ATTACK AGAINST VC INFRASTRUCTURE

1. When we speak of the VC infrastructure, we are speaking of the VC organizational hierarchy, the management structure, as opposed to guerrillas, for example, VC troops, and even, in many cases, VC terrorists. Many if not most of these latter categories, guerrillas, troops and even terrorists, are young people who have been either impressed or seduced into the VC, and cannot in any way be considered "hard core" Communists.

2. We do include in "infrastructure" all PRP members, and all front organization officers (as opposed to the rank and file of these front organizations). Thus all members of a village chapter, all District Committee and all Province Committee cadre are included, as of course the higher echelons, Region (or Zone) and COSVN. We would also include members of the so-called sapper units—these people are hardened Communist troops, organized in military formations, to carry out sabotage and terrorism of the larger and more dramatic nature—hotel bombings in Saigon, Long Binh ammunition dump, General Walt's residence. These latter are not casual acts of terrorism, but carefully planned and fully organized military operations—Commando type operations.

3. Effective attack on VC infrastructure depends on precise identification, location, and pattern of movements and activities of these Viet Cong cadre and their organizational units.

4. To the end of developing intelligence information on the infrastructure, we have three operational collection programs: informant operations; interrogations of captured (or arrested) and defected VC; and agent penetrations of VC organizations.

5. Informant operations, as they affect the infrastructure per se, produce information mainly on hamlet and village cadre and guerrillas, and to a much lesser extent on District level cadre. These latter, the District cadre, will be mainly tax-collectors, propagandists, and so on, those VC elements exposed to the "general public". Informants can quite often give information regarding locations of District and higher headquarters, bases, meetings and so on, without however, providing useful identification of the persons.
6. The interrogation of prisoners and defectors is by far the most important source of infrastructure information, in terms of identifications, job description, physical description, activities, base areas, hiding places, and so on. Very rarely, however, can prisoners or defectors give advance information on locations and movements, meetings, conferences, et cetera.

7. The third program, agent penetrations, can produce substantial bodies of infrastructure information—identifications of cadre, movements and activities, and at times advance information of meetings and conferences. Our handicap here is that agent communications are characteristically slow, so that frequently, even though an agent has learned in advance of a cadre conference, we or a military element able to react, receive the information too late.

8. We have, as of last complete reporting date, 30 September, 137 penetrations of District committees throughout the country, of which 93 are Police Special Branch penetrations, and 44 are CIO. We had under development as of that date 153 additional District level penetration cases, 92 PSB and 61 CIO. We had, as of 30 September, 15 Province Committee penetrations, with an additional 20 under development.

9. An additional source of information not regarded as a separate operational program, is the exploitation of captured documents.

10. It is important to realize that, due to VC use of aliases, VC security compartmentation, and geographical dispersal of the various sections, for example a VC Province Committee the full and complete true name identification of these cadre is very difficult. Many VC are known only alias.

11. Information from the above four sources is assembled and collated in Province Police Special Branches. Once a year, each Province PSB will publish a VC Political Order of Battle, which will contain all that the police know of the VC organization, and a fill-in, to the extent possible, of the true names of identified VC cadre. Vietnamese reporting channels are not very efficient however. It turns out that a great deal of
information on VC identifications will exist in Police files at District level, and also in Sub-Sector files. In order to prepare complete political OB's, for military operations, for example, not only will Province files be exploited, but also, information from District and Sub-Sector will be collected and added. This is a slow laborious process.

12. Attack against the infrastructure involves a variety of action "tools". Arrest of terrorists and saboteurs often lead immediately to the arrest of underground cells in GVN cities. VC cadre may be arrested in GVN controlled areas, based on informant tips or on reports of penetration agents. It is quite rare, however, to catch high-level cadre in this fashion--what we get will be city cadre and occasionally a District Committee officer. Danang, Qui Nhon, Phan Thiet, Tuy Hoa, Ben Me Thuot, Saigon, Can Tho, are all cities where (extensive) underground networks have been rounded up on one or more occasions in 1966.

13. In the countryside several different action "processes" are employed. First will be the precisely targeted raid of ambush, based upon intelligence information regarding the residence or future movements of one or more cadre. We try, by these and other means, to catch meetings or conferences of VC Village chapters and District Committees. These raids or ambushes may be carried out by the Police, by PRU's by RF, or in some areas by Special Forces elements. Such raids have been quite successful, or partially successful--when they result in one or more VC Village or District Cadre being killed. Unfortunately, they are more often killed than captured.

14. A second action method is the military search and destroy, hamlet search or "County Fair" type operation. For these operations, the Police prepare search lists from their files; in an increasing extent as a result of encouragement and pressure, they also collect VC defectors and other sources to use as "identifiers" of VC caught in these cordon and sweep operations. A modest number of Viet Cong village and district cadre will be caught and identified in these
operations, and at times one or more Province level or higher cadre may be caught and identified. Thus in Phuoc Tuy Province, a recent sweep operation caught a Province Committee security cadre. In operation Irving, a Zone 5 (VC Region level) economic cadre was captured. Those are just the most recent such catches.

15. A final and not insignificant aspect of the attack on infrastructure are the direct military operation targeted on the VC District, Province, or Region base areas. Whereas it is possible to reach District Committee bases, meetings, and conferences with small ground units, and it is possible to capture the District Cadre, catching Province and higher cadre has so far, largely been a matter of luck. Province and higher level cadre very rarely are exposed to capture. However, almost all reasonably reliable information on District Committee meetings, Province Committee and higher base areas, meeting, and conferences are increasingly resulting in air or artillery strikes. Sometimes military operations are directed against a VC gathering rather than an installation. For example, a Marine Battalion attacked a Quang Nam Province Committee conference last spring, and more recently, 175mm artillery fire was directed on the reported site of a combined conference of MR-4, MR-1 and CO%VN representatives. We have on occasion been fortunate enough to receive after-action information on such strikes, and we are confident that the damage to the infrastructure, in terms of key personnel killed, is significant.

16. The overrunning by Australian troops in January 1966 of the Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee (now VC Region 4) headquarters in the Ho Bo woods is an example of military operational activity. While not capturing "infrastructure", the operation destroyed and disrupted the headquarters, and the documents lost suffered by the VC unquestionably seriously degraded the Special Zone Committee capability, at least temporarily.

17. A special Task force has been organized to launch a combined intelligence/police/military assault against the MR-4 (Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee) headquarters and base area.