-Tattvika Yogin's knowledge respectively should be understood in the manner explained in the 'Paddhati.'

The non-Yogins or Ayogins are the individual souls other than the Yogins or sages. The word 'Jivas or individual souls' differentiates the Ayogins from the Lord and the Lord's Consort, and the words 'other than the Yogins' distinguish the Ayogins from the Yogins.

The Ayogin's knowledge is knowledge characterised by immense ignorance in regard to objects other than the Lord. Merely saying that the Ayogin's knowledge is knowledge characterised by immense ignorance' would have entailed a too wide application to the Yogin's knowledge
also. The Yogan’s knowledge is also accompanied by immense ignorance, viz., in regard to the Lord. Hence the words ‘other than the Lord.’ The Ayogin’s knowledge is also of two kinds as in the previous cases. Besides, it is also generated in time and perishable in time. This generation or cessation means generation or cessation with respect to the manifestation of the svarūpa or essence. The svarūpa or essence here means the svarūpa or essence of the knowing as a cognitive process or state.

The Ayogins or non-Yogins are also of three kinds: (1) those that are fit for liberation, (2) those that are perpetual participators in (the storm and stress of) life, (3) those that are fit only to live the stupefied life of inertia or Tamas. Of these, ‘essential’ knowledge in the case of ‘those fit to be liberated’ is in agreement with the nature of reality, while the same in ‘the perpetual participators in life’ is of a mixed character (partly true and partly false). Of others, however, such knowledge is false as being in non-agreement with reality. As regards ‘external’ knowledge, it is both (true and false, i.e., in some cases true and in other cases false) in all the three kinds of the non-Yogins.

The Vaiśeṣikas accept sense-perception, inference from a mark, memory and the intuitions of the Sages as the four kinds of valid evidence. This (the Vaiśeṣīka view) however is untenable
as this enumeration does not include the Lord's knowledge which is timeless and eternal as also knowledge derived from authoritative communication (Agama). Further, recollection being the effect of the action of the mind which is a sense-organ, and the intuitions of sages being only a species of Yogik knowledge, and Yogik knowledge being itself a variety of sense-knowledge aided by the power of Yoga (according to their own admission), there is no reason for a separate enumeration of memory or recollection and of the intuitions of sages as independent sources of knowledge.

[Having explained the nature of direct self-contained knowledge (kevalapramāṇa), we shall now discuss the nature of pramāṇa as Anupramāṇa or mediating processes.]

Anupramāṇa is the means or instrumental cause of valid knowledge. Merely saying 'Anupramāṇa is knowledge' would entail a too wide application to knowledge itself (which is the result or effect of Anupramāṇa) and to uncertain and doubtful cognition (which also is a species of knowledge, though not valid knowledge). Again, merely saying 'Anupramāṇa is an instrument or effectuating means' will entail a too wide application to the axe and other like instruments. Again merely saying 'Anupramāṇa is valid knowledge' will entail a too wide application to Kevalapramāṇa (which is direct, self-contained valid
knowledge). Simply saying again that ‘Anupramāṇa is the instrument of that which is valid’ will entail a too wide application to the instrument of perception (which also is valid). Likewise saying merely that ‘Anupramāṇa is the means to knowledge or cognition’ will entail a too wide application to that which is a means to doubtful cognition, etc. Lastly saying that ‘Anupramāṇa is the cause of valid cognition’ will entail a too wide application to the knower. Thus our definition of Anupramāṇa is proved to be necessary in all the points.

(What, then is a sādhana, instrumental cause or means?) A Sādhana or instrument is that which being absent, the effect does not arise, even though other conditions like the knower, etc., are present, and which being present unobstructed, the effect necessarily arises. E.g., the axe in the process of striking (the tree to be felled). Hence there is no too wide application to any and every concomitant condition, e.g., no too wide application to cases of erroneously cognised marks or signs. Where error is involved, the presence of defects of sensibilities, etc., is the bar (to the cognition of the really effective means).

(The sādhana is thus the cause par excellence, i.e., the most effective of the causal conditions. And this brings us to the question of the nature of the cause.)

The cause may be defined as the unconditional,
invariable antecedent of the effect. And the effect may be defined as that which is negated by the negation consisting in antecedent non-existence. (This means that the effect is that which does not exist before it is caused to be.) The cause again is of two kinds, viz., the material cause and the instrumental cause. The cause which suffers transformation (into the effect) is the material cause, for example, Prakṛti or primal matter as the cause of the universe, the lump of clay as the cause of the jar. The cause which produces the effect without being itself transformed thereinto is the instrumental cause, for example, the unseen moral forces (Adṛśta) as the cause of the universe, the potter's stick as the cause of the jar. Hence it follows that among the assemblage of causal conditions that which is the cause par excellence (i.e., most effective) is the sādhana, means or instrument.

Anupramāṇa is of three kinds, viz., perception, inference and authoritative communication. (Of these) perception is the means to the apprehension of that which is comparatively proximate, is non-mediated and present here and now. Hence perception is limited in range, being restricted to a small number of objects (i.e., objects which are near and present and not separated by any barrier). Inference however is a means to the knowledge of the remote, the mediated and
the past and the future. Lastly, Āgama or authoritative communication is an independent source of the knowledge of all sorts of objects of which the number is endless. The above enumerative statement is based on the order of the kind and number of objects made known (respectively by the three kinds of knowing, viz., perception, inference and authority). There being three kinds of Anupramāṇa or effective means to valid cognition, the cognition resulting therefrom is also of three kinds, viz., perceptual, inferential and authoritative knowledge. Of these, perceptual knowledge is the cognition that is produced by the process of perceiving. This (cognition) is what is meant by immediate knowledge, direct knowledge or witnessing knowledge (sākṣātkāra). Similarly, the knowledge reached through inference is called inferential or mediate knowledge. Lastly, the knowledge derived from authoritative communication is called authoritative knowledge or revealed knowledge.

(What, then, is perception as a source of knowledge?) Perception is the process of a sense-organ that is free from defects. (In other words, perception is the stimulation, by the object, of an organ of sense not subject to any sensory defects.) Here the word 'sense-organ' prevents a too wide application to inference and the rest.

But it may be said, perception is a species o
an instrumental cause, and an instrumental cause is possible only through an intervening action or operation. For example, the instrument of the act of cutting is the axe, and the axe is an instrumental cause of the cutting or felling of the tree through the intervening operation of coming into contact with the tree. The intervening operation is that which being effected by the instrumental cause serves to effect that which results from the action of the instrumental cause, e.g., the contact with the tree which is effected by the axe. (What, then, is the intervening action in the case of perception as an instrumental cause or agency.)

We grant the force of the question which is thus raised. And our answer is this. The sense-organ is the instrument, and the contact of the sense-organ with the object (perceived) is the intervening operation (through which the sense-organ produces its effect as an instrumental cause). The consequence or effect which results from the action of the sense-organ as an instrument is direct or immediate knowledge (sākṣātkāra). Here the process or operation (i.e., the perceptive operation) is described as the operation of the eye (i.e., of the sense-organ concerned) with a view to stress the fact that the organ (as the seat of the operation) is primary while the operation inhering therein is secondary. And further the organs are said to be free from
defects and to be in contact with their respective objects with a view to ensure the truth or validity of the knowledge resulting therefrom. Hence there is no discrepancy in our definition.

Perception is of seven kinds, *viz.*, the six different kinds of perception consisting of the operations of the senses and the perception of the sākṣṭ or witnessing consciousness. Of these, the perception of the witnessing consciousness is perception consisting in the operation of the Witnessing Intelligence as organ or instrument. The objects of such immediate knowledge or presentation are: the essence of the Self or Atman as well as the properties thereof, the nescience underlying absence or privation, the mind, the functions of the mind such as knowledge, pleasure and the rest, time, Ākāśa in its original unmodified condition, etc. It also reveals its own nature.

(Sensuous perception as arising from the operation of the six different organs presupposes the six organs of sense.) The six sense-organs are the olfactory sense, the gustatory sense, the visual sense, the tactual sense, the auditory sense and the mind. Of these, the objects of the olfactory sense are odour and the different kinds of fragrance which are the specific modes of odour; the objects of the gustatory sense are tastes and its specific forms; the objects of the visual sense and touch are substances having magnitude and
perceptible (generated) colour and form, certain qualities such as number and the rest, the different kinds of motion, and the generic characters. The feel of air is also an object of touch. Air itself is (not directly perceived by touch, but only) inferred from its feel (which is revealed to touch). (The inference is as follows.) The wind that blows is felt as being neither hot nor cold. Since the feel is a quality like colour and cannot go wandering, there must be some substance in which the feeling in question inheres or abides. What, then, is the substance which is the substrate of the feeling in question? It cannot be earth, for earth, though characterised by perceptible touch, is also characterised by perceptible form and colour, whereas the feeling which is experienced (in the case of the blowing wind) evidently has no substrate of a perceptible form and colour. Nor can the substrate in question be either water or fire, for the feel which it induces is not experienced as cold (as in the case of water) or hot (as in the case of fire). Nor again can it be the four ubiquitous substances since they are all devoid of the quality of such feeling. The assumption of tactual properties in the ubiquitous substances would entail a perception of touch everywhere and at all times. Nor also can the mind be the substrate in question, for the mind is atomic or infinitesimal and the touch of the infinitesimal or atomic is imperceptible.
i.e., beyond sense-perception. Hence we conclude that which constitutes the substrate of the quality that is felt by touch in the case in question is the (specific) substance we call air.

But it may be said air is perceptible (and not inferred as above shown), because it is the substrate of a perceptible touch just as is the jar. This objection is not tenable, for air is the substrate of perceptible touch only because of an adventitious condition, *viz.*, its association with an object of perceptible form and colour. (An adventitious condition is anything that is invariably correlated with the *probandum* but is not an invariable correlate of the *probans*.) In the case in question, the condition is an invariable correlate of the *probandum* as determined by the property of the subject in which it is inferred. (The subject of the inference is air which is an external substance and the *probandum* is perceptibility). That the adventitious condition is perceptible colour and form is proved by the invariable correlation of external substances that are perceptible and the presence of perceptible colour and form together with the absence of any such correlation between the ground of the inference, *viz.*, ‘being the substrate of perceptible touch’ and the adventitious condition, *viz.*, the ‘presence of perceptible colour and form.’ Thus we find that whatever is an external substance and is perceived is also characterised
by perceptible colour and form, but we cannot say that whatever is a substrate of a perceptible touch has also perceptible colour and form. (Hence being the substrate of a perceptible touch is a valid ground for perceptibility only on the condition that the substrate has perceptible colour and form and not otherwise. In other words, the ground is a ground only under conditions and not unconditionally and therefore the inference in question is not flawless.) Hence though you affirm the presence of the ground (viz., being the substrate of a perceptible touch), in the subject of the inference (viz., air), yet perceptible form and colour which always accompany the probandum, i.e., perceptibility, is no invariable correlate of the ground (and so the ground fails to prove the presence of the probandum being shown to be no invariable correlate of an invariable correlate of the probandum.) Hence it follows that air is inferred from its special touch (and not perceived as contended).

The objects perceived by the auditory sense are sounds and their varieties in the form of the alphabetical or verbal sounds.

Inadvertence of the mind (partial or complete), colour-blindness, jaundice, etc., are the defects of the five sensibilities.

The objects (of the five different senses) are also objects of the mind (the sixth sense) and the mind makes them its objects by presiding
over and guiding and directing the operations of the five external senses.

But the mind also perceives past events and in such perception it does not require the aid of the external senses. The result of such perception (of the past independently of the external senses) is memory or recollection. Memory is thus said to be an effect of internal perception (by the mind as the sixth sense). The contact of sense and object in this case (i.e., in the case of a direct perception of the past by means of the mind as the sixth sense) is furnished by what we call the Samskāra, trace or disposition left behind by the past experience. (The mind as the sixth sense has a direct vision of the past and what we call the disposition or trace of the past experience is nothing but the contact of the past with the present, or as Bergson would say perhaps, the insertion or prolongation of the past into the present). The process (of the mind in recollection) is thus analogous to that of the specially gifted senses of the yogis which possess extraordinary supernal powers due to the practice of yogīk concentration (and thereby cross the gulf between the past and the present).

The defects of the mind (which vitiate the mental or internal perceptions) are desires, predispositions, etc.

There are also defects of the objects perceived (which interfere with their correct perception) and
these are long intervals (of time or space), close proximity (in time or space), subtile or potential condition of the objects, intervening barriers (media) separating the objects from the perceiver, non-manifestation of the objects (e.g., of the stars in daylight), intermixture with objects of a like or similar nature, etc.

These defects being present, in some cases the cognition itself is not generated and in some cases doubt or uncertainty arises (as to the evidence of the cognition that is generated).

In the case of cognition due to the operation of the senses, the cause consists of the contacts of the four beginning with the self. Thus the self must come into contact with the mind, the mind with the sensibilities, the sensibilities with the objects. The sensibilities have no immediate intuition of objects at a distance and must actually dart forth to the place of the objects and come into contact with them in order to reveal them. The self-same contacts which enable the sensibilities to reveal their respective objects are also the immediate cause of the perception of their respective absence. No intervening relations mediate between the contacts and the absence in the case of perception of absence (as Naiyāyikas say).

One school of philosophers (the Naiyāyikas) holds that the contact which brings on cognition in the form of immediate perception is of six different kinds. Thus (according to
this school) it is either conjunction, or inher-
ence in the conjoined, or inherence in that
which is inherent in the conjoined, or inher-
ence, or inherence in the inherent, or the
relation of qualifying and qualified. Of these,
conjunction is the contact or relation that
is effected between the eye and substances like
jars, etc. (i.e., the relation which brings on the
perception of substances like jars, etc.). The
relation of inherence in the conjoined similarly
exists in the case of colour (which is a quality),
actions and generic characters. (These inhere in
substances like jars, dishes, etc., and these latter
are in conjunction with the eye. Therefore the
visual perception of colour, action and generic
character takes place through the relation of in-
herence in that which is in conjunction with the
eye.) In the same way in tactual perception, the
relation which brings on perception by the tactual
sense is actual conjunction with the tactual sense
in the case of perception of substances such
as jars, etc., and the relation of inherence in that
which is in conjunction in the case of the quality
of touch, the actions and generic characters of
these substances. So also in the case of the
internal perception of the self by the mind, the
relation is conjunction of mind and the self-
substance in the case of the perception of the latter
while it is inherence in that which is in conjunc-
tion in the case of the perception of the pleasure
and pain that exist in the self. So also in the case of perception of smell and taste by the olfactory and gustatory senses, respectively, the relation is inherence in that which is in conjunction, the smell and the taste being inherent in substances which are in conjunction respectively with the olfactory and gustatory senses. Similarly, in the perception of the generic characters of qualities and actions, the relation which mediates is inherence in that which is inherent in substances in conjunction (the generic characters being inherent in the qualities and actions which are themselves inherent in the substances of which they are qualities and actions). In the perception of sound by the auditory sense, however, the relation is simple inherence, for the auditory sense is nothing but ether or Ākāśa as limited by the tympanum of the ear (sound being a quality of Ākāśa and so inherent in Ākāśa). (The auditory sense being Ākāśa itself as limited by the tympanum and sound being inherent in Ākāśa the relation which holds between sound and the auditory sense in the case of perception of sound is a relation of pure inherence.) But the perception of the generic characters, etc., of the sound (inherent in particular sounds) is mediated by the relation of inherence in the inherent (sounds being inherent in Ākāśa and therefore in the limited Ākāśa which is the auditory sense, and the generic characters, etc., of sounds being
inherent in sounds). The perception of the absence of the jar by the eye takes place through the relation of qualification and qualified. In the case of the perception in the form 'In this place here, there is no jar,' the absence of the jar is the qualified and the qualification which specifies the absence is the particular place or locality with reference to which the absence is perceived. (The localisation thus acts as the specifying attribute of the absence in question.) In the case again of the perception of the absence being in the form "This place is characterised by the absence of the jar," the place itself acts as the qualified substrate and the absence of the jar is regarded as its qualification. Similarly in the perception of Inherence itself the mediating relation is that of qualified and qualification (Inherence does not inhere. Nor is it in conjunction with the objects between which it holds. Hence the relation of inherence to the objects between which it holds is said to be a unique relation which is that of qualification and qualified. The inherence is a qualification of the objects between which the inherence honesent Thus in the case of the inherence of the \(\text{vyoga}\) cloth in its parts, viz., the threads, the inherence is related to the cloth and the threads by the relation of qualification to qualified (and not on a second relation of inherence nor by conjunction. Non-

All this however is fallacious and uncausal Qualities, actions, etc., being nothing apart
(i.e., being non-different from) the things qualified or the things acting, etc., a relation of inherence between qualities, etc., and their substrates is impossible (for inherence presupposes a difference between the inherent and that in which the inherent inheres). Besides, there is no valid ground for the acceptance of inherence as real. Though the relation of conjunction between the self and the mind is required in the case of the perception of other objects, it is not so required in the perception of the self itself or its properties and states, for the self and its properties being the objects presented to the witnessing Intelligence are not objects of perception by the mind. Again, alphabetical sounds being themselves substances are not qualities at all. It cannot be said that they cannot be substances as besides having generic characters they are perceptible to only one of our external senses. For this rule fails, according to our view, in the case of darkness. (Darkness has generic character, is revealed only and not a quality.) And it fails also in the percept sound of the light of the lamp according to the sound of those who hold it to be substantive. (The sound of the lamp has generic character, is presented to one external sense and yet is held by the Naiyāyika to consist of nothing but fire, which are substances.) Further though alphabetical sounds are qualities of ether or
Ākāśa, yet since as qualities they are non-different from their substrate of Ākāśa, a relation of inherence between non-alphabetical sounds and Ākāśa is impossible. As regards the relation of qualification and qualified, it being only another name for the relation that consists in nothing but the essence of a relation itself (svarūpasambandha), no separate relation of qualification and qualified really exists. (Svarūpsambandha is the name of the relation that consists in the essence or svarūpa of a relation. Thus inherence is related by svarūpasambandha to the objects between which it holds. This means that the relation which relates inherence to its relata is no separate relation but the svarūpa or essence of the inherence itself.)

But some however say that memory is the consciousness that is caused only by traces of past experience. The adverb 'only' precludes recognition (which arises not simply from traces but also require other factors). Recognition is the cognition that arises from the joint operation of traces of past experience and sense-contact with present objects. The word coincidence (samprayoga) means contact (of sense and object). Non-mention of traces (as a causal condition of recognition) will make recognition indistinguishable from a simple cognition like 'Here is a jar.' Non-mention of coincidence or contact (as a causal
condition) will again make recognition indistinguishable from memory.

The above view is not tenable. For all valid knowledge is due to a valid ground or source of knowledge and therefore since memory is one kind of valid knowledge, the cause of memory, *viz.*, the traces of past experience, will have to be admitted as an independent pramāṇa or ground of true knowledge. But in this case the number of pramāṇas or valid sources of knowledge will be four and this is unestablished (as we have seen that the number is three and neither more nor less). It cannot be said that the objection applies also to our view (of recollection or memory). We hold memory to be due to internal perception by the mind with concentration of attention (*bhāvanā*) as an auxiliary condition. (Hence in our view memory is a form of perception, a kind of intellectual intuition where the trace of the past experiences serves the function of contact of the present mind with the past experience. Thus according to our view, though memory is admitted to be a form of valid knowledge, it is regarded only as a variety of perception, and so the cause of memory is not a separate source of knowledge, though no doubt it is a ground of true knowledge.)

There are four kinds of perception (as a source of valid knowledge), *viz.*, the Lord’s perception, the Consort’s perception, the perception that
belongs to the Yogan or Seer, and the perception that belongs to an ordinary mortal (ayogin). The objects of these different kinds of perception are the same as the objects of the corresponding cognitions or experiences which each kind induces in its respective perceiver. For fuller details the reader is referred to Jayatirtha’s Pramāṇa-paddhati (which we think unnecessary to go into over again here). Thus everything (relating to perception) has been set forth and therefore we close our chapter on perception as expounded in this Pramāṇacandrikā on the lines chalked out by the revered Jayatirtha. We bend our heads in respect to the sage Vyāsadeva.

Let us now proceed to the next Pramāṇa, viz., Inference. Inference is flawless reasoning, flawless establishment or proof of a conclusion (by means of a reason or ground). The synonyms of proof are reasoning, arguing from a mark to the thing marked, concluding on the basis of something which is pervaded by an invariable relation to something else.

Inference cannot be defined simply as reasoning or arguing from a mark, for the definition would then apply to fallacious reasonings such as those where the subject of the inference is fictitious or unreal and where the mark is known by a valid source of knowledge to exclude (instead of being invariably related to) the thing marked. In these cases the reasonings are
grounded on an invariable correlation and yet the reasonings are fallacious. (In the former, though the invariable relation holds, the subject of the inference is non-existent and thus the locus in which the relation is to prove the existence of the probandum does not exist. In the latter, the invariable relation is asserted in the reasoning but in actual fact no such relation holds, and thus the conclusion lacks material truth.) Hence inference is defined not as reasoning merely, but as flawless reasoning. Nor again can inference be defined simply as that which is flawless for in this case the definition will apply equally to Perception as a source of knowledge. Hence it is defined as reasoning (which is flawless).

The instrumental cause of inference is the sign or mark (by means of which we infer the probandum). The operation or process (of the instrumental cause) which leads to or establishes the conclusion is reasoning or argumentation (i.e., reasoning by means of the sign through which the subject of the inference is brought in relation to the probandum). The inferred conclusion is the result which emerges out of the process. Reasoning (Parāmarśa) consists in the cognition of the mark in the form of its invariable relation to the probandum as a property of the subject of the inference. For example in the inference of fire in yonder mountain from the perception of smoke therein, the reasoning consists in cognition of
the smoke as an invariable concomitant of fire and as being, as so invariably related, a property of the mountain yonder. The cognition which results from the process, *viz.*, yonder mountain is on fire, is the resulting inference. Invariable relation means invariable concomitance (or sequence) as in the case ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire.’ By concomitance or co-existence is here meant a relation merely between the ground of the inference and its *probandum*. By the invariableness of the concomitance is not meant then co-inherence in the same substrate. The invariableness of the concomitance means simply that the concomitance is fixed and unfailing. The purport of the whole is that *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance consists in an unfailing relation between the ground of the inference and its *probandum*. It follows therefore that the essential character (the defining mark) of *vyāpti* consists in the unfailing regularity of concomitance (between two or more phenomena). Thus when we observe that wherever smoke is perceived, there fire also is perceived, we are said to cognise the relation of *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance between ‘smoke’ and ‘fire.’ Here ‘smoke’ is the pervaded and fire the pervading property. The locus or abode of the invariable relation is called the pervaded while that which defines or marks off the relation is called the pervading.
to B, A as the locus of the invariable relation is the pervaded, while B as defining or marking off this (particular) invariable relation from other invariable relations is the pervading or pervader.] By the pervaded being a property of the subject of the inference is meant its existence in a suitable place (so as to make its invariable relation with the pervader possible. It does not mean that the pervaded property should be spatially or temporally included within the pervader). And thus our theory is free from flaws even of a trivial character.

Some however give the following account of invariable concomitance. Invariable concomitance (as an element or factor of inference) means the coinherence of the ground and the probandum in one and the same locus so that the probandum can never be that which is negated by the absolute negation that coinheres in the locus of the ground of the inference and also does not coinhere in the locus of that which it negates. (In other words, if the probandum is not that which is negated by the absolute negation that occupies the place where the ground exists and also does not occupy the place where the object negated by the said absolute negation exists, then the relation of coexistence in the same locus between the ground and the probandum is an invariable relation.)

Mere coexistence with the probandum in one and the same locus does not fully bring out the
nature of vyāpti or invariable relation. Take the inference, f. i., "Yonder mountain is on fire, because it has the character of knowableness." Here coexistence in the same locus holds (between the ground, 'knowableness,' and the probandum, 'fire,' i.e., the locus of 'fire,' e.g., the 'oven,' is also the locus of knowableness, i.e., the oven is a knowable object). And yet the inference is evidently fallacious. To exclude such cases, the probandum (coexistence wherewith will constitute vyāpti) is qualified as being one which is not that which is negated by the absolute negation which occupies the place where the ground or Hetu exists. (This qualification of the probandum excludes the case of the above fallacious inference and other like cases. For 'fire,' the probandum of the above inference, is that which is negated by the absolute negation occupying the place where the ground, viz., 'knowableness,' exists; e.g., fire never exists in the great lake and yet 'knowableness' exists in the great lake in so far as the lake is a knowable object. Therefore the probandum, 'fire,' is not that which is absolutely non-existing where the ground, 'knowableness,' exists.) Even this qualification of the probandum, however, fails to exclude the case of (the evidently fallacious) inference, "The tree is in contact (with the monkey) because it has the generic character of substances." (Here 'contact' is the probandum,
and it is not that which is absolutely non-existent where the *hetu*, or ground, *viz.*, 'the generic character of substances,' exists. 'The generic character of substances' exists in substances. 'Contact' as a quality also exists in substances. Hence 'contact' is not that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. And yet the inference is fallacious.) To exclude such cases the *probandum* is further qualified as being one which also does not coexist in the same substrate with that which is absolutely non-existent where the ground or *hetu* exists. This excludes the case of 'contact' and the like. ['Contact' abides in substances. It is thus not that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. But despite this, contact is also not that which does not coexist with that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. For 'contact' coexists with the absence of contact in the same substance. 'Contact' of the tree and monkey coexists in the tree with the negation or absence of such contact in another part of the tree. 'Contact' thus coexists with non-contact (with the absolute negation of contact) in one and the same substrate.] In other words, non-contact or negation of contact being coexistent in the same substrate or substance with contact which is the object of the negation, the rule, that the *probandum* should not exist in the same substrate with that which is absolutely non-existent where
the ground exists, fails, and the case cannot be regarded as one of invariable relation or vyāpti.

But all this, we hold, is fallacious and un-sound. Take the case of the inference 'There is rain on the hills higher up because the rivers below are full.' Here from the fullness of the rivers at the base we infer the occurrence of rain at the top. In such inferences, where the probandum occupies a different place from that occupied by the probans or ground, the above definition of invariable concomitance as co-existence, in the same substrate, of the ground and the probandum altogether fails. It cannot be said that our view is open to the self-same objection as the above view, for unfailing relation of effect and cause holds equally, in our view, in the case of inferences where the probans and the probandum occupy different places.

(We have so far discussed the meaning of invariable relation. We now proceed to explain the different forms of invariable relation that constitute the grounds of inference.) Dharmas or properties of things may be related in four different ways. Thus two Dharmas or properties may be related by a positive symmetrical invariable relation so that each is invariably concomitant with the other. Two properties again may be so related that one of them is an invariable concomitant of the other, but not vice versa.
Two properties again may be invariably related by the relation of mutual negation and exclusion. Lastly, two properties may be so related that at least in one case where one is, the other is, as also at least in one case where either one is, the other is not. (This last relation is equal to the following three propositions taken together where A and B express the two properties, \textit{viz.}, ‘At least in one case where A is, B is’ ‘At least in one case where A is, B is not,’ ‘At least in one case where B is, A is not.’) The first form of concomitance is similarly equal to the two propositions—‘Wherever A is, B is,’ and ‘Wherever B is, A is,’—taken together. The second and the third will correspond respectively to the propositions ‘In all cases where A is, B is’ and ‘In no case where A is, B is.’) We have a concrete illustration of the first form of invariable concomitance in the unfailing relation that holds between scriptural (Vedic) prohibition and conduciveness to demerit and sin and between scriptural injunction and conduciveness to merit and righteousness. Thus whatever is scripturally prohibited is productive of sin and demerit and whatever tends to demerit and sin is scripturally prohibited. Here each of the two (related properties) is at once pervaded by, and pervader of, the other. Similarly it is also observed that whatever is scripturally enjoined is also conducive to merit and righteousness and whatever is
conducive to merit and righteousness is also laid down by scripture. The second form of invariable concomitance is again illustrated in the case of the relation between smoke and fire, as also between the product of will and non-eternity. Thus 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire' but no invariable relation holds in the form 'Wherever there is fire, there is smoke,' for in the case of the heated iron-ball (where fire is, but smoke is not) the invariability fails. Here 'smokiness' is the pervaded and occupies a smaller area while 'fireness' is the pervader and occupies a wider area. Similarly, 'whatever is a product of will-causality is also non-eternal,' but no invariable relation holds in the form of the converse of this, viz., 'whatever is non-eternal, is also a product of will-causality,' for it is seen to fail in the case of antecedent non-existence (which is non-eternal and yet is no product of will-causality). The third form of invariable concomitance is illustrated in the relation which holds between the generic character of the cow and the generic character of the horse as also between that of the elephant and that of the lion. Thus wherever there is the generic character of the cow, there is nowise the generic character of the horse and wherever there is the generic character of the horse there is nowise the generic character of the cow. No relation of pervader and pervaded holds between either one and the other, all relation
being non-existent between the two. Similarly, ‘whatever is an elephant, is nowise a lion’ and ‘whatever is a lion, is nowise an elephant’ are well-known mutually exclusive relations to be noted in this connection. The fourth kind of invariable concomitance is illustrated in the case of the relation which exists between the the property of being a cook and the property of a man as also between the property of being one of the five elements and the property of moving. Thus though in one particular instance the property of being a cook and the property of being a man may co-exist, yet in another case the property of being a cook may co-exist with that of being a woman to the exclusion of that of being a man as also in a third instance the property of being a man may co-exist with the property of being a non-cook to the exclusion of the property of being a cook. In this case also no relation of pervader and pervaded holds between either one and the other, for inspite of a relation existing between the two, there are instances in which the relation fails. In the same way, though the property of being an element is co-existent in some instances with the property of moving (viz., in earth, water, air and fire), yet in the case of Ākāśa or ether (which is an element but does not move) the property of being an element exists to the exclusion of the property of moving, and in the case of the mind the
property of moving exists to the exclusion of the property of being an element. (The smoke is not an element and yet it moves.)

In all these when the property which is pervaded produces the cognition of the property that is the pervader, we have what is called an inference or anumāna. The pervading property (of which the inference produces the knowledge) is called the inferred character, anumeyā, or object of inference.

The following objection may however be raised to the view of inference expounded above, viz., that it is not possible for the smoke that exists in the mountain far away to produce a valid cognition of fire in the man who exists here in his house. The reply to this objection is as follows. In the case of inference the instrumental cause is a known agency and not an unknown condition as in the case of perception. (The relation of smoke to fire is known to the man who makes the inference, but in perception the action of the sensibilities with reference to the object perceived is not known before the perception.)

The reply however does not seem to be convincing, for there are people (e.g., the savages of the Cocoanut Island) in whom the perception of smoke at a distance does not call forth the cognition of fire. The answer is that in this case though they have a cognition of the form of
the smoke, yet they have no knowledge of it as an invariable concomitant of fire. For even when an object like smoke might previously be cognised as an invariable concomitant of something else such as fire, it may fail to be cognised on account of failure of memory as an invariable concomitant of the latter in a fresh instance and thus fail to produce the cognitum of fire. (Therefore in the case of savages where the smoke was never cognised as invariably related to fire, a cognition of smoke in the first instance cannot possibly produce the knowledge of fire.)

Therefore we conclude: when an accurately and correctly cognised mark or sign is accompanied by a recollection of its invariable concomitance with the thing marked or signified and is thereby able to produce the cognition of the thing marked or signified in a fit place or locality, we have what is called an inference or *anumāna*. Hence even though the form of the marked or signified thing may be already known yet since the inference makes it known further in relation to a particular place or locality, the inferential process is not useless or superfluous. (The inference, in other words, entails a real march of thought conducing as it does to a new synthesis of the already known thing with a place or situation to which it was not previously known to be related.) Hence inference consists of two factors: (1) invariable concomitance (of
the mark with the thing marked); (2) the presence of the mark in a suitable place such as will make possible the inference of the thing marked either in the same place or some other (causally or otherwise connected) place. There is no rule that the mark should also be cognised as a property existing in the subject of the inference (for the mark may exist in one place, e.g., the fullness of the rivers at the base, and the thing marked, viz., rain, may be proved to exist in some other place, e.g., at the top of the hill).

A question here arises: how does the cognition of the invariable concomitance arise? How in other words, do we arrive at the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between different objects or events? The answer is, by means of the corresponding perceptions, inferences and testimony. Thus in the case of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, we arrive at the knowledge of the concomitance of smoke with fire by the perception of the one together with the other in the domestic oven and other places. Here repeated observation and non-observation of the contrary are the auxiliary conditions. But how can perception which apprehends only that which is present and is in contact with the sensibilities, apprehend an invariable concomitance that extends not merely to all cases (actual and possible) but also to the past (and the
future and the remote)? It would be possible if you admitted a transcendental contact (pratyāsatti) of past and present and of here and far (as Naiyāyikas do), but according to you, no such transcendental contact exists (between the present sense organ and the past and distant objects). The answer to this is: though there is no transcendental contact between a particular instance and its sāmānya or class, yet since the past and the distant are capable of being drawn into relation to the present instance by means of similarity or resemblance, the cognition of an invariable concomitance as extending to all instances (actual and possible) is fully established. Invariable concomitance as made known mediately by means of inference will be illustrated later on. The following are instances of invariable concomitance known from authoritative testimony. 'Whoever is a Brahmin, is a person who must not be put to death,' 'The animal that is a cow is one that must not be touched with the feet,' 'Whatever is enjoined by the Vedas, ought to be accomplished as a duty.'

Inference is of three kinds: inference from effects, inference from causes, and inference from phenomena that are neither causes nor effects. When an effect is the ground of our inference of the cause, we have an inference from an effect, e.g., when from the presence of smoke we infer the existence of fire. When the cause serves as
the ground of an inference of the effect, we have an inference from a cause, e.g., when we say, 'yonder mass of clouds which owes its special character to its own cause proves an impending rain-fall.' When a particular mark proves the existence of a probandum without being either the cause or the effect of it, we have an inference from something which is neither a cause nor an effect, e.g., when the presence of taste proves the existence of colour.

Inference may be divided again into two classes from another standpoint, viz., into inference of what is specifically observed and inference of what is generically observed. Thus where the object inferred is perceptible we have an inference of the specifically observed, e.g., when fire is inferred from smoke. Where the object inferred is not perceptible, we have an inference of the generically observed, e.g., when the visual sensibility is inferred from the cognition of colour.

Some (the Naiyāyikas) hold that inference is of three kinds, viz., Kevalānvayī inference, Kevalavyatirekā inference and Anvayavyatirekā inference.

(According to the Naiyāyikas) the pakṣa or the subject of an inference is that substrate which is to be proved to own the probandum as its property. To exclude the sapakṣa or the co-ordinate of the subject and other like substrates, the subject is defined as that which is to own the probandum as a
property. Since the property here means that the cognition whereof is to be produced by the sign or mark (in the inference), the definition is not too wide. (The sapakṣa is also a substrate of a property, but it is not the substrate of the property the cognition whereof is to be produced by the mark or sign. It is the substrate of a property which is homogeneous with the property that constitutes the probandum, but it is not the substrate of the property which is the probandum itself.) But it may be said that the hetu or ground has also this character of being characterised by the probandum as being related to it by conjunction (and thus the definition is too wide as applying to the hetu or ground as well). To meet this objection the pakṣa has been defined as a substrate. (The hetu is not the substrate of the property that constitutes the probandum, but is related to it only by concomitance or conjunction, but the pakṣa is the substrate in which the probandum is to be proved to abide as a property.) The sapakṣa or co-ordinate of the inferential subject is that substrate which owns a property which is homogeneous with that which constitutes the probandum. To preclude a too wide application to the case of the smoke in the oven, the definition includes the word ‘substrate.’ [The smoke in the oven is the familiar instance of drṣṭānta and not the sapakṣa. It is distinguished from the latter by the fact that it is not the substrate, while the
sapakṣa is the substrate of a property (in this case the kitchen fire) homogeneous with the property constituting the probandum (i.e., the fire in the mountain)]. To have defined the sapakṣa simply as the substrate of the probandum (and not of a property homogeneous with the probandum) would have been absurd. (For the sapakṣa and the paksā would in that case have been identical, and a sapakṣa other than the paksā would have been an impossibility.) Therefore in the definition the word ‘homogeneous’ has been included. The meaning is that the sapakṣa is the substrate of a property homogeneous with the probandum and as such is devoid of the character of uncertainty (i.e., the uncertainty that characterizes the paksā as the substrate of the probandum). The vipakṣa or contra-ordinate of the inferential subject is a substrate devoid alike of the probandum and every property homogeneous with the probandum. The words ‘devoid of the probandum’ distinguishes the vipakṣa from the paksā while the words ‘devoid of every property homogeneous with the probandum’ distinguishes it from the sapakṣa. (The sapakṣa is a similar instance in which the existence of a property like the probandum is known for certain, and the vipakṣa is a dissimilar instance in which the non-existence of the probandum and of all properties similar to the probandum is known for certain.)
[These definitions of the inferential subject, the co-ordinate of the inferential subject and the contra-ordinate to the inferential subject, prepare the way for the definitions of Kevalānvayī and other forms of inference.]

Thus the Kevalānvayī inference is one which is based on a ground that pervades the subject and also exists in its co-ordinates but which has no contra-ordinate to its subject actually existing. [In other words, a Kevalānvayī inference is one that is based on numerous instances of agreement in presence but is without any instance of agreement in absence.]

Kevalānvayī inference cannot be defined simply as an inference in which there exists no co-ordinate to the subject, for in this case it will be indistinguishable from the inconclusive reasoning ‘All things are nameable, because they are knowable.’ (Here the subject of the inference being ‘all things’ or ‘everything,’ no contra-ordinate to the subject exists, but since there is here also no co-ordinate to it, the ground of the inference, viz., the invariable relation between ‘knowableness’ and ‘nameableness,’ is without a corroborative familiar instance and thus lacks material certitude.) Hence the words ‘in which the ground is existent in the co-ordinate.’ But even thus the definition remains imperfect for an inference which has no contra-ordinate to its subject and in which the ground is existent also in
the co-ordinate, is not distinguishable from the fallacious reasoning in which the ground does not exist in the subject of the inference, e.g., the inference ‘sound is nameable because it is visible.’ To exclude such fallacious reasonings Kevalānvayī inference is further specified by the qualification that it is an inference in which the ground must exist in the subject. Even this, however, is not sufficient, for this by itself does not distinguish it from such fallacious reasonings as ‘The jar and sound are nameable, for they are characterised by shape’ where the ground, viz., ‘shape,’ exists only in one part of the subject, viz., the ‘jar,’ and not in the other part, viz., ‘sound.’ To exclude such fallacious reasonings and prevent these being confounded with Kevalānvayī inference, the ground is stated as being not merely existent in the subject but also as pervading it. The pervasion of the subject may again be of two forms, viz., (1) Where the ground pervades both the subject and its co-ordinates, and (2) where the ground pervades the subject but exists only in a portion (i.e., in some) of the co-ordinates. ‘Sound is namable, because it is knowable, just as is the jar’ illustrates the case where the ground pervades not merely the subject but also its co-ordinates. In the same reasoning the words ‘because it is a quality just as is colour’ (in place of the words ‘because it is knowable just as is the jar’) illustrates the case where the
ground exists only in some (i.e. a portion of the entire extent) of the co-ordinates. (The ground, viz., ‘quality’ is predicable of some nameable things, but not of all nameable things.)

The invariable concomitance which constitutes the ground of inference is of two kinds, viz., invariable concomitance as agreement in presence, and invariable concomitance as agreement in absence. Invariable concomitance as agreement in presence consists in the invariable concomitance of the ground of the inference with the \textit{probandum}. Invariable concomitance as agreement in absence consists in the invariable concomitance of the absence of the \textit{probandum} with the absence of the ground. In the case of agreement in presence, the ground is the pervaded and the \textit{probandum} is the pervader. In the case of agreement in absence, the absence of the \textit{probandum} is the pervaded and the absence of the ground the pervader. In every case an invariable concomitance is understood as following in the wake of the pervaded. In the case of the above inference ‘sound is nameable, because it is knowable, just as is the jar,’ the invariable concomitance of ‘knowable’ with ‘nameable’ is based on an agreement in presence only. The agreement in presence here is ‘whatever is knowable, is nameable, just as is the jar.’ But we have no agreement in absence here in the form ‘what is not nameable is not
knowable,’ it being impossible to get any case of an object which is not nameable as illustrative of such absence, since all things are nameable and there is nothing that is not nameable. This is why inference based on such concomitance consisting of agreement in presence only is called inference of the Kevalānvaya type. Where the ground pervades the subject, where no co-ordinate of the subject exists and where further the ground is excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject, we have an inference of the Kevalavyatirekī type (according to Nyāya). If Kevalavyatirekī inference had been defined as one in which the ground is excluded from (some instances of) the contra-ordinate to the subject, the definition would have been too wide and would have applied to the fallacious reasoning based on a non-invariable ground, ‘yonder mountain is on fire, because it is a mountain.’ To exclude such reasonings the definition lays down that the ground must be excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject. In the present case, the ground, viz., ‘being a mountain,’ though excluded from such contra-ordinates as ‘the great lake,’ ‘the sheet of water,’ etc., is yet not excluded from such other contra-ordinates as ‘a fireless mountain,’ ‘a hill without fire.’ Hence the ground is not excluded ‘from every case of a contra-ordinate to the subject’ and thus does not come up to the requirements of the definition (of a Kevalavyatireki
inference as set forth above). Thus the definition does not apply to such cases and is not too wide (as applying to such fallacious reasonings as well). It must be noted however that the mere fact of the ground being excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance does not suffice as a complete definition of the Kevalavyatirekī inference, for as such it remains undistinguished from Anvayavyatirekī inference based both on agreement in presence and agreement in absence. To exclude such inferences, the definition stresses the fact that 'no co-ordinate of the subject should exist,' i.e., no similar instance where the existence of the probandum should be known for certain should exist. (In Anvayavyatirekī inference, the existence of the co-ordinate or similar instance is a sine quā non while in Kevalavyatirekī the non-existence of the co-ordinate is a sine quā non.) But even this added qualification does not suffice as a definition of the Kevalavyatirekī inference, for as such it has a too wide application to the fallacious inference based on a Svarupāsiddha ground (i.e., on a ground that does not exist in the inferential subject), viz., 'The body of the finite individual has a soul accompanying it, since this body is conscious.' (Here the ground, viz., 'consciousness' is non-existent in the 'body' which is the inferential subject. The dead body, e.g., is devoid of consciousness.) To
exclude such cases, the definition insists on the existence of the ground in the subject. Even this, however, does not suffice, for as so qualified the definition applies to the fallacious inference based on a ground that exists in one part of the subject (and not in the whole of it), viz., “The finite individual and the Lord are omniscient, because they are all-creating.” (Here the ground ‘all-creating’ is true only of the Lord and not of the finite individual, i.e., it holds good of one part of the subject and not of the whole of it.) To exclude such cases the definition says, ‘The ground must pervade the subject.’ The following is an instance of a Kevalavyatireki inference answering to all the above requirements: ‘The Lord is all-knowing, because He is all-creating.’ It is based on the invariable agreement in absence, viz., ‘Whatever is not all-knowing, is also not all-creating, just as is Devadatta.’ There are innumerable instances illustrating this agreement in absence but none illustrating the positive agreement in presence between ‘what is all-creating’ and ‘what is all-knowing,’ for Ramkrśna and other Incarnations of the Lord are comprised in the subject of the inference (and therefore cannot serve as corroborative illustrations) while other finite individuals are non-omniscient (and therefore cannot be cited as illustrations of the agreement in presence). For these reasons (viz., that it is based on an invariable relation which can be
actually observed only as agreement in absence and not as agreement in presence) such inference is called *kevalavyatireki* inference.

An inference in which the ground pervades the subject, exists in the co-ordinates or known similar instances wherein the *probandum* exists, and is excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject is an *anvayavyatireki* inference. An *anvayavyatireki* inference is not completely defined as one in which the ground is found to be non-existent in the contra-ordinates, for as such the definition fails to exclude the fallacious inference based on a non-invariable ground, *viz.*, ‘The body of the finite individual is non-eternal, because it has the character of the element of earth.’ In this inference the ground, *viz.*, ‘character of the element of earth,’ though non-existent in such eternal entities as the ether, etc., is yet existent in such other eternal entities as the atoms of earth, etc. (Thus though excluded from some objects which are not non-eternal, it is yet not excluded from some other objects which are also not non-eternal.) To exclude such cases, the definition says, ‘the ground must be excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate.’ But this also by itself does not suffice as a complete definition, for as such it remains indistinguishable from *kevalavyatireki* inference based on agreement in absence only. Hence the definition adds the words, ‘the ground must exist in the co-ordinates.’
(The *kevalavyatireki* is devoid of co-ordinates.) Even with this added qualification, the definition has a too wide application to the fallacious inference based on a *svarūpasiddha* ground (i.e., a ground that does not exist in the subject), *viz.*, ‘Devadatta is all-knowing, because he is all-creating.’ (Here the ground ‘all-creating’ is excluded from all cases of ‘not all-knowing’ and also exists in ‘what is all-knowing,’ *viz.*, the Lord. But it does not exist in Devadatta, the subject of the (inference). Hence the definition further adds, ‘the ground must exist in the subject.’ Even now however the definition applies to the fallacious inference based on a *bhāgāsiddha* ground (i.e., a ground that exists only in one part of the subject and not the whole of it), *viz.*, ‘The mountain and the lake are on fire, because they smoke.’ (Here the ground ‘smoke’ exists in one part of the subject, *viz.*, ‘mountain,’ and not in the other part, *viz.*, the ‘lake.’) To exclude such cases the definition says ‘the ground must pervade (i.e., exist in the whole of) the subject.’ As ‘smokiness’ is absent in the ‘lake’ (being true only of the ‘mountain’) it lacks the character of pervading the subject (in the above case).

Such *anvayavyatireki* inference based both on agreement in presence and agreement in absence may again be of two kinds. Thus it may be an inference with a ground that
exists in every case of a co-ordinate, or again it may be an inference with a ground that exists only in some (not all) instances of its co-ordinates. For example, the inference, 'The finite individual is eternal, because there is no cause that can put an end to it' is a case of an anvayavyatireki inference with a ground existing in all cases of the co-ordinates. In respect of all eternal things such as the ether, etc., the ground, viz., 'absence of a cause of an end or destruction' holds good. Again, the inference 'The mountain is on fire, because it smokes' is an instance of an anvayavyatireki inference with a ground that exists only in some (and not all) its co-ordinates, for in some 'fiery' things (e.g., the red-hot iron ball) 'smoke' (which is the ground of the inference) does not exist. This latter example is a typical anvayavyatireki inference and takes its name from the following two invariable relations (of presence and absence) on which it is based, viz., 'Whatever smokes, is on fire, just as is the oven' and 'Whatever is not on fire, does not smoke, just as is the great lake.'

Inferences based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence take their character from the corresponding invariable concomitances. Thus we have invariable concomitance based on agreement in presence in 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.' And we have invariable
concomitance based on agreement in absence in 'Wherever fire is not, smoke is not.' And inferences that resemble these two forms of concomitances considered together are called Anvayavyatireki Inferences or inferences based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence.

All this however (i.e., this division of inference into kevalänvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvaya-
vyaṭireki) we (the Mādhvas) reject as untenable. For we consider an agreement in absence as being unsuitable for proving the presence of the sādhya or probandum. In proving the presence of a positive entity by means of the presence of another positive (entity), an invariable relation between the absence of one and the absence of the other has no logical scope. (An invariable relation between the negation of one thing and the negation of another does not justify any positive step from the presence of one to the presence of the other.) For in this case the positive ground exists in the subject of the inference (and thus falls within the domain of affirmation) while the invariable relation as an agreement in absence (the absence of the probandum and the absence of the ground) belongs to the domain of negation and thus occupies a different place. Thus the invariable relation occupies one place (the domain of negation) and the ground as a property of the subject occupies a different place (the domain of affirmation). (Hence there is no
relation between the two to justify an inferential step.) How then, it may be asked, are kevala-vyatireki inferences in vogue? In this way. Here also the real ground is an invariable relation in presence, e.g., the invariable relation between 'omniscience' and 'all-creativity' in the above inference. But it is impossible to cite positive similar instances of this agreement in presence in response to the demand for an indication of the actual places where this invariable relation holds. Hence for accomplishing this end by means of inference, an invariable relation of absence acquires relevancy (for our purpose). For example, if in the above instance it is asked:—"What proof have we of an invariable relation between 'all-creativity' and 'omniscience'?" we can say at once that 'all-creativity' must be pervaded by 'omniscience,' for it is that which is negated by the negation which pervades the negation of 'omniscience.' When one thing is so related to another thing that the negation of the former pervades the negation of the latter, the former thing is invariably related to the latter. (Thus if A is so related to B that the negation of A is pervasive of the negation of B, i.e., if 'All not-B is not-A,' then A is invariably related to B, i.e., 'All A is B.') This relation is admitted, e.g., by the person seeking 'fire,' as holding between 'smokiness' and 'fireness.' In the case of the so-called anvayavyatireki
inferences supposed to be based on agreements in presence as well as absence, the agreement in absence is in reality purposeless and out of place. The invariable relation in such cases is sufficiently established by perception, etc., (of the instances of agreement in presence). (Thus the agreement in absence is without real usefulness.) Notwithstanding this it may be conceded that the agreement in absence serves some sort of purpose as indicating in a way that the positive relation of agreement in presence is not negativc by any instances of the failure of the agreement (i.e., by any instances to the contrary.)

According to another (Nyāya) classification, inference is of two kinds, viz., (1) inference for oneself, and (2) inference for convincing others. Of these, inference for oneself is the cause of self-conviction and the knowledge one gathers for one's own self.

An inference for oneself takes place in the following way. A person in the first place makes repeated personal observation of the togetherness of 'smoke' and 'fire' in the oven and other places. From such observation he gathers that there is an invariable relation between 'smoke' and 'fire.' Having gathered the invariable relation, when he draws near a 'mountain' and is thrown into doubt as to the existence of 'fire' in the mountain, he notes the trail of smoke rising from the mountain and recollects the
invariable relation between 'smoke' and 'fire' (which he gathered from repeated previous observation). When the recollection takes place (that 'where smoke is, fire also is'), and the said person draws near the mountain (with the trailing smoke), the knowledge at once flashes forth that 'the mountain yonder has smoke which is an invariable concomitant of fire.' Thus does he make an inference for himself. This last step (i.e., the knowledge that the mountain possesses 'smoke' which is invariably related to 'fire') is called parāmarśa or inferential reasoning. From this (reasoning process) arises the knowledge that 'the mountain is on fire.' (The above illustrates inference for oneself.) As regards inference for others, it is a fully-expressed reasoning consisting of five steps which are employed to convince others as to the way of inferring 'fire' from the (observed) presence of 'smoke.' The five steps are:—(1) 'Yonder mountain is on fire,' (2) 'because it smokes,' (3) 'Whatever has smoke, is also on fire, just as is the oven,' (4) 'So is it with this (mountain yonder),' (5) 'therefore it (the mountain) is so (on fire).' By all this even a second or third person is assured of 'fire' from the knowledge of the presence of the established mark or sign thereof (i.e., of the sign of 'smoke'). The above five steps are called respectively (1) Pratijñā, (2) Hetu, (3) Udāharaṇam, (4) Upanayah and (5) Nigamanam.
Of these pratiṣṭhā (the statement of the proposition to be proved) consists in the statement of the subject of the inference as possessing the probandum as a property. (In the above inference), e.g., the statement ‘Yonder mountain is on fire’ is the pratiṣṭhā. (2) The hetu (the ground of the inference) is the statement of the mark or sign with a suffix indicative of its instrumentality (towards the conclusion), e.g., the statement ‘because it smokes.’ (3) The drstiṣṭāntah is the concrete case in which the invariable relation or vyāpti is apprehended. It is of two kinds, viz., (a) sādharmyadṛṣṭāntah, and (b) vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntah. A concrete example in which an invariable relation of presence is apprehended is called a sādharmyadṛṣṭāntah, e.g., in the inference (of fire) from smoke, the case of the oven. A concrete case in which an agreement in absence is apprehended is a vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntah, e.g., in the same inference from ‘smoke,’ the case of the great lake. The udāharana is the statement of the concrete case or example as exemplifying or illustrating the invariable relation of which it is a case in point. (The udāharana is thus a statement of a case in point while the drṣṭāntah is just the concrete case and no statement of it as illustrative of the invariable relation.) It is of two kinds, viz., (a) sādharmyodāharanam, and (b) vaidharmyodāharanam. A statement of a concrete example
illustrating an agreement in presence is a sādharmyodāharaṇam, e.g., the statement ‘Whatever is smoky, is fiery, just as is the oven.’ A statement of a concrete example illustrating an agreement in absence is a vāidharmyodāharaṇam, e.g., the statement ‘What is not fiery, is not smoky, just as is the great lake.’ (4) Upanayah is the statement of the mark, the invariable relation whereof has been well-established in the concrete example, as existing in the subject of the inference. It is also of two kinds according to the nature of the concrete example (which establishes its invariable relation). ‘The mountain yonder has a trailing smoke just as the oven’ is a case of a sādharmyopanayah. ‘The mountain is not devoid of smoke like the lake’ is a case of a vāidharmyopanayah. (5) Nigamanaṃ (the conclusion) is the statement of the subject (as characterised by the probandum) as proved or demonstrated, e.g., the statement, ‘Therefore, yonder mountain is on fire.’

All this, we hold, is unsound and untenable. As there is no scope for the two kinds of vyāpti or invariable relation (in inference), so also there is no scope for the two kinds of udāharaṇa (illustrating such relation). Besides, the alleged rule as to the necessity of five steps in inference is an unproved assumption. The way in which the supposed necessity of the five steps may be refuted has been set forth in the Paddhati and the reader
is referred thereto for an understanding of the method of the refutation. This closes our dissertation on the nature of inference.

We shall now discuss the fallacies of reasoning. The fallacies are of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) fallacies arising from discrepancy or contradiction (*virodha*), and (2) fallacies of inappropriateness (*asaṅgati*). Of these, the fallacies of contradiction are of three kinds, *viz.*, contradiction in the *pratijñā* or proposition to be proved, contradiction in the *hetu* or ground, and contradiction in the *dṛṣṭāntah* or illustration. Contradiction in the *pratijñā* again may be of two kinds, *viz.*, contradiction of the *pratijñā* or proposition to be proved with what is established by the recognised sources of knowledge, and internal self-contradiction in the proposition in question. Of these again, contradiction with the evidence of the accepted sources of knowledge may be of two kinds, *viz.*, contradiction with the deliverance of a stronger evidence or proof, and contradiction with the deliverance of an evidence of equal strength or force. The following is an example of a proposition in contradiction with the deliverance of stronger evidence:—‘The subject-matter of controversy (*i.e.*, the world) is false; because it is an object of perception; whatever is an object of perception, is false, just as is the silver that is (falsely) perceived in the shining mother-of-pearl.’ This conclusion is contradicted by the evidence of perception to
which objects like the jar, etc., are presented as real, by the evidence of inference also as it proves the opposite, viz., 'The subject under discussion (the world) is real, because it yields expected results, just as admittedly real things do,' and lastly by the evidence of scriptural testimony which declares the world to be real. It thus runs counter to the combined evidence of perception, inference and authoritative testimony. Hence it is in contradiction with evidence of stronger force or strength. As an example of contradiction with evidence of equal force or strength we have the following pair of inferences: —

(1) 'The disputed subject (i.e., the world) is false; because it is perceptible; just as is the silver perceived in the locus of the mother-of-pearl.'

(2) 'The disputed subject (i.e., the world) is real; because it is the object of valid knowledge; just as is the self.' In these two inferences, the corresponding invariable relations as also the presence of the respective grounds in the corresponding subjects being exactly of the same order, we have here a contradiction between evidences of equal strength and force. An internally discrepant or self-contradictory statement may, again be of two kinds. It may be an apasiddhānta or a jāti. An apasiddhānta is an asserted proposition that contradicts the accepted beliefs of one's own school of thought. Since one has subscribed to the tenets of the school to which one has
elected oneself, in making a statement contradicting such tenets one is really contradicting oneself. This is why an **apasiddhānta** is regarded as a form of self-contradiction. A statement of the existence of God by one belonging to the atheistic Sankhya School of thought is an example of this kind of self-contradiction. When one refutes oneself by the very assertion one makes we have that form of self-contradiction which is called **jāti**. For example, one who says ‘My mother is childless’ commits this form of self-contradiction. **Virodha** or contradiction in the **hetu** or ground is also of two kinds, **viz., svarūpāsiddhiḥ** and **avyāptiḥ**. The following is an example of **svarūpāsiddhiḥ**:—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible.’ Here visibility is non-existent in sound, sound being audible (and not visible). **Avyāptiḥ** again is of three kinds. We have **avyāptiḥ** when the mark or sign (the ground of the inference) is related to the **probandum** as well as the absence of the **probandum**. We have also **avyāptiḥ** where the mark or sign is related to the absence of the **probandum** without being related to the **probandum**. Lastly, we have **avyāptiḥ** where the mark or sign is unrelated both to the **probandum** and the absence of it. As an example of the first (of these three) we have the following:—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.’ The following is an example of the second:—‘Sound is eternal, because it is a
product of will.’ As an example of the third we have: ‘All that is, is non-eternal, because it exists.’ In this last example, the subject of the inference being ‘whatsoever that is’ the hetu or ground is unrelated both to the probandum and the absence thereof. (Since the subject in this case is ‘all,’ i.e., everything actual and possible, there is nothing outside the subject to serve the purpose of a probandum or the absence thereof. Therefore the hetu or ground as a property of the subject is without relation to the probandum as well as the negation of it. There being no probandum, there is also no absence of probandum and thus the hetu or ground is without relation to either.) Contradiction in the example is of two kinds, viz., contradiction arising from the example being without relation to the probandum, and contradiction arising from the example being without relation to the ground. The former is illustrated in the following:—‘The mind is non-eternal, because it has shape, just as the atom has.’ The second is illustrated by the same inference if in place of the words ‘the atom’ we substitute the word ‘action.’ (We shall now deal with the fallacy of inappropriateness.) An example of the fallacy of inappropriateness is addressing to an admitted theist the traditional theistic argument:—‘The earth and the rest have an intelligent author, because they are effects, just as is a piece of
cloth.' The inappropriateness consists here in the absence of any demand for such an inference (the addressee being a theist and therefore not standing in need of being convinced). The inappropriate is just that for which there is no real need. This is the definition of the inappropriate.

Others (the Naiyāyikas) enumerate the following five as the essential characters of the hetu or ground of a valid inference:—(1) existence in the subject of the inference as its property or dharma, (2) existence in the co-ordinates or similar instances, (3) exclusion from the contra-ordinates to the inferential subject, i.e., from dissimilar instances, (4) non-sublation of its viṣaya or object, (5) absence of a counter-hetu or counter-ground leading to a contradictory conclusion. Of these, all the five characters are attributed to the ground of an anvayavyatireki inference. The ground of a kevalānvoayi inference however should possess only four of these, there being no contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance in such inference and so the exclusion of the ground from the contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance being impossible in this case. The ground of the kevalavyatireki is likewise required to possess only four characters, there being no co-ordinate or similar instance in such inference and therefore existence of the ground in the co-ordinate or similar instance being out of the
question in this case. The fallacious *hetu* or ground (according to these *Nyāyāyikas*) is a ground that possesses only some of the above characters and does not possess the rest. The fallacious ground is either the *asiddha*, or the *viruddha*, or the *anaikkāntika*, or the *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*, or the *satpratipakṣa* ground or *hetu*. An *asiddha* or unestablished *hetu* or ground is one that is devoid either of the character of invariable relation (to the *probandum*) or of the character of being a property of the subject of the inference. There are three kinds of an *asiddha* or unestablished *hetu*, viz., an *āśrayāsiddhah* *hetu*, a *svarūpāsiddhah* *hetu* and a *vyāpyatvāsiddhah* *hetu*. An *āśrayāsiddhah* *hetu*, i.e., a ground with its *āśraya* or substrate unestablished, is of two kinds, viz., a ground with an asserted substrate that does not actually exist, and a ground with an asserted substrate in which the existence of the *probandum* is admitted as an established fact. The former is illustrated in the following inference:—

'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, just as is the lotus in the lake.' Here the substrate of the ground is the sky-lotus, and a sky-lotus nowhere exists. The second form is illustrated in the case where the theistic inference 'The earth, etc., have an intelligent author, because they are effects, just as is a piece of cloth' is employed for the benefit of a convinced theist. Here the *probandum* being
admitted (before the inference) to be a character of the subject, there is no subject in which the existence of the probandum is doubted. Thus there being no subject to which the probandum may be (hypothetically) attributed for purpose of demonstration and proof by means of the inference, the substrate of the hetu or ground is non-existent for logical purposes. (Here the subject of the inference is ‘the earth, etc.,’ and this, according to the theist, being admittedly the handiwork of God, the proving of the same by means of the presence of the ground therein is superfluous. Thus the hetu has no logical function with reference to the asserted subject, and this is the same as saying that the asserted subject is no logical subject, i.e., does not exist for logical purposes. The svarūpāsiddhah hetu or ground is illustrated in the following: ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible.’ Here the ground is ‘visibility,’ and this is non-existent in sound, sound being audible (and not visible). The vyāpyatvāsiddhah hetu or ground is of two kinds, viz., a hetu or ground devoid of all relation to the probandum, and a hetu or ground related to the probandum only through an extraneous condition. The former is illustrated in the following: —‘All that is, is momentary, because it exists.’ Here as the subject of the inference is ‘all’, (and thus comprises everything), there is no similar instance or co-ordinate to the subject outside
the subject, and therefore the *hetu* or ground has no relation to anything outside the subject, *i.e.*, has no relation to the *probandum* (there being no *probandum* in reality). The latter is illustrated in the following:—‘Vedic sacrifice (of animals) is a cause of sin, because it entails destruction of life, just as is the killing of a Brahmin.’ Here ‘scriptural prohibition’ is the extraneous condition through which ‘destruction of life’ becomes ‘productive of sin.’ (On condition that the ‘destruction of life’ is also one that is *prohibited by scriptures*, is it a *source of sin*. Thus not ‘destruction of life’ as such, but such ‘destruction of life’ as is *scripturally prohibited*, is a source of sin.) (What, then, is an extraneous condition or *upādhi*?) An *upādhi* or extraneous condition is defined as one which pervades the *probandum* but does not pervade the ground. ‘Scriptural prohibition’ (in the above inference) is an extraneous condition in this sense. Thus wherever there is productivity of sin, there scriptural prohibition may or may not be. In the subject of the above inference, *e.g.*, (*i.e.*, in sacrifice sanctioned by Vedic prescription) there is destruction of life but no scriptural prohibition. But how, it may be asked, is the presence of an extraneous condition a defect in reasoning? (In this way, we reply.) The presence of an extraneous condition is a defect as revealing the failure of the concomitance (on which the inference is
based) or as showing the inference to lead to a contradictory conclusion, i.e., as showing forth the subject as related not to the probandum but to the contradictory of it. For the extraneous condition, e.g., scriptural prohibition, being non-pervasive of the ground (viz., animal sacrifice), may also be excluded from the subject of the inference (viz., Vedic sacrifice), and being so excluded may effect the exclusion of the probandum which it pervades, viz., productivity of sin. And so it may show forth the ground, viz., ‘animal sacrifice,’ as being related, not to the probandum, but to the contradictory of the probandum. (In other words, it proves the failure of the concomitance between the ground and the probandum, for as non-pervasive of the ground, it shows forth the ground as capable of falling outside its range and thereby as failing to be related to the probandum which it pervades.) For the pervading (i.e., the extraneous condition pervading the probandum) being itself non-pervasive of, i.e., capable of being unrelated to, the ground, the pervaded (i.e., the probandum which is pervaded by such extraneous condition) must also be similarly capable of being unrelated to the ground. And so the subject of the inference being shown to be reduced to the position of the contraordinate to the subject, the ground asserted to be existing in the subject is shown to be reduced to the position of a fallacious non-
invariable ground. Further, the upādhi also shows forth the subject as related to the contradictory of the probandum, i.e., it gives rise to an inference proving a contradictory conclusion, in the following way. The upādhi or extraneous condition, being itself excluded from the subject of the inference, also effects the exclusion therefrom of the probandum which it pervades. And thus the absence of the upādhi establishes the absence of the probandum. Hence we get the counter-inference establishing a contradictory conclusion:—‘Vedic sacrifice is not productive of sin, because it is not prohibited, just as is the daily meal.’ In this way ‘sacrifice of life’ is a vyāpyatvāśiddah hetu or ground, being subject to an extraneous condition (in the matter of its invariable relation to the probandum). Upādhīs may be of four different kinds. In the first place, an upādhi may be an extraneous condition pervading the probandum without qualification or restriction. Secondly, an upādhi may pervade the probandum as qualified by a property of the subject of the inference. Thirdly, an upādhi may be a condition pervading the probandum as qualified by a property of the ground or sādhana. Lastly, an upādhi may be a condition pervading the probandum as qualified by a neutral property (i.e., a property which is neither a property of the subject nor a property of the ground of the inference). The first of these is illustrated in the inference
‘Yonder mountain is smoky, because it is fiery,’ where the presence of greenwood is the upādhi or extraneous condition. (Provided the fire is greenwood fire, it is a sign of smoke. Thus ‘greenwood’ is the condition of the fire being a sign of smoke. Now this ‘greenwood’ is pervasive of the probandum ‘smoke’ without any qualification.) The second is illustrated in the following:—‘Air is perceptible, because it is the substrate of perceptible touch.’ Here the upādhi is ‘generated colour’ which is pervasive of perceptibility in external substances. Here ‘being an external substance’ is a property of the subject of the inference, viz., air. Now ‘generated colour’ (which is the upādhi) does not pervade the probandum (viz., perceptibility) simply without qualification. In quality, etc., e.g., there is ‘perceptibility’ inspite of the absence of ‘generated colour.’ Hence we have to say ‘perceptibility in substances.’ (‘Generated colour’ does not pervade ‘perceptibility’ as such, but ‘perceptibility in external substances.’ This excludes ‘perceptibility of quality, etc.’ which is not pervaded by ‘generated colour.’) But even this does not suffice. The Atman or self, e.g., is a perceptible substance, perceptibility of the Atman as substance is not pervaded by generated colour. And so we have to say, ‘perceptibility in external substances.’ (The Atman is not an external substance. It is an internal substance revealed
to internal perception.) The third form of upādhi is illustrated in the following:—‘The child in the mother’s womb ought to be a dark-coloured one, because it is the child of Maitrī.’ Here the upādhi is ‘vegetable diet,’ and it pervades ‘darkness of colour with respect to a child of Maitrī.’ In this case the upādhi, ‘vegetable diet,’ does not pervade the probandum without ‘qualification.’ In the (unbaked) jar, e.g., there is darkness of colour, but there is no ‘vegetable diet.’ Therefore we have to say ‘the upādhi pervades darkness of colour as relating to a child of Maitrī.’ The fourth form is illustrated in the following:—‘The colour of the atom is perceptible, because it is an object of knowledge, just as is the jar.’ Here the upādhi is ‘generated colour,’ and it pervades ‘perceptibility relating to external substances.’ Now ‘being an external substance’ is a neutral property in this case. It is not a property of the subject (‘the colour of the atom’). It is also not a property of the ground (‘knowability’). Further in this case we cannot say that ‘where perceptibility is, there also generated colour is,’ since the concomitance fails in the case of ‘quality’ and the like. Hence ‘generated colour’ is not pervasive of the probandum (i.e., perceptibility) simply without qualification. Hence we say ‘perceptibility relating to external substances’. Thus the meaning is ‘where perceptibility relating to
external substances is, there generated colour also is,’ and in this respect the *upādhi*, ‘generated colour,’ pervades the *probandum*, ‘perceptibility’. But this *upādhi*, ‘generated colour,’ does not pervade the ground, ‘knowability’. We cannot say ‘whatever is knowable, is also characterised by generated colour,’ the concomitance being seen to fail in the case of the subject of the inference (the colour of the atom). (The colour of the atom is knowable, but it is non-generated colour.) If we define *upādhi* merely as a condition that does not pervade the ground (and leave out the other part of the definition, *i.e.*, that such condition must also be pervasive of the *probandum*), then in the inference ‘sound is non-eternal, because it is a product of will’ the property of ‘being a jar’ will be. an *upādhi*, for in a sound which is a product of will, there is absence of the property of a jar. (But the above inference is free from an *upādhi*, and therefore our mutilated definition of *upādhi* is the cause of the illegitimate assumption of an *upādhi* in this case.) Again if we define *upādhi* simply as a condition that pervades the *probandum* (omitting the other part of the definition that ‘it must be non-pervasive of the ground’), then in the inference of ‘fire’ from ‘smoke,’ ‘the nature of being a substance’ will be an *upādhi*. (Fire is a substance and therefore pervaded by ‘the nature of being a substance’.) Therefore (to avoid the absurdity of supposing an
upādhi where there is none) we say 'the upādhi must also be non-pervasive of the ground.' (The nature of being a substance pervades 'smoke' also and thus is not non-pervasive of the ground.) The viruddhah hetu, i.e., the contradictory ground, is one that is pervaded by the negation of the probandum. E.g., the ground in the inference 'sound is eternal, because it is a product of will,' is a contradictory or viruddhā ground. The ground in this inference is 'being a product of will,' and 'being a product of will' is pervaded by 'non-eternity' which is the negation of 'eternity.' The anāikāntikah hetu or ground is one that is non-invariable (i.e., one which is not invariably related to the probandum). The anāikāntika ground is of three kinds, viz., the sādhārana or common, the asādhārana or uncommon and the anupasamāhārī or inconclusive. Of these the sādhāranaḥ anāikāntikah is a ground that exists also in that which is a negation of the probandum. (It is common to the probandum and its negation and therefore is called sādhārana anāikāntika or common non-invariable.) The ground in the inference 'the mountain is on fire, because it is knowable' is an example of this kind of a non-invariable ground. The ground in this case is 'being a knowable' and this holds good also of the lake which is devoid of fire. The uncommon anāikāntika is a ground that is excluded from all co-ordinates and contra-ordinates
to the subject and exists only in the subject. For example, the ground in the inference ‘the element of earth is eternal, because it has odour’ is a case of an uncommon non-invariable ground. Here ‘possession of odour’ which is the ground or hetu exists only in the subject of the inference, viz., in the element of earth, and is excluded alike from all other eternal and non-eternal objects. The inconclusive anaikāntika is a ground which is bereft alike of instances showing its agreement in presence with the probandum and instances showing its agreement in absence therewith. For example, the ground in the inference ‘All that is, is non-external, because it is knowable’ is a case of an inconclusive non-invariable ground. Here the subject of the inference being ‘all that is’ there is nothing outside the subject to serve as an illustration of the invariable relation between the ground and the probandum. The kālātyayā-padiṣṭa hetu or ground is one that seeks to prove a probandum the negation of which is established by valid evidence to be the property of the subject. It is also called the badhita hetu, the sublated or disproved ground. The ground or hetu in the following inference is a case in point:—‘Fire is devoid of heat, because it is knowable.’ Here the probandum is ‘absence of heat’ but the negation of this probandum, viz., ‘heat,’ is proved by tactual perception to be the property of fire which is the subject of the inference. The
satpratipakṣa hetu or ground is one which has a counter-ground opposed to it proving the negation of the probandum (in the subject of the inference). For example, the ground of the inference ‘sound is eternal, because it is audible, just as is the class-character or generic nature of sounds’ is countered and stopped from functioning by the ground of the inference ‘sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect, just as is the jar.’ A countered or hindered ground is also called a prakaraṇasamaḥ hetu.

Just as we have the fallacious ground or pseudo-ground (in various forms) so also we have the fallacies of the example or udāharaṇa, i.e., fallacious examples or pseudo-examples (udāharaṇābhāsāḥ). There are many different kinds of the fallacious example. For example, with reference to examples illustrating relations of agreement in presence, we have first the case of a fallacious example which is bereft of relation to the probandum. Thus in the inference ‘the mind is non-eternal, because it has shape; whatever has shape, is non-eternal; just as is the atom,’ the ‘atom’ which is cited as illustrating the agreement in presence is a pseudo-example in this sense. For the atom is devoid of ‘non-eternality’ and so is devoid of relation to the probandum. Secondly, we may also have pseudo-examples that are bereft of relation to the ground. In the same inference if we say ‘just as is action’ (in place of ‘just
as is the atom’) we shall have a pseudo-example bereft of relation to the ground, for action, though non-eternal, is yet devoid of ‘shape.’ And thirdly, we may also have fallacious examples which are bereft of relation both to the ground and the probandum, e.g., in the same inference, if we say ‘just as is ether’ (in place of ‘just as is the atom’) we shall have a pseudo-example devoid of relation to the ground as well as the probandum. (Ether is devoid of shape and is devoid of non-eternity.) In the case of examples illustrating relations of agreement in absence, we may also have pseudo-examples devoid of relation to the absence of the probandum. For example, in the same inference if we say ‘just as is action (by agreement in absence).’ (Action is non-eternal and therefore is devoid of relation to the negation or absence of non-eternity.) Secondly, we may also have in such cases fallacious examples in the form of examples bereft of relation to the absence of the ground. For example in the same inference, if we say ‘what is not non-eternal, is not an object with a shape, just as is the atom.’ And lastly, we may have also fallacious examples bereft of relation both to the absence of the ground and the absence of the probandum. For example, in the same inference, if we say ‘just as is the jar.’ (The jar is non-eternal and therefore bereft of relation to the negation of non-eternity. The jar further has a shape
and is therefore bereft of relation to the negation of shape."

All these (i.e., the Nyāya fallacies so far set forth) we reject as untenable. Why? Because some of these so-called fallacies are not fallacies strictly speaking, while the rest are comprehended in ‘conflicting evidence’ and the other fallacies we have explained above.

The manner in which some of these so-called fallacies may be proved to be logically flawless as also the manner in which the rest may be shown to be comprehended in our enumerations of the fallacies are fully set forth in the Paddhati to which the reader is referred for an understanding thereof. We refrain from going over the same ground here for fear of prolixity. Thus everything (relating to inference) has been correctly and intelligibly set forth. This closes the chapter on Anumāna of the Pramāṇacandrikā which follows the track shown by the reverend feet of Śrī Jayatīrtha. Let our heads bend in honour to the sage Vedavyasa and let us close with an invocational of the name of Hari and the incantation of Om.

We now proceed to discuss the nature of Authority or Āgama as a source of knowledge. Any verbal communication free from defects is Āgama. The qualification ‘free from defects’ (in the above definition) distinguishes āgama from the mere (deceptive) appearance thereof, while
the words 'verbal communication' differentiate it from perception and other sources of knowledge.

What, then, are the defects of a verbal communication? The defects of a verbal communication are:—(1) unintelligibility, (2) conveying of the opposite of the true or correct information, (3) conveying of what is already known, (4) conveying of useless information (for which nobody cares), (5) conveying of information not derived or sought for by the person to whom it is conveyed, (6) conveying of a command or injunction to accomplish the impossible, (7) conveying of advice of a more difficult means when easier means are well within reach, etc. Of these (1) unintelligibility is of two kinds, viz., (a) unintelligibility due to want of significant words, and (b) unintelligibility due to want of intelligible relation (between the words of a verbal communication). Examples of the former are:—'Because ka-ca-ta-ta-pa's are ja-ba-ga-da-ha' (cf. abracadabra). Examples of the latter are:—'The cow is a horse,' 'Man is an elephant,' 'The bowl is the cumin seed,' 'The ten apples are five cakes.' (2) Conveying the opposite of what is true is illustrated in the following:—'The world is unreal,' 'The Sūdras have the right of access to the Vedas,' 'The Brahmmins have no such right,' etc. (3) Examples of conveying what is already known are:—'The sun rises in the east, and sets in the west,' 'Molasses are sweet,' 'The Nimba fruit is
bitter,’ etc. The objection that ‘conveying the known cannot be a defect as it adds to the force of the evidence that is already available (and thus strengthens our knowledge), misses the real point at issue. Later evidence strengthens our knowledge only where earlier evidence has failed to remove uncertainty and produce complete certitude in regard to that about which we were in doubt. (Hence where no uncertainty exists, the attempt at further enlightenment by means of verbal communication is waste of energy.) (4) Examples of stupid, pointless communications (for which nobody cares) are:—‘How many teeth has the crow?’ ‘What is the weight of the sheep’s egg?’ ‘How many threads of hair are there in the blanket?’ ‘What is the news of the province of Cola?’ (Cola being the name of the place where the questioner himself lives), etc. (5) Examples of communications which are of no use to the persons to whom they are conveyed are:—‘Advice of business and trade to one who has subdued the desires of the world,’ etc. (6) Examples of communications enjoining the accomplishment of the impossible are:—‘When alluding to a person who is dead and gone, one proceeds to describe an elixir that will bring the dead back to life and that may be found in the north of a certain hill called Mṛtiḥaramahīḍhara,’ etc. (7) Examples advising more difficult and less accessible remedies where easier ones are at hand are:—‘To ask a
man to cut down something with an axe which he can easily remove by his finger-nails,' 'To advise a thirsty man on the Ganges banks to sink a well for quelling his thirst,' etc.

A verbal communication is made up of words and sentences. A word is a combination of letters with a case-ending. The words 'with a case-ending' (in the above definition) exclude non-sense combinations of letters like ja-ba-ga-ḍa-da (which are devoid of case-endings). A sentence is a combination of words characterised by mutual expectation, suitability of relation, and proximity (in time). Expectation is that relation of one word of a sentence to another (or others) of the same sentence without which the relation expressed by the sentence will not be apprehended, e.g., in the sentence 'Bring the jar,' the verb ('bring') without the object ('jar') will not produce the apprehension of the relation of a verb to its object, and so the verb 'bring' has the relation of expectation to the object 'jar'. Or we may say, expectation is the fulfilling (on the part of the subsequent word) of the intent or expectation which is generated by the word preceding it (in a sentence). Therefore, 'The cow is a horse,' 'Man is an elephant,' etc., are not sentences, for in these the words do not expect, i.e., enter into relation to, one another. Though 'expectation' is, strictly speaking, a property of consciousness, yet objects (denoted by words),
as producing in the hearers of their respective names an expectation of these objects in mutual relation, are also said to 'expect' one another. And as words (the names of objects) denote such objects (with mutual expectation), words also are said to have 'expectation.'

By suitability or fitness of relation (between the words of a sentence) is meant the absence in the cognised relation (between the said words) of any clash with valid evidence. Thus in the words 'moistening by water,' the relation of effect and cause which is asserted between the act of 'moistening' and the agency of 'water' remains uncontradicted by valid evidence. Here the compatibility of the relation between 'moistening' and the agency of 'water' constitutes the suitability or fitness of the relation between them. For this reason the words, 'He is moistening by means of fire,' do not constitute a real sentence, there being no suitability of relation in this case. Between 'fire' and the act of 'moistening' there is no question of a mutual agreement or compatibility of relation.

By proximity (in time) is meant the expressing of the words (in a sentence) without any long pause or interval of time between the different words. Thus the words, 'Bring the cow,' uttered without any long break or interval of time between them, have this character of proximity (in time). For this reason, the words,
‘Bring the cow,’ uttered separately, each after an hour or thereabout after the previous one, will not constitute a sentence, for they lack the character of sufficient (temporal) proximity (to produce a unity of meaning).

In verbal communication as a source of knowledge, the sentence is the instrumental cause, the recollection of the meanings of the constituent words, the intervening process, and the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, the result (of the process). Verbal communication also (like inference) conveys knowledge only of such correctly communicated objects as are accompanied by the knowledge of the meanings of the constituent words of the communication. In this respect it is unlike perception (as an instrument of knowledge) which makes things known by its bare existence (without being itself known or apprehended), for an authoritative communication like inference depends on a known instrumental cause (i.e., the knowledge of the meanings of its constituent words). Otherwise the absurdity will follow that an authoritative knowledge will have to be admitted where a verbal declaration (of a truth), though existing in itself, has not been actually heard by a particular person, or, even though heard by him, has not been understood because of lack of knowledge of the meanings of the constituent words.
(We now proceed to discuss how words mean their respective objects.) Some hold that words like ‘the cow,’ etc., mean only class-characters, these being the first to be presented as attributes (as soon as the words are heard). The individuals are reached (mediately) through these class-characters which drag them behind themselves. Others hold that words mean the individuals as specified by their corresponding class-characters. According to this view, a class-name is subject to the conditions which regulate the use of words. Thus all words such as ‘ether,’ etc., mean specified individuals, these alone being the determining conditions of the use of words. Others hold that words like ‘the jar,’ etc., mean class-characters; proper names like ‘Devadatta,’ etc., mean individuals; words like ‘possession of the dewlap’ mean shape or make; while words like ‘the cow,’ etc., mean all the three. The real fact, however, is that the meaning of a word is just that object which is immediately presented to consciousness as soon as the word is heard. In the apprehension of the meaning of a word similarity acts as connecting or mediating link. Thus since the word ‘jar’ calls forth the idea both of ‘individual jars’ and ‘the class-character of jars,’ this word must be supposed to be capable of meaning both the ‘class-character’ and ‘the individuals.’ Again, since the word ‘white’ calls forth the idea of the quality of white colour as
well as the substrate of the quality (the white thing), it must be supposed to mean both ‘the quality’ and ‘the substrate.’ Similarly, the word ‘gone’ means both the action of ‘having gone’ and ‘the agent of the action,’ the word ‘stick-in-hand’ means both the ‘stick’ and ‘the person, Devadatta, who holds it in his hand,’ etc. Or, we may say, words like ‘cow’ etc., being nouns or substantives, must denote individuals, while words like ‘bring,’ etc., should mean attributes or adjectives. In combinations of words such as ‘bring the cow,’ the act of bringing being made possible through an individual agent of the act, the meaning should be conceived as consisting in the individual (in the individual agent of the act).

(The question now has to be discussed, how we acquire a knowledge of the meanings of words.) Our view is that we learn the meanings of words from the signs made with the fingers (by our elders while uttering the words). Thus the child sitting on the person of its father or mother begins to learn the meanings of words when the said father or mother tries to rouse it from a state of inattention and to draw its attention towards himself or herself and to the words which he or she may utter, by making signs with the fingers, or by producing a soft sound by striking one finger-tip against another. In this way the child is taught the
meanings of such sentences as ‘Child, that is your mother,’ ‘that, your father,’ ‘that, your brother,’ ‘the man is eating the plantain fruit,’ etc. Thus by the said signs the child gradually learns that the said words are related in a general way to the said objects pointed out by these gestures and that the relation is the relation of meaning or signifying these objects. Later on when such words as ‘This is your sister,’ ‘That is your friend,’ ‘He is eating a cake,’ etc., are uttered in his presence, and he begins to note the different contexts in which these different words are uttered, he learns, through the differences of the contexts, to distinguish the specific meanings that attach to particular words, e.g., that the word ‘mother’ attaches to ‘the female parent,’ etc. Others however opine that the meanings of words are learnt from the behaviour of the seniors or elders. Thus the inquisitive child, when he hears a senior say to a junior, ‘Bring the cow,’ and notes that immediately after words the junior is prompted to the act of bringing the cow, concludes by agreement and difference that the action of the junior is prompted by the knowledge produced by the words of the senior. And so assuring himself, when he hears other sentences spoken in other contexts such as ‘Bring the horse,’ ‘Secure the cow with a rope,’ etc., he gathers from the divergent contexts that the word
'cow' means one particular kind of animal, the word 'horse,' animal of a different kind, etc. But this view is not tenable. The quickly-forgetful child cannot possibly retain the consciousness of the word he hears till the actual bringing of the object desired.

A word has two kinds of function or vṛtti, viz., (1) primary (mukhyā) and (2) non-primary or secondary (amukhyā). The direct or primary function of a word is its sakti or power of referring to, or meaning, a particular object. Sakti is defined as that relation between a word and an object which is conducive to the recollection of the object (as soon as the word is heard). Samaya, sangati, saṅketa, vācaka, etc., are used as synonyms of sakti. This sakti is of three kinds, viz., yogah, rūḍhiḥ and yogarūḍhiḥ. Of these, the power to refer to an object by virtue of the powers of the constituent parts of the word is yogah. The power of meaning which belongs to a word as a whole irrespective of the powers of its constituent parts is rūḍhiḥ. Lastly, the power of meaning which is derived from both (i.e., both from the word as a whole and the meanings of the constituent parts) is yogarūḍhiḥ. Of these, some words mean their respective objects through the meanings of its constituent parts only, such as the words pāthaka (reader), pācaka (cook), dandi (the man with a stick in hand), kundali (the coiling thing), etc.
Some words, again, mean their respective objects by the powers inherent in the words as a whole irrespective of the powers of the constituents. Such are words like *ghaṭa* (jar), *paṭa* (piece of cloth), etc. Lastly, some words mean objects through their powers as a whole as reinforced by the powers of the constituents such as the word *paṅkaja* (the lotus), etc. In this manner all other words with primary meanings, such as the *mahāyogaḥ*, etc., should be understood (as signifying their objects).

The non-primary or secondary function of a word is called *Lakṣanā* or Implication. Implication is a kind of relation to the object of a word's *śakti* or power of meaning. There are two kinds of Implication, *viz.*, (1) Implication which is independent of relation to the direct meaning (*Jahallakṣanā*), and (2) Implication in which the direct meaning also enters as a factor (*ajahallakṣanā*). ‘The milkman lives in the Ganges’ illustrates the former. (Here ‘the Ganges’ means not the river, but the banks of the river Ganges.) ‘Men with umbrellas are going’ illustrates the latter. (Here *chatrinak*, i.e., ‘men with umbrellas,’ means ‘pedestrians.’) According to another classification, Implication is of the following two kinds, *viz.*, (1) Implication in which the implied meaning is independent of any special end or purpose to be subserved, and (2) Implication depending on
some purpose that is subserved. 'Travellers are going' is an example of the former. (Here 'mārgāḥ,' literally 'roads,' means 'travellers' by implication.) Here the traversing of the roads by travellers being observed to happen without any special end or purpose to be served, such implication is also called rūdhālakṣaṇā. 'The milkman lives in the Ganges' is an example of the latter. (Here 'the Ganges' means 'the banks of the Ganges.') In this case 'living near the Ganges' being prompted by considerations of sanctity and the like, the implication is called kevalalakṣaṇā. The inapplicability or failure of the primary meaning is the real cause of an implication. In a similar way should be conceived other non-primary functions of words such as the gauni (the deferred), etc.

Āgama, i.e., an authoritative verbal communication is of two kinds, viz., (1) communication having a personal source, and (2) communication devoid of a personal source. The Rg-veda and other orthodox scriptures are the impersonal Āgamas, or Āgamas without a personal source. Valid personal communications are those recorded in the Mahābhārata and other sacred works. Thus, it is said, "Scriptures are of two kinds, viz., (1) the eternal, and (2) the non-eternal. Such, for example, are the Vedas beginning with Rg-veda, the Mahābhārata, the Pañcarātra, the original Rāmāyaṇa, and the Purāṇas. All these
as also all those that follow in the wake of these are to be regarded as the (authoritative) sacred scriptures. Those that are other than these, O Janärdana, they are heretical and should not be regarded as authoritative scriptures, etc.’

But it may be said: ‘The Vedas have a personal source, because they consist of collections of sentences, just as are the verses of Kālidāsa and the rest.’ Our reply is, this conclusion does not follow, the inference in question being vitiated by the presence of an extraneous condition. The extraneous condition is ‘a personal origin established by tradition.’ In other words, ‘a collection of sentences’ (which is the ground of the inference) is in itself no proof of a personal origin. It is a sign thereof only on the condition that such personal origin is established by tradition.

But it may be said: ‘The Vedas are devoid of evidential value and validity, because despite the due accomplishment of the Vedic prescriptions the promised fruits are not realised, just as are the hopes generated by the utterances of deceitful people.’ Our reply is, this is not the case, because the above inference contradicts the following valid reasoning:—‘The Vedas are authoritative, because they consist of impersonal prescriptions, i.e., of sentences without a personal origin, just as are the lunatic’s ravings by agreement in absence.’ (The lunatic’s ravings are
non-authoritative, and they are not without a personal source. And thus they illustrate the agreement in absence ‘what is not authoritative is also not without a personal source.’) It cannot be said that this inference entails the fallacy of an asiddha hetu or unestablished ground. For śruti (authoritative scripture) declares that the sentences of the Vedas (i.e., the Vedic prescriptions) are eternal verities. (Thus the eternity, i.e., lack of a personal origin, in respect of the Vedic sentences, is not asiddha or unestablished.) Smṛti (i.e., the secondary scriptures derived from the primary scriptures) also declares that the Vedic sentences are without beginning and without end, are eternal or timeless, have inherent authority and are self-existent. Nor is non-fruitfulness or non-efficacy of Vedic prescriptions a proof of invalidity (of the Vedas), for the prescriptions being seen to bear the promised fruits only in the properly qualified agents accomplishing them, the non-perception of the fruits in other cases must be attributed to the inherent disqualifications of the agents.

But it may be said: ‘Āgama is not valid evidence, because it does not prove anything, just as a deceitful utterance.’ Thus the viśaya or object to be proved by valid evidence is of two kinds, viz., (1) the immediate, and (2) the remote or mediate. Of these, the immediate is
the object evidenced by perception. There is no other object, besides these two, which can serve as an object to be established by the evidence of Āgama or authoritative communication. If you say that Āgama causes the knowledge of the mediate, then as, in your view, nothing is valid independent evidence which causes the knowledge of the already known, and Āgama has application only to objects proved by other forms of evidence, so all Āgamas will be shorn of evidential value as wanting in any distinctive objects to be proved thereby. All this, we reply, is wrong. Just as the evidential value of visual perception in regard to objects distinct from the objects of hearing cannot be denied inspite of the fact that visual perception proves only immediate objects just as hearing does, so also the evidence of Āgama in regard to objects distinct from the objects of inference, e.g., in regard to such special objects as heavenly happiness, liberation, etc. (which are not objects of inference), is unimpeachable despite the fact that Āgama is indistinguishable from inference in the matter of the mediateness of the objects it proves. It cannot be said that ‘heavenly happiness,’ ‘liberation,’ etc., are objects of inferential proof, and so Āgama is devoid of any special objects to be established by its evidence. For if you say this, we shall say contrarily that Āgama as being evidence of mediate objects (such as
heavenly happiness,’ etc.) is a valid source of knowledge, while inference, being devoid of proper special objects (i.e., objects not characterised by the mediateness that characterises the objects proved by Āgama) is devoid of evidential authority.

The Vaiśesikas hold that Āgama is included in (i.e., is a variety of) inference. But this view is wrong, for even in the absence of the recollection of invariable concomitance and the like, there is realisation of the meaning of a verbal communication, this being a matter of common experience.

Bhāskara and his followers hold that Āgama without a personal source is independent evidence, but Āgama having a personal origin is a variety of inference. This also is a wrong view. For the sum of conditions for the comprehension of the import of sentences, viz., expectancy, suitability of mutual relation between the constituent words, etc., being identical in both (i.e., both Personal and Impersonal Āgama), there is no valid ground for assuming any special character attaching to only one of these.

Thus have we described all the three forms of evidence or Pramāṇa. Anything other than these (three) is not a pramāṇa or valid source of knowledge.

But it may be said: there is another form of evidence distinct from the above three, viz.,
Arthāpatti or Presumption. When a thing or event is seen to be inexplicable except on the assumption of something else and when on the basis of our observation of this otherwise inexplicable thing we are led to presume that which is necessary to account for it, we proceed according to the method of Arthāpatti or Presumption as a source of knowledge. Thus when we learn by perception or reliable testimony that Caitra is alive and yet is not in the house, we at once presume that he must be somewhere outside, for absence inside of one who is alive is not explicable except on the assumption of his existence outside. Hence the proof here of outside existence consists in the Arthāpatti or Presumption which is created therefor by the otherwise inexplicable fact of inside non-existence of one who is alive. This process is distinct from the processes of perception and the rest, for outside existence is not an object of perception and the rest.

This, we hold, is not the case, for the so-called presumption is only an inference (in disguise). (The inference is as follows:—) ‘Caitra must exist outside, because, though alive, he is absent inside; whoever is alive, and does not exist in a certain place, must exist in some other place, just as I myself do.’ This inference being quite competent to produce the knowledge of the outside existence, what is the
use of assuming a separate source of knowledge such as Presumption? In this inference the words ‘though living’ preclude the case of the dead (who are non-existent because not alive). Similarly, the substantive (qualified by the adjective ‘though alive’), i.e., ‘absence inside,’ precludes the case of Devadatta and the like who are existent within the house.

But it may be said: there is another separate source of knowledge, viz., comparison. Comparison (Upamāna) is the cognition of an object as characterised by likeness to another, e.g., of likeness to the cow as produced by the recollection of a comparative statement as an auxiliary condition. Thus a person ignorant of the meaning of the word ‘gavaya’ first learns from a forester that ‘gavaya’ means ‘an animal resembling a cow.’ Thereafter when later on he comes across in a forest an animal looking like a cow, he recollects the previous advice of the forester that ‘gavaya is an animal like a cow.’ Thereon the knowledge dawns on him ‘That animal (resembling the cow) must be what is meant by the word gavaya.’ As this knowledge is not caused by perception and the rest, the process (which generates the knowledge) is regarded as an independent source of knowledge called Upamāna or comparison.

This, we hold, is not the case, for (the so-called) comparison is really comprised in inference. The inference in such cases is as
follows:—‘The subject of the enquiry is the meaning of the word gavaya, because, not being a cow, it possesses resemblance to a cow, just as is the jar by agreement in absence.’ (What is not the meaning of gavaya, is also not that which, not being a cow, bears resemblance to the cow, just as is the jar which is not the meaning of gavaya and is also not that which, not being a cow, bears resemblance to the cow.) To preclude illegitimate application to a second cow resembling a first cow, the words ‘not being a cow’ have been included, and to preclude illegitimate application to the jar and the rest, the substantive ‘that which bears resemblance to the cow’ has been included.

But it may be said: there is yet another separate source of knowledge, viz., negation or Abhāva. This must be admitted in order to account for the cognition of negation. Thus non-apprehension (i.e., negation or absence of apprehension) of the jar and the rest assures us of the absence or negation of the jar, etc. This non-apprehension is just the negation or absence of apprehension. The non-apprehension being apprehended or realised in consciousness, the negation, i.e., the absence, of the jar, etc., is also cognised or apprehended.

This is not the case, we say; for this so-called negation as a source of knowledge is in reality comprehended in one or other of the
Pramāṇas we have explained above. Thus, according to our view, that which causes the knowledge of negation (in a particular case) is the Pramāṇa or evidence of the negation in that case. For example, the evidence in regard to the present non-existence of the Kauravas is the testimony of the Mahābhārata. In the case of Devadatta’s lack of vision we have the following inference as proof or evidence of the lack or negation:—‘The subject of controversy (Devadatta) is devoid of vision, because he is ignorant of the nature of colours.’ Similarly, the absence of pleasure, etc., is evidenced by the immediate intuition of the witnessing intelligence. The realisation of the non-existence of a jar before oneself results from a quickly-produced perception. It is not an effect of non-apprehension only, for it has the nature of an immediate positive experience. No doubt, a proximate non-apprehension is also an indispensable condition. But the mere fact of a proximate non-apprehension as an indispensable condition does not constitute the latter an independent source of knowledge, for in that case by a similar line of reasoning one may say that in the cognition of positive reality the non-apprehension of its negation is the real evidence or proof. Where in the midst of darkness we cognise the absence of a jar and the like by means of exploring with the hands, the non-apprehension
qua non-apprehension is not the real cause of our knowledge of the negation or absence. The non-apprehension is a cause here only as it is treated as a sign or mark serving as the ground of an inference. The inference in such cases is as follows:—'The jar does not exist here, for, though fit to be perceived, it is not actually observed here, just as an elephant.' But it may be said: a negation or absence being admittedly incapable of positively stimulating the sensibilities, we cannot sensibly talk of negation being perceived by the senses. Our reply is: this is not the case as there is no bar to a negation being in contact with the sensibilities just as there is none with respect to a positive entity.

But it may be said: we have mathematical or quantitative reasonings (sambhava) and these should constitute a separate source of knowledge. Thus when the cognition of the greater leads to the cognition of the less we have sambhava or quantitative reasoning. For example, the knowledge that there is one hundred yields or establishes the knowledge that there is fifty-five.

To this our reply is: quantitative reasoning is only a variety of inference. The inference here is as follows: 'Devadatta must own fifty-five, because he owns one-hundred, just as I myself do.'

There is another kind of knowing, viz., knowing by the method of exhaustion. Thus when
by eliminating other possible alternatives one after another we arrive at the last or remaining alternative, our knowledge of the truth of this last alternative is gained by the method of exhaustion. It is of two kinds, viz., (1) that which proceeds by the method of affirmation, and (2) that which proceeds by the method of negation or exclusion. The former is illustrated in the following:—When we know that the two persons before us are Caitra and Maitra, then the knowledge, ‘this one of the two persons is Caitra,’ entails the knowledge, ‘the other one is Maitra.’ The second is illustrated in the following:—When we know that the two persons before us are Caitra and Maitra, then the knowledge, ‘this one (of the two) is not Caitra’ entails the knowledge, ‘this, then, must be Maitra.’

This also, we hold, is a case of inferential knowledge. The inference is as follows: The disputed subject is Maitra, because, being either Caitra or Maitra, he is not Caitra (in fact), just as is Caitra (by agreement in absence). (In other words he who is not Maitra, is also not he who, being either Caitra or Maitra, is not Caitra, just as is Caitra, who is not Maitra and is also not he who, being either Caitra or Maitra, is not Caitra.) Here to preclude the illegitimate extension of the hetu to the cases of the jar, etc., the words ‘being either Caitra or Maitra’ have been included.
Upakrama, etc., are also forms of inference; for they produce an inferential knowledge of the purport of sentences. An unbroken continuum of tradition without any known originator thereof is Aitihya or Tradition. For example, the hearsay, 'In this fig-tree lives a demon' (is a case of aitihya). This is nothing but verbal testimony (and should not count as an independent source of knowledge). So also all the rest such as omens and signs (Sakuna), written language (lipi), gesture language (cestā) —all these as sources of knowledge are included in the forms of evidence (i.e., the three we have explained) we have set forth above. We shall now explain the nature of validity itself. The intrinsic nature of validity is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) intrinsicality in respect of origin (utpatti), and (2) intrinsicality in respect of verification in consciousness (jñāpti). Of these, intrinsicality in respect of origin means that the validity arises from the same conditions as cause the cognition itself of which the validity is a logical character. In other words, validity being an intrinsic or essential character of a cognition in the matter of its origin means that the causes which produce a cognition are also the causes which produce the validity of the cognition. By intrinsicality in respect of verification in knowledge is meant that the validity is apprehended by the same agency as is the cognition itself of which it is a logical character. In other
words, validity being an intrinsic or inherent character of a cognition in respect of its being known as such means that that which apprehends the cognition also apprehends the validity of the cognition.

The extrinsicality of invalidity is likewise of two kinds, viz., (1) extrinsicality in respect of the origin of the invalidity, and (2) extrinsicality in respect of its confirmation in consciousness as such. Of these, extrinsicality or adventitiousness in respect of origin means that the invalidity arises from conditions other than those which cause the cognition itself. Again, extrinsicality in respect of the invalidity being known as such means that the invalidity is cognised by an agency other than the agency which cognises or apprehends the cognition itself. Thus everything has been set forth in its proper place.

The Sāṇkhya philosophers however hold that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic alike in respect of their origin and their being known as such. The Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, hold that both are extrinsic. And they say in this connection that a cognition itself is caused by the sense-organs, etc., while the validity of the cognition is caused by the presence of certain specially efficacious qualities in the usual causes of a cognition. Similarly, the invalidity of the cognition is due to the presence
of certain special defects or deficiencies in the causes of a cognition. And so also (in the matter of being known) a cognition itself is cognised immediately by internal perception by the mind. But the validity of a cognition is cognised mediately by inference from the mark or sign of successful or unsuccessful practical reaction. Thus the general condition (according to Nyāya) of valid cognition is an efficacious quality (in the cause), and the general condition of invalid cognition is a certain defect or deficiency (in the cause). The Buddhists, again, say: invalidity is intrinsic while validity is extrinsic. But the real fact is, both the cognition and its validity are caused by the sense-organs and the rest. But the invalidity is generated by the sense-organs, etc., together with certain defects as auxiliary conditions. Similarly, both the cognition and its validity are cognised immediately by the witnessing intelligence. But the invalid cognition is cognised only as cognition by the witnessing intelligence. The invalidity of it is known mediately by inference from the mark of practical unfruitfulness or failure.

But it may be said: the position taken by the author here is not tenable. The author's view is: the agency which cognises the cognition also cognises the validity thereof. Further the power of the instruments of cognition to produce the cognition becomes the power to produce its
invalidity when aided by the special causes of invalidity. The power thus becomes as it were a different power through the influence of the defects in the matter of producing invalidity. Moreover, the cognition of these instruments takes place through a different agency, for the sense-organs, etc., are themselves cognised each by its own pramāṇa or suitable knowing process (e.g., the sense-organs are cognised by inference from the results which their actions produce). At the same time their conduciveness to the production of valid knowledge is also cognised by inference (i.e., by another inference from the mark of practical fruitfulness). But why should this be so? (i.e., Why should you suppose that the agency which cognises a cognition also cognises its validity, but the fitness of the sensibilities to produce a valid cognition is not cognised by the same agency, i.e., the inference that cognises the sensibilities themselves?) What is the bar to the supposition that the validity is cognised by an agency other than that which cognises the cognition (just as the fitness of the sensibilities is cognised by an inference different from that which cognises the sensibilities themselves)?

Our reply to this is: this cannot be admitted, because any such admission will entail an infinite regress. Thus we say: the validity of a valid cognition must itself be cognised as such by some valid cognition, otherwise there will be no
valid cognition anywhere. And such validity cannot possibly be cognised by any agency other than that which cognises the cognition itself. In the event of any other agency apprehending the validity, the validity of this apprehension will itself have to be apprehended by another (i.e., a third) apprehension, thus leading to an infinite regress. And if to avoid the infinite regress we say that the second cognition apprehending the validity of the primary cognition is self-validating or self-evident, then so may also be the primary cognition. Therefore by the method of elimination of other possible alternatives, the intrinsicality of validity is established as the only position that remains unshaken. It cannot be said that the objection of an infinite regress holds equally in respect of our view that the validity is immediately cognised by the witnessing Intelligence, for the witnessing Intelligence (in our view) is self-revealing and as such reveals both itself and its validity. But why not assume the same with regard to cognition also? Because, we reply, cognition being a state or function of the internal organ is non-intelligent and as such is incapable of self-illumination or self-revelation. The validity of the instruments should be understood on the lines of the Paddhati. Thus is everything beautifully explained.
This brings the chapter on Āgaraṇa in the Pramāṇacandrikā by Śrimacchālaṁśeṣācārya to close.

May the sage Śrī Vedavyāsa be pleased.
प्रमाणचन्द्रिका

प्रथम: परिचयः

श्रीमदनमदौम्यमञ्जरीगत-रामचरितमाणसादेवसंख्याकृतिहृदय-शोभाय नमः ॥ चरि: ॐ ॥

लक्षणि: पदा्तिरीज्ञुगऽ नला गुरुरघिरि ।
प्रमाणचन्द्रिका कुमारी बालानां बोधिसत्वः ॥

इह खलु सुखभवे ने खाद्य दुःखं मनागपि मा भूर्धिति
निकलितेचितमोचखः भगवद्मुक्तसात्माक्षात्मानस-साधकानुशुभा परत्वमदि लतम्भि भवदायत्तयाश्चतावर्धणं
वेदितयम् । तदुः भाषाकारः ।

य एतपरत्वं तु संविभेव हि सदा ।
वशमिलेव जानानि संसाराबुधृते हि स दृष्टि ॥

परपरतत्त्वानं च प्रमाणचन्द्रिकानि तत्विकत्वायमिदं प्रकाशमार्थ्यं।
यथा जयथे रेव पद्मादृः प्रमाणचन्द्रिकां
सहिष्णुं प्रतिप्रच्छन्ति, तथापि भावमवृमौर्षोऽरुपि वाकवृक्षां
मिति नायकः। शुक्लेन शक्ति बोधित्वति तेनं तदद्वेदनां
प्रायेन तदुपायेव विचिन्द्रवृत्ते संदेहास्तिष्ठ दृष्टिप्रतिप्रच्छन्तिं
प्रकाशमिति न वैवैध्यविदेः ।

प्रमाणचन्द्रिकाः च उदेश्यादिकाधिग्रन्तिर्मि उदेश्यादीनां
वधषुभुवि हि। नाममात्रेः कृपास्वरूपं सुगुर्जयेम् ॥ चरि ॥
लश्चनिदेशः। नामसामायश्वस्तुस्वदीर्तनैमिति लभोतिः।
एवस्मृतवत्वापि दश्यम्। कीतं शब्दः। तावश्यातः
लचन्न्यमवः गङ्गाकार्येकार्यादिः। तहारमाय स्वदीर्तनैमिति।
नारायणस्वः वर्षोकालस्यवस्तुलः। तावश्यातः लचन्न्यमवः
विद्वाणिदिवश्यम्। अतो विलकित। तावश्यातः लचन्न्यमवः
काकर्वि गतम्। अतो नाम्नेति। गोविन्दमायेयेयः। तथापि
गयुवतोऽपि प्रशिवीवति अदिलकण्यावचेतापितामिति।
तत्पतिः राधाकार्यां मात्रेव्य। तथ लचन्न्यमवः चर्पण्युत्तोग्ये सतीतैः।
गयुवती प्रशिवीवति अदिलकण्यावाकातः तु गोविन्दमायेयान्य वस्तुस्वदीर्तनैवेद्यपि
लचन्न्यमवः प्रयुक्तवालोभमायेयात्मा। तथा च लचन्न्यमवः
गयुवती सती संस्कर्तनामां वस्तुप्रतिपारकस्यस्य। तत्त्वं
इति पर्यवंुयति। कैलेययवती प्रशिवीवति अदिलकण्यावाको
प्रतिक्रियासाधारणां मात्रेव्य मात्रेव्यः प्रयुक्तबालोभमायेयात्मा।
तथा च गयुवतोऽपि प्रशिवीवति लकण्यावाको गयुवतस्वदीर्तनायान्य
प्रतिक्रियासाधारणां प्रयुक्तबालोभमायेयान्य वस्तुस्वदीर्तनलोभमायेयात्मा। न च प्रशिवीवति चुती गयुवतोऽपि
शंकायः। तथ रोहिताप्रशिवीवति लकण्यावाको गयुवतस्वदीर्तनायान्य
प्रतिक्रियासाधारणां प्रयुक्तबालोभमायेयात्मा। च रोहिताप्रशिवीवति
लकण्यावाको नवयुक्तवालोभमायेयात्मा। तथ।
प्रशिवीवती गयुवतस्वदीर्तनायान्य प्रतिक्रियासाधारणां प्रयुक्तबालोभमायेयात्मा।
लश्चनमायाप्रतिति धर्मस्य लचन्न्यमवः।
सकवलकण्यावालको सति
लक्ष्मीविनितिमिच्छिद्यः। यथा गोः साक्षादिपिं, ततो
गोमात्रव्य, नास्ति चागोसु। धर्मस्य लचन्न्यमवापि
एको प्रशिवीवतीमिति। अतो लक्ष्मीव्य लश्चनिदेशः।
तावलके शब्दले विरच्छित्वमि। तहारषाय लच्छ्यापकैति।
तावलके शुद्धिले विरच्छित्वमि। तत्तपिराय लच्छ्याविविद्वि।
ज्ञातीयविज्ञातीयविज्ञातिः संरक्षणाशवस्यः लच्छ्याप्रायोगिणम्।
लक्षपकतावक्षतरकाशारागपकाज्ञात्वक्षतरकसमीक्षे सज्ञातीम्।
तद्वच्छिन्ततिं विज्ञातीमिः विविद्वितम्। गोलयये
गोलं लक्ष्यतावक्षतरकं तथ शाचार्याकं पशुवन्म्।
तद्वच्छिन्तति अभसायसाज्ञातीम्। तद्वच्छिन्तति घटाद्यो
विज्ञातीम्। साचार्यापकलं नाम तद्वच्छिन्ततेपापालकं
सति तद्वच्छिन्ततेपापालम्। पशुवन्म लक्ष्यतावक्षतरक्षतरकाशारागपकः
पृथ्वीविलामूलायालकले सति गोलयमपकलान् साचार्यापकलं
विृत्या। तेन प्रसिद्धार्थिना सर्वस्यापि सज्ञातीवले
विज्ञातीयविज्ञातिः कथितत्रिंने दृष्टान्तकाराय। एवं
सर्विन्द्रि लक्षणेषु सज्ञातोर्यदु भ्रेमम् ॥ सकलबुद्धिविरिले सति
लक्ष्यतावक्षतरकाशारागपकण्डन्ततु धर्मस्वलच्छ्यम्।
इत्यादिव विचित्रः भवक्षाप्योक्ति। विचित्राभावम्
विचित्राभावम् विचित्राभावम्। विशेषाभावम् चति भवक्षाभावम्
भवक्षाभावम् विशेषाभावम् ॥ तत्र लक्ष्यतावक्षतरकाशारागपकण्डन्ततु
लक्ष्यतावक्षतरकाशारागपकण्डन्ततु धर्मस्वलच्छ्यम्।
इत्यादिव विचित्राभावम् विचित्राभावम् विचित्राभावम् ॥
मायावाहिनिं भवक्षाभावम् ॥

युक्तायुक्तविषेण प्रोक्तम। चल्लम्प लच्छ्यागमनमन्निवयेष्मि।
चल्लकंते लच्छ्यागमनमन्निवयेष्मि। चल्लम्प कायवर्तने
सम्भवः। गृह लच्छ्यागमनम् चल्लम्प ॥
तत्रात्र दुर्मायायागमनमन्निवयेष्मि। वहायं प्रमायाय।
वयावशिष्टकः ले विविधविकारिलं प्रमायायागमनमन्निवयेष्मि।
यथायथ प्रमायाय। वयावशिष्टकः ले विविधविकारिलं प्रमायायागमनमन्निवयेष्मि।
वहायं प्रमायाय।
पद्यात्मः पार्श्वकाराः निरूपितोऽवस्थि। एवसूक्तार्थां भाषायम्। श्रवणलोकमा निष्प्रस्तृतत्वं व्याख्यायितुपुराणां यथाविचित्ति-विशेषणात्। यथाविचित्रं प्रमाणानि प्रमाण-प्रमाणस्वरूपतिः। अतो श्रवणलोकार्यकलः। अन्तः प्राचार्यं वा परमर्यं वा श्रवणलोकार्यकलः निर्देशितमात्र न प्रथमचाराध्यायाः। न चैवप्रमनवतं। तथावियालः। प्रमाणान्। प्रमाणात। प्रमाणविषयः। प्रमेयम्। यथाचार्यानम्। प्रमा। बाणिज्यनुसार कार्यशिष्याः। यथाचार्यानुसार संभवार्थः।

ननु किमिदं संशयल्ल। अनवधारणलं तदलित चैतं॥ न। अन्वधारणलं निष्प्रस्तृतम्। तथं संशयमिलनालम्। संशयलं च निष्प्रस्तृतम्बलनलस्वरूपम्बलाल्प्याययालाल्प्याभिंवर्तितं चैतं॥ न। अनवधारणस्वार्तः संशयलक्ष्यताः। न चान्योद्योगः। एकाक्षिन्। धर्मिन्न्य भास्मानविन्दुआनकाराविधानानविन्दुानविन्दुानवाध्यायोविन्दुानवाध्यायोविन्दुानवाध्यायोविन्दुानवाध्यायोविन्दुानवाध्यायोविन्दुानवाध्यायोविन्दुानवाध्यायोजनितविशिष्ठतिः। चान्य संशय इत्यौल्ल धर्म ग्रह इति बाणिज्यतिः। अतोऽविन्दुानकाराविधानालक्षणम्। तावलुके। खास्युपुरुषेऽग्रहस्तस्वरूपं। इत्यादि समुच्छलस्वरूपतिः। तत्त्वसंप्रदाये। श्रवणमन्त्रेन विचारितविशिष्ठतिः। तत्त्वसंप्रदाये। श्रवणमन्त्रेन विचारितविशिष्ठतिः। अतो विचारिते। पर्यं रज्जुमात्र भ्रमणविशिष्ठतिः। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। ज्ञानोत्तरो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। विचारितविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति। अतो भ्रमणविशिष्ठति।
प्रमाणांकप्रदेशः विशेषज्ञसायां खाशुलिन्द्रायां वक्रकोटरायां धूपलिन्द्रायां शिरःपश्चातिकमुपलमभास्यो भोलामार्गं संशयानमानुस्यवतः सिद्धं स्वाभ: पुष्पो वैति ॥ सङसाधरणं धर्मं: संशयो यथा । श्रद्धे चाकाशविशेषसमाधरानं धर्मसुपलमभास्यो निर्माणकमक्षणं: संशयो भवति किंमयं श्रद्धे नियोजननियो वैति ॥ विप्रतिपतितज्ञ: संशयो यथा । इत्यश्च वेदातिकार्ययो: भौतिकलाभौतिकविप्रतिपरं पञ्चनो निर्माणकपयं: संशयो भवति किंमयं वैधिकमेवस्य भौतिकानि उत्तराभौतिकानोति ॥ उपलब्धिज्ञ: संशयो यथा । श्रृङ्खलनानानतं जलोपलब्धो झर्ना निर्माणकारार्यो संशयो भवति । किं पारस्तेवोदं कृपाकनेर्मानभवतः सतुपलभ्यते चतास्तेवोपयोगिति ॥ भनुपलब्धिज्ञ: संशयो यथा । श्रविन्ने पिन्ताचोरस्तीति मात्मा खुश्यति हि विद्यमप्यं पञ्चनो निर्माणकपयं: संशयो भवति । किं विचारमात्र एव पिण्डाओन्तर्ध्वनिमत्तथा नीपलभ्यते विन्दुविवधमात्र एवेति ॥ उपलब्धि: नुपलब्धों: साधारणधर्मं एवान्तर्भवस्य विन्दुशेषं कार्यानि उपनयने ॥ उपलब्धों: साधारणं कथम् । उपलब्धिं भभकारे सतारिय घटावोमाएलोकान्वर्मनं देषा । भ्रमित घटावोन सुकाशारिकविप्रतित्वांतरस्तिं ॥ भनुपलब्धों: साधारणं कथम् । भनुपलब्धिं सतामोक्षरसृजना मात्र भ्रमगविषारोदों च देशेति ॥ भसाधारणधर्मंविप्रतिपरं पञ्चनो साधारणधर्मं एवान्तर्भवस्य साधारणधर्मं एक एव संशयेष्ठितरित तथम् ॥ एतत्त्रोत्तरप्रकारस्तु पद्मलभ्यकरिष्ठ ब्रह्म: ॥

तद्भाववन्दे तत्प्रकारकावधारापुस्तानं विपर्ययः । श्रानं विपर्ययं एत्युक्ते संशयेष्ठितामि । तदुदासार्थम् ध्वन्द्धारण—
रूपमिति। तत्तुलक्ष सम्यगविद्वानित्वासिः। पतस्मादभावते तत्रप्रकारकिते। तदभावति तत्रप्रकारकावनं विपर्ययः इत्यादि पुनः संबंधविद्वासिः। चतुर्दशवार्तिति। तदभावति तत्रप्रकारकावार्तारंपुष्यां विपर्ययः इत्यादि वचः। कपि-संयोगित नम्मात्मतित्वासिः। संयोगक्षयवायुमृत्विलाव। पहः, एवेति। स च प्रत्यासलुकाभामाबिष्को जायते। तत्र प्रत्यासां यथा। शृवत्तिकायं रजतमिति। अनुमान-भास्तो यथा धूलीपतले धूमभारद्र वडाभावति वडानुमिति।। चामामास्तो यथा। नेदोरी पद्ध फलानि सत्तौति प्रतार्क-वाक्यात्मकं ज्ञानम्।।

ननु यथावस्थित्विषयाविषयाकारित्र नम्मात्मचर्यामिति यदुः तद्दगपक्षम्। श्रृवत्तिवायुमृत्विलाव। चेतु, न।

श्रृवति: प्रत्याप्रामणांमुशस्य वायुमुशस्य भावाधेयाः।

प्रमाणमिति विषयम प्रमाणविद्वारं धर्माध्यायं सूत्रविद्वानि।।

इति स्वादि: श्रृवत्तिप्रामाण्यां तस्य सहस्त्रां। केवल भावानं प्रमाणमिति वद्वति। तत्र प्रमेयवुल्की परालयवार्तित्वासिः। प्रक्षवुल्की प्रमाणावासिः। करणान्तिन्ति लक्षणाः। वैदिकविद्वार्तिति। तब, फलेन्द्वार्तः। प्रमाणवाण्यं प्रमाणविद्वारं:। तद्रापि न सच्चवति। यदा घटादि

* For the use of the word अनुमान in masculine, compare—

नदामाक्षरः: कार्यामृतमानं इति शृवति।। खुलिकोपि न हुँलिकी मानवत: प्रदुष्पवः।।

Sarasvatikanṭhābharana, ch., śāl. 70.
सत्व प्रमेयम् ईश्वरः प्रमाति तदा सवम्र्मियसेष्ठरप्रमावामलेन प्रमेयतित्वायाः। साधनायसयोगाय्तरसे सति प्रमावासः विवर्ष्टितमिति च तु्। न। चाल्यवस्त्रेयणात्। नन्दीशरस्वामिप्रामायसात्तवायासिपरिहाराय्ते तद्दिति चेतु्। न। प्रमायमयक्षवडकलावृत लघुस्क कर्षणधिकरणभावव्युत्तुश्चक्षणीपि कत्यंनः

शास्नात्। नन्दीशरस्वतीलेपी प्रमात्त प्रधिकरणस्मातः

पति। प्रमायमयक्षधायतेलसुपथत इतिचेतु्। न। तव कार्त्तेदिपि अधिकरणलभावान्। कियायशयि। कृत्तकर्षणोरावरकस्थाधिकरणलघुलिभीति। चनुभूति। प्रमाययम। स्त्रियाभतिरितियां भानमुभूति।। भानमिस्वायुलृतो चटैविष्यायी।। चृत्विभिरितिभबुलोऽऽ चतुर्विविशिष्यतिभवन्या।। चत चंछ्यावाट

तित्वा:। चत तह वेदादो च प्रधानेनेति।

प्रमायं दिविंध केिवलनुमुप्रमायं चेति। चत प्रधान्य-

प्रधानोहेयो:। तव यथार्थाय्यां केिवलप्रमायमुः। यथार्थमिति संज्ञयवुद्यात्।। भानमिति प्रधच्युदायस्।। केिवलप्रमायं चतुर्विधम्।। ईश्वरशान्त लक्ष्मीशान्त योगिन्यान्योगिणिस्याः

चेति।। सत्त्वशान्तमोक्षशान्तम्।। सत्त्वमिति वज्राधि-

शान्ति:।। भानमिति ईश्वरादियुदायस्।। यहा

खर्घसर्वस्याविश्वस्यानमोक्षशान्तम्।। भानमोक्षशान्त-

मित्रयोगिनिशतियायाः:।। तदार्थाय खर्घसर्वथिति।

ईश्वरप्रधच्युतिशतियायवाराृ शान्तपदम्।। तदार्थ्येन यथार्थ-

मोक्षशान्तपदप:। भनादि नित्यं च।। ईश्वराकाशाः स्थान

लक्ष्मीशान्तम्।। भाल लक्ष्मीशान्तमित्री।। ईश्वराकाशाः

शतियायाः।। चत ईश्वराश्चार्थिमिति।। प्येत्यालस शेत्याविष-

याविष्यायाः।। तावलुकी ब्रजादिविश्वानाशतियायाः।। चत
एकति। भानितव्यिकृतः। भाय च ईश्वरेष
लसार्वतिकम् अन्यदानादोचिने सर्वविषयपालं लक्षोज्जशानम्।
श्रान्त लक्षोज्जशानमिस्त्रे उम्बदार्शितमन्धितिवाः। भत: सर्वविषयपालिति।
तावल्के कक्षुयोगिन्यितिवाः। भतोजांनालोचिने इति।
तावल्के सर्वविषययाति। अनालोचिने सर्वविषयपालं लक्षोज्जशानमिस्त्रे
ईश्वरसार्वतिकितिवाः। भत ईश्वरे तलसार्वतिकितिवाः।
ईश्वरे तलसार्वतिकितिवाः। भत: सर्वविषयपालिति।
लक्ष्मीप्रतिकृतितिवाः। भानितव्यिकृतः। तदस्य नियमिन
श्रान्तं लक्ष्मीखलमन्दिर निलं च। योगप्रामाण्यतिवाः।
लक्ष्मीप्रतिकृतितिवाः। भानितव्यिकृतः।
तत्तविविधः कक्षुयोगिन्यितिवाः। भत: सर्वविषयपालिति।
तावल्के सर्वविषययाति। अनालोचिने सर्वविषयपालं
लक्षोज्जशानमिस्त्रे उम्बदार्शितमन्धितिवाः।
ईश्वरसार्वतिकितिवाः। भत: सर्वविषयपालिति।
तावल्के सर्वविषयपालिति। अनालोचिने सर्वविषययाति।
ईश्वरसार्वतिकितिवाः। भत: सर्वविषयपालिति।
तावल्के सर्वविषययाति। अनालोचिने सर्वविषययाति।
योगिन्य. प्राण तात्त्विकयोगिन्यमिस्यो ऄकारशानेतिवर्षीयासः। ध्योत्सूरबिकाविभिन्वारसि। तावलुः लक्षोमानेतिवर्षीयासः।
तावलुः औषधि योगिन्यमिस्यो ऄकारशानेतिवर्षीयासः। तखालोचनभावद्रामाद्राम ऄकारशानेतिवर्षीयासः।
पत: यालोचनेयोर्यः। तावलुः क्षेत्रिय योगिन्यमिस्यो ऄकारशानेतिवर्षीयासः।
पतोल्लाल्यान्ते सङ्कीतः। तद्ग्री दिवर्य लक्ष्यं बाह्यः पैति।
लक्ष्यं वथार्भेव। वाग्म: वादायाद्वार्याहं मपी। वज्यदाधारविख्यातितित्रिका देवरूपः ईश्वरो योगिनोहार्याहः।
वालोले सति ऄकारशानेति वज्यदाधुः स्तम्भः और्यशानेतिवर्षीयासः। और्यमात्त्त्विकयोगिन्यमिस्यो ऄकारशानेतिवर्षीयासः।
पतोल्लाल्यान्ते स्तम्भः । लक्ष्येऽर्यः। ताल्लुः याकोयमानेतिवर्षीयासः।
पतोल्लाल्यान्ते । ताल्लुः सन्ध्रः। तखेंद्रि त्यस्य अनुताल्लुः ।
पत: ऄकारशानेतित्रितः। ताल्लुः तात्त्विकयोगिन्यमिस्यो ऄकारशानेतित्रितः।
पत: सालोले सङ्कीतः। तद्ग्री दिवर्य लक्ष्यं बाह्यः पैति।
वथार्भेव। तात्त्विकदां स्तम्भाः। और्योजनायः पूर्ववः।
तात्त्विकतात्त्विकयोगिन्यमिस्यो
रन्दाल्लुः सङ्कीतः। तद्ग्री योगिन्यमिस्यो और्योजनायः।
श्रीयल्लोकविसाहाय योगिन्यमिस्यो और्योजनायः।
श्रीयल्लोकशानेतित्रितः। श्रीयल्लोकशानेतित्रितः।
श्रीयल्लोकशानेतित्रितः। श्रीयल्लोकशानेतित्रितः।
नियांसारिणां तु नित्रेव। अष्टीयं लग्नाः प्रभुवेधित। नास्ति
तु व्रजाधिमण्यविविधिकसित। इन्द्रियं निकृष्टं कृतिरां
चैति चतुर्विंश्च यथार्थसन्भानमिति वैशिष्टिका:। तदसतुः निलव-
र्क्षणस्वागतेरमाणज्ञ्य चारसंग्रहात्। सूतिमेनोपक्षेप्यात्रः
जन्यतेन प्रार्थ्यत्च योगिन्यानलङ्ग्य योगिन्यास्य योगसमक्षकृतन्त्रनि
प्रज्ञानग्रस्तेर्या तेष्वतलङ्ग्य पुत्रग्रहण्यायोगाच। यथार्थस्वाग
लाङ्ग्यमन्त्रप्रमाणस्य। बालसिद्धे तत्र संग्रहादी चातुर्विंशी।
बालसिद्धे कृत्वा विषादित्वात्। यथार्थस्वागत्विषादेषी
संग्रहादिसाधिनां विषादित्वात्। यथार्थस्वागतकारणसिद्धे
प्रमाणादानविषादित्वात्। इति ‘स्वं सार्थम्। सति च दारादी
कारणं यदभवानं कार्यमावो यस्मिन्स्त्रविशिष्टवेष भववेष
कारणं तदुपर्वत साधनित्व। यथा व्यक्तवानं क्षुद्रः। अतो
नत्वाद्वारस्वाधिसाधिनां विषादित्वात्सिद्धित्वात्। भावाद्वाद
प्रतिस्वादी धतु चन्ते। अनव्यासितेऽति कार्यनिनयतपुर्ववर्ती
इति वार्षम्। कार्यं प्रामाण्यायायोगीं। तबार्षम् विद्वेषवेष।
उपादानकारणं निमित्कारणं चैति। परिषामिले सति
यवारं तदुपादानकारणस्य। यथा जगतः प्रक्षति स्वपुषपकु घटस्य।
परिषामिले सति यवारं तस्बिततत्तत्त्वादकारणस्य। यथा
विक्र्षितां गजतः। दश्यां च घटस। तत्तत्व उत्तारकारण
कारणं यद्विधितं तत्त्व साधनसिद्धं भवति।

प्राप्तस्वादित्वविविधवत्तत्वादनकारणप्रक्षतियोऽस्याः प्रत्येकम्।
नात्मकात्तावृष्टि नागत्वविविधविषयः गच्छन्नुसमानस्य।
वायुक्तेः नात्मकात्वप्रक्षतियोऽस्य भगवं द्विति। वर्त्त्विपक्षकेशेषा:।
अनुप्रामाण्यं भौतिकात्तप्रसारायत्तानमपि विद्वेषवेष। प्रत्येकादास्विद्वेषवेषं देवता।
तद्विषदन्तया चबन्तया चयाचारे चन्द्रमम। 
इच्छुक साक्षात्कार दत्तुष्ट्वे। 
प्रच्छणदानमन्यं साक्षात्निमित्त। 
आद्यमणकं चन्द्रमां श्वास्तुम। 
निद्रिष्टोऽभिः प्रवचनं दुःखियेरः किंवियासिवाराष्यणं 
निद्रिष्टोऽभिः। 
प्रच्छणदानोऽभिः सिवियासिवाराष्यणं इन्द्रियं निद्रिष्टोऽभिः। 
ननु प्रच्छणं निद्रिष्टोऽभिः। 
कर्मण्यं चावानतर्व्यापारिः भाव्यं। यथा 
विन्दुकर्मण्यं पर्यङ्गर्वीयोगशिवान्तर्व्यापारं। 
तच्चन्त्रयुक्तं जनकोऽवान्तर्व्यापारं। यथा प्रच्छणप्रथमं द्रास्तसंयोगं। 
सद्यं। 
इन्द्रियं कर्मण्यं। 
तस्यार्थं योगशिवान्तर्व्यापारं। 
साक्षात्कारं। 
फलमं। 
चत्र तु धर्मप्राप्याचारायन्विवचया 
भद्रस्यं इन्द्रियं लक्षमं।
३७ तत्र निश्चितायुगीर्वी वें वसविवचयं 
समकाष्ठमुरुहिन्द्रियं। प्रत्येकमिल्लम। 
कशिदवान्तर्व्यापारं 
प्राचार्यविवचयं च जज्ञातुगीर्वी वें निद्रिष्ट पार्षण्ड्रियस्विकरं 
प्रत्येकमिल्लम। 
प्रज्ञो न बिरोऽृ। । प्रत्येकं गत्विवचयं। 
साधिरन्विवचयं नादातुः। तद्रामात्तरुपेन्द्रियं चारोत्तुष्ट्वे। 
तथाविवचयं। 
विवचयं। ज्ञातुरुपेन्द्रियं चारोत्तुष्ट्वे। 
नग्रेकं श्वास्तुम। 
प्रेक्षोऽभिः। 
तद्रामात्तरुपेन्द्रियं चारोत्तुष्ट्वे। 
विवचयं। 
विवचयं।
जबतेजसी, उपलभ्धमानसरसलयमानुषाशोतकात्तू। न विनु-नतुत्तम, सर्वहरितत्तालू। तददिपी तदाैतकृती सर्वंता सर्वंत्री-प्रकर्षपिबिुक्तालू। न मनं, धरमाश्रयांश्रयातीरित्रियलालू।

तथात य: प्रतीयमाणाप्राणृशय: स वागु:। न नु वागु: प्रकाश: प्रकाशार्थषयमयलालू घटवदृ शृति चैतु, न। उद्दलरुपवत्तली-पारिवालू। प्रखोपायो: पच्छवर्तविनवनसाध्यायक्तालू। यह भब्रीक्त्वते सति पत्रवचलं ततोऽदुरतुक्ततवत्तमिति दत्ताने साध्याय-वापकालालू। यत्र प्रकाशार्थषयमयलं ततोऽदुरतुक्ततवत्तमिति वासिनाशिः। पचे साधनावापकालालू।

तथातैलोऽ: अयातुमेयलं शिष्यं। प्रस्तुत्तिष्ठिष्ठा वर्षायद्: तोतेनिदिश्य बिष्या:।

एतेनं प्रेमित्रियामं मनोनिर्धितितलं बाणवकामवा-दयश्च दोषा:। मनस्सु बाणीमित्रियामन्ध्यानेते सर्वं विष्या:।

वारितियनैरिन्हेयाणितात: पदार्थं मनोविष्या:। अहं: फत्तमं। मानसप्रायचन्ता अहंितिरिक्ष:। तन्न संक्त्यानं

विभिकसुपुरु:। यथा योगीमित्रियायं योगजो घर्मं:। तथा शयनो दोषा रागाद्। अर्थि-दोषाय अतिदूरुक्तलम् अति-शायों सीतां शायानम् अतिश्चियस्यालं साध्यं चेलाद्य:।

एतेनु दोषेन तस्मु कौञ्ज्या भानेरव न जायते। शाचिचिक शंकप्रा- दिक्षू द्यःत्वाय।

इन्द्रियजन्यशयानां आश्वासिततापं सर्विकस: कार्षक:।

चाया मनसा संयुक्ते। मन इन्द्रियेश, इन्द्रियायं नै याया प्रकाशकारिकनियमतात:।

सर्वात्मासिद्धियां सिद्धिश्च:। शाखाविषयप्रतिियोजितक्रियावीच च साचाराक्त एव सर्विकस:।

कार्षक:। न तु कचित्तप्रमया शिक्ति भार्यपु:। यथे तु

साक्ष्याप्रमाणाँद्वितिरिन्द्रियाथ्यो:। सर्विकस:। शाचिचिक:। तदुङ्गा।
संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः, विशिष्टविशेषभावमिलति। तद्र चच्छो घटातिस्वरे: संयोगः। रूपकर्मसामान्यः: संयुक्तसमवायः। तथा लघुमो: घटातिस्वरे: संयोगः। कर्णकर्मसामान्यः: संयुक्तसमवायः। तथा मनस चालणा संयोगः। भागागतसूक्ष्मचिद्विभ संयुक्तसमवायः। धारणसयोगंधरसाम्यः संयुक्तसमवायः। ताभायं संयुक्तै फले गन्धरसयो: समवायात्। तथा गुष्कर्ममहतसामान्यः: संयुक्तसमवायः। श्रीतस्य श्रव्येन समवायः। कर्णशायकुक-विक्षिप्तनबहसः: श्रीकर्त। श्रव्यकार्यशुलायात्। तदर्सत: शब्दालिङ्गातिसामान्यः: समवेतसमवायः। तथा चच्छो घटाभावे मिश्रितविशेषभावः: सविकर्मः। राधस्य भूतस्य भूततस्य विशेषविशेषायात्। घटाभावस्य विशेषविशेषायात्। घटाभावविभूतचलमिलत: चच्छः संयुक्तस्य भूततस्य विशेषविशेषायात्। घटाभावस्य विशेषविशेषायात्। एवं समवायान्यी विशेषविशेषायाम: सविकर्मः। दृश: तन्तुः पतसमवायः, पतसमवायबलस्यकत्व इत्यादि वदति। तदनेदसतः। गुमादीन्तः गुमादिर्मित्रकीर्त: समवाय-भावात्। समवायस्यधी: प्रमाणाभावाः। प्रातेनः संयोगस्यान्य: प्रतासातिलेपि गुमादीन्तः न न तथा तथालम्। प्रातेनसङ्केत्रां च शास्त्रियविशेषमनो-विशेषायात्। वर्णविशेषशुल्कः द्रुत्यस्य प्रातेन: प्रातेन-गुमादिर्मित्रकीर्त:। न च समाजराले सङ्केत्रात्तिलेपि बृद्धिपाल्लेपि: वर्णे गुमादिर्मिति वाचस्य। परस्पर: तस्मिन्न अभिचारात्। परस्पर: गुमादिर्मिति अभिचारात्। धान्याकर्मशुल्कः प्रातेन: गुमादिर्मिति तदनेदसतः।
सम्बन्धाकावाच्य। विशिष्टविशेषभावव्य स्वरूपस्ववप्लेन
मिल्लस्वब्याधाकावाच्य।

यथू कैविच्यादृः संस्कारमाधकस्वप्नां वर्णः। प्रत्येक-भन्निनित्वातिनिवारशाय मात्रपदम्। संस्कारस्ववप्लोकाणों
जायमांस' वर्ण प्रत्येकम्मम्। सम्बाण्योः संयोगः। संस्कारान-श्वेतुमृण अथ घट चृत शानितिर्वादः।
सम्बाण्योः श्वेतुमृण श्वात्वतिर्वादः। सम्बाण्योः श्वेतुमृण
तत्र। ततथा सति यथार्यभान-मात्रध्य प्रमाणज्ञ्यविनियमातु, वृंतेश्व यथार्यभानलातु
तत्त्वक्षणसंस्कारार्थिपूर्वकथापत्तेः। ततथात ताति
प्रमाणानि चत्वारितति विभागावुपयते। ननु तथं दूषण
भवतात्मापि समानम् चृति चेतु, न। चाच्चाबिनु श्वात्त्वर्मावनास्य-भजनान्यस्ववप्लक्षेन
खल्लमानसप्रक्ष्यभानवलात्न्यकारार्दिति।

चतुर्विंश्च प्रत्यधम्। ईश्वरप्रति पूर्वक्षण योगिप्रत्यधम्
योगिप्रति पूर्वक्षण चृति। विषयस्वू तत्त्वार्थविषयवदू विविधत।
यथ विशेषस्वू पदस्त्रुतार्थाय ज्ञातवः इति सर्वमवदार्थम्।
इति श्रीमण्डलोत्तथूपूज्यमायदश्रिंश्चर्गीं चर्गवाच्यम्
प्रमाण-चन्द्रकारां प्रत्यधारिक्ष्णः समासः।
हितीय: परिच्छेद:

श्रीवेद्वासाय नमः। चधारुमान निष्कण्ठे। निर्दोषपतिरतुरुमानम्। उपपतियुपविलिङ्ग: आधारितं पर्यायः। उपपतितुरुमानमिथुनं चायपारिप्रेरित: बाधिते चालिस्थिति:। तथोपयोगीश्वरलेखनपदपविलातु। भतो निर्दोषविति। तालकुने प्रवचाराविनायः। भत उपपतिरिति। भत मिङ्गलकर्षणः। परामनो आयातः। भुविसिति: फलम्। व्यासाचारकारणसंस्कृतात्तत्रान् परामर्शः। यथा बिन्दुबाहुप्राचीपान्यभविनिति श्रावनः। तत्तथं पवत्तोधिशिष्ठनिरंति श्रावनमुनिष्ठि:। यत धूमस्तब्रह्ममिति साहचर्यनितिमो व्यासः। भत साहचर्यें हेतौ: साहो नम्भसम्बन्धमानं विचित्रसमूहं। न तु साधनाधिकारसम्भवेष। तस्त नियमो नियतलम्। व्यासाचारितिसाधारसम्बन्धो व्यासितिबिधं:। दासीधर्मितियोऽस्मातसम्बन्धो दासितिबिधं:। यत धूमस्तव्राह्ममिति भासितिदानम्नम्। तत्र धूमस्तव्राह्ममिति यथावचम्य:। भविष्यवतियोऽपर्यायः। भासितिवर्त्तमानं आयामः। आयामिनिधिपतियोऽपर्यायः। भव्यस्माभिने नम्भसम्बन्धितसंश्लेषं विचित्रितम:। यथातो न बहितु चुड़ौशप्रजः। आचार्यान्यसमासाधिकारः साधनसमासाधिकारोऽयोऽस्मात:। तथा भास्तियोऽपर्यायः तथा यथासमासाधिकारं आयामितिबिधं:। साधनसमासाधिकारं भासितिबिधु:। परक्तोधिशिष्ठमानं प्रमेयलादिव्याधिसितिबिधम्। तहुदासाय
माधवा लैण 

साधनसमागमिकरणाल्यात्माप्रतियोगिता। तात्त्विके ह्यः 
संयोगी क्रियात्मान्यायात्। * तत्त्वार्थाराय प्रतियोग- 
समानाधिकारणयितः। संयोगाभावस्य 
प्रतियोगिनमानाधिक- 
पराल्यावाचार्यकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकवाचार्यकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकवाचार्यकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्तिकर्ति
संवाहालम्। यदास्तलं न तत्र सवः संग्रहम्। तद्योन्न्योऽन्यं
वाण्यावपकाथाः। नावास्खेतुवाभावात्। एवं यद्र गजलं न
tत तत्र सवः संविलम्। यद्र सिंहलं न तत्र गजलसिमिति
रथवनम्। चतुर्याः यथा पाणकलपुश्चरमूलतमूलवालयः।
Pाणकलपुष्चलयः: पुष्चविश्रिवि समावेिः पाणकलं पुष्चवल-
परिकारणं स्तोऽथ वर्त्ते। पुष्चवलममि पाणकलपरिकारणपथं
पुष्चर्वि वर्त्ते। तावर्ग नान्योऽन्यं वाण्यावपकाथावधाय
नाव नाविकस्य परस्परविविचारात्। एवपश्चात्कलमुलवः:
कचिँहकामा-
विश्रिवि भूतलं भूतलपरिकारणं भावणि वर्त्ते। भूतलपरिकारणं
मनसि वर्त्तु इति ढृवश्वम्। तत्र वाणो धर्मो
वाण्यावप्राप्तिः जनयवनुमानमतिः। वाण्यावपकाथाय
इति।

ननु पर्वते वर्तमानो धूमो ग्रहान्त्वेनिं: पुष्चवल
विश्रिविभिन्नप्रभां न जनयति। उच्चाय। न प्राण्यवस्तुमाणि-
मञ्जालन्त्वस्मृ। किंतु भावेन। तथापि नारिकेलहीप-
वासिनो देशान्तरगतस्य धूमप्रतीताविणि कामावक्षाहिमोऽथवः।
तस्य धूमस्लूप्यप्रकारसि वनवासस्य तन्नान्ताभावात्।
वाण्यावक्षाहिमोऽथवः। कदाचिन्द्रविभाषां
हुवपि समुचिन्त्यादि विन्द्रविभास्यमयद्वृत्तमानिर्वृत्तति। तमसामुः
खरानुभावात्। तथा च वाण्यावक्षाहिमोऽथवति। समुहान्तरकारणं
लिपि समुचिन्त्यादि विन्द्रविभास्यमयद्वृत्तमानिर्वृत्तति। तमशा
धर्मानुभावस्तु हृदे वाणि:
समुचिन्त्यादि विन्द्रविभास्यमयद्वृत्तति। न तस्य पुष्चवलमान्तिः।

ननु वाण्यावर्गे कैन मन्नानि जाते। यथायहि
प्रवचनमानाणिर्रितिः भूमिः। तब तावहुमहाबिना
व्याससङ्गादी प्रत्ययोग्याः। तत् भूमौर्ष्यन्यंभिचारादेशं सहकारित्वः।

ननु वर्तमानसङ्केतसापञ्जानी प्रत्ययं सर्वोपसंहरेष काधमतीतावाक्षादं व्यासं ग्रहीयत्। प्रवासांतरभावादितिचेच। सामान्यलक्षणप्रवासांतरभावाविष्टी साहखेनेव प्रतिसाधिना प्रवासपतिसम्भवेन सर्वोपसंहरेष व्यासग्रहोपपत्तोऽवनुमाणाया तु व्यासदूसातोदाहिरिष्याम्। यो ब्राह्मणः स न हजतः। या गीः सा न पदा सम्प्रद्याः।

यदहिं तत्साभ्यमित्वावाक्षागमगम्या व्यासिन्नुष्ठवथा।

त्रिविधमनुमाणं कार्यानुमाणं कारणानुमाणं चाकारं कारणामुनाणं चेति। यत्राद्यं कारणानुमाणयति ततो कार्यानुमाणम्। यथा धूमोऽम्बेरुमापकः। यत्राद्यं कार्यानुमाणयति ततोकारणानुमाणम्। यथा इत्यादि-विभिन्नेवोचितरं देशनापानिका। यथृ खसायाख कारणं न भवति कार्यम् न भवति अघं च तदनुमापणः तदकार्यानुमाणम्। यथा रत्नो रुप्यानुमापकः।

पुनर्विधमनुमाणम्। दशं सामान्यतीक्ष्य चेति। तत्र प्रत्ययोग्यानुमापकं हत्तम्। यथा धूमोऽम्बे:। प्रत्ययोग्यानुमापकं सामान्यतीक्ष्यम्। यथा ृपादिश्ृणं चन्द्राराजेतिस। कैचि विभिन्नमाणं वेदवाचनान्यज्ञविवर्तितिसमस्तयितिक्रियेदात्। साध्यसम्बन्ध धर्मं परः। सप्तचौदी धर्मसम्बन्धिवाचसिवार्तवां साध्यसम्बन्धिवाचसिवार्तवाय। यथातीनिलिखितं जनवित्यम् स साधो धर्मः यतो नातिवासिः। साध्यसम्बन्ध संयोगिन सम्बन्ध शैत्यविवाहितिति तदार्थाय धर्मीं। साध्यसम्बन्धवाक्षान्त धर्मीं सचा:। महानवीक्ष
धूमेश्तित्वासिवारशय धर्मीति। साधनमभावान् धर्मी सप्त
इयुः समस्थवः। पचित्वित्वासित्व। अत: समानित।
सन्दिक्षलाकारसन्तर्प्य समानमभावानिविश्यं। साधतबमान-
धर्मरित्तो धर्मी विपंच।। पचित्वित्वासिवारशय साधतमरित-
पदस्व। सपचित्वासिवारशय तल्मानरित्तित।। पचाङ्ग्रापूं
सपचित्तित्वासिवारशय असिभदेवनिपं भवनान्तिनः।।
अत: सपचित्तित्वासिवारशय असिभदेवनिपं भवनान्तिनः।।
वासिवारशय असिभदेवनिपं भवनान्तिनः।। वासिवारशय
असिभदेवनिपं भवनान्तिनः।। वासिवारशय असिभदेवनिपं
भवनान्तिनः।। वासिवारशय असिभदेवनिपं भवनान्तिनः।।
तत्तपित्रिराय पचाङ्ग्रापूं तावः घटशब्दा
बापिष्टो नवेल्लाधिनं भागासिभदेवत्वाः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
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पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्तिनः।। तत्तपित्रिराय
पचाङ्ग्रापूं भवनान्ति...
पर्वतलादित्वादित्रिविशार्धित्वादित्।

तदर्शनम् सर्वं अनुसरितं। पर्वतलय सन्निकामकामहाज्ञाते

वावृत्तित्वादित्रिविशार्धित्वादित्रिविशार्धित्वादित्।

तद्वादित्रिविशार्धित्वादित्रिविशार्धित्वादित्।

तदादित्रिविशार्धित्वादित्रिविशार्धित्वादित्।

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तदर्शनम् पर्वतावलयकालम्।

उदा

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नित्यं विनाशकारणशून्यतादिति सुप्रभावपकम्। स्वेषाः
nिरो गगनानि विनाशकारणशून्ययत्स तह्वः। पवतोऽभिमानम्
धूमवक्षादेशः सुपचेष्टेदेशात्। अभिमलयस्ति क्रियाज्ञानानां
वस्त्र्यावतः। इति हि यो धूमवान् सोऽभिमानम् यथा
महानसः। योऽभिमानम् न भवति स धूमवान् न भवति यथा
महाक्षेत्र स्थिति यासिग्नवदनन्यत्वाक्षरनिधीन्ते इत्यादिः।
तदिदमस्तु। अतिरिक्तासे: प्रश्नसाध्यसिद्धान्तपुरोगात्।
न हि भावन भवसाधने प्रभावम् प्रभावने असिसिप
युज्यति। असिसिपज्ञमत्योवेधिकास्य च एवं सति स्थात्।
कथाम तदमेव केवलवितारं: संवेब्याहरः। इत्य ततापि
यक्षणवताः स संवेब्य इत्येव व्याति:। किन्तु असिसिपच्छन
खानक्षेत्र विश्वातिकिविपयलेन सा र्ध्यितुमस्मृकाभ्यूहू।
ततोऽभिमानेन तां साधन्ति अतिरिक्तायासिसिपयुज्यते। सवेन
क्षणादेशः प्रकृते कथमण्यं असिसिप्याकांणां सवेकर्तां
सर्वश्लेषं व्यासं तदभावव्यावाचायग्रतियोगिलात्।
यद्यक्ष्माव्यावाचायव्याचायग्रतः तस्मि व्यासं। यथा धूम
वस्त्र्यावेधिकास्य विश्वातिकिविपयलेन संवेब्याहरः।
प्रश्नसाध्यातिरिक्ताः सुप्रभावपकमस्मृकाभ्यूहः।
विश्वातिकिविपयलेन संवेब्याहरः। अभिचाराविसत्रायणस्थेन कथमण्यं
युज्यते वै।

पञ्चसुमां हिमविः साधृं पराधृं च हश्ति। तव साधृः
सप्रभावविस्तपित्वेः। विभे भूमोर्यान्तरण महानादृः यथा धूम
स्वाच्छादिति आसियं गद्दीवा तदनिता वर्तमानसाय गतं।
तद्विते चाचात् सन्निहात: पवते धूमं पक्ष्यन व्याति स्थाति।
यथा धूमस्वाच्छादिति। तदनिता वर्तमानसाय गताः
वद्वियात्मकयोक्ति सम्बन्धविधिरुपूर्वस्तवति। तत्त्वार्थसूत्रोऽन्तरस्तवसूत्रोऽयं बिधिपरामर्शं द्विपूर्वस्तवति। तत्त्वाधिकारिनिती स्वसम्बन्धविधिरुपूर्वस्तवति। यथसंध्वमास्तिनिमन्तकाय परं प्रतिबोधितं पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रयुक्तम्। वत्ततं विश्वमानः धम्मवनस्तवम्। यथसंध्वमास्तिनिमन्तकाय परं प्रतिबोधितं पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रयुक्तम्। वत्ततं विश्वमानः धम्मवनस्तवम्। तथा चायाम्। तत्त्वाधिकारितै। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। एवं प्रश्नं पराश्रयात्मामिलितम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठा। यथा पवेंतकोपितनमानिति। साधववत्य पञ्चायत्ववादं प्रतिष्ठाने। तत्त्वाधिकारितै। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रतिष्ठादितिविधिथितवरोपेक्षाम्। प्रश्नं प्रति


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ब्रिधा। लिङ्गस साधन तदभविन च सम्बन्धः; साध्यस्वभावोऽभवे सति तदभविनेव सम्बन्धः; उभायस्वभावाभवे ततः। तताद्यो यथा श्रव्योदयः प्रभेयलालितः। हितोऽयदृ श्रव्ये निःस्र तत्वलालितः। हतोऽयदृ यथा सर्वनिःस्र सत्वलालितः। चतुर्वत्स पच्चिनोभयस्वभावो नास्ति।

हृदान्विरोहे हितिवधः। साध्यवैकल्य साधनवैकल्य चैति। भार्यः यथा शनोदिल्य मुर्त्तवान् परमार्शवादितः। हितीयं यथा यथवैवाद्यमाने यथा कर्मेति।

यतः प्रतिवैत्यं सच्चार सति तथाविदितः। जातानाक्षिं साधनाय प्रस्तुतालितः। अभ्याक्षरितोऽसक्तितिरति तत्वचार्यलालितः।

यत्र तत्वतथ्यं सच्चार सति तथाविदितः। जातानाक्षिं साधनाय प्रस्तुतालितः। अभ्याक्षरितोऽसक्तितिरति तत्वचार्यलालितः।

यत्र तत्वतथ्यं सच्चार सति तथाविदितः। जातानाक्षिं साधनाय प्रस्तुतालितः। अभ्याक्षरितोऽसक्तितिरति तत्वचार्यलालितः।

यत्र तत्वतथ्यं सच्चार सति तथाविदितः। जातानाक्षिं साधनाय प्रस्तुतालितः। अभ्याक्षरितोऽसक्तितिरति तत्वचार्यलालितः।

यत्र तत्वतथ्यं सच्चार सति तथाविदितः। जातानाक्षिं साधनाय प्रस्तुतालितः। अभ्याक्षरितोऽसक्तितिरति तत्वचार्यलालितः।
वायुसङ्केतानुपर्योः साधनः पवित्र प्रभावात्राध्यायेः
वाणोऽर्ज्जिनः यथा श्रवणिनिवयाध्यायेः।
च चातुर्यं हेतुः स च शब्दे नास्ति।
श्रवणं श्रवणलात्।
श्वेतज्ञानां निमित्तः।
साध्यस्म्भवेऽरितः सोपाधिकसम्बन्धेः।
हाँवः श्वास्त्यं सवनं चषणं सत्त्वादिति।
च सर्वस्य पचलेन प्रभावात्राध्यायंसाध्यसब्धाभावो श्रेयः।
हिंसायो यथा वैद्यो हिंसा पापसाधनं हिंसालात् श्रावणं
हिंसालात्।
क्षेत्राध्यायेऽवयोः समभवे नित्यविक्रमे
पावे संभाव।
साध्याध्यायकले सति साधनाध्यायक उपाधिरिति
उपाधिश्च सम्बन्धवः।
यथाधम्मसाधनले तव निष्ठद्धिरिति आध्यात्मकता।
इंसालं तव निष्ठद्धिरिति नास्ति।
पि हिंसालख सत्त्वाध्यायात् नन्दो हपाधी
कयं दोष प्रति चेतिद्वियम्।
उपाधिरिति चारोराध्यायकले प्रति
पापवादोराध्यायकले दोषों भवति।
तव निष्ठद्धिलोकाध्यायत्राध्यायसाधनले
सताद्ध्यायकालात्मकाध्यायमर्मेः
साधनलं निवर्त्यहिंसालख साध्यभावसम्बन्धाभावात्।
आध्यात्मकता आध्यात्माध्यायेः।
तत्त्व पश्चात्विपितैव सताद्ध्यायकाले दोषाः
भवति।
प्रतिपापवादोराध्यायकले भवति।
उपाधि: कयं पश्चात्वार्त्थमानः
सताद्ध्यायत्राध्यायान् आपरात्यम्।
तत्त्वादिति नास्ति।
वायुसङ्केतानुपर्योः साधनः पवित्र प्रभावात्राध्यायेः
वाणोऽर्ज्जिनः यथा श्रवणिनिवयाध्यायेः।
च चातुर्यं हेतुः स च शब्दे नास्ति।
श्रवणं श्रवणलात्।
श्वेतज्ञानां निमित्तः।
साध्यस्म्भवेऽरितः सोपाधिकसम्बन्धेः।
हाँवः श्वास्त्यं सवनं चषणं सत्त्वादिति।
च सर्वस्य पचलेन प्रभावात्राध्यायंसाध्यसब्धाभावो श्रेयः।
हिंसायो यथा वैद्यो हिंसा पापसाधनं हिंसालात् श्रावणं
हिंसालात्।
क्षेत्राध्यायेऽवयोः समभवे नित्यविक्रमे
पावे संभाव।
साध्याध्यायकले सति साधनाध्यायक उपाधिरिति
उपाधिश्च सम्बन्धवः।
यथाधम्मसाधनले तव निष्ठद्धिरिति आध्यात्मकता।
इंसालं तव निष्ठद्धिरिति नास्ति।
pि हिंसालख सत्त्वाध्यायात् नन्दो हपाधी
कयं दोष प्रति चेतिद्वियम्।
�पाधिरिति चारोराध्यायकले प्रति
पापवादोराध्यायकले दोषों भवति।
तव निष्ठद्धिलोकाध्यायत्राध्यायसाधनले
सताद्ध्यायकालात्मकाध्यायमर्मेः
साधनलं निवर्त्यहिंसालख साध्यभावसम्बन्धाभावात्।
आध्यात्मकता आध्यात्माध्यायेः।
तत्त्व पश्चात्विपितैव सताद्ध्यायकाले दोषाः
भवति।
प्रतिपापवादोराध्यायकले भवति।
उपाधि: कयं पश्चात्वार्त्थमानः
सताद्ध्यायत्राध्यायान् आपरात्यम्।
तत्त्वादिति नास्ति।
वर्त्तमानसाध्यतापारकेचिं। चात्म यथा——परंतो भूसंवनीति
मत्स्यदिक्षाद्विन्त्यजस्मीं उपाधिः। द्वितीयो यथा——वाच्यः
प्रवचनः प्रचर्रपर्यायालेखनितं वहिद्रुव्यायाविचारप्रयत्नं
याक्तपुंजदृश्यतरपलाम्। चति वाहित्र्व्यालं पचार्मः। चतोष्टस्य
प्रवचनं केनलसाध्यायापकलं नासिः। गुणादीप्रवचनं
संस्कृति उष्ण तर्पपवाचार्यात्। चतो द्रथ्यालाविचित्रेष्य
युज्यताः। तथाज्ञानी न साध्यवाच्याक। चतो बहित्र यथा
वर्त्तमानस्वा विषेयते स्थान। चततीयो यथा——गम्भीरः
शामो भवितुमहेश्वरि मैत्रीतनयालेखनित्वत् मैत्रीतनयालाविचित्र—
शामलवाच्यापकं शाकापाकजस्तम्। ब्रजापि शाकापाकजस्त्वः केनलसाध्य
वाच्यापकलं नासि। घटादी श्यामलस्वा विषि शाकापाकजङ्गलान
भावात्। चतो मैत्रीतनयालाविचित्रेश्युज्यताः। चतुर्थीयो यथा——
परामाणुप्राय वर्त्तमान प्रसींतलात् घटवदिश्यत् वहिद्रुव्यायाविचित्र
प्रवचनं प्रवचनं अतत्रहुपत्रसुद्द तर्पपवाचम्। चति
वाहित्र्व्यालं सुदासीनो ध्यामः। प्रस्तु पचार्ममलाभावात् साधवाप
भावाः। चति वल प्रवचनं ततोष्टस्य तर्पपवाचम् दृति साधार
वाच्याकता नासिः। गुणादी भविचारात्। चतो बहित्र
यथा लाविचित्रे घटादी तर्पपवाचमिति साधवाच्याकता वेया। यव
प्रसींतलं ततोष्टस्य पवाचमिति साधवापाकता नासिः।
पचि भविचारात्। यथाविलख्यते सु साधवापाक
व्यापीरिष्कृते श्वेतोदिति। जनकालेखनित्व घटवमुखपाधि: खात्।
जनकालेखनित्व घटादी घटवाचार्यात्। चति उपसं साधवापाकते
सत्तीति। साधवापक व्यापीरिष्कृते श्वेतमातुमानि द्रव्य
मुपाधि: खात्। चति उपसं साधवापाकते।
प्रामाण्याव्यासी इत्यतः । यथा श्रव्यो नित्यः क्षतकलाविद्यति । क्षतकलं हि निश्चयाभावविनिज्ञतेन व्यासी ।

स्वयंमीतिरेवनावैतिकः । स चिन्धि । साधारणसाधारणशास्त्रसंहारिते भवति ।

तत् साधारणवच्छृति: साधारणानेत्राकान्तिकः । पवयोगिनिमानु: प्रतिवाद्यान्ति: प्रभृतिलोकः वाक्याबद्धति क्रृते

विवाहानलात् । सर्वसंप्रदायिपत्तशास्त्र: पच: एव वर्त्तमाने इत्यतसाधारणानेत्राकान्तिकः । भूर्तिया गम्भरवाद्यान्ति: गम्भ-वच्छवं स्वर्गो निषेध्योर्ज्ञिनवें वाहतं भूसामान्त मृत्युभाषान्तिकः ।

चन्द्रयायति: रूपक्ष्यात्तरहितोर्ज्ञिन्युपसंहारिति । यथा सर्वमन्नानं प्रतिवाद्यान्ति: तत: सर्वथाप्याय पचलात् द्यासां नानु: । यथा साधारणः प्रमाणन निन्तित: स कालाभ्याघृतं: । चर्चेव साधित

इति चौयत: । यथा सर्वेन्तोंगुः पद्धार्थादिहीनवात्युक्तां साधिं तद्भाव उप्लवं साधिन्नप्रत्येकं यज्ञत: इति।

साधारणसाधारणं हिंनं विविधं यथा विविधि स कर्तितप: । यथा श्रव्यो नित्यः नाश्चात्यं श्रव्यवत: । श्रव्योनिन्नित्यः

वायुलाइकित्वदिलिन्नेन प्रतिव्याप्लात: । चर्चेव प्रकारसम

इति चौयत: । तथोद्यांतरभित: उदाहरणवच्छवद्वासामनं

उदाहरणभासा: । तेन चानिकप्रकरार: । तत् साधिहिंनं

हिंनं ताब्याधृवेकं यथा—मनोनिन्नं सूर्यं लात: । यथात

तद्नियां यथा प्रमाणपुरूषाति। परमाण्याविकीवलमाभावावादेः

साध्यावैकल्यम: । साधनबेकल्यं यथा चत्रवायुमाने यथा कर्मित: ।

कर्मिनिन्निन्नित: सूर्यं लातामाभावावादेः । सम्बेकल्यं यथा—

चत्रवायुमाने यथाभिबेककं चौयत: । चालोरोद्यांतरभित: साध्या

भावावैकल्यं यथा—तद्नियां यथा कर्मित: । साधनाभावावैकल्यं यथा—तद्नियां यथा कर्मित: ।
भवति यथा पर्माणुरितं। उभयाभावबैकल्यं यथा—
तत्तत्त्वबेवातुभं यथा घट तत्त्वं वदनि।

तद्वत्तदसत्। केषाचिदृश्यश्लात्। केषाचिदिविमाणाकोणाकोणाकोणात्। केषाचिर्तु भरतोष्णाकोणाकोणात्। केषाचिदिविमाणाकोणाकोणात्। केषाचिदिविमाणाकोणाकोणात्। केषाचिदिविमाणाकोणाकोणात्।

तत्त्वं संस्कर्षितं। तत्त्वं श्रीमाण्डलोपूर्वाप्रायः
प्रदर्शितमार्गतवात्मकं प्रमाणचन्द्रकायामुमानपरिच्छेदः।
श्रागमपरिच्छेदः

श्रीविद्यासाध नमः। हरि: कः॥

श्रागमसो निरुपयते। निद्रेः। श्रद्धा श्रागमः। श्रागमा-भूक्तिताचारवाणियाम निरोधितः। प्रख्यादावतिताचारवाणियाम श्रद्धा दृतः। प्रजावधकलम्, विपरौत्स्यथेकलम्, भ्रात्रापकलम्, प्रायोजनवच्चम्, भन्निभिन्नत्वम्, अनुमानमंत्रेणवच्चम्, श्रायक्षावचनसंभव-पादनम्, तथ्या सति गुरुवाहोपदेशननिम्नतःवादः। श्रद्दोया:।

प्रतिधारकः च डेहा। निभिवेल्येन प्रथायाभावेन चेति॥

तत्तत्त्वस्थोदाहरणं कष्टतपाणा जगबंध्दलादिबादिः। दिशो-स्थोदाहरणं गोलम: पुष्पो हस्तीलि। कुँकुममाणिनम्। दय दार्द्मानि बड़पुष रत्नादि। विपरौत्स्यथेकशोदाहरणं विमतं मिथा। शुद्धां वेदाधिकारीश्च ब्राह्मानं नास्तीवादि। भ्रात्रापकलस्थोदाहरणं सु पुरस्तादादिवः। उपरि पञ्चाश्चमेति। महुः गुडः। तस्मां निस्मापानिर्बचारः।

नं प्रमाणभानरसङ्गादृश्यादृश्या दार्श्येन्दुरुवक्तुकलेन कवं भ्रात्रापकलकेहो दोषलिमिति वाचम्। पूर्वप्रभुग्माप्रमाणप्रसाराश्च-भ्रात्रापकलस्थोदाहरणं उपरीतप्रभुग्माप्रमाणाः तत्त्रित्यकलेन दार्श्येशुलकस्ततर्थं। भ्रात्रापकलकेहो-दृश्यम्।

जावात्र काति या द्वात्र: श्रेष्ठास्यां कियत्तकं।

कमले काति रोमाशी का वार्ता चोकमखः॥ रत्नादि।
चन्द्रबिमतांत्र्योजनवक्षोदाहरं विरं तत्व वाणिज्योप- 
द्रेः इत्यादि। जश्वाकासाधन-प्रतिपादकालवक्षोदाहरं स्तु- 
सुधिशो जूरिन्द्रहिमसहिबोधरूपतर-सामुदी दस्यमृतसत्रोभोनी- 
कथानादि। लघुपदि तत्त गुरुपत्रोपसुद्धवक्षोदाहरं नैके न जायमानं कार्यों कृतार्थो शृणुकिं। तथिपि तत्त गीर्यार्य- 
तरक्षिणोत्तरो व्रुपखनोपदेश इत्यादि।

शब्दः पद्माकाशः। विमहान्ता वाणोः पद्मः।
जवगद्भक्रियार्कायं सर्वसुभवित्याविवाहाय विमहान्ता इति।
चाकाक्षायोग्यतासर्वचिद्मतं पदानां समुहो वाक्मः। यस्मी 
विना विना वाक्यार्थायानुभावकलं तथव तेनाकाला। यथा
घटमानयेत्विक्रियादृशः कर्मण्टद्रेः विना विक्रियार्थभावाय- 
बोधाजनकलमित्यान्यपदस्य घटप्रदेश सहाकाला। चधवा
पूवपदस्यात्ताकालानुसारकलमाकाला। चतएव गौरेः 
पुष्णको- 
हस्तोति न वाकम्, परस्यार्थायार्थधाराः। यथा 
काकाहीका 
चेतनधर्मः। तथापि सर्वस्तवततसपदश्चुन्धोविच्याकाला 
जनकालं साकाला इत्यष्ट्या। तत्प्रतिपादकालात्यान्यः 
साकालाशीलश्च इति। प्रताताः यथ्यम्बस्य यथरादिविरोधाभाय 
योग्यता। यथा जलन सिंधोत्तज्ज जलरेवनयो। कार्यकारण- 
भावसंस्कृत्यावजितलातु स्थनस्य जलन सहान्यो योग्यता।
अत एवविवना सिद्धोतिति न वाकम्। योग्यार्थविरघताः।
न सिद्धनिःशनोऽथ नीततितत्त सदिशः। यथायावधाननोपहीचरितानि गामायवहे 
वातिद्वान द्विमित्रिणि। चतएव प्रहरे प्रहरेश्चुन्धोचरितानि 
गामायवेलादीनि न वाकम्। सदिशभावात्।

चत वाक्य कारणम्, पदार्थम्तिरवालोकायाः वाक्यार्थां 

फलम्। भागमोहपि शास्त्रीयहार्दिसंगुणः सम्यक् खुत एवाध्यः बोधको न प्रखचवक्तात्तादिमानेय। भागमसांतुमानवत् भात- करिष्णलु। अन्यथा भागमध्य सहुपतृः सचेष्टपि तदशाविषः
श्रवणेऽवत्तुष्टसंस्कृततिकथा वा पुंसः बायंप्रमापकलापते॥

गवादिपदानां जातावेव शक्तिः विशेषतया जातेः प्रथम- मुख्यस्वभावतः। अन्तिलाभकुलचिपार्दिति कैरिृत। जाति- विक्रिया ज्ञानयो वाचा: । अत्र जातिविधः शब्दप्रार्थितिनिमित- परः। तथा चाकाशाद्यः सबंधिपि शब्दः। प्रार्थितिनिमिततविशिष- क्वत्राचिन इत्यपरे। घटाधिश्रव्यर्ते जाति:, जेवद्रव्यसंप्रभा- शब्दः शक्ति:, साक्षादिष्कुलशः श्राविषः, गवादिश्रव्यर्ते मृत्यु- यमपीऽवधः। वसुतस्तु यथाचक्नुराल्कादिति यावतोऽयः। प्रतीयने
तात्त्त्त्त्तक्षणवच्चा:। सारस्त्तु तु श्राविषः प्रथ्यासस्तत्तुपः।
यथा घटश्रव्य घटघतवयोः। प्रतीयमानवताः स शब्दः। तत्र शक्ति:।
श्रव्यः: गुप्तुयुगिनोः शक्ति:। गतश्रव्यः: क्रियातदायीः, देवश्रव्यो जेवद्राचिनः शक्ति घटाधिश्रव्यर्ते। यथा घटाधिश्रव्यर्ते
पदानां विशेषतया अन्तय एव वाचा:। आन्यायिकां तु विशेषणालिनिन वाचम्। गामानवेशादाः सर्ववानयानादेः
व्यक्तावेव सध्यवेव विशेषतया व्यक्तावेव श्राकृत्यनातू।

श्राकृत्यश्रव्यशाहुत्रप्रथारासवशादूर्वक्षिप्तिनेव भवति। तथा हि
मातुः: पितृवः खडः स्थिरं बालमनमानसकं सन्तप्रकृतिप्रसरण- छोटिकावाटनाभाः। श्रवणनिभुषाधिकृतयोः मातात्त्त्त्त्त्त्तसुः
च विधाय यदा युक्त्यस्तिता वाक्यः प्रयुक्ते। बाल तवेयं माता तत्र
पितायं ते भावायं कदनीक्षममभवते नानाधिकः। तदा तेन
निर्देशनेव तत्र श्रव्यश्रव्यशः तत्क्षणविशिष्टसुः वास्यवचक- 
भास्माद्यम् तात्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त-च भास्माद्यम् तात्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त-च भास्माद्यम्

g: रमनीनायां
बोधनीति। पुनर्विंते स्फूर्तिः पंचतीतीवितीयः प्रयोगान्तरेषु शब्दार्थं योरावपोहोपापायणं शब्दमेदान्तिकमवक्तमानारिपुरोपनदानां जनकादेहि विशिष्टावो वाचकाकमवगच्छन्तीति।

परमेव तु शक्तिप्रसंह स्वंतमवहारात्। तथा हि अधिपर्वतीयः गामानबोधनमद्वाकश्वराचार्यशंकानां मध्यमरूपः प्रतिसम्प्रवतूमज्जय गवाननं हि मध्यमरूपः प्रतिश्चर्णमनन्याय पवनः भूतेर्वक्रयं वाक्यविधां तिथिः शश्कुमाय गां बधानेिताबावाचार्यां धारोपाएवाधाराव्यो गोपस्य गोवः \शक्ति। शब्दपदार् स्वशमात्मा शक्तिरिति यत्त्वत इवादृष्टि। तव। शचन-हिश्चर्याश्यीलस वालस एक्ष्यादानयनपर्यं शब्दानुसमानान-बानीपति।

कृतिहिन्दिषा। सुच्याससुखा चेति। तत्र शक्तिमुख्य। हर्ति। यथर्क्षुण्डकुलपदार्थसम्भवः शक्ति।। सा च समयसम्बन्धितवत्वकलादिबिंत्वविश्वायति। सा शक्ति। स्विरिव्य। योजः। कृष्टि। योग्राहिडेति। तत्तावयव-शक्तियोऽं। समुद्रायासनो कृष्टि।। उमयशमनियोग्रहितः।

तत् केचि यश्या योगकिसार्यबोधकाः।। ते च पाचकपाठवदिष्टं कुष्ठायाद।। केचि इवार्थविभोकाः।। ते च घटपदाद।।

केचि समाश्यामयश्याकाः।। ते च पदविक्तः।। एवमण्या चपि महायोगमाः सुभूत्वत्वाय ब्रेयः।। लच्छास तसुक्ष्मा हर्ति।।

श्रवक्तस्मयो लच्छाः। सा हिन्दिषा जाहलध्वाः जाहलध्वाः चेति। यश वाचश्चन्त्रस्यान्यां बावः तत्र जाहलध्वाः। कथा गण्याय चोष इष्यादृशी। यश वाचश्चन्त्रस्यान्याः तत्र जाहलध्वाः। यथा कुम्भो यानीवादी। सा पुनर्हिन्दिषा। प्रयोजननिरपेक्ष। प्रयोजनसमपिषा। चेति। तत्रान्तः यथा। मार्गसाधनीति। तथं
प्रयोजनाभविष्यितः प्रतीयमानलात् नक्ताचकरिताः। वितत्वा
यथा गद्याय वोष चैतिः। द्रव्यं च पारिवर्ग्योऽध्योजनापेश्याय
प्रवत्तमानलाकोवललचणीत्यति। सुखार्थांपुष्पस्वर्तिंचच्याभीनम् ॥
एवम् महो प्रण गौम्याया प्रसुख्या हस्तयो ब्रह्मणः ॥

आगमो हितिः। चर्युक्तेऽय: पौष्यश्रेयः। तत्रापासेयः
क्रमादिदार्मणामाः। पौष्यम् भारतादिसादगमाः। तदुक्रमः
आगमो हितिः। द्रश्यो निवोधिनिवस्तुथ्रीव च।
क्रमादिभारतं चैव पश्चाद्रममाखिलम्
सुलभार्मण्यं चैव पुराणं च तदाज्जतम्॥
*ये चानुवभिषेषोऽस्य सर्वं ते च सदांगमः॥
दुरागमस्वदनये ते ते न भ्रेय जनार्दन इति॥

नतु वेदः पौष्यो वाक्समूहलात् कालिदासःसिद्धाक्शः
वदिति चैव। शृवसमार्कवृत्तकालसोपाधिवात्। नतु वेदो
न प्रमाणम्। तदुक्रमः च पश्चाद्रममाखिलम्। विप्रलब्धकवाक्ला
वदिति चैव। वेदः प्रमाणभवेऽप्राविद्यवाक्लात् अतिरेकों
शोभानात्वाक्षेपदिति युक्तिविद्यवात्। न चाचिदः। वाचा
विसेविनियोऽविवादर्शः। अनादिनिधनः निधयो वामुस्ताने
स्याध्वेदीस्त्रृतेष्ठ। न च फलविण्वार्माद्रमाख्यः।
प्रविधानाशो फलोपलक्षेण तदरुपलक्ष्य सर्वेद्विगुणाभिनी
निमित्तकालान्तिः। नन्दागमो न प्रमाणं निर्विष्यन्यात्।
विप्रलब्धक्षराविश्वतु। तथा हि। विषयो हितिः
अपरोजः परोषतति। तदादिः। प्रश्चास्व विषयः।

* हुदितुपकक्षिप प्रांतस्तु चन्द्रायनः। चन्द्रायनः परिच्यथाः खारिः।
ब्रह्माणरमाणार्धां ब्रह्माणेऽपि पाठो निर्णयः।
# खण्ड चारितिः विषयमीवादाः येन विषयेषांगः प्रमाणं

खातू। यथायागः: परोक्षनमानजनां: तथापि लम्भते

प्राप्तक्ष चिन्हसाधकस्य मानात्तरविषये प्रवर्तानमानला-

ध्रुपमाथामः। एवं सर्वायागः: चर्चितविषयाभावानां

प्रामाण्यमिति चेत्। यथार्थपरोक्षविषयायतविशिष्टिः

प्राकादिविष्याचार्यविशिष्टिः च चुवार्दः: प्रामास्थुमवज्ञनौनः

तदृज्जयति परोक्षविषयलविशिष्टिः प्रामास्थुमवज्ञनौनः

स्व-समाधिस्वरूपः अर्थाण्वतिंनीर्यशान्यानोऽपि

प्रामास्थुग्राम्याविषयसहायतुविशिष्टिः हि चैवर्णक

ग्राम्याविषयसहायतुविशिष्टिः साहिरि चः विशेषक्षेपाभावात्

तदेवं वर्णिताभूमि बीस्मि प्रमाणानि। एतेऽयोग्यः

प्रमाणाः।

नन्वयपत्तिः प्राकृतः प्रमाणमाति। चर्चितप्रमाणायां

धर्मनास्वयपपातः बुद्धिव्यवस्थिः। जोव्याभिः च चीति

स्वतः हि च चीत्व नन्वयपातः कल्यात्। जोव्याः

ग्राम्याविषये बहविभावः विना नोपपदाति। चतो विशेषधामराः

* चर्चितप्रमाणां विषयों कथें पाठः अच्छे हैं। विषयक्रमां प्रमाणात् पाठवं।

सहास्र श्रुतिप्रभावाः।

† प्रमाणः (?)
नुपर्षिस्प्रसृतायार्थिपतिर्व्र बहिःसते प्रमाषम। तत्र
प्रवक्षार्थिः भिष्मः। बहिभर्मिवस्व प्रवक्षाार्थिविषयतात्। मैत्रेय,
भर्मापतितजनाना एवान्तर्भवात्। चैत्यो बहिंततु हृदयः सति
गृहेऽस्तवः। यो जीवनम् यत् नास्ति स ततोप्यात्तिः यशाहृ
मित्रनुमानेनेव बहिभर्मिव प्रतीयमान्तवालिमयापते:
प्रवक्षानया। सती श्रविचारवर्ताय सल्लन्तः गृही विधमाने
देवतान्व श्रविचारवर्ताय श्रविशेषभाग इति भोयम।

ननु उपमानमणि प्रश्चवः प्रमाषमांस्य। बहित्त्वावक्षार्थः
श्रविशेषार्थेन्दुगोसाध्यविशिष्टविप्रेणस्तन्यमुपानम्।
तथाहि
कसिदु गव्यश्रविस्मानानकुतस्मिर्दार्कायखः पुष्पादोहസ्यो गव्य
इत्ततिह्वावक्सः खुला वनगत्तहार्कायाः धारनू गोसाध्यः
विशिष्टप्रस्तुः पश्चातः। तदनन्तरमवं गव्यश्रविस्माः इति
प्रवतिश्रविशयोति। इत्य तु प्रवक्षांकनयालात् प्रमाषांकराः
सुपमानानान्तमानिताति। तच्च, उपमान-हृद्यं जनानाना
एवान्तर्भवात्। यशा विभ्रमो गव्यश्रविस्माः: चंगोते सति
गोसाध्यविशेषार्थिकै घटवत्। गोसहिः गवान्तः श्रविचार-
वर्ताय सल्लन्तः। घटाधृ श्रविचारवर्ताय श्रविशेषभिन्तः।

नन्न्वाक्षां प्रश्चवः प्रमाषमांस्य। तत्त्वाभावश्रविशथायानां
कर्मीयम्। तथा हि घटाध्यनुपलब्ध घटाभायो निकोयति।
जनुपलाविस्मिपलवाभाव इति। शभाभाष्येन घटाभायो गशुत
इति चेत। तत्त्वोशीष्टशतर्खातात्। तथा हि शभाभाषानकार्यः
समानप्राप्तम्। तथेऽति कोरवान्तायो भरातश्रवस्मातै
देवदत्तया चहुवराभावः: श्रविशेषार्धितः: चन्द्रपद्धवा
दिख्यानुमानस्य:। सुच्छाभावप्रवतिश्रविषाचिक्षिपर्वेष्वीः
गम्या। पुरूषतिष्ठायाभावप्रवतितिस्य भक्तिः जायमाना
प्राचार्य नामांची लतेली अपरिष्करणानि। अनुपलधिक्षेत्रानि नामविस्तृत विलीन्याते। प्रयक्तप्रमाणानि भावोपलब्धवाभावानि पदबिरिप्रमाणां विहारां धर्मसाधनेन नसतानि। यत सम्बन्धार्थ उपप्रार्थणानि विभागांचे प्रत्येक तदानुपलधिक्षेत्राचे न तत्कारणम्। किंतु *सिक्षा*नै। क्षेत्रेऽव नास्ति योगादि सक्तनुपलब्ध मानालाहक विरूद्धितं। नवनाथ नामप्रेवङ्ग्ले व नवनृत्यां व नवनिरंत्रिण व नवनिर्विन्यासां नवनाथानि प्रत्यवचारपरमाणां मेवलोकां दानामूलयां धारितं। भावबद्धब्रह्मानि इदंत्र्यप्रचलितां वाधकामावातः।

ननु सत्त्वादोद्वेष्यं प्रसारं प्रमाणानि सन्ति। जैत्यम्। तेषामपुरुषेऽवलभावात्। तथाहि अनुपरमाणां बहुबलां सच्चानः। यथा शतसौतीति रामचं पञ्चाश्यज्ञानम्।

tadantatprakarana pratyakshayanam.

नदनाम एवलभावात्। देवदर्थं पञ्चाश्यामान् शतत्वाद्वृयथाहिम्मति प्रयोगसभ्यात्। प्रसारप्रतिष्ठिते प्रतिश्रृंखलाश्रेणीः तुद्धः प्रनिर्देशः। स द्वितीयः। विद्विशुच्य निविवेवसुभुः।
tatābhya yathā.

*चैतरबिद्ययोर्यो चैतर इत्यत्सत्यसङ्केत्योगमानम्।* नित्यायः यथा। चैतर इत्यतः तत्त्वबृत्तिमति। द्रामप्रमुखमानसंहारा।

विमलो भैरः। वैद्विद्ययोर्यत्तरसंहारः सत्ति चैतरात्

*विद्विशुच्यः चैतरविरद्धिः प्रयोगप्रत्येकः।* चैतरात् अभिचारार्थ\`

विविधाः। चैतरात् विविधाः सत्ति चैतरात् अभिचारार्थ।

यथावत् विद्विशुच्यः चैतरात् अभिचारार्थ।

द्रामप्रमुखमानसंहारा। अनवार्तकतत्त्वं प्रवादपर्माणयः

मैत्रीकम्। यथावत् विद्विशुच्यः चैतरात् अभिचारार्थ।

*विद्विशुच्यः चैतरात् अभिचारार्थ।*
प्रामाण्यां निरूपये। प्रामाण्यां खत्त्वं हिविधम्।
हजाको भ्रामी चैत। तत्त्वात्पत्तीं हत्त्वं नाम प्रामाणकारणमारण-जन्यलम्।
येन भ्रान्त जायते तेनेव तदर्थं प्रामाण्यं जायत वैत।
भ्रामा हमत्त्वं नाम प्रामाणकारणमारण-जन्यलम्।
येन भ्रान्त गज्यते तेनेव तदर्थं प्रामाण्यं निरूपये।
प्रामाण्यां परत्त्व-भापं हिविधम्। उपयोगी भ्रामी चैत।
तत्त्वात्पत्तीं परत्त्वं नाम प्रामाणकारणातिरिक्तकारणजन्यलम्।
भ्रामां परत्त्वं नाम प्रामाणकारणातिरिक्त-ग्राहणस्वरूपः।
सत्त्वानां प्रामाण्यमारणस्त्रोतस्त्रोतस्त्रोतस्त्रोतस्त्रोतस्त्रोत।
भ्रामां परत्त्वमारणस्त्रोतस्त्रोतस्त्रोतस्त्रोत।
एवं भ्रान्त मानसाध्वच्यवेयम्।
तत्त्वप्रामाण्यां च संवर्दगविसंवदारिदिकुलजीविलिङ्गमिति।
प्रामाणयां साधारणकारणयं गुणः।
प्रामाणयां साधारणकारणयं ठीकः।
प्रामाण्यं परत्त्वप्रामाण्यं खत्त्वं वैत।
भ्रामां चैत।
भ्रामां चैत।
तथा भ्राणं तत्त्वप्रामाण्यं च साधिकय भ्राणं।
तद्भ्रामात्त्वं तु मित्तवार्डिदिनानुदेशितप्राप्तिः।
तथा भ्राणं तत्त्वप्रामाण्यं च साधिकय भ्राणं।
तद्भ्रामात्त्वं तु दोषस्वजनतेरतिरिक्तदिकुलजीवित।
तथा भ्राणं तत्त्वप्रामाण्यं च साधिकय भ्राणं।
तद्भ्रामात्त्वं तु विसंवदारिदिकुलजीवित।
नन्तर भ्रामात्त्वं भ्रामात्त्वं समस्तायनकल्याणकस्तोत्रं प्रामाण्यां साधिकय प्रामाण्यां साधिकय।

* सामान्यादित्वप्रामाण्यां साधिकय कारणां प्रामाण्यां साधिकय चैत।
भ्रामायणेन तु दोषवशाद्या यथिभवतीति। नरसिंहः
परत एव। इतिराधिकरण्यष्ठयायः प्रमाशवेशवतात्।
यथार्थस्त्रायामसाधनस्यायथ्युमास्माभवास्यालिनितितृतु
कृतः। भ्रामायणविनिर्देशालये किं वाध्यमिति चेचः। तथावेदेन
वश्यानात्। तथा हि प्रामायणं तवदवश्यं कैनविवः प्रमाशणं
भ्रातवं यथया तदभवपस्यात्। न च भ्रामायणविनिर्देशेऽन
तदर्हुसं सुभवति। तत्तुभ्रामायणविद्येन यज्ञाभिशकरित्वा
वश्यानात्। तथै तस्ये प्रथमस्वें तथावेदेनकारोपयते।
अतः धरीष्टवित्त प्रामायणं यथाभवतिः। न च साधने
विद्यातिक्षणवश्यानप्रार्डः समान इति वाचामस। साधने
ख्रुप्रकायः वाबाने प्रामायणं च गोवर्धनोत्तकारात्।
भ्रामायणं तथावेदेनोथुप्रामायणयामिति चेच। अन्तःकरणे
कर्ष्टस्ध्वर्णे जडलेन स्थानप्रकाशलायोगाविति। करणप्रामायणं
तु पद्धूवध्यमेव भ्रामायणमिति सवं प्रमायमृ ॥ भृ: ॥
इति श्रीमच्छाविष्णुविष्णूर्चिताय अष्टविष्णुमायमपरिच्छेदः समामः।
श्रीवेद्यायः प्रायघतमः ॥