A Proposal for the Coordination and Management of Intelligence Programs and Actions on the VC Infrastructure and Local Irregular Forces

(Note: All recommendations relating to personnel and funds must be approved by GSA Headquarters. However, no problem is anticipated for arrangements worked out in the field.)
Purpose

To undertake the integration of efforts of all U.S. and GVN organizations, both in intelligence collection and processing and in operations directed at the elimination of VC infrastructure and irregular forces. To ensure that basic programs conducted by different organizations and components, as relate to elimination of the VC infrastructure, are made mutually compatible, continuous, and fully effective. Initially these purposes will be sought in the three corps areas (I, II, and III) wherein Free World Military Assistance Forces are operating.

Assumptions

1. Each organization concerned (OSA, 525th MI Group, National Police Special Branch, Military Security Service, as well as the U.S. and ARVN combat forces and related intelligence detachments) has a general mission, of which the operation against the infrastructure and irregular forces is a part.

2. For purpose of management effectiveness, establish military and civil management structures and lines of command that be utilized to the fullest extent possible. These command lines of technical matters with field echelons will continue as necessary. Differing procedures within the various components relative to staffing and personnel management, and differing statutory and regulatory procedures and limitations as relate to personnel, logistic and fiscal responsibility must be acknowledged.

3. While much has been accomplished against the VC infrastructure, much more can be accomplished by integration, unified management and joint coordination of the various programs in being. In addition, joint coordination and concerted action can generate substantial influence and pressure on the GVN at all levels to bring about an effective and coordinated operation against the VC infrastructure.

4. For unified direction and for high-impact management of the various programs, reporting and information systems must be centrally designed, administered and controlled, and information specifications and criteria must be established centrally.

Discussion

1. Ultimately, success in prosecuting intelligence and repressive/disruptive operations against the VC infrastructure and local irregular forces demand that the following functions be performed:
a. Centralized evaluation of problems at all operating levels.

b. Continuous generation of centralised guidance, based on maximum current knowledge of the structure, strength and strategy of the target — the VC infrastructure and irregular forces [and of the available forces responsive to US/VN control.]

c. Realistic division of labor between the several echelons of operation, and vertical and lateral coordination of effort for efficiency and economy of effort.

d. Rapid and full communication in both directions between the various echelons, to ensure that guidance and progress reporting are timely and that support for lower echelons is adequate. The integrity of technical or specialized channels for flow of information and communications in both directions is essential for management purposes.

Mentioned only

e. A reporting/information management system must be created to surface and identify problem areas in the attack on the infrastructure, and to make them responsive to management correction.

f. The organization and exploitation of a limited number of services of common concern.

2. Certain services of common concern can only be carried out effectively at the Saigon level, and a central staff mechanism is required to support the coordination of nationwide programs and operations. However, since the command structure of the U.S. civil and military organizations and of the U.S. advisory and control mechanisms in South Vietnam all converge at the Corps Tactical Zone level, it is necessary to establish at that level similar focal points and equivalent procedures for coordination of programs and operations. Nevertheless, the center of gravity of intelligence collection and synthesis concerning the infrastructure must be at the Vice and the main weight of the attack on the infrastructure will be generated at both province and district.

Recommendations

1. A joint, and within the near future combined staff mechanism, operating at National, Corps, and Province levels and which can supervise coordinated activity at the District level, be created. This mechanism will provide all U.S. elements, and ultimatelyVN agencies,
with purposeful guidance and support. This mechanism should be
directly responsive to Deputy COMUSMACV (RD) and should support
joint decision-making by a Mission level coordinating committee
chaired by Deputy COMUSMACV (RD) and including senior intelligence
and operations representatives of MACV, OSA and OCO.

2. It is recommended that an Infrastructure Intelligence
Collection and Exploitation (ICEX) Staff be created, to support
Deputy COMUSMACV (RD). This will be a joint civilian/military
staff, which will have managerial, staff and reporting functions.
The staff will have the following composition: Director; Deputy
Director and Executive Secretariat; an Intelligence Group, Opera-
tions Group, and Reports Management Group. The ICEX Staff will
have the following general missions and functions:

a. Develop, coordinate, review and make recommendations
regarding basic programs for mounting attacks on the VC in-
structure, local irregular forces, and related problems;

b. Monitor and review programs and operations relative
to the attack and elimination of the infrastructure;

c. Develop, coordinate and administer a centralized
reporting and information system. This will be a management
control system, which will focus on key indices as relate to
programs, performance, coordination, and which will attempt
to identify and highlight problem areas.

d. Monitor and review operational procedures and perform-
ance at Sector (Province), Corps (Region), and National levels,
in order to ensure coordination, integration and the attainment
of high levels of performance. Recommend corrective actions.

e. Conduct and develop coordinated staff studies, situation
reports and analyses, and coordinated staff recommendations
within areas of standing responsibilities.

f. Conduct field investigations and reviews, and prepare
staff analyses and recommendations.

3. Following are recommended components of ICEX Staff:

c. Office of the Director: Mission and Functions. The
Director, ICEX will be the senior U.S. Coordinator for organiz-
ing the overall attack on the infrastructure, and in this capacity
will support Deputy COMUSMACV (RD) and the mission committee
(Para 1 above). The Executive Officer will function as repor-
teur for committee meetings and will perform such administrative
support function for the ICEx as the director may from time
to time require. At the earliest possible moment the ICEx
committee should encourage the GVN to create an analogous
organization and to appoint a counterpart for the Director
ICEx.

b. Intelligence Group: Mission, Functions and Composition.
The Intelligence group will be composed of two senior intelli-
gence officers, one from MACV J-2 and one from OSA, and one
stenographer. It will:

(1) Provide or arrange for the presentation within
ICEx of current intelligence briefings, daily and weekly
summary reports, and special intelligence presentations
as relate to infrastructure.

(2) Organize and monitor the preparation and coordina-
tion of special inter-agency field intelligence studies and
estimates concerning the VC infrastructure and local irregular
forces.

Maintain close and continuing liaison with all
principal intelligence production elements within the
American Mission.

(4) Review, directly, selected categories of raw source
material, as obtained from various elements and agencies.
Special attention in this regard is directed towards selected
captured documents, which yield particular insights into
effectiveness evaluation of the attack on the infrastructure.

(5) Develop an intelligence evaluation system for
measuring progress and impact in the attack on infrastructure.

We adopt for this element the "Program Manager" concept. The
Program Managers will be senior operational and management
personnel, drawn from appropriate agencies to handle three
specific programs (see below). Each Program Manager will have
a deputy, drawn from the opposite service (an OSA Program
Manager will have a MACV deputy, and vice-versa). A total of
nine (9) officers and three (3) clerk typists is the estimated
requirement. General mission and functions are:

(1) To undertake management review and supervision of
certain specified and identified programs.

(2) To conduct and coordinate planning activities,
the establishment of requirements, etc.
(3) To task appropriate elements of the operational concerns with one aspect or another of the programs for which he is responsible.

(4) To effect coordination among the several components.

(5) To monitor and review program understanding, program performance and program coordination at all echelons down to and including Sector (Province).

(6) To prepare operational guidelines, directives and guidelines.

(7) To render advice, guidance and recommendations.

(8) As necessary, to have funds and resources made available (within legal limitations) for direct implementation, through tasked agencies, of specific projects.

d. We identify the following specific program areas for immediate appointment of Program Officers:

(1) Intelligence/Action Program. Within the operations group, four officers will concern themselves with intelligence program evaluation, smooth and rapid functioning of intelligence coordination and dissemination systems, and action programs responsive to intelligence information. They will review basic plans, ensure their coordination and proper functioning at all echelons. They will develop and require a consolidated monthly report from Province Intelligence Coordinator (ICEX) assessing the adequacy of knowledge on VC infrastructure, steps taken to improve intelligence effort against it, problem areas, and special accomplishments.

They will also develop and require a Province/Sector monthly narrative report regarding actions initiated against the VC infrastructure, forces utilized (as distinct from offensive or defensive large unit military operations), problem areas, and recommendations for further action.

(2) Screening and Detention Program. This group of three officers will concern itself with the civil detention program. It will specifically address itself to the judicial treatment of VC civil defendants, and to the creation and operation of an adequate Vietnamese detention program for members of the infrastructure. See Annex 1.
(3) Interrogation Control Program. This group (two officers) will concern itself, jointly with the Intelligence/Action and the Detention Program group, with all aspects of interrogation exploitation of infrastructure prisoners, whether POWs or civil detainees and VC defectors, including the proper functioning of various systems in being, proper and prompt feedback of information from higher to lower echelons, and so on. See Annex 2.

e. Reports Management Group: Mission, Function and Composition. This group will be composed of four officers, and a visual aids specialist. This group will include representatives of OSA and MACV, a systems analysis specialist and a statistician. The Reports Group will:

(1) Design and produce, in consultation with the Intelligence and the Operations Groups, periodic reports for feedback to and support of Corps and Sector IGEX elements, concentrating and focusing attention onto infrastructure attack. (See Annex 3.)

(2) Review existing reporting systems of all U.S. elements, as they relate to or have a bearing on the attack on the infrastructure and our progress in this attack. Review will be from standpoints of adequacy, accuracy, comprehensiveness, economy, responsiveness to management requirements, consolidation and integration. In conjunction with the Operations Group, design and recommend an integrated reporting system.

(3) Provide specialist assistance in information systems analysis for the analysis, flow-charting, coordination and integration of intelligence collection and production systems (See Annex 3).

(4) Process statistical and graphical portions of reports, preparing presentations, graphics, maps, etc., as directed and required.

(5) Prepare statistical analyses and assist in interpretation of statistical data.

4. Corps Level IGEX Staff.

a. It is recommended that the OSA Regional Officer in Charge be designated Senior IGEX Advisor to the Senior Corps Advisor. He will be co-equal to the Corps C-2 Advisor, who is and will remain responsible for all military combat intelligence. At Corps, it is further recommended that an IGEX Committee
be formed, including Corps C-2 Advisor, Corps C-3 Advisor, appropriate PWMAF officers (whom are not from Advisory officers) Regional Chief 135th and 150th MI Groups. The Corps ICMX Advisor will chair this committee. With the exception of this ICMX coordination role, we recommend that field operational relationships of 150th MI Group, 135th MI Group and CCM be analogous.

b. The structure of each of the U.S. and GVN agencies engaged in operations against the VC infrastructure includes a command echelon at Corps Tactical Zone level. It is at this level that GVN civil administration and military command come together, and it is here — in three of the four Corps areas — that the lines of command and action between the USF advisory system and U.S. troop commands converge. For smooth development of the overall program of intelligence and operations against the VC infrastructure, regular consultation and coordination at Corps level is essential. The coordination function at this level does not necessarily involve the centralization of such operations as intelligence collection, and supervisory sites such as those of CSM and of the Regional Office of the 150th MI Group are sufficiently strong to obviate the need for a supervisory effort. However, the exploitation of intelligence studies and ADP data collating to focus Corps Commanders and Advisory elements on the infrastructure problem, is a proper function of a Corps ICMX Committee (see below) and provision should be made for periodic briefing of the Senior Corps Advisors and their staffs.

c. Since the main burden of supervising the intelligence and reaction operations of Police Special Branch, the Criminal Intelligence, and PWU programs already rests upon the CSM Regional Officers-in-Charge at each Corps headquarters, the assumption by them of the ICMX coordinating function would entail the least disruption of the current responsibilities of any of the regional commanders. Further, to assign the coordinating function to them would be a logical measure in view of the long-term mission objective of making the GVN civil security authorities with which they deal the main instrument for countering subversive activity once pacification is achieved.

d. Functions of Corps ICMX Coordinators.

(1) To establish immediately and convene periodically meetings of a Corps Intelligence Coordinating Committee, consisting of the Senior Intelligence Officer assigned to the Corps Advisor; Corps C-3 Advisor the chiefs of the
135th and 149th MI Groups, and the senior counterintelligence officer of the Military Intelligence Detachment assigned to support the U.S. forces in the Corps areas, and such other officers as are appropriate.

(2) To ensure proper and full utilization and exploitation of civil intelligence resources and information in Corps-planned and Corps-mounted military operations against infrastructure.

(3) To participate with Corps intelligence and operational elements in the planning and mounting of operations specifically directed against the infrastructure.

(4) With Corps Senior C-2 Advisor, to stimulate the functioning and focus on infrastructure, of the Vietnamese Corps Intelligence Coordinating Committee or Center, as appropriate.

(5) To serve as the focal point for coordinating the assignment of CVM political, Special Branch, MSS and other elements to support sweep and destroy operations in the CTZ.

(6) To establish and monitor the operation of inter-provincial level intelligence exchanges between Province Intelligence Coordinators, whether wholly within a given Corps area or involving provinces in two different Corps areas, as required by the territorial organization of VC provincial and regional level commands.

(7) To report periodically to the ICEN Staff Saigon on the interrelationships between VC infrastructure operations in the various provinces of the Corps areas and to recommend reinforcement of specific intelligence operations against the infrastructure.

(8) To establish, together with the Senior Intelligence Officer at Corps level, procedures to ensure that the provincial intelligence effort receives the maximum benefit from combat intelligence operations and that combat intelligence needs are fully considered, on a timely basis, in the coordination of infrastructure intelligence.

5. Sector (Province) ICEN Staff.

2. It is recommended that a single officer be designated as ICEN officer for the Senior Sector Advisor. This officer will be designated either from OSA or CRD personnel in Province, as
appropriate, by Senior Sector Advisor in consultation with Corps ICGN and Senior Corps Advisor and subject to the appropriate American intelligence and operations personnel. For periodic and systematic consideration of and preparation of recommendations for attack on the infrastructure.

b. The center of gravity of intelligence operations against the VC infrastructure and irregular forces must necessarily rest at the province level. Coordination and division of labor is required at this level to ensure that maximum use is made of the limited professional/technical intelligence skills available in South Vietnam and, at the same time, that the closest possible link is maintained with subordinate intelligence and operating elements at the district level, where the bulk of the attacks on the low-level infrastructure and local guerrilla forces must be generated and carried out.

c. The coordinating functions that must be carried out at province level are:

(1) **Intelligence Processing**

(a) Centralization of collection and dislocation to district level of raw intelligence generated by province level operations (MIG and IPM interrogations; intelligence operations; exploitation of captured documents; census grievance center reporting) and by district level operations outside the district being serviced. It should be recognized that Police Special Branch Plans Sections or, alternatively, PIC Collection Sections are the natural center of gravity for such collection. Consolidation of infrastructure files at Provinces.

(b) Evaluation, collation, and transmission to higher echelons of intelligence from all agencies concerning the higher echelons of the VC target (province, interprovince, VC region, and CSSVN) for processing (IBP), evaluation and analysis.

(c) Coordination with Sector S-2 advisor on mutual exchanges of combat intelligence and infrastructure intelligence.

(2) **Reaction Operations Coordination and Support**

(a) Generation at Province level attacks on infra-

structure.
(b) Organization of the augmenting of and coordinating with district civilian intelligence elements of Police/RU forces under the command of province authorities, in support of military sweeps and clearing operations.

(c) Resolution of conflicting priorities between those reaction operations, proposed at district level, which require province level support.

(d) Coordination with the Sector Advisor on reaction operations.

(3) Management and Supervision

(a) Preparation for higher echelons of periodic program and problem reports.

(b) Guidance, support, and inspection of district level coordination operations.

(4) Intelligence collection coordinations.

(a) Promoting and systematizing province level source control. Stimulation and focusing of Vietnamese Province Intelligence Coordinating Committees.

6. District Level Coordination.

a. In selected Districts, District Operational Intelligence Coordinating Centers will be formed. These District Centers will be combined Vietnamese/ American centers, with appropriate American representation (Sub-Sector 2-2 and a CI representative where possible) and including Vietnamese representatives from Police Special Branch, MSS, Census Grievance, Chieu Hoii, RU Teams, and so on. These Centers will serve as clearing-houses for immediate review, first-level collection and rapid dissemination of VC infrastructure information to reaction forces and to higher echelons (Sector, tactical units, etc). (See Annex 4.)

b. The intelligence personnel -- U.S. and Vietnamese -- available or likely to be made available for continuous duty at district level is certain to be small and unlikely to have the necessary background and experience in intelligence to do a fully professional job of intelligence collection on a continuing basis. Their assigned mission must be kept as simple as possible.
c. District level intelligence cooperation between U.S. and SVN elements cannot depend solely upon the intelligence collected locally. It requires steady inputting from higher level -- partly in the form of spot reports (agent reports, NVA interrogation reports) and partly in collated form -- Village and hamlet target folders, periodically updated intelligence estimates of VC strength and capabilities in adjoining areas; relevant intelligence concerning the areas which has been obtained in other districts. Terrain intelligence synthesized by military intelligence agencies (photogrammetry, updated maps, collations of data on enemy movements, on base areas, and on enemy installations, etc.) must also be obtained and used.

d. Reaction forces permanently assigned to district level are usually limited and effective reaction often will require obtaining assistance from Province (Sector).

e. The prime functions of district level intelligence coordination should be (1) evaluating and pulling together of current intelligence locally procured (2) determining (against collated holdings provided from Province) the best course of action to be pursued as a consequence of current intelligence, to include both intelligence following and rapid reaction operations with local forces under District (Sub-Sector) control (3) proposing to Province/Sector specific reaction operations (or specific targets for reaction operations (4) periodically assessing, on the basis of intelligence acquired the quantity of available intelligence collection efforts in the District.

f. In addition, District level intelligence elements should be prepared to provide intelligence support for the form of human assets with knowledge of the area and of the capabilities (guides, Hoi Cham, local police, etc), to the District when they are temporarily assigned to the District for training operation.

g. In Districts where no DOICO are established, the Sector 106K Advisor will be responsible for ensuring the fullest and most timely dissemination to Sub-Sector personnel of all pertinent Province produced information, and will attempt to stimulate and encourage its fullest utilization.
The Screening/Detention Problem

1. A problem which has already reached critical proportions in Vietnam concerns the growing burden of handling large numbers of civilian detainees, swept up in military operations, and also those arrested in more normal fashion.

2. First and foremost is the total inadequacy of physical facilities in being for either processing, holding, or imprisoning civil detainees. Such prisons or prisoner compounds as exist are enormously overcrowded, and all categories and varieties of suspects, persons awaiting trial, those already tried and convicted, and so on, are crowded indiscriminately in these existing facilities. The first requirement is adequate physical camps, permitting proper segregation of and proper controls over the various categories of individuals.

3. Another serious aspect of the same problem is the question of screening the civil detainees, so as to permit the rapid sorting out of those VC who should be processed from an interrogational standpoint and those who should be processed judicially for long-term imprisonment. Equally important here is the rapid identification of innocent civilians, so that they can be released (after proper registration and record making), either to go back to their villages or to relocate as refugees. As refugees, there must be arrangements made, physical facilities and materials provided, and so on.

4. Those who are detained for further processing and interrogation are then at the mercy of a totally inadequate and insufficient judicial system, with the result that they must wait for a year or more before their cases are reviewed and determination made as to the nature of the charges being lodged against them. They are living under sub-standard conditions, with no useful occupation, and numbers apparently escape or manage to say their way out. Both controls and records are lacking, so that no one really knows how many such people there are, who they are, nor what happens to them.

5. One result of the inadequacies of the system is that, in a number of instances, detainees are released almost immediately, even if substantial bodies of evidence may exist against him; the province authorities can neither imprison them nor feed them.

6. These problems -- construction of screening and detention facilities, judicial reform and streamlining, greatly increasing the speed of handling, coordination with refugee activities, creating a meaningful and accurate registration and record system, and so on -- are closely related to the elimination of infrastructure.
It does little good to acquire large bodies of intelligence information, conduct operations throughout the country, both military and civil, capture or arrest all kinds of VC, only to put them into a system which permits them to be released, to escape, or to buy their way out and go back into operation.

7. There is desperate and highest priority need, therefore, for the creation of adequate screening/detention, registration and judicial facilities and systems. There is need first of all for the immediate creation of detention/screening facilities for civil defendants, similar to POW facilities. There is, moreover, need for administrative legislative action by the GVN to facilitate rapid judicial disposal of the thousands of pending cases. And finally, there is need, in conjunction with detention, registration and judicial processes, for devising a system to keep track of those subjects, know what their disposition was, and know what they are and what they are doing, either inside or outside the prison system.

8. It is therefore proposed and recommended that a Program Officer with two assistants be located in the operations cell of the IGEX Staff. One assistant would be responsible for case construction, and the other would be a local specialist concerning himself with judicial reform question. It seems quite probable that this part will require funds and material to make credit to it from appropriate agencies, in order to proceed with it as soon as possible.
Interrogation Control Group

1. VC suspects and prisoners are being captured or arrested by military units, by the National Police, by Province and District Units, and by the Military Security Service. Other high-profile VC personalities become available for intelligence exploitation through the Chieu Hoi program. At present the coordination and management of their exploitation to acquire the maximum intelligence on the VC infrastructure and irregular force targets and to ensure that significant personalities do not resist interrogation successfully or escape identification is inadequate.

2. A central services group is required:
   a. To identify rapidly significant sources wherever they enter the system.
   b. To ensure that local interrogation operations at province/sector level are adequately focused on and adequately supported with intelligence inputs from all components the infrastructure target.
   c. To ensure that adequate interrogation/detention facilities are established and maintained with full support from all components involved.
   d. To facilitate the prompt identification and transfer of selected sources to the interrogation facility best equipped to exploit their knowledge fully.
   e. To resolve questions of priorities in the interrogation process.
   f. To ensure that a central record is maintained on a continuing basis of particularly knowledgeable and cooperative sources who should be readily recoverable for reinterview.
GICV - Automatic data processing of VC personnel and intelligence

Political OD* reporting.

1. The ADP system established by GICV - S-20 for compiling
personality information on VC target personalities is of greatest
importance as an source of support for Corps, Sector (Province) and
District intelligence and exploitation operations. The present
system provides for development of the data base by the preparation
of input sheets on the basis of interrogation reports, captured
documents, agent reports and finished or semi-finished intelligence
collations, received from Sector 8-27, CENCO, CENCO, and, through
Combined Intelligence Staff the Provincial Interrogation Center,
interrogation reports and Police Special Branch provincial colla-
ations of infrastructure organizational units obtained are being provided;
Special Branch and GICV (SCG) spot information can also be made available.
In addition to the input generated by the political section of
GICV itself, an additional input is at present being received from the
Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS), located at the Directorate
Central of National Police in Saigon. This staff has assumed direct
responsibility for the inputting into the ADP system of all data
concerning VC personalities in the city of Saigon, the provinces of
Sia Binh, Bi An District of Binh Hoa province, Cu Chi District of
Bau Negia province, and other VC organizational units comprising
the organization of VC Military Region 4. A study should be made of
the ADP operation as it is at present constituted and of the possibi-
ity of the ADP system to produce collated printouts for the 11th
Corps, Sector (Province) and District coordinators on a regular
basis.

2. On the basis of the experience accumulated in the OD
coordination operation, a determination should be made of
the feasibility of deskilling certain input operations
in the collection sections of selected Police Special Branch Inter-
rogation Centers, to provide for the collection and
inputting of data from all intelligence collecting elements at
provincial level. This proposal is based on the assumption that other
GDI agencies can be induced to assign personnel to work with the TIC
collation staffs in this field.

3. The feasibility of producing printouts which can be used
by Vietnamese intelligence personnel at province and district level
who have no command of English should also be explored.

4. A determination should be made concerning the exclusion
of certain marginal categories of VC personalities from the AD
operation. In this regard, suitable criteria for selectivity in
the production of print-outs should also be established.
Trip Report: Visit to Dien Ban, Khanh Hoa, and Review of Intelligence Sorting Center

1. Dien Ban District Operation Intelligence Coordination Center. The Dien Ban center is the first district coordinating center established and has been in operation approximately 2 1/2 months (10 or 11 April 1967). The Dien Ban District is in the area of the First Marine Division and the original prescreening for District Intelligence coordination was made through the Commanding General of the First Marine Division and as a result it has been well supported and cooperation of the Marine Corps. As Dien Ban District is located in the Sub-Sector area, a limited area, the format in which the American, a Brit Pick and the British Col. of the First Marine Division and a Lt. from AFRICAN SUB-SUB-Sector. Since in the center, the various Intelligence representatives, are held in representative, e.g. National Police, two interpreters/translator and three clerk/couriers. One of the transit zone is an M16 GI with the Third GI in the unit. A new system was provided by the Census Bureau, the employers were hired and their salaries are paid by the CIA and the Sub-Branch. There are six desks, two typographers and a file clerk was provided by the National Police. Electric fans and fans have been installed by the Marines. Office supplies are provided by the CIA and the Marines. The center requires a light user which the center is supposed to provide but is not yet available. The Marine Corps has no radio communication but there is a PRC 25 in the Sub-Sector office, this however can only be used for very high priority traffic. Normal communications are by landline to Sub-Sector and to Headquarters of the First Marine Regiment, which is a poor situation, however, because the landlines are constantly being cut by the VC.

The purpose of the center is to establish a system for the reception, collection and dissemination of available information. This is provided by various Intelligence agencies operating in the sector and in the District. There are National Police, Police Special Branch, Census Grievances, ODA, AFRICAN and others. The KH input and the KH goes into the center through the National Police representative. ARVN input theoretically goes through the Sub-Sector advisor. This entire process is in contrast to previous arrangements whereby information would be reported in each agency’s own channel to Province (Sector) and then redisseminated to the other agencies. Information is received in the center from contributing agencies and is
immediately circulated around to all representatives for familiarization and for provision of supporting information from their own sources. It is then relayed to First Marine Regiment Headquarters. At the end of each day, all information is summarized for subsequent theater and First Marine. Within the center the records are handled by the Americans. Lt. Horace handles CB reports and call-up maps; Sgt. Fisher handles infrastructure files and source contact and files. Source control which is just beginning, is not a true-name file; each of the contributing agencies has agreed to identify its sources by ID number. This step will not, however, be taken in the next step, that of plotting the location of all of these entities on an overlay, will likewise not be taken until a field name is available.

3. Reaction capabilities in and adjacent to the District are the First Marine Regiment (6/Lavallone), one NAVY unit in the Western part of the TACR. There are also Vietnamese units in the District, four of these are in the RB priority area. The police capability in District is practically non-existent; there are no uniformed Police in Da Nang. No CB's are currently in existence. They are however available on call from Headquarters. Up to 5, for all practical purposes the Center is functioning as a clearing house for tactical information for the Marine Battalions.

4. Not only does the center provide quick dissemination of spot information, but it is also a facility for making a list of people and identifying to the operating units. In the 3 1/8 inch like the center has provided up to 30 people to the District in the past. In the District, these guides have been made available by the Americans, Census Enumerator, Police, district chief, sub-sector chief... etc. As an incidental point, I noted that the Americans also began to take one or several National Policemen with them on special operations, but this does not appear to be an SOI.

5. On the operations themselves, the Marine elements initially screen suspects or detainees and through interviews of physical evidence, by some instant or by one of the American's or guides, suspects are detained. The practice is not to believe that the capturing battalions are beginning to check the men if 1 person picked up through the center, that identification is only the individual may be delivered by the Marines directly to NPB or to the Province 110 in Hoi An. The bulk of the detained are turned over to the District Police and they, lacking for either to detain or process these people, release most of them to go back to their villages. The District Police will list a positive case exists against an individual, and him up to Province. The Americans in the Center were convinced that a number of people have been picked up over and over again. This turned out, however, to be more a repeat suspicion than it was a fact which can be demonstrated. The system, especially on the record-keeping side, was not adequate to prove that repeat captures are being made.
6. The Center receives the full support from VC intelligence, also of the Third CI Team who works in the Province Intelligence Coordinating Center (PICC) at Hoi An.  VC Richardson, for example, makes a daily run visiting the Center and brings down PICC reports, Province Special Branch reporting and any other information received at Provinical level.

7. During the period 28 March to 19 April the Center has chalked up 42 VC KIA, 2 WIA and 57 probable killings as result of operations in reaction to its reporting and dissemination.  From 6 April through the 11th, 11 positive identifications were made of VC through information provided by the Center.  As noted above, in the 2 1/2 month time period, the Center has provided approximately 50 guides.  In February the Center disseminated 199 reports, and in March 135.  The average rate at this time, 11 April, is yet to report a day.  The information time lag on dissemination of information has been cut at the very least by 24 hours and in most cases more.

8. Hieu Phong District Command is in Operation from District Center.  At Hieu Phong the office was opened on 25 November and has been operating since yesterday.  The Hieu Phong Center is staffed by a Cpt. Ford from the Third Marine CI team and a technically sitting to it is a Police Special Branch Office, a PIICIC, S-2 representative and a Census Ordnance man.  There are 3 of a National Police Officer, for an AD representative and a NLA representative.  It is located in the District headquarters command, however, as noted above has been overrun by the VC destroyed approximately 10 or 10 days previously.  The Center has 10 desks and 2 typewriters, one of which is a Mac OS or a type 2 typewriter of one of the USA officers.  They now have two clerical hands, two typists and one interpreter.  They do not have a guard for the building and the National Police has too few people to be a guard.  Since the Center has been in operation only a brief period of time, I did not inquire in detail as to the reception conditions in the District or as to procedures followed, since an aspect of not really exist yet.  In general the work in the Center is not quite to be the same as at Dien Ban.  Information enters from military agencies and in some cases directly from agents and is channelled to couriers.  Information is circulated around for delivery and coordination and is then reported by field telephones to the District Office at Hoi An.  A Captain at the sector then runs the information around to operating units.  As at Dien Ban, VC Richardson brings up the direct to the District on Sector and from 3 KIA on a daily basis.  Cpt. Ford, as a matter of interest, had two PICC reports sitting on his desk while we were talking.  The District Police chief is not available to Cpt. Ford his VC political and military branch has a document approximately 3/4th of an inch thick, handwritten, typed single space; Cpt. Ford had been tremendously impressed by this VC OS and feels that it will be an invaluable aid to the work of the center.
9. After the overrun, MACV Sector has pulled out Sub-Sector, so that these people, including Sgt. Ford, have to cross to Hau Than each day. As an incident, Sgt. Ford stated that both Police Special Branch and Central Grievance officers gave ample and timely prior warning of the VC attack in Hau Than. Sgt. Ford stated that the average number of reports being received in the center are between 5 and 10 a day, although today, 16 reports had already been received.

10. Phuong Dien DIOC, Hau Than, Inspector. In Hau Than the Centers are only being installed and are not yet operational. A Marine sergeant is assigned to the project in Hau. This Marine, Sgt. Ron McKinney, was extremely enthusiastic about the proposal and explained that the entire idea of the District Center was to break down the conflicts and jealousies of the various intelligence agencies. In Hau Than the proposals were made to the Thach Ha Province Chief and were also to the MACV Sector Advisor, and arrangements made through them.

11. The Phuong Dien Center is constituted and headed by one representative from the National Police Special Branch, the Central Grievance Branch, two people from S-2, a District Chief Line Representative, a Marine from the First GI Team of Third Division, a Sub-Sector S-2 representative and the Sector Sub-Sector Inspector. At the present time this group is meeting as a committee once a week, at which meeting they compare reports from their own agencies. Up to now they have not had time for one officer has reported how they are... However available and supplies are coming, the Center will become a regular Center operating on a staff basis similar to the other MACV in Quang Nam Province. The office space is in the Sub-Sector compound; it is the former living quarters for the Sub-Sector S-2 officer (ARVN) who was killed in action at 43 a week ago. The Phuong Dien Center has no communications except Chan MACV Advisory Team Connex.
Infrastructure Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy COORDINATOR (HC)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ambassador Komor</td>
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| Director, ICEX (OSA)             |
| Deputy Director, ICEX (MACV)     |
| (Two secretaries)                |

Executive Officer

Secretariat

1 officer (admin)
(plus 1 secretary)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence Group</th>
<th>Operations and Inspection Group</th>
<th>Reports Management Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4 Officers) (1-MACV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 MACV</td>
<td>1. Intel/Action Program – 4 officers³</td>
<td>(1-OSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 OSA</td>
<td>2. Screening/Detention Program – 3 officers³</td>
<td>1-Systems analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>3. Interrogation Control Program – 2 officers³</td>
<td>1-Statistical analyst</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(plus 3 stenographers/clerk typists)</td>
<td>1 visual aids specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(MACV-HCO)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(+ 3 clerk/typists)</td>
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IX (RD) - coordinator

Corps

ICEX Coordinator

ICEX Coordinator

ICEX Coordinator

ICEX Coordinator

II Corps

III Corps

IV Corps