MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

January 25, 1971

Subject: Military Coup in Uganda

Uganda's President, A. Milton Obote, on his way back from the Singapore Commonwealth Conference, appears to have been overthrown today by a military coup d'etat. Fighting broke out in Kampala and Jinja in the early hours of January 25. Around 3:15 p.m. Radio Uganda broadcast a statement that a military coalition headed by Major General Idi Amin, Chief of the Defense Staff, and backed by the Commander of the Police, had taken over the government.

It is not clear how solid Amin's position is. Although the fighting subsided this afternoon, it has reportedly resumed tonight, presumably between Amin's forces and those still loyal to the President. Obote landed at Nairobi several hours ago and is said to be consulting with Kenya's leaders.

There have been no reports of injuries involving Americans or other foreigners.

Statements by military spokesmen have attacked Obote for favoring his own Langi tribe and accused him and his followers of getting rich at the expense of the "common man" while preaching socialism. While the southern Bantu, particularly the Baganda (who have long opposed Obote) do not seem to have been directly involved, they are for the moment at least probably sympathetic with the announced aims of the coup leaders despite an aversion to military rule. These goals include the release of political detainees and an early return to civilian government with free elections.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.
The military government has called upon ministers and civil servants to return to work, but we do not at the moment know of the whereabouts of most members of Obote's Government or whether all the ministers would be acceptable to the new regime. The statements of the new leaders suggest they would seek a government of national unity that might be more conservative than Obote's both in national and international issues.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Uganda Coup

1. USG is seriously concerned about disruptive effect which coup in Uganda may have in what has been one of most stable areas in Africa, with resultant sharp decline in favorable attitudes which currently exist in this country and elsewhere towards East Africa. US and especially UK have strong ties in area - cultural, educational, commercial, political - and number American tourists and businessmen traveling to area has steadily risen in recent years. Continued turmoil in East Africa will inevitably lead to sharp drop in tourism and growing reluctance of private firms to invest in...
area. Obviously such developments could have highly unfavorable effect in economic development and progress of area.

2. In view above, Dept would like Embassy to explore with HMG whether any initiative might usefully be taken to avert further deterioration. Request Embassy seek appointment(s) with appropriate FCO officials per Carter/Walker telecon ASAP. We have asked Amb. Ferguson, who currently in Geneva, to go to London to participate with Embassy representative in these discussions.

3. In addition to obtaining general FCO reaction re developments in Uganda and neighboring East African countries to date, you should raise following specific points:

   a) Utility of high-level person acceptable to both sides, preferably African leader (perhaps Kenyatta or other Kenyan) but possibly UK national of stature of Malcolm MacDonald, mediating between Obote and Amin
with aim of finding solution acceptable to both sides. Realize chances of success probably very slight but believe worth trying if suitable mediator can be found. Obote and Amin have had close relationship in past and Amin has publicly stated Obote is welcome to return to Uganda but not as President. Also said in first press conference Obote not a bad man but misled by people he trusted.

b) UK assessment of effect of coup and Obote's continued presence in Tanzania on future relations among three East African states, and particularly on East African Community.

c) In connection above point, desirability of British discussing entire problem with Kenyans to see what action they might be willing to take with both Tanzania and Uganda (Obote and/or Amin) to assure continuation of effective East African Community and other regional institutions. We assume GOK attaches
considerable importance to holding such institutions together.

d) UK assessment of Amin's support and ability to hold out.

e) Any additional thoughts or information re recognition question.

GP-3

END

ROGERS
1. MR. WALKER AND I EXPLOR\(\text{E}\) AT LENGTH POINTS REFTEL AS INSTRUCTED AND REPORTED SEPTEL.

2. WHILE I REALIZE I HAVE BEEN OUT OF TOUCH WITH FAST MOVING SITUATION IN KAMPALA AND WASHINGTON I FEEL COMPELLED TO REPORT MY OWN STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION TO PARA.

3. [A] MEDIATION BETWEEN OBOTE/AMIN NOT IN US INTERESTS IN UGANDA OR IN OUR INTERESTS REST OF BLACK AFRICA. US INTERESTS UGANDA WILL BE BETTER SERVED BY LESS "PROGRESSIVE" GOV. LIKELY EMERGE UNDER WHOEVER REAL POWER IS MY GUESS IS ONAMA.

[B] OBOTE COUL\(\text{D}\) NOT ACCEPT A UK MEDIATOR AS WOULD COMPLETELY DESTROY HIS PROGRESSIVE AFRICAN IMAGE. MOREOVER OBOTE AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IS PATHOLOGICALLY ANTI-BRITISH. E\(G\) ON TWO OCCASIONS IT HAS BEEN STATED TO ME THAT HE BELIEVES UK HAS BEEN OUT TO GET HIM FROM THE BEGINNING INCLUDING BEING BEHIND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. OTHER SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED THIS IS SINCERELY HELD BELIEF.

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
April 21, 2005

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAGE 02: LONDON 00800 281913Z

(C) NON OAU MEDIATOR SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE AFTER NIGERIA - BIAFRA.

(D) THE LIKELIHOOD OF A KENYAN MEDIATOR I BELIEVE IS NIL. I DO NOT BELIEVE AFTER STRAINS OF LAST SIX MONTHS THERE IS SINGLE OFFICIAL KENYAN WHO REGRETS OBOTE'S DEPARTURE OR WHO WOULD LIFT A FINGER TO AIDS HIS RETURN IN ANY CAPACITY. MOREOVER, KENYAN'S FUTURE INTERESTS MORE LIKELY SERVE BOTH IF OBOTE COMPLETELY OUT OF WAY AND WITH ANTI-Obote GOV IN CHARGE.

(E) COMPROMISE WITH OBOTE IN PICTURE WILL UNDERCUT VERY PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN MOST SYMPATHETIC TO USG AND USG POSITIONS, I.E. AMIN AND ONAMA. MOREOVER, LIKELY CENTER OF GRAVITY NEW GOV CERTAINLY WILL BLUNT INFLUENCE SOVS AND CHICOMS AND HENCE GOV APT TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE MODERATE AT HOME, IN OAU AND IN UN.

(F) INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN UGANDA CANNOT HELP BUT BE IMPROVED WITH OBOTE OUT OF PICTURE. UNLIKE RECENT COUPS AFRICA AND SOME LAS, THIS COUP IS FROM RIGHT, NOT FROM "PROGRESSIVE" LEFT.

(G) I BELIEVE COMPROMISE GOV, GIVEN OBOTE'S PAST PERFORMANCE IN 1962-66, COMPROMISE GOV, WILL BE INHERENTLY MORE UNSTABLE AND DISRUPTIVE THAN THE POSSIBILITY UP-COMING WEAK AMIN GOV.

(H) PROBLEM FUTURE EXACLYS NOT NOW IN UGANDA BUT IN TANZANIA, AND THAT PROBLEM IS NYERERE'S, I.E. WHO TO RECOGNIZE, SINCE HE CANNOT DO BOTH, NYERERE IS NOW ONLY ONE IN WHOSE INTERESTS IT WOULD BE TO BRING ABOUT A COMPROMISE, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE HE CAN PLAY ROLE DUE TO OBVIOUS PRO-Obote IDENTIFICATION.

(I) FINALLY, BELIEVE THAT MAJOR FRIEND, UK, INTERESTS CLEARLY BEST SERVED BY ANY GOV IN WHICH OBOTE HAS NO PART.

3. I BELIEVE CRUCIAL PROBLEM AND REAL POSSIBILITY IS

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COUNTER COUP OR INTRA-COUP FROM OBOTE FOLLOWERS OR OTHER RIVAL FOR POWER WHO HAVE CAPACITY TO GOVERN (WHICH AMIN DECIDEDLY HAS NOT). AMIN'S VERY LACK OF CAPACITY MAKES THIS EVENTUALITY ALMOST CERTAIN. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN AMIN/OBOTE COMPROMISE WOULD IN ANY WAY LESSEN THIS PROBABILITY. INDEED BELIEVE REVERSE IS TRUE.

ANNENBERG
AFRICA STAFF NOTE NO. 1-71 (O/NE Distribution Only)

SUBJECT: Reflections on the Uganda Coup

1. While the dust is far from settled on the recent military seizure of power in Uganda, at least a few of its implications are already discernible. As the first coup in Black Africa in over a year, it has aroused more than the normal amount of attention and comment from Black African countries. Further, it marks the downfall of one of the area's more radical heads of state who had just played a noisy role at the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore. But ex-President Obote's strong stand against British plans to sell arms to South Africa had little or nothing to do with his loss of power.
2. The coup itself appears to have been a hastily improvised defensive measure taken by Maj-Gen Idi Amin -- the new head of Uganda -- to counter President Obote's effort to oust him. General Amin has since made the usual charges about tribal favoritism, corruption, economic difficulties and lack of democracy in the previous government -- all of which are true -- to justify the takeover. He has also promised eventual return to civilian rule, pledged respect for international treaties, and professed his desire for good relations with practically everyone.

3. Amin is regarded as more moderate and pro-Western than Obote but his ability to organize and run an effective government is questionable. The General rose from the ranks and is popular with the troops and many junior officers, but factionalism within the army mirrors the divisions within the country and Uganda -- a congeries of hostile tribes -- is difficult to govern under any circumstances.

4. It is too early to predict what domestic policy changes the new regime will make or how popular it is likely to be once the euphoria over Obote's downfall wears off.
The Baganda -- Uganda's largest and most advanced tribe -- will hope for the power and benefits denied them during their long years in the wilderness under Obote. They will probably be difficult to control and placate. Moreover, the government is in financial trouble, thanks in part to Obote's recent lavish spending. At the outset the Amin regime will have few funds with which to meet competing tribal demands. In general, whatever combination of tribal groupings gains ascendancy, internal politics are likely to be even less stable under Amin than under Obote.

5. The external ramifications of this coup are surprisingly extensive. Radical African leaders are sharply disappointed at the loss of one of their more vocal and rising stars. For them, this is the most traumatic coup since Nkrumah's downfall in 1966. President Nyerere of Tanzania has publicly denounced Amin as a rebel and asserted that Obote remains the lawful Ugandan president. Nyerere has given Obote asylum and assisted his campaign to deny recognition of the new regime. Obote has visited Kenya and Ethiopia and may be seeking Sudanese military aid. He
probably is also looking for sympathy from the Somali and Zambian governments. Obote's charges of Israeli and other (read British) foreign instigation of Amin's coup fall on receptive ears among radical African leaders and will increase their suspicions of the West. But the non-recognition campaign is almost certain to fail.

6. Ethiopia appears quietly delighted at this turn of events. It expects Uganda to sympathize with the rebels in southern Sudan and perhaps to aid them. Such pressure on Sudan could, in turn, divert Sudanese attention from Ethiopia's own troubles with the dissidents in Eritrea. Since Amin has had fairly close contact with the Israeli military technicians who are training the Ugandan army, the Sudan is probably worried that Amin might permit stepped up Israeli contacts with the rebels. In any event Sudanese-Ugandan relations are likely to be further strained over the next months, and the usual border clashes involving refugees and rebels may increase.

7. Perhaps the most serious repercussions of the coup lie in its effects on the fragile East African Community
(EAC) -- which provides a common market and common services to Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Obote usually sided with Nyerere in intra-EAC disputes and President Kenyatta's patience was often taxed in the effort to hold the arrangement together. Now that Nyerere has publicly denounced Amin and harbours Obote, the whole structure is endangered, along with hopes of broadening the community to include neighboring countries. On the other hand, the service functions of the EAC -- transport and communications -- could easily be maintained even if the heads of government refuse to speak to one another.

8. Kenya disapproves of military coups, partly because they can be contagious, yet it is pleased to see Obote replaced by someone more to its liking. If Amin's conciliatory attitude towards Tanzania continues and Nyerere accepts some face-saving excuse to resume relations with Uganda, the power balance in the EAC is still likely to be in Kenya's favor. If Nyerere remains adamant, Kenya and Uganda could maintain effective ties but the EAC would be in for some very rough
sledding. In any event, Tanzania and Zambia, the remaining radicals in the area, are likely to draw closer together.

9. The coup will probably have little affect on Uganda's or East Africa's relations with countries abroad. Obote's nationalization program is likely to be slowed or stopped -- but not reversed. Uganda may get along a bit better with the UK and with the US; a bit worse with the USSR and China. But the main impact of the coup will be confined to Eastern Africa, where the gulf is widening between moderates and radicals.
SUBJECT: RENEWED CONTACTS WITH GOV

1. AS DEPT AWARE FOLLOWING JAN 25 COUP WE CUT BACK RIGOROUSLY ON ALL CONTACTS WITH ALL MINISTRIES AND OTHER ENTITIES OF GOV AS AMIN REGIME CONSOLIDATES ITS CONTROL AND PARTICULARLY SINCE FORMATION OF NEW CABINET EMBASSY AID PC AND USIS HAVE PICKED UP SOMEWHAT LOW LEVEL CONTACTS WITHIN GOVERNMENT BEING CAREFUL HOWEVER TO AVOID CONDUCT NEW BUSINESS BUT RATHER FOLLOWING UP ON EXISTING OLD BUSINESS.

2. ABOVE AGENCIES AND PARTICULARLY AID ARE FACED WITH DEADLINES PROGRAMS AND COMMITMENTS WHICH MAKE IT NECESSARY TO START TRANSACTING CERTAIN NEW MATTERS CALLS FORWARD FOR TRAINEES BEING SPECIFIC CASE IN POINT.

3. COUNTRY TEAM THIS MORNING FELT IT NECESSARY AND IN OUR BEST INTERESTS CONTINUE PICKING UP SPEED AND INCREASING LEVEL OF MEETINGS WITHIN GOV SO THAT BUSINESS CAN PROCEED WITH AS LITTLE FURTHER INTERRUPTION AS POSSIBLE ADDITIONALLY THERE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING MATTERS WHICH GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED ARE DEFINITELY OPEN FOR NEGOTIATIONS DEPT WILL RECALL AMIN IN HIS MEETING WITH CHARGE MONDAY FEBRUARY 12 INDICATED GOV WILLINGNESS PROCEED ON AID BI LATERAL AND LINCOLN SCHOOL BOTH ARE MATTERS TO WHICH ALL CONCERNED ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE AND OF WHICH TIME IS OF ESSENCE.

4. WE PROPOSE THEREFORE IN ADDITION TO RECOMMENDING
CONTACTS: REFERRED TO ABOVE, TO ARRANGE MEETINGS BETWEEN DCM AND APPROPRIATE FRI OFFICIAL TO DISCUSS THOSE TWO MATTERS, AS WELL AS FORTHCOMING VISIT OF NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE. WE FURTHER PROPOSE STARTING NEXT WEEK TO EXCHANGE NOTES WITH GOVERNMENT ON OUTSTANDING MATTERS, E.G. MATTER OF MARINE GUARDS FOR EMBASSY. FURTHERMORE, AMBASSADOR HOPES NEXT WEEK TO START PAYING CALLS ON NEW CABINET MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE KNOWN TO US FROM EARLIER DAYS, AS DEPARTMENT AWARE AMBASSADOR HAS ALREADY BEEN IN INFORMAL CONTACT WITH TWO OF LAWYER MINISTERS DURING COURSE OF MEETINGS RELATING TO LEGAL PROFESSION.

5. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT BY END OF MONTH WE SHOULD BE IN POSITION TO TAKE UP MATTER OF BILATERAL SIGNING WITH MINFONAFF, FERGUSON.
STATE

SUBJECT: US/Ugandan Relations

REF: (A) Kampala 641; (B) State 19295; (C) State 25475

1. Department shares Embassy's view (ref A) that it
   now desirable further strengthen informal contacts
   with new Ugandan Government. However, we wish delay
   formal public actions, e.g. exchanging Apollo 14
   be publicly interpreted in manner which
   messages or signing agreements, that might prejudice African acceptance of new Ugandan Govern-
   ment or in any way add to problems threatening future
   of East African Community.

2. USG encouraged by evidence that, with exception
   Tanzania, countries initially most active in backing
   Obote now appear to be moving more cautiously. We
   continue believe moderate African states, particularly
   Congo (K), Ethiopia and Kenya, can be most effective
   in fostering acceptance new GOU if latter not too

DRAFTED BY: PLA

APPROVED BY: AF

CLEARANCES:

AF - Amb. Moore

AF/C - Mr. Cohen (subs)

L/AF - Mr. Runyon

AF/E - Mr. Coote

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
April 21, 2005
closely identified with non-African powers. USG therefore particularly desires avoid any formal actions on eve February 26 OAU Ministerial Meeting in Addis Ababa.

3. At same time, we agree with Embassy that we should make clear to new Ugandan Government that USG welcomes its gestures of friendship and looks forward to carrying on diplomatic relations in fullest sense at earliest appropriate moment. USG position this regard clear from press statement (ref B).

4. Subject your further views, suggest you seek appointment FonMin Kibedi to convey essence above and say you instructed to review orally with him and other appropriate GOU officials such outstanding matters as Lincoln School problem, National War College visit, AID participant trainees, AID project agreements and AID bilateral so that agreements can be concluded
Amembassy KAMPALA

-3-

can be concluded following OAU meeting when we assume African attitudes towards GOU will have been satisfactorily resolved. (Presume Embassy has now received approved bilateral text forwarded AID TO A-4, Jan. 21.)

5. Department also plans, prior OAU meeting, to seek appropriate occasion in Addis Ababa, Kinshasa and Nairobi to advise respective governments of USG's position on relations with GOU.

GP-3

END
SUBJ: GOV/USG RELATIONS:

REF: KAMPALA 770, 772, 778, AND 779

IN MANNER YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE REQUEST YOU DISCUSS WITH GENERAL AMIN OUR VIEWS HIS SEVERAL PROPOSALS AS FOLLOWS:

1. SEVERAL REQUESTS REPORTED KAMPALA REFTELS FROM GENERAL AMIN PUT USG AT THIS TIME IN DIFFICULT POSITION WE DESIRE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OVERTURES FRIENDSHIP AT SAME TIME WE AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN PRIMARILY AFRICAN ISSUES AND IN ACTIONS CONCERNING SECURITY OF AFRICAN STATES WE HAVE SOUGHT TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN SECESSION PROBLEMS (NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND SOUTHERN SUDAN) WHICH PLAGUE AFRICAN STATES AND WE HAVE RESPECTED AFRICANS OPPOSITION TO ANY POSSIBLE BREAK UP OF A FELLOW AFRICAN NATION. MOREOVER WE ARE RESTRAINED BY OUR OWN LAWS AND OUR LIMITED RESOURCES FROM INAUGURATION OF NEW MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OR EVEN SINCE CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT LAST YEAR FROM OFFERING MILITARY TRAINING IN US.

SECRET 561

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By TIM/NARA, Date 11/27/99

NPMP NSC Files Country Files Africa Box 746/01/116
2. GIVEN THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF OUR POLICY, WE CANNOT read not give any encouragement to General Amin: that we will be able to satisfy his wishes for U.S. military equipment under MAP or FMS. (SEPTEL)

3. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE HIS NEEDS AND WE APPRECIATE THE PROPOSED ORIENTATION OF HIS NEW GOVERNMENT. WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE, IF GENERAL AMIN UNDERSTANDS OUR VERY REAL LIMITATIONS TO INITIATE REQUESTED LIAISON AND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD AS WILL BE EXPLAINED MORE FULLY IN SEPTEL. FURTHER, WE ARE PREPARED TO APPROVE COMMERCIAL PURCHASE BY GOV OF TYPES OF DUAL-PURPOSE MILITARY EQUIPMENT EXPLAINED IN ADDITIONAL SEPTEL.

4. IN LIGHT SITUATION PAR. 2 WE WOULD BE THOROUGHLY UNDERSTANDING IF AMIN FELT IT IMPRUDENT TO MOVE AGAINST SOVIET ADVISORS AT THIS TIME OR TO CUT HIMSELF OFF FROM ACCESS TO SPARES FOR SOVIET ORIGIN MILITARY ITEMS. AMIN IN BETTER POSITION TO JUDGE THAN WE BUT WE SUGGEST THAT IF SOVIETS HAVE NOT CLEARLY DETERMINED THEIR POSITION TOWARDS HIS REGIME THERE MAY BE MERIT IN AVOIDING ACTION WHICH WOULD LEAD SOVIETS TO ENCOURAGE THOSE IN KHARTOUM OR DAR WHO MIGHT BE ATTRACTED BY EXTREME MOVES AGAINST HIS REGIME.

5. APPARENT THAT WHAT NEW UGANDAN GOVERNMENT DOES IS OWN BUSINESS, BUT WOULD SUGGEST THAT AMIN REGIME ACCEPTANCE BY MODERATE AFRICAN STATES LIKELY BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT IF IT INITIATES ACTIONS AGAINST ITS NEIGHBORS.

6. FINALLY, WE HAVE STRONGEST RESERVATIONS TOWARD ANY EFFORT INVOLVE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIMES IN DISPUTES BETWEEN BLACK AFRICAN STATES. WE CANNOT SEE THIS AS BEING HELPFUL EITHER TO AFRICAN STATES INVOLVED OR TO LONGER RANGE EFFORTS REDUCE PROSPECTS VIOLENT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE-DOMINATED AFRICA. ROGERS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ACTION: Embassy KAMPALA
INFO: Embassy ADDIS ABABA
Ambassador DAR ES SALAAM
Ambassador LONDON
Ambassador NAIROBI

JOINT STATE/ AID MESSAGE
REF: Kampala 641: State 27102

Now consider it desirable to continue forward movement toward normalization relations in a low-key manner, avoiding public statements. Hope GOU will take similar view matter.

2. Suggest that Embassy/USAID now begin move pending ProAgs forward for signature by GOU at appropriate levels. Prefer you start with pending revisions of ProAgs already signed (Tororo Girls School, Agricultural Co-Ops and IPA), following these with new ProAgs. Believe
Amembasy KAMPALA

it preferable also to space ProAgs out somewhat rather than presenting simultaneously. If GOU issues statement on revisions, we would reiterate that we regard revision existing ProAgs as part normal working contacts. At that time could reconsider whether proceed with new ProAgs.

3. Among new ProAgs, AID/W particularly interested in signature those covering Agricultural Research Survey Team and Makerere Graduate Agriculture Faculty as contractors already contacted and recruitment underway. FYI: "Realize Mission cannot issue Makerere.PIO/T until it receives AID/W's comments on proposed OPEX guidelines and final agreement on guidelines reached. AID/W comments pouch March 4. In addition, Chief Agricultural Research Officer PIO/T will need revision to bring it in line with new guidelines. END FYI.

4. USAID should not include Livestock Production ProAg
among first priorities for signature because contract negotiations already underway for other projects and FY-71 deob involved in Livestock ProAg amount. No objection, however, if Mission prepares Livestock ProAg now for possible signature next month.

EXEMPT.

END
TO: J - Ambassador Johnson
THROUGH: S/S E
FROM: AF David D. Newsom
SUBJECT: Normalization of Relations with The New Ugandan Government - ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

Since the January 25 military coup in Uganda, we have gradually expanded our working relationship with the new government of General Idi Amin Dada but have made it clear we do not yet regard our relations fully normalized. It had been our intention to follow the African lead. We hoped the OAU Ministerial Meeting held in Addis Ababa at the end of February would clarify the African position, but the Meeting adjourned without seating the Amin delegation. The issue was instead referred to the OAU Summit scheduled in June.

A considerable time has now elapsed since the coup. The Amin Government is in full control and has promised to honor the international obligations of its predecessor. Moreover, since the OAU Ministerial Meeting, a growing number of African states, including Congo (K), Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, have indicated through remarks or actions--although generally not through formal statements of recognition--that they intend to do business with the Amin Government.
We have a number of matters to carry forward in Kampala. We believe that further delay in normalizing relations is not only unnecessary, but will be resented by the Amin Government. We therefore wish to instruct Ambassador Ferguson to move an AID bilateral and a Development Loan Agreement forward for signature, two actions that will effectively normalize our relations with the new government.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached telegram to Kampala.

Attachments:
1. Telegram to Kampala
2. Reference Telegrams

Clearance:
AF/E - Mr. Coot 
AF - Ambassador Moore 
S/S 

AF/E:GLKinter:kr 3/13/71
X 21191
JOINT STATE/AID MESSAGE

SUBJECT: US/UGANDAN RELATIONS

Ref: Kampala 874, 875, 876 (NOTAL); State 38065

1. After some of ProAgs covered State ref have been finalized, agree that desirable next step will be to obtain GOU agreement on final draft bilateral. If, during your discussions with ForMin and Attorney General, question of signature arises, you can respond that, assuming GOU proposes no further changes US draft, you prepared sign bilateral. Would hope signing could be accomplished with little or no publicity. FYI: If bilateral is signed, we would be prepared to respond to any queries by saying we consider we have normal relations with GOU. If
pressed if this means we recognize GOU, we would respond in affirmative without identifying any act or time. END FYI.

2. Moreover, believe we should also at same time move PTTC loan agreement forward, submitting it to GOU if you have not already done so and indicating USG readiness to sign, again without publicity. GOU should understand that execution loan agreement obligates USG provide only up to $3.2 million for project with GOU to finance remainder. Septel follows on question possible increased costs.

3. At appropriate point you should indicate to MinEd and other pertinent officials our hope that GOU will reciprocate USG's responsiveness by registering Lincoln School in order to permit its construction program to go forward as soon as possible.

GP-3.

END
TO: J - Ambassador Johnson
THROUGH: S/S E
FROM: AF David D. Newsom

SUBJECT: Normalization of Relations with The New Ugandan Government - ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

Since the January 25 military coup in Uganda, we have gradually expanded our working relationship with the new government of General Idi Amin Dada but have made it clear we do not yet regard our relations fully normalized. It had been our intention to follow the African lead. We hoped the OAU Ministerial Meeting held in Addis Ababa at the end of February would clarify the African position, but the Meeting adjourned without seating the Amin delegation. The issue was instead referred to the OAU Summit scheduled in June.

A considerable time has now elapsed since the coup. The Amin Government is in full control and has promised to honor the international obligations of its predecessor. Moreover, since the OAU Ministerial Meeting, a growing number of African states, including Congo (K), Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, have indicated through remarks or actions--although generally not through formal statements of recognition--that they intend to do business with the Amin Government.

GROUP 3
Downgrade at 12-Year Intervals
Not Automatically Declassified

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
April 21, 2005
We have a number of matters to carry forward in Kampala. We believe that further delay in normalizing relations is not only unnecessary, but will be resented by the Amin Government. We therefore wish to instruct Ambassador Ferguson to move an AID bilateral and a Development Loan Agreement forward for signature, two actions that will effectively normalize our relations with the new government.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached telegram to Kampala.

Attachments:
1. Telegram to Kampala
2. Reference Telegrams

Clearance:
AF/E - Mr. Cootie
AF - Ambassador Moore
S/S

AF/E: GLKinter:kr 3/13/71
X 21191
J.OINT STATE/AID MESSAGE

SUBJECT: US/UGANDAN RELATIONS

Ref: Kampala 874, 875, 876 (NOTAL); State 38065

1. After some of ProAgs covered State ref have been finalized, agree that desirable next step will be to obtain GOU agreement on final draft bilateral. If, during your discussions with ForMin and Attorney General, question of signature arises, you can respond that, assuming GOU proposes no further changes US draft, you prepared sign bilateral. Would hope signing could be accomplished with little or no publicity. FYI: If bilateral is signed, we would be prepared to respond to any queries by saying we consider we have normal relations with GOU. If
pressed if this means we recognize GOU, we would respond in affirmative without identifying any act or time. END FYI.

2. Moreover, believe we should also at same time move PTTC loan agreement forward, submitting it to GOU if you have not already done so and indicating USG readiness to sign, again without publicity. GOU should understand that execution loan agreement obligates USG provide only up to $3.2 million for project with GOU to finance remainder. Septel follows on question possible increased costs.

3. At appropriate point you should indicate to MinEd and other pertinent officials our hope that GOU will reciprocate USG's responsiveness by registering School in order to permit its construction program to go forward as soon as possible.

GP-3.

END
July 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: United States Presence in Uganda

During Ambassador Ferguson's farewell call July 18, President Amin attacked the role of various categories of Americans in Uganda. He accused the United States of sending Israeli agents into Uganda disguised as American tourists, stated that United States tourists are spying on behalf of the CIA, alleged that the Peace Corps is "full of spies", and declared that he wants all United States and other intelligence personnel out of Uganda. He stated further that he wanted to know the exact number of Americans and the jobs they perform in Uganda so that he could take this into account when he conducts a personal review within the next two weeks of the presence of the United States, UK and "others" in Uganda. Most of the conversation appeared later in the Ugandan press.

The Department has instructed our Charge in Kampala to see the Uganda Foreign Minister as soon as possible and to state that we received President Amin's comments with considerable distress, that the 133 Peace Corps Volunteers now in the country are specifically enjoined from engaging in intelligence work of any kind, and that we hold the GOU responsible for fair and non-discriminatory treatment of all United States citizens.
in Uganda. Further, our Charge is to ascertain whether the GOU wishes us to advise American tourists contemplating travel to Uganda that the GOU intends to prohibit entry of or to discriminate against Americans of Jewish faith.

Assistant Secretary Newsom plans to make the same points to Ugandan Ambassador Ramathan in a meeting scheduled for July 20.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
FOR ASST SECRETARY NEWSOM FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: THE USG AND THE ASIAN EXPULSION ACTIVITIES OF GOU

REF: USUN 2946 STATE 151787 - POL 23-10 UGANDA

1. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE USG MAINTAIN A STRICT POLICY OF NO PUBLIC COMMENT IN REGARD TO THE ASIAN EXPULSION ACTIVITIES OF GENERAL AMIN.

2. IN THIS VERY MOVING HUMAN TRAGEDY IT IS PRACTICALLY GUARANTEED THAT THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL EVENTS THAT, LIKE THE PRIMARY ACT ITSELF, WILL BE IN VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ANY ACTION BY THE USG IN COMMENTING OR TAKING THE LEADERSHIP IN STATEMENTS AND/OR ACTIVITIES CONDEMNING THESE ACTIVITIES WOULD BE MISINTERPRETED AS AN ACT OF INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UGANDA. OUR RELATIONS FOR THE MOMENT ARE FRAGILE AND SUCH AN ACTION WOULD CERTAINLY COMPLICATE THEM. FURTHERMORE ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

3. LET US HOPE THAT AFRICAN LEADERS WHO DO NOT HESITATE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA FOR THEIR VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WHO ALSO ATTACK THE US AND UK FOR Alleged VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WILL HAVE THE COURAGE TO TAKE THE LEADERSHIP IN ANY UN OR INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO END THE VIOLATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
Of Asians of various nationalities living in Ugandan, President Nyerere has already spoken, a prominent African Church group and several East African newspapers have criticized some aspects of Amin's expulsion order. Perhaps others will follow and take the matter to the UN. If they do, this will help to restore the prestige of the UN in America and Western eyes because the past decade it seems that the UN will only attack Western countries but does not dare to look into the violation of human rights occurring in non-Western countries.

4. One way for us to help Asians—if a decision is taken to do this—would be to find an Arab leader who, like the President of Sudan, could approach Amin. I do not rpt not recommend that we do this. We are cultivating our Embassy contacts with the Sudanese and Libyans for future use when the need arises. We want to preserve whatever credits we have to serve more concrete bilateral concerns.

5. I feel best efforts we could make on humanitarian side, without ill effect to our bilateral relations, would be in line with State 154457, para 3, to offer special immigration to small group of expellees who will be, for all practical purposes, stateless. I can assure you that this gesture—however nominal—would be well received by the British and Indian High Commissions in Kampala and I would believe also by their governments.

6. I have asked all members of the American Embassy and all agencies—USAID, USIS and Peace Corps—to refrain from making any remarks on the Asian expulsion order to anyone outside of the US official family. We are regarding it as an internal matter, although all of us are deeply moved by the daily manifestations of inhumanity. GDS

MELADY
SUBJ: USG AND ASIAN EXPULSION

1. DEPT CONCURS YOUR VIEW WE SHOULD AT THIS TIME MINIMIZE OUR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUE. OF AMIN'S OUSTER OF ASIANS AND SHOULD NOT TAKE LEAD IN RAISING SUBJECT IN UN OR ELSEWHERE.

2. WE DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO INITIATE A STATEMENT ON ASIANS, BUT IF ASKED ABOUT IT, WE BELIEVE OUR RESPONSE CALLS FOR SOME SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. WE WOULD WISH TO REFLECT OUR CONCERN AND REGRET ABOUT ANY SITUATION WHERE HUMAN BEINGS ARE SUDDENLY UPROOTED AND DISPLACED. THIS WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE UN CHARTER AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE MIGHT ALSO TAKE NOTE OF THE ENCOURAGING STEPS AMIN HAS TAKEN IN RESCINDING HIS ORDER TO EXPEL ASIAN CITIZENS OF UGANDA AND IN MODIFYING HIS POSITION ON NON-CITIZENS. SUCH A STATEMENT FREE OF INVECTIVE WHICH EXPRESSES OUR GENERAL CONCERN WHILE STRESSING POSITIVE ASPECTS FLOWING FROM Amins HAVING MODIFIED HIS PREVIOUS POSITION COULD ALSO, WE WOULD HOPE, ENCOURAGE HIM TO EASE PRESSURES FURTHER.

3. MORE PRESS GUIDANCE FOLLOWS.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom
Sir Dennis Greenhill, Permanent Under Secretary
Ambassador Cromer, British Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Cdr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

PLACE: Office of Sir Alec Douglas Home

DATE & TIME: 4:15-5:15 p.m., September 14, 1972

After picture taking and opening amenities, the group sat down for discussions over tea.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Uganda]
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Uganda]

**Home:** Uganda is a mess; we are trying to settle some of those chaps, some 50 thousand of them. Can you do anything?

**Kissinger:** I believe we are looking to see if we can take any but I am confident that we cannot take enough to help your problem. We are eager to avoid this issue before November 7.

**Annenberg:** It is a difficult political situation.

**Sonnenfeldt:** Our immigration laws are difficult.

**Kissinger:** I'd be amazed if we could move enough to make any difference.

**Sonnenfeldt:** Or whether we could do it under the existing laws.

**Home:** Even 200 would help.

**Annenberg:** An exodus will be underway in November.

**Cromer:** And it is quite a burden.

**Kissinger:** Are there other places they could go like Kenya?

**Home:** I don't know where. We are talking to the Kenyans now.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

INFORMATION September 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT

FROM:
AL HAIG

SUBJECT:
Contingency Planning for Uganda

Since your instructions to me yesterday morning, an Interdepartmental Task Force has been reviewing and updating contingency plans to cope with possible turns in the Uganda situation. We will include a daily update on the situation in your morning brief and I will provide you with an update of the provisions of the contingency actions as soon as they are completed.

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
April 21, 2005
I. BACKGROUND

On January 25, 1971, General Idi Amin overthrew President Milton Obote of Uganda. This triggered a purge of Obote's tribal kinsmen in the army and eventually led to the ouster or death of nearly all non-commissioned officers in the security forces. As a result, an unruly army has terrorized the country.

General Amin himself is uneducated, irresponsible, paranoiac and racist. He has ordered the expulsion of 55,000 non-Ugandan Asians. He earlier expelled the Israelis in order to please the Arabs. Amin now thinks the UK, Israel and at times, the US, want his overthrow. The anti-Israeli aspect has become increasingly intense and adds a dangerous focus in the situation.

The present fighting began on September 17, when several hundred Obote supporters, who had taken refuge in Tanzania, attacked Amin's forces in southern Uganda. This was expected to lead to a popular rising against Amin but did not.

2. HUMAN TOLL

There have possibly been 4,000 to 5,000 tribal killings (Obote supporters) since Amin came to power. Casualty figures for the latest fighting are unknown but they do not exceed a few hundred.

3. FORCES INVOLVED

a. Internal. Amin is strictly a domestic product. He has had little more than vocal support from the Arabs.

b. African

-- Tanzania clearly favors Obote's supporters and has armed them.

By [Redacted] NARA, Date 11/22/99
-- Libya has promised financial aid to Uganda, but, so far, none seems to have materialized.

-- Most Africans consider Amin to be mad.

c. Non-African

-- Neither the USSR nor PRC are behind Uganda's problems.

-- The UK has maintained its important economic assistance notwithstanding Amin's actions against them. They fear what termination of their aid would do to their 7,000 nationals.

4. OUTLOOK

Amin is riding high after having repulsed the Obote invaders. He may try to take revenge on the Asians or UK, whom he blames for the invasion. Economically, the country is almost bankrupt and the expulsion of Asians is bound to make matters worse.

5. UNITED STATES ROLE

a. Interests. Our interests there are negligible but we have traditionally aided Uganda in order to foster East African stability.

b. Safety of Americans. Amin has said that Europeans (i.e., whites) would make good targets for his army if an attempt is made to unseat him. Such an attempt was just made, but foreigners did not suffer unduly. One Peace Corpsman died near the area of hostilities but this was accidental. Nonetheless, Amin's repeated threats against Europeans are real and no one can assume this irrational man might not act violently against Americans. As a result, State is trying to bring in US personnel from the countryside to Kampala. After this is accomplished, a partial evacuation from Kampala will be considered.

c. Future Plans. Preparation of evacuation program.
6. **ACTION RECOMMENDED**

a. Instruct the African NSC Interdepartmental Group to prepare a contingency study on an urgent basis which would focus on:

(1) recommendations for the withdrawal of Americans from Uganda;

(2) the termination of assistance programs there, in a way which would not further endanger our people;

(3) responses to a deteriorating situation resulting in reprisals against non-Africans (whites -- possibly including US but more likely UK citizens -- and Asians);

(4) actions in the event the GOU refused to allow US or UK citizens to depart;

(5) responses in the event the UK asks for help in evacuating its citizens (7,000) or Asians, or both.

Agree _____    Disagree _____.
Conversation Number: 30-17

Date: September 21, 1972

Time: 7:42 p.m.-7:43 p.m.

Location: White House Telephone

Participants: Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger

Nixon: I don’t want to irritate your evening, but I was not satisfied with the report on Uganda, which came from State.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Now, the man we have there is Melady, who is a sweet guy. He’s a great supporter of ours, but totally African, all African. He doesn’t understand. Now, I know him--Tom Melady--know him well. Second point, I want harder action taken. I want all--everybody from America evacuated as soon as possible.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: I want hard action. And second, I want to get that Burundi Ambassador’s ass out of there right now and that’s an order.

Kissinger: That should be--

Nixon: Now, goddamnit--

Kissinger: That will be ordered today.

Nixon: Now we--I think you will agree, Henry, we have really had a double standard on this thing.

Kissinger: Oh, sure.

Nixon: In the African Division, you know what I mean, do we care when they kill a poor goddamned Pakistani? Do we care when these damn Africans eat 100,000 people? I mean, it’s really gone too far. What do you think?

Kissinger: I couldn’t agree more.

Nixon: All right. Will you get on Tom about it? Now Melady’s report saying, he said, “Well, no Americans have been arrested and there are a few UK’s have been killed. Goddamnit, if a Britisher killed--I mean call Melady back for instructions. You know? Let’s call him right back. How about that?

Kissinger: We can do both of those.

Nixon: All right. You get Melady’s ass right back here.
Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Okay.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Bye.
At the beginning of the meeting, Dr. Kissinger handed over to Ambassador Cromer the President's letter to Prime Minister Heath [Tab A] thanking him for the courtesies extended to Dr. Kissinger on his recent visit to London.

Dr. Kissinger: Here is the letter. And a copy for you.

Ambassador Cromer: That's very nice.

What I want to talk to you about is entirely on my own initiative. I have absolutely no instructions on this. When the President saw Sir Burke Trend [July 28], it was agreed that if ever anything came up with any political overtones on the money side, we should raise it. I want to mention this Schweitzer business. As you know, Schultz more or less blocked his reappointment. Of course you're quite entitled to do this. Volcker went and told him, and was then spreading the word.

Dr. Kissinger: He ran afoul of Connally.

Ambassador Cromer: And Volcker is continuing this and is being more Connally than Connally.
As I say, you're entitled to take the position you want. I am concerned that the manner in which you went about it may hurt the atmosphere for the reform we want.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought Schultz was going to see him.

Ambassador Cromer: The less developed countries, for example, I'm afraid are now going to portray him as a hero. There will be a lot of speeches at the forthcoming meeting.

There was a "secret" meeting yesterday of the less developed countries -- which I heard about -- in which the delegates here were in fact discussing proposing to their governments that they take this line.

You know I will be seeing Schultz today.

Dr. Kissinger: To see a speech he's giving this week. Yes. Please call me, Rowley, and give me your honest opinion of it. What he is instructed to do is give a general framework, with some specifics, but not on a confrontation basis. We thought that having no American position at all would be even more unsettling.

Ambassador Cromer: Yes. As I say, I'm saying this completely without instructions. Just to warn you about what I think is coming.

Dr. Kissinger: It's perfectly all right. You're not asking us to do anything.

And call me about the speech. I can't stop it but perhaps I can moderate it.

Ambassador Cromer: In London you mentioned to Burke a new formula you had for presentation to the North Vietnamese.

Dr. Kissinger: Here it is. The statement I made and the new formula we presented. [Hands over U.S. proposals and opening statement from September 15 Paris meeting.]

Ambassador Cromer: This is very top secret, of course.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, because our Secretary of State doesn't even know we made a presentation, let alone what it contains.

Ambassador Cromer: Clive Rose is coming over to talk about SALT with Sonnenfeldt. You said at one point you might see him. Do you want to?

Dr. Kissinger: What do you think? I leave it to you. Sonnenfeldt doesn't admit that when he's through there's any reason for me to do anything.

Ambassador Cromer: Let's do it this way: If anything is unresolved after he meets with Sonnenfeldt, I shall ask for an appointment.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if you request it, I'll do it.

Ambassador Cromer: My Secretary of State is, of course, delighted with the President's kind invitation. He would also like a quiet word with you, perhaps before dinner.

Dr. Kissinger: After dinner might be better.

Ambassador Cromer: He'll be leaving late in the evening.

Dr. Kissinger: Then before dinner is fine. How about 7:30, here?

Ambassador Cromer: Fine.

We have some news on this Uganda business. It's absolute hell.

Dr. Kissinger: As you know, we're moving to take some of your people.

Ambassador Cromer: Yes, that marvelous. The news is that it was deteriorating quite badly yesterday but it is better today. But we'll face the problem of taking care of the British -- the real British. The problem is to get them from the country to the airport.

Dr. Kissinger: What can we do?

Ambassador Cromer: We don't know what to propose!

It was interesting that a Libyan plane carrying arms to Amin tried to overfly the Sudan. The Sudanese forced them to land and took the arms!
They made a very robust statement. This is the first major reverse the Libyans have suffered. It may be the only healthy outcome of this.

**Dr. Kissinger:** If you have to consider strong measures, you won't get into trouble with us, to put it mildly.

**Ambassador Cromer:** We're in touch with State on this.

**Dr. Kissinger:** The President is in a mood to be much tougher than State. He has been thinking of pulling back our Ambassador. What do you think?

**Ambassador Cromer:** That would be a mistake. We're more evil in their eyes than you are. For you to pull out now would be interpreted by Amin, who is a madman, as part of a conspiracy.

**Dr. Kissinger:** We will look with favor on anything you have to do. What can we do?

**Ambassador Cromer:** I don't know. There are eight American Jews there that State is particularly concerned about.

**Dr. Kissinger:** On these statements, I gave you, there are two things. This is about as far as we are going to go. We may play around with the cosmetics, but it is as far as we can go.

They are exceptionally confidential, I have to repeat. We haven't given this to anyone else. If the North Vietnamese ever found out we gave this to you...

My impression of the North Vietnamese is that they are eager to settle and afraid to settle at the same time. They are eager to settle but don't know how to do it. They are clumsy.

[At this point the meeting ended.]
Conversation: 154-7

Date: September 24, 1972
Time: 11:37 am – 11:52 am
Location: Camp David Telephone

Participants: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger

Kissinger: We have a problem in Uganda and I--
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: The problem is this. The British are very worried that there may be a massacre of 7,000--
Nixon: British?
Kissinger: --British they've got there, and they're scattered all over the country.
Nixon: Of course.
Kissinger: And they would like to have some secret talks with us about some logistics help.
Nixon: Sure. We'll have them.
Kissinger: They've tried it earlier this week and State has turned them down--
Nixon: Screw State! State's always on the side of the blacks. The hell with them!
Kissinger: Well, I--
Nixon: No.
Kissinger: I knew this would be your reaction--
Nixon: Well, I just can't understand why we haven't had them before. You know, like that thing on Burundi.
Now I want State's ass reamed out on that for not--
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: --for not--Henry, in the whole Burundi business--I've been watching it in, in the press. Did you know, State has not sent one memorandum over to us on it?
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: Or have they? Have there--or have you had something that I haven't seen?
Kissinger: No, no. They have not.
Nixon: Well, how do you feel about it?
Kissinger: Well I--
Nixon: Don't you really feel--I mean, and just be--let's be totally honest. Isn't a person a person goddammit? You know, there are those that, you know, they talk about Vietnam, these people far away that we don't know. And you remember that poor old Chamberlain talk about the Czechs. That they were far away, and "we don't know them very well." Well now, goddammit, people are
people in my opinion.

Kissinger: Well, it's not only that--

Nixon: I don't mean our national interests gets involved. But every time, every time that anybody else gets involved—you know, every time that—one other individual or us, and you have a little pressure group here, State goes up the wall. But I'm getting tired of this business of letting these Africans eat a hundred thousand people and do nothing about it.

Kissinger: And it's—and when they have--and all these, these bleeding hearts in this country who say we like to kill yellow people--

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: We have--there hasn't been as many killed in the eight years of the war as were killed in three months in Burundi.

Nixon: Henry, the whole point is--and also--well it's, it's the thing that Agnew stuck to [laugher], stuck to McGovern where Agnew pointed out—now, now they're talking about how many we have bombed in the North. And I've told your staff to get the figures for me. How many, how many South Vietnamese or anti-communist North Vietnamese have been killed by the North Vietnamese government? Civilians—how many? It's unbelievable.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Nobody gives a damn.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: And, and that's what it's—they, they're involved in. I know what the Uganda thing is. What it is—it's just like Burundi. The State—Newsom's attitude—the attitude of State is to be for whatever black government is in power. Is my—right or wrong?

Kissinger: One hundred percent right.

Nixon: And that was—and that, basically Henry, was the problem on Nigeria. Now frankly, I was on the side of the Biafras then. Not just—not because of Catholics. And you were too. Not because of Catholics but—State was on the side of the Nigerian government. Why? Because they said, well, "all the other governments would come apart." Well frankly, I'm almost to the opinion myself—and this is far down the road, we need a new African policy. But first of all, we shouldn't have 42 ambassadors to these goddamn countries. In the second place—I mean, you know, at the same level as anybody else—in the second place, my own view is that some federations down there are what are needed, or something. I don't know. But, but we can talk about that later. But at the present time, looking at Uganda, of course we've got to help those 7,000 people. I asked Rogers about this when we met with Bush.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: You—were you there?

Kissinger: Yes, I was there.

Nixon: Well you remember, I said, "what about this?" He said, "well we've got a plan to evacuate the Americans." Well now, that's a fine howdy do. What the hell are the damn British going to do? 7,000 of them. They'll be murdered.

Kissinger: Well, what, the way--
Nixon: Isn't that really the problem or not?
Kissinger: That is exactly the problem.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And, and the British are in the bush. All of ours are in Entebbe. And actually, they haven't turned against ours so much yet, but they--
Nixon: No.
Kissinger: --have turned against the British.
Nixon: No. I understand.
Kissinger: Now--
Nixon: Well, who--
Kissinger: --I would recommend, Mr. President--
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: --that in order to keep this thing from turning into a, a huge leak, is that--
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: --to send a Defense Department man over--a civilian, not a military guy.
Nixon: Well, we've got anybody we can trust?
Kissinger: Well, that can even leak, if necessary, and say all he's empowered to discuss is the logistics--
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: --in--if there has to be a joint evacuation. Now, no one can blame us for that. Then we can tell the British we can use that as a base. If they have further requests, to take them up here in Washington.
Nixon: Well, good. Good. Let me, let me, let me put it another way. Why don't we have Goodpastor, from his place--I mean, just go over and, and--
Kissinger: But I worry--
Nixon: --and put it at a--I don't care whether it's at a high level. You mean you'd--they'd start killing, is that it?
Kissinger: One is, they might start killing. Second, we might get a tremendous uproar that we are planning a military campaign.
Nixon: Okay. Okay.
Kissinger: While we can achieve most of it by using--in fact, we can achieve all of it--and we can alert Goodpastor to start looking to his assets. That we can do on an independent--
Nixon: Well, I think you should take--tell Goodpastor--look, NATO's sitting over there on its ass doing nothing anyway. Why don't we tell Goodpastor to, to get all the assets for the purpose of evacuation that we can have? Right?
Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: In other words, NATO assets. Let's let the NATO countries do it.

Kissinger: I think that's a good idea. We can get Goodpastor to pay a visit. He--it's--

Nixon: I just kind of feel that's a good idea.

Kissinger: Well, he can pay it a NATO visit.

Nixon: A NATO visit. Right. And then tell him in confidence that I want him to discuss this matter of assets with him. You know, Goodpastor will love having something to do. How's that sound to you?

Kissinger: I think that--well, I--

Nixon: Yeah, and then, and then send the defense man too.

Kissinger: We'll send the defense man so that's the--that's the overt--

Nixon: What man do you have in mind?

Kissinger: Well, somebody out of Nutter's [unclear]. I thought we, we would pick a low-key guy. Just to get the facts. Right now we don't even have the facts--

Nixon: Could we get--how about somebody--well, why don't we--better still, why don't we just have somebody from your office go over who knows these people.

Kissinger: Well, I'm--

Nixon: You're afraid that we'll--that I'll get in it then, huh?

Kissinger: No, I'm afraid in--with the campaign going on--

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I think the major thing now is to get information, but Goodpastor's an excellent idea.

Nixon: No reason why he can't, can--is there?

Kissinger: No. That's an excellent thought.

Nixon: You see, the problem is that if we, that--I agree, that if we get in it they'll say we're trying to get it. But, on the other hand, we have got to, we've got to be prepared to help the British. We can't have a British slaughter down there. The British have got enough problems.

Kissinger: Absolutely, and it's a--it would be a disgrace anyway.

Nixon: Have they asked [unclear]?

Kissinger: Well, they sent a personal message to you at midnight last night because they--

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: --were stonewalled by the State Department all week--

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Kissinger: --asking whether we could start some secret technical talks in London.
Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And that's what I think we should respond to. I like this Goodpastor idea.

Nixon: Yeah, why don't you, why don't you on our private channel get a hold of them and say that Goodpastor will be paying a NATO visit, but that he has private instructions from me to discuss on a secret basis what the hell we can do. How's that sound to you?

Kissinger: That sounds excellent.

Nixon: And, and then you call Andy and you say, "Now Andy, you've got to deny this. This conversation never took place. But by god, we—we're not going to let these people be destroyed by these people." Let's do that. That'll reassure the British. They just want to know privately what we're--

Kissinger: Actually, I could meet Andy in Paris and give it to him orally. That would--

Nixon: Very good. Very good. But you could let--you should let the British know that we've talked about it, and that Goodpastor thing. And then you--if you want to send the defense guy, you can. Only thing is--

Kissinger: I think you should send somebody overt.

Nixon: Yeah. All right.

Kissinger: Because then we—that's the--

Nixon: Overt we'll say for the purpose of evacuating Americans and British.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Nixon: Isn't it awful though what these—that this goddamn guy at the head of Uganda, Henry, is an ape.

Kissinger: He's an ape without education.

Nixon: That's probably no disadvantage. I mean that--

Kissinger: [laughter]

Nixon: I mean, you figure that that asshole that was the head of Ghana had a brilliant education in the United States.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: I mean, so, let's face it--no, no, what I mean is he's, he's—he really is. He's a, he's a prehistoric monster.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: But, but the same with Burundi. But can—I really, really got to shake up the Africa—while all the departments—but the Africa department at State, Henry, is a disgrace.

Kissinger: Oh, the whole--

Nixon: When I receive those—you know, I receive ambassadors. All I receive is Africa—three out of four every time are African ambassadors. They're nice little guys, and so forth and so on, but they don't add anything.
Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I mean, it--and, and State just treats them--I mean, what, what do you think they're up to? What is our African policy? Will you tell me?

Kissinger: Our African policy--I just took a paragraph out of a speech--Rogers was happy to accept this, no disrespect to Rogers. But this guy Patterson had two paragraphs in the--in Roger's U.N. speech--

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: --which was an all-out attack on South Africa--

Nixon: No sir.

Kissinger: --on Mozambique--


Kissinger: --and they are anti-white in Africa. They are, they are obsessively liberal. But you don't hear them say a peep --you, you know, when one of these governments is, is not fully democratic that they don't like, they scream. But when they murder people in Burundi, when there's--get a fellow in, in Uganda has a reign of terror, you don't ever get a protest.

Nixon: Yeah. Now, on, on Burundi, State underestimated, and I know that your people were using it. Do you use the figure 100,000? I understand it's 200,000. Now I want the Belgian ambassador--do you know him? Here in Washington.

Kissinger: I, I've met him, I don't know--

Nixon: He's a decent fellow?
Kissinger: He's a decent guy. Yeah.

Nixon: All right. I want you or--you're the one to do it. You call him in, and--it'd be a very nice touch anyway--and just say, "on a private basis, we'd like to note your estimate of what the hell's happened in Burundi." I really want to know. I don't mean there's anything we're going to do about it. Nothing is going to come out of it.

Kissinger: But we ought to know it.

Nixon: But, but you know, let's get it from the Belgians. Don't you agree?

Kissinger: I agree completely.

Nixon: I mean, the--on this one, though--now that you mention Patterson, he's one that's going to go the day after the election. That son-of-a-bitch has done things in--I mean he's--

Kissinger: It's an intolerable situation. Every time we want to do something we have to worry how we can finagle it--

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: --so that it doesn't leak. Now we've got another month where we've got to put up with it.

Nixon: That's all. Well you'll do this then--

Kissinger: Immediately.
Nixon: And don't you think that—who, who will you call? You'll call Burke Trend or?

Kissinger: I'll first call Cromer.

Nixon: Cromer. Oh yeah. Okay. Well he's—he'll keep it.

Kissinger: He'll keep it. Absolutely.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: Because he delivered the message.

Nixon: Call Cromer. That's the better way to do it anyway. Tell him to pass it to the— that I'm outraged by the whole damn thing. That naturally we've got to handle it in a very discreet way. And that we're going to do it two ways. We're going to send Andy over on a, on an official visit, and that the British should – for discussion of NATO problems. And that we're going to send a defense guy over overtly. Right?

Kissinger: Right.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Africa]

Nixon: But anyway, this is good. I'm glad—I think it's good to let the British know we're going to help. Then, you might give the Belgian ambassador a call and say, "Don't, don't report this but that the president wants to know what the hell went on and for him—set it up for when, for Wednesday or Thursday of next week. Would you do it?

Kissinger: I shall certainly do it.

Nixon: I want to know what happened in Burundi. And I want the real cold-cock on that. Just, just you know, for future reference.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: Because in these African governments and the rest, the idea that we're going to stand still on the ground that any African government that was—overthrew a colonial power thereby becomes lily white by our, by our standards and thereby beyond criticism is ridiculous. This damn double standard is just unbelievable.

Kissinger: Out of the question
MEMORANDUM FOR COL. KENNEDY

FROM: Denis Clifford

SUBJECT: Admittance of 1,000 Ugandan Asians

1) Bill Timmons Office has lifted its objection to having the Attorney General sign the necessary parole authority as requested by Secretary Rogers.

2) State and Justice have conferred with the Counsels of the House Judiciary Committee, and State reports that Congressmen Rodino, Deanis, and Hutchinson will not object to the Attorney General's acting on Rogers recommendation provided:
   --the Attorney General, or the Acting A-G calls Rodino beforehand, and
   --some other high official calls Hutchinson and Dennis (Huffman in State's legal office) believes Acting Secretary Irwin would be pleased to do this.

3) John Lehman informs me that the Attorney General's parole letter is, in fact, signed and can be released as soon as Justice has the go ahead from the White House. The letter is in Ralph Erickson's office (Miss Dunn) (Tel: 739-2101)

4) We anticipate that the President and Sir Alec will address the Ugandan Asian subject during the discussions that are going on now

NEXT STEPS:
1) We have to ensure that the President has not said anything to Sir Alec that would cause us to hold up on further action. If OK, then,
2) Telephone calls have to be made to the Congressmen per para 2, above.
3) Justice has to be told by the White House to release the letter.
4) If the letter is released the President should be informed before this evening's dinner permitting him to inform Sir Alec of the steps he has taken.
5) I am standing by.
SUBJECT: ADMISSION STATELESS ASIANS ON PAROLE

1. ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN REPLY TO SECRETARY'S REQUEST, HAS FOUND IT WOULD BE IN PUBLIC INTEREST TO GRANT PAROLE TO STATELESS UGANDAN ASIANS AND HAS AUTHORIZED UNDER SECTION 212(d)(5) OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT THE PAROLE INTO US OF UP TO 1,000 STATELESS UGANDAN ASIANS.

2. DEPT PLANNING MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OCTOBER 2. NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID ABOUT DECISION UNTIL YOU INFORMED RELEASE MADE HERE. OUR ANNOUNCEMENT WILL SEEK TO EMPHASIZE FACT THAT UP TO 1,000 WELL QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS RATHER THAN FACELESS BLOCK OF PERSONS WILL BE PAROLED.

3. DEPT HAS INFORMED UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

4. FOR USUN - YOU REQUESTED NOTIFY SENATOR MCgee.
MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: The Situation in Uganda

The purpose of this memorandum is to bring you up to date on what is happening in Uganda and what actions we and others have taken. The nature of our future relations with Uganda is presently being reviewed. Ambassador Melady has been brought back from Uganda in order to participate in that review and as soon as it is completed I will submit recommendations for your approval.

1. Tribalism at its Worst

Since his assumption of power in January, 1971, General Idi Amin has been destroying the elite of all tribes not allied or belonging to his own grouping. The judiciary, top civil servants, academics, the limited professional class and senior army and police officers have been Amin's targets. Amin has not had to eliminate whole tribes to insure his control; he has simply eliminated their leadership with little regard for the consequences of wiping out the economic and intellectual backbone of the country.

There are no reliable estimates of deaths. They most probably number several thousand but not above 10,000 in a population of 10 million. This compares with over 100,000 deaths in Burundi where the population was 3.5 million.

If Amin succeeds, his West Nile tribal kinsmen, who represent between 5 and 10% of the country's population, would rule the country. The ill-fated invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian-backed Ugandan dissidents has greatly strengthened Amin and accelerated the elimination of any opposition to him.

2. The Asian Expulsion

Amin's expulsion of Asians is moving apace. Most non-Ugandan Asians should be out of the country by the November 8 deadline. These appear to number 25,000 to 30,000, which is far less than earlier
estimates of 55,000 expellees. Furthermore, Asians are not being brutalized as they were in the initial stages of the expulsion, probably because of the world's outcry, which included many African leaders.

3. **Europeans and Americans in Uganda**

As security deteriorated in Uganda, the number of Europeans and Americans resident there declined from an estimated 11,000 in September to 7,800. Our own presence went from 1,000 to about 700; all of our 114 Peace Corps volunteers were withdrawn. The British went from an estimated 7,000 to 5,000 citizens.

The safety of Europeans and Americans does not appear to be a problem right now. Amin has resorted to expelling those foreigners he dislikes and otherwise, has told his troops to lay off whites, whose services the country still needs. In fact, Amin has gone out of his way lately to be friendly to the United States and West Germany, in the hope that we will respond with aid. (For all practical purposes, US aid to Uganda is presently suspended although we have not stopped on-going technical assistance. This subject is now under review.)

4. **The Soviet and Arab Presence**

Whereas most everyone else -- excluding the French, whose presence has remained at about 200 -- has reduced its presence, our Embassy in Kampala expects the Soviet presence to rise above the present 125. This could result in Sino-Soviet competition between the Soviet-backed Amin versus the Chinese-supported Nyerere of Tanzania. It is too early to speculate on this subject.

In addition, a Libyan contingent (possibly 400 men) remains in Uganda. Both the Egyptians and Libyans have promised Amin assistance, which can only anger Nyerere, who, up to now, has blindly supported the Arab cause against Israel.

5. **Future Actions by Amin**

Assuming Amin will remain in power, and both State and CIA so believe, it seems likely that Amin will continue to purge Uganda's elite along tribal lines. He is also expected to pursue Africanization programs which will include the takeover of businesses vacated by
Asians as well as probable future nationalizations affecting the British. Foreign missionaries will probably also come under increasing scrutiny by Amin.

6. **US Interests**

Our own interests in Uganda are limited to protecting our remaining citizens and maintaining a presence in Uganda, rather than giving free rein to the Soviets, assuming they are responsive to Amin. However, if aid is a prerequisite for a presence, we may not be able to stay in Uganda. This will, of course, be more thoroughly reviewed in the paper for you which will discuss our future policy. This paper should be ready in mid-November.
THE KAKWA, AND HIS WEST-NILE ALLIES. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT AMIN KNOWS MUCH ABOUT CHAKA, THE FOUNDER OF THE ZULU NATION, BUT THE TWO MEN HAVE MUCH IN COMMON. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: CHAKA WAS A CHIEF FROM A MINORITY CLAN IN SOUTH AFRICA WHO IN ABOUT 1818 BEGAN CONSOLIDATING THE ZULUS INTO ONE NATION BY WIDESPREAD BLOODSHED AND EXTERMINATION OF HIS ENEMIES. HE WAS MURDERED IN 1828.)


3. WITH MORE PERCEPTION THAT HE SEEMED CAPABLE OF, AMIN SET ABOUT INSURING THE LOYALTY OF THE ARMY. HE REMOVED THOSE OFFICERS HE CONSIDERED DISLOYAL BY WHATEVER MEANS HE DEEMED NECESSARY AND REPLACED THEM WITH MEN HE CONSIDERED LOYAL TO HIM. IN JULY 1970 THE ARMY HAD 99 ACHOLI
OFFICERS, 50 LANGO, AND 107 WEST NILE; IN JANUARY 1972 THERE WERE 19
ACHOLI OFFICERS, 16 LANGO, AND 222 WEST NILERS. MOST OF THOSE REMAINING
ACHOLI AND LANGO OFFICERS ARE IN SUPPORT POSITIONS. THE WEST NILERS,
THE MAJORITY OF THEM FORMER WARRANT OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS,
CONTROL THE TROOPS. AMIN HAS SIMILARLY RIDDEN THE SENIOR POLICE RANKS
ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT REPLACED THOSE WITH WEST NILERS. RATHER, HE HAS
LEFT THE POSITIONS VACANT.

4. THE MOVES AMIN MADE AGAINST MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL SHOULD
HAVE BEEN ENOUGH. TODAY AMIN COULD, IF HE WANTED, PROCLAIM HIMSELF
EMPEROR CONSIDERING THE LACK OF OPPOSITION HE WOULD FACE. ALL IS NOT
COMPLETELY SMOOTH, HOWEVER, WITHIN THE WEST NILE COALITION. THERE HAVE
BEEN INDICATIONS OF STRAIN BETWEEN THE LUGBARA, THE LARGEST WEST NILE
GROUP, AND AMIN'S KAKWA. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY SINGLE TRIBAL GROUP,
SUCH AS THE LUGBARA, COULD BRING AMIN DOWN ALONE, BUT, ACTING IN CONCERT
WITH ONE OR MORE SIZEABLE TRIBAL GROUPS FROM ANY AREA, THE COALITION MIGHT
SUCCEED. IT IS PROBABLY SUCH A POSSIBILITY AS THIS THAT AMIN FEARS.

5. WITH THE MILITARY UNDER CONTROL, AMIN STILL HAS THE PROBLEM
OF THE ELITE. BECAUSE OF THEIR POSITION IN UGANDA SOCIETY, THEY EITHER
ARE THEMSELVES INFLUENTIAL OR ARE IN A POSITION OF STRONG INFLUENCE WITH
THE ELDERS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TRIBES. AMIN DOES NOT NEED TO ELIMINATE
WHOLE TRIBES TO INSURE HIS CONTROL; HE NEEDS ONLY TO ELIMINATE THEIR
LEADERSHIP. IF THAT LEADERSHIP HAPPENS TO CORRESPOND WITH THE ECONOMIC AND INTELLECTUAL BACKBONE OF THE COUNTRY, IT MAKES LITTLE DIFFERENCE TO AMIN. IT IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT HIS EXTREMELY ELEMENTARY CONCEPT OF ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT SIMPLY DOES NOT PERMIT HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT DESTROYED TALENT CANNOT BE REPLACED OVERNIGHT OR EVEN IN A GENERATION. THE EXPELLED ASIANS REPRESENT MOST OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERTISE TO BE FOUND IN UGANDA AND SOME KEY ASIAN TECHNICIANS ARE NOW BEING TURNED BACK AT THE AIRPORT, BUT MANY GOT AWAY EARLY. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE PRESENT PURGE WOULD NOT HAVE REACHED ANYWHERE NEAR ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF INTENSITY IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR THE ABORTIVE OBOTE-SPONSORED INVASION. IT APPEARS THAT THE INVASION MAY HAVE FRIGHTENED AMIN SUFFICIENTLY TO MAKE HIM DECIDE TO GET HIS HOUSE INTO WHAT HE CONCEIVES TO BE THE PROPER ORDER, A SOCIETY IN WHICH HIS TRIBE AND ITS ALLIES ARE IN TOTAL CONTROL.

6. THE REALLY PUZZLING THING IS THAT AMIN HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THE PRACTICE OF THIS PHILOSOPHY FOR SO LONG. IF HE HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO, HE MAY BE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE HIS HOLD AND KEEP IT INDEFINITELY. THE ACHOLI, WITH ORIGINALLY THE GREATEST STRENGTH IN THE ARMY AND POLICE AND, ACCORDING TO THEIR CLAIMS, THE GREATEST MARTIAL TRADITION OF ANY TRIBE IN UGANDA, HAVE LET THEMSELVES BE SELECTIVELY SLAUGHTERED TO THE POINT THAT THEY WILL SOON HAVE NO LEADERSHIP LEFT. THE LANGO NEVER HAD A CHANCE; THEY HAD MADE THEMSELVES SO THOROUGHLY HATED DURING THE OBOTE PERIOD THAT THE OTHER TRIBES WERE QUITE HAPPY TO
STAND BY AND SEE THEM CUT TO RIBBONS BY THE WEST NILERS, THE ITESOT ARE SOMEWHAT OF AN ENIGMA. THERE ARE STILL MANY OF THEM IN THE ARMY, BUT THEY HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN SO BEMUSED BY WATCHING THEIR ANCIENT ENEMIES, THE LANGO AND THE ACHOLI, GET IT IN THE NECK, THAT IT HAS NOT OCCURRED TO THEM THAT THEY MIGHT BE NEXT. EXCEPT FOR THE BAGANDA, NONE OF THE OTHER TRIBES APPEAR TO HAVE ENOUGH STRENGTH TO BE A PROBLEM FOR AMIN, ALTHOUGH THE WAY THE SAMIA ARE SUFFERING THEY MUST HAVE DONE SOMETHING WRONG.

7. ONE COULD THINK OF THE BAGANDA AS THE BENGALIS OF UGANDA, TRADITIONALLY USING GUILE INSTEAD OF GUNS, BUT EVEN THE BENGALIS PRODUCED THE MUKTI BAHINI, EAST PAKISTANI'S INDIGENOUS GUERRILLAS WHO FORMED AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE AGAINST THE WEST PAKISTANIS. IT MAY BE THAT THE BAGANDA HAVE BECOME USED TO BEING TRAMPLED UPON AND ARE PUTTING HOPES FOR INDIVIDUAL SURVIVAL FIRST, AS ALL THEIR POTENTIAL ALLIES SEEM TO BE DOING.

8. WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW IN UGANDA HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM, OR EAST-WEST IDEOLOGY. IT IS RAW TRIBALISM AT WORK, WITH THE CHIEF OF A MINOR TRIBE (THE CHAKA-ZULU SITUATION AGAIN) ON HIS WAY TO SUBJUGATING AND CONTROLLING THE NEIGHBORING TRIBES. UNLIKE CHAKA, AMIN HAS THE LIMITATION OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITH WHICH TO CONTEND. SINCE HE ONCE MOOTED THE IDEA OF EXTENDING HIS FRONTIER THROUGH NORTHERN TANZANIA TO INCLUDE THE PORT OF TANGA, HOWEVER, PERHAPS THE BORDERS DO NOT MEAN MUCH TO HIM.
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: United States Policies in Uganda

As a result of discussions with Ambassador Melady during his consultations in Washington, the Department and other agencies have reached the following conclusions regarding our immediate and future policies toward Uganda.

In view of the vagaries of President Amin's actions and the uncertainty of how the situation will develop in the months ahead, we have concluded that no long-term decisions should be made at this time. We have decided that in the absence of any serious changes in the political or internal security conditions in Uganda, our official activities will be maintained at roughly their current levels for the immediate future. We have a commitment to confer with the Congress before undertaking any new aid programs in Uganda. After Congress reconvenes in January, we can determine what our longer-term role should be and whether such consultation is necessary. Our technical assistance and training programs, which are of direct benefit to the Ugandan people and which already are funded, will be maintained. No action will be taken on the $3-million livestock loan which has been under discussion. The Peace Corps office in Kampala will remain open until early next year to offset any possible adverse reaction from Amin resulting from the recent withdrawal of all of the 114 Volunteers.

We are continuing to work closely with the United Nations and other international bodies in trying to ensure that all non-citizen Asians may leave Uganda.
as rapidly and safely as possible and have somewhere to go. The stateless parolees coming to this country were flown out by the November 8 deadline. Nearly all of the 1,200 other stateless Asians who were not out by that date are now at or on their way to temporary transit centers outside Uganda, where they will await further word on permanent new homes. There had been signs that those overstaying the deadline, as well as the estimated 6,000-8,000 Asians who were exempted or who are Ugandan citizens, might be subjected to some harrassment, but no serious incidents have been reported thus far. Nonetheless, the fate of those Asians staying on in Uganda remains highly uncertain.

The British position in Uganda also is continuing to deteriorate. The British Government now seriously doubts that it will be able to have satisfactory dealings with Amin, and its presence there, including technical assistance, is being wound down. Half of the 7,000 British residents have already left. The U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth office has told us that it does not regard Uganda as sufficiently important to its vital interests to attempt to arrest the deteriorating situation by active diplomatic or economic measures.

As part of their contingency planning, the British have asked whether we would assume the protection of their interests if a break in relations with the Ugandan Government should occur. We have expressed our willingness to do so.
MEMORANDUM

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Uganda

The purpose of this memorandum is to bring you up to date on the situation in Uganda and on our own policies toward that country.

1. Amin: What Next?

Having ousted Israel, defeated the Tanzanian-backed invasion of Ugandan exiles, expelled Uganda's 45,000 Asian residents, and terrorized his population into obedience, General Idi Amin appears to be riding high. The damage he has inflicted upon his economy seems of little consequence to him. Instead, the General seems bent upon further purifying his country of foreign influences so that he can build whatever tribal-Muslim society he dreams about. The British, Christian missionaries, and Uganda's large Catholic population are all mentioned as being among Amin's next targets for expulsion or repression. At this point, however, Uganda is relatively quiet as those who live there wonder what Amin will do next.

2. The Situation for the British

The British situation in Uganda has reached the point where the UK has formally asked the US Government to protect their interests should Amin expel them. State has agreed to do so. The UK has told our Embassy in London that it does not regard Uganda as sufficiently important to its interests to arrest their deteriorating situation by active diplomatic or economic measures. The UK's presence in Uganda has been reduced from 7,000 citizens in August to about 3,400.

3. US Policies

After consultations with Ambassador Melady, who has unconvincingly argued for assistance to Uganda, State has recommended that we adopt a "wait-and-see" posture. In State's words:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By TIM LEW NARA, Date 11/29/99

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
April 21, 2005
"In view of the vagaries of President Amin's actions and the uncertainty of how the situation will develop in the months ahead, we have concluded that no long-term decisions should be made at this time. We have decided that in the absence of any serious changes in the political or internal security conditions in Uganda, our official activities will be maintained at their current levels for the immediate future."

State's posture would permit technical assistance to continue. This involves an annual program of about $2 million, which covers the cost of 38 AID personnel in the fields of agriculture, education and health. However, unless new funding is provided by July 1, our technical assistance programs will come to a halt.

Our Ambassador in Kampala, Thomas Melady, would like to preclude such a termination. He says that "We cannot bring Amin in line by withdrawing our assistance." Furthermore, he adds, "a drastic cutoff of aid might jeopardize the safety of our people."

The African Bureau at State, on the other hand, tends to believe that at worst, a termination of US aid would simply lead to the expulsion of Americans. But, State's African Bureau feels, Amin might not even go that far because of Uganda's need for American coffee purchases, and tourists.

4. My Own Views

For the moment, I agree with State that no decisions need be taken concerning Uganda, particularly AID levels. With our 114 Peace Corpsmen out, and technical assistance slimmed down from 50 personnel in August to 38 today, our assistance programs in Uganda could be allowed to die by attrition. Much will depend, of course, on what Amin does next.

It is therefore my recommendation that the Department of State be informed that you agree that no decisions need be taken at this time concerning our official activities in Uganda but that you want to be informed beforehand should State-AID wish to give any new assistance to Uganda.

With respect to State's agreement to protect British interests, I find no objection. This will complicate our own problems in Uganda, but
if we chose to stay there, I assume that you would wish us to be of assistance to the British.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That I be authorized to inform the Department of State that you approve of their recommendation not to make long-term decisions concerning United States policy toward Uganda at this time, but that you wish to be advised beforehand if the Department feels new assistance funds should be allocated to Uganda.

   Approve   Disapprove

2. That I be authorized to inform the Department of State that you approve of their contingency agreement to represent British interest in Uganda.

   Approve   Disapprove

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By TIM/EA NARA, Date 11/29/79

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
April 21, 2005
December 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Future Uganda Policy

The President has reviewed our current policy toward Uganda. He approves the Department of State's recommendation not to make long-term decisions concerning United States policy toward Uganda at this time but wishes to be advised beforehand if the Department feels new assistance funds should be allocated to Uganda.

The President also approves the Department's contingency agreement to represent British interests in Uganda.

Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: RELIECTIONS ON THE AMIN REGIME AND US-UGANDAN RELATIONS AS OF END OF 1972

1. SUMMARY: THIS REPORT OFFERS SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT AS THE YEAR 1972 CLOSES AND WE APPROACH THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE COUP THAT BROUGHT GENERAL AMIN TO POWER IN UGANDA. WE FIND AMIN'S TO BE ONE OF THE MOST RADICAL IN THE SENSE OF EXTREMIST REGIMES TO HAVE APPEARED IN INDEPENDENT BLACK AFRICA, A REGIME WHICH MUST BE CHARACTERIZED AS RACIST, ERRATIC AND UNPREDICTABLE, PRIMAL, INEFFICIENT, BELICOSE, IRRATIONAL, RIDICULOUS AND MILITARISTIC, BUT ITS MOST SALIENT CHARACTERISTIC HAS BEEN AMIN'S KAMPUTH FOR SUBVERSION, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN HIS SERIES OF DECREES THAT THE COUNTRY CAN GET ALONG WITHOUT WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT ISRAELIS, ASIANS, FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS, HS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SIGNARIES, BRITISH. THOUGH AMIN MAY "GET AWAY WITH IT" IN THE SENSE THAT HE WILL SUCCEED IN EXPELLING MOST NON-UGANDANS FROM THE COUNTRY, WE DOUBT HIS COUNTRY OR PEOPLE WILL BE ANY BETTER OFF FOR HIS POLICIES. THE US HAS DEPLORSED THE GENERAL’S ANTI-ZIONIST CAMPAIGN (WHICH OFTEN BECOMES AN ANTI-JEWISH CAMPAIGN), AND THOUGH WE COULD DO LITTLE ABOUT IT WE WERE DISTRESSSED BY THE EXPULSION OF THE ASIAN COMMUNITY AS A GROSS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. THE "DRASTIC DECISION" AGAINST THE BRITISH IS ALSO DOING THE COUNTRY NO GOOD. WE ACCOUNT FOR THE CESSATION OF VERBAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE US AND STAGNATION OF THE INCIDENTS OF MOLESTATIONS OF OUR CITIZENS--THE TWO BILATERAL ASPECTS OF MOST CONCERN TO US--PRIMARILY TO AMIN'S PREOCCUPATION WITH OTHER, MORE IMMEDIATE, THREATENING TARGETS OR TO A DELIBERATE DECISION ON HIS PART TO LEAVE US ALONE FOR THE PRESENT. WE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE RECENT LULL TO REDUCE OUR PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY BY OVER A THIRD. WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT AMIN WILL CONTINUE TO LEAVE US ALONE, FOR WE FORESEE THAT--IF HE REMAINS IN POWER--HE WILL NEED ADDITIONAL SCARECROWS TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE DIRE EFFECTS OF HIS POLICIES, AND WE PROVIDE A CONVENIENT TARGET. WE ALSO NOTE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL "TIME-BOMBS" THAT MAY EXPLODE TO DESTROY OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE COMMUNITY. THE AMIN REGIME, GENERAL AMIN'S REGIME MUST BE ONE OF THE MOST RADICAL TO HAVE APPEARED IN BLACK AFRICA SINCE THE ERA OF INDEPENDENCE BEGAN; NOT RADICAL IN THE SENSE OF "LEFTIST" BUT MORE IN THE SENSE OF "EXTREMIST." THE POLICIES DECREED BY THE GENERAL DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS HAVE BEEN BASED ON A RAMPAGING XENOPHOBIA, BUT THAT HAS NOT BEEN THE ONLY EXTREMIST CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS REGIME. WITHOUT ANY FEAR OF EXAGGERATION IT CAN BE DESCRIBED AS:
(A) RACIST: ENOUGH EVIDENCE IS PROVIDED BY THE TREATMENT OF THE CITIZEN ASIANS, WHO WERE SINGLED OUT FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN THEIR RACIAL ORIGIN.

(B) ERRATIC AND UNPREDICTABLE: GENERAL AMIN HAS JUMPED AND SHIFTED IN SO MANY DIFFERENT, OFTEN CONTRADICTORY, DIRECTIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR THAT MOST OBSERVERS OF THE UGANDAN SCENE HAVE LONG SINCE GIVEN UP TRYING TO PREDICT WHAT HIS NEXT MOVE WILL BE.

(C) BRUTAL: EVEN "BARBARIC" MIGHT NOT BE TOO STRONG A TERM TO DESCRIBE THE CAMPAIGN OF OPPRESSION AND VICTIMIZATION THAT HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE BLACK UGANDAN ELITE, ALL APPARENTLY WITH THE SANCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

(D) INEPT: THE LOW STATE OF THE ECONOMY AND OF GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION TODAY IS TRAGIC, ESPECIALLY WHEN VIEWED AGAINST THE ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND GENERALLY ABLE CIVIL SERVICE WITH WHICH THE COUNTRY WAS ENDOWED ONLY 24 MONTHS AGO.

(E) BELLICOSE: WHEN HE CANNOT GET A HEADLINE ANY OTHER WAY AMIN IS FOND OF THREATENING ONE OR MORE OF HIS NEIGHBORS. HIS FAVORITE TARGETS HAVE BEEN TANZANIA, RWANDA, AND THE SUDAN. HE WAS NOT ATTACKED KENYA AND ZAIRE, PROBABLY BECAUSE HE IS AFRAID OF THEM.

(F) IRRATIONAL: AMIN NEARLY CONSISTENTLY HAS PURSUED POLICIES THAT HAVE BEEN INIMICAL TO THE WELFARE AND PROGRESS OF HIS OWN COUNTRY AND PEOPLE, USUALLY OUT OF IGNORANCE, BUT PERHAPS ALSO BECAUSE OF HIS PARANOIDA AND MEGALOMANIA.

(G) RIDICULOUS: AMIN'S BUFOONERY HAS BEEN TOO WELL PUBLICIZED TO REQUIRE ILLUSTRATION, AND IT HAS PERHAPS NOT BEEN SURPRISING THAT HE IS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO MANY AFRICAN LEADERS WHO NONETHELESS HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO QUESTION PUBLICLY HIS FITNESS TO RULE, IN SOME CASES PROBABLY BECAUSE THEIR OWN CREDENTIALS MAY NOT BE MUCH BETTER.

(H) MILITARISTIC: SINCE THE REGIME'S SOLE FIRM SUPPORT SEEMS TO BE THE ARMY, IT IS PERHAPS NATURAL IF DEPLORABLE THAT WHAT USED TO BE A RELATIVELY PEACEFUL AND SECURE COUNTRY IS NOW
PERVADED BY FEAR OF ITS OWN "SECURITY" FORCES.

3. BUT OF ALL OF THE CHARACTERISTICS THE ONE WHICH HAS BEEN MOST SALIENT DURING 1972 HAS BEEN THE SEVERAL MANIFESTATIONS OF GENERAL AMIN'S EXTREME XENOPHOBIA. DURING THE LAST THREE-QUARTERS OF THIS PAST YEAR AMIN HAS DECREED THAT THE COUNTRY CAN GET ALONG WITHOUT, IN FACT WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT:

(A) ANY ISRAELIS, WHO WERE PROVIDED MILITARY TRAINING TO HIS ARMY AND AIR FORCE, AS WELL AS IMPORTANT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN OTHER AREAS, PLUS THE WORK OF CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES DOING A GOOD MANY OF THE BIG GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY PROJECTS;

(B) SOME 50,000 ASIANS WHO PROVIDED THE MASS OF THE COUNTRY'S BUSINESS SKILLS, IN TRADE, DISTRIBUTION AND LIGHT INDUSTRY, AS WELL AS PROFESSIONAL AND SKILLED ARTISANAL TALENTS OF ALL KINDS, THE COUNTRY'S ESSENTIAL MIDDLE-CLASS, PLUS AT LEAST TWO OF ITS BIGGEST INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES WHICH DOMINATED THE "LEADING", MODERN SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY;

(C) THE FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS, WHO PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE COUNTRY'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, AS WELL AS PROVIDING TECHNICAL EXPERTISE IN OTHER SECTORS. THOUGH THEY WERE NOT EXPELLED, THEIR DEPARTURE AND LOSS TO UGANDA RESULTED FROM THEIR ABHORRENCE OF SOME OF AMIN'S POLICIES AND HIS INABILITY TO PROVIDE AN ATMOSPHERE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE VOLUNTEER TO CARRY OUT THEIR ASSIGNMENTS;
(D) THE FOREIGN MISSIONARIES, WHO PROVIDE A GREAT DEAL OF THE MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL (AS WELL AS RELIGIOUS) SERVICES OF THE COUNTRY, MOSTLY FREE OF CHARGE, AS WELL AS FINANCING EDUCATIONAL AND MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE RURAL AREAS WHERE THESE TEND TO BE NEGLECTED BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.


4. THE QUESTION IS: WILL AMIN "GET AWAY WITH IT," AS PEOPLE ARE FOND OF ASKING: THAT IS, WILL UGANDA SURVIVE HIS XENOPHOBIA?
SOME OBSERVERS OF THE AFRICAN SCENE ARE QUITE FEARFUL THAT AMIN WILL BE "SUCCESSFUL" AND THAT HE WILL THEREBY SET A VERY BAD EXAMPLE FOR THE REST OF AFRICA TO IMITATE. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THESE FEARS ARE NOT WELL-FOUNDED: HE PROBABLY WILL "GET AWAY WITH IT" IN THE SENSE THAT HE WILL ACHIEVE THE EXPULSION OF MOST OF THE NON-UGANDANS WHO INHABITED THE COUNTRY AT THE BEGINNING OF 1972, BUT WE VERY MUCH DOUBT THAT UGANDA OR THE UGANDANS WILL BE ANY BETTER OFF FOR ALL THAT. THE EXAMPLE THE GENERAL IS SETTING, IN OUR VIEW, IS PRECISELY HOW NOT TO RUN A COUNTRY.

US REACTIONS TO AND RELATIONS WITH THE AMIN REGIME.

AS FAR AS OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS HAVE BEEN CONCERNED, WHAT HAVE BEEN AMIN'S ACTIONS AND POLICIES THAT HAVE INVOLVED US MOST DIRECTLY?


(B) THE ASIAN EXPULSION WAS NOT AS BRUTAL AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED. THE FEARS OF SOME ABOUT LARGE NUMBERS OF MURDERS AND OTHER FORMS OF BRUTALITY WERE NOT REALIZED, FOR LUCK OR FORTUNE. BUT IT WAS A DRASTIC MOVE WHICH HAS DONE THE COUNTRY NO GOOD, AND IT HAS BEEN A SERIOUS INSTANCE OF THE DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE WAS NOT MUCH WE COULD DO ABOUT IT AT THE TIME, AND THERE IS NOT MUCH THAT ANYONE CAN DO ABOUT IT TODAY, AS IT APPEARS TODAY TO BE A CLOSED AND DARK CHAPTER IN UGANDA'S MODERN HISTORY.

(C) THE "DRACtic DECISION" PROMISED BY THE GENERAL AGAINST THE BRITISH IS ONLY NOW UNFOLDING, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THAT IT WILL END UP BEING MORE SERIOUS THAN IT SEEMS TODAY, AS HAS...
Not to be reproduced without the authorization of the Executive Secretary.
GENERAL'S IMMEDIATE ATTENTION: THESE "TIME-BOMBS" INCLUDE:

(A) OUR HISTORICAL AND QUITE EVIDENT CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AS THAT COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL MILITARY, FINANCIAL, AND POLITICAL SUPPORTER. AMIN IS SO VIOLENTLY ANTI-ISRAELI THAT HIS WRATH AGAINST THEM MAY IN TURN BE DIRECTED AT US AS ISRAEL'S FRIEND.

(B) THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANTI-AMIN ELEMENTS IN THE US MAY ENGINEER A BOYCOTT OF UGANDAN COFFEE BY AMERICAN BUYERS. THIS WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO BRING AMIN'S WRATH DOWN ON US EVEN THOUGH WE HAD PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE AFFAIR.

(C) THE LAWSUITS NOW BEING PURSUED IN NEW YORK BY ISRAELI FIRMS WHICH ARE OWED MONEY BY AMIN'S GOVERNMENT. THE USG IS LIABLE TO GET CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF ONE OR MORE OF THESE SUITS AGAIN WITH THE CHANCES GOOD THAT AMIN WILL TURN ON US WHETHER WE ARE INNOCENT (NOT INVOLVED) OR NOT.

(D) AMIN'S NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY SUCH AS HARRY ENDEL'S ITS FIRM MIGHT EVENTUALLY TRIGGER THE HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT, WHICH WOULD BE REGARDED BY AMIN AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT.

(E) OUR UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO PROVIDE UGANDA ANY FURTHER AID MAY STIMULATE THE GENERAL TO WRITE US OFF AS WORSE THAN USELESS, WITH OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR CONTINUED PRESENCE HERE.

7. IN CONCLUSION IT SEEMS FAIR TO SAY THAT MOST OF THESE POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE SMOOTH COURSE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH UGANDA ARE LARGELY MATTERS OUTSIDE USG CONTROL. THERE IS NO REASON TO HOPE THAT WE WILL BE MORE FORTUNATE THAN WERE THE ISRAELIS AND THE BRITISH, WHO WERE ALSO DONE IN PRIMARILY BY DEVELOPMENTS OVER WHICH THEY COULD EXERCISE LITTLE OR NO INFLUENCE. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE STEPS QUIETLY TO REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF AMERICANS IN UGANDA TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND TAKE OTHER APPROPRIATE STEPS THAT WILL ASSURE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN CASE AMIN RESUMES THE ATTACK ON US.

GDS DEC 1980

MELADY

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
May 4, 2006
UGANDA: WILL AMIN SURVIVE?

Uganda's deteriorating internal situation and worsening relations with neighboring states have cast new doubt on President Idi Amin's ability to survive. His base of support, the army, is increasingly restless. According to one report, he is considering stepping down, though retaining control behind the scenes. Other reports say that he was asked to resign by members of the military and that his reaction was to order their assassination. One minister has resigned, and another may soon follow suit. Executions of alleged guerrillas and arbitrary military behavior in general have apparently weakened Amin's support among rural Ugandans, who form nine-tenths of the population.

East African Frictions. Last week's crisis over the disappearance of Kenyans working in Uganda was eased by President Kenyatta's personal intervention with Amin. Amin's relations with Tanzania remain strained. As long as former Ugandan President Obote and his followers stay in Tanzania, there is the risk that the Ugandan army may try a "preemptive strike" against the exiles. Finally, Uganda's troubles threaten the East African Community, which provides common rail, air, and other services to the three East African countries. Only concerted action by Kenyatta and Tanzanian President Nyerere may prevent its breakup.
Amin's Personality. Amin is often portrayed as a buffoon and a "grossly over-promoted Warrant Officer." But his native shrewdness has enabled him to outmaneuver better-educated military rivals and sophisticated politicians. As a member of a minority tribe (the Kakwa, one of the largest contingents in the army) and a minority religion (Islam), Amin once was viewed as a neutral arbitrator between Uganda's two major, warring tribal groups. He has recently been accused of attempting to "Islamize" Uganda by eliminating Christians who have hitherto dominated the government.

The Future of Uganda. Ten years ago Uganda was one of Africa's most promising countries. Today it is one of the worst-governed. But alternatives to Amin are few. Obote remains unpopular. The likeliest successor would be another officer, but he would have to win the backing of an army which has been unreliable since it was rewarded for a mutiny in 1964.

Whoever is in charge will be hard put to solve the financial problems created by large defense expenditures and to cope with economic stagnation, which has been aggravated by the Asian exodus and moves against Western economic interests. Western influence in Uganda has declined as Arab influence has grown. But the phasing out of UK, Canadian, Norwegian, and now US assistance has not been counterbalanced by aid received from Libya, Egypt, and other Arab countries.

Implications for the US. The major US interest in Uganda is the safety of the approximately 570 American citizens who still reside there. This number will drop as the USAID program is ended and as missionaries are encouraged to leave. One possible scenario with implications for the
US would be a confrontation between Christians and Muslims or between antagonistic ethnic groups. Uganda, an English-speaking country with extensive academic links with US Africanists and longstanding missionary ties, is more familiar to Americans than, say, French-speaking Burundi. A bloody internal upheaval or repression, therefore, might arouse attention and indignation in the US, as the Biafran issue did a few years ago.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET |

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: US Aid Phase-out in Uganda

As a result of the further deterioration of the security situation in Uganda, the Department of State wishes to complete the phase-out of American assistance. The internal situation in Uganda continues to be marked by violence. This has led to a serious deterioration in security and resulted in the disappearance or flight of many of Uganda's educated people. Even some of General Amin's civilian Ministers are getting out of the country, fearful that Amin's unruly army will turn on them next. So far, Westerners have generally escaped harm, but many fear that sooner or later Amin will be assassinated, unleashing bloodshed from which foreigners will find it difficult to escape. The modern sector of the economy is also in a shambles, as a result of the expulsion of Asians and Europeans and ongoing nationalizations.

Ambassador Thomas Melady believes that the situation in Uganda has now reached the point where we should reduce our presence and programs as quickly as possible. Melady feels that as long as Amin controls the army, which he apparently does at the present time, he can remain on top unless an assassination occurs. State agrees with Ambassador Melady and wants to proceed with the phase-out of our bilateral AID program, hoping to complete it by July 1.

Our Ambassador was recalled as a result of an unwarranted cable sent to you by Amin after the signature of the Peace Agreement. Amin's cable (Tab A) accused us of being the aggressors in Vietnam and said that we had to rebuild North Vietnam. State recommends sending Melady back to supervise our AID withdrawal and to encourage Americans to leave. Furthermore, his return would lessen the negative impact on General Amin of the paring down of our presence. After the AID phase-out is completed, however, State will probably recommend that our Embassy in Kampala be headed by a Charge. With the withdrawal of AID personnel,
the U.S. presence in Uganda will be down from 1,000 Americans there last summer to under 450, which includes 400 private citizens, mainly missionary families.

Recommendation:

That you approve Ambassador Melady’s returning to Uganda to oversee the phasing out of our bilateral aid program.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A - Text of telegram to the President from General Amin on the signing of the Vietnam Peace Agreement.

"Absolutely not. - Cut to a 100 maximum for all four agencies."

SECRET/HQDS (1)

PRESERVATION COPY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Return of Ambassador Melady to Uganda

I understand and share your reluctance to have Ambassador Melady return to Uganda to avoid dignifying the Amin regime with the presence of your personal representative.

Nonetheless, I would ask that the decision be reconsidered with a view to insuring to the extent possible the safety of American citizens during the phase-out of our AID program in Uganda and withdrawal of our 120 AID-related personnel, which will be completed by June 30. Given President Amin's paranoiac behavior, we hope to manage this operation quietly in such a way as to avoid incurring his wrath against the 570 American citizens in Uganda, 200 of whom are missionaries and their families. Because of the host of problems we have had with the Amin regime and his unpredictability, I believe we might be running a serious risk of aggravating Amin personally by reflecting our strong official displeasure toward him at this critical time.

I would therefore recommend that Ambassador Melady be allowed to return to Uganda until the end of June to oversee our AID withdrawal, at which time we would then reduce our representation to the Charge level in keeping with your and our basic outlook toward the Amin regime.

William P. Rogers

GDS—DECLAS Dec. 31, 1981

PRESERVATION COPY
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Return of US Ambassador to Uganda

Secretary Rogers has sent the memorandum at Tab A asking that you reconsider your decision (as shown at Tab B) not to send Ambassador Melady back to Uganda. The Secretary argues that withdrawal of our Ambassador might set off Amin against our 570 Americans and make it difficult for us to quietly reduce our presence there. Rogers states that he understands why you do not want Melady back, but in a scribed note says that Amin "is crazy and we have to recognize it."

We held up action on the Rogers reclama because of a subsequent cable from Kampala on the security situation in Uganda. Our Charge feared that Amin, who has glorified the Palestinian guerrillas, would not deter the Black September movement from acting against our personnel in Kampala. The Palestinian threat now appears to have been exaggerated, however, although the internal security situation in Uganda remains as precarious as ever.

While I concurred with State's earlier recommendation that Melady return because he could coordinate our phase-down better, and possibly deflect Amin's attention from our activities, I no longer agree. Melady's absence has not resulted in harm to our personnel, nor hampered our phase-out activities in any apparent way. Melady left Uganda on February 9.

RECOMMENDATION

That you disapprove Secretary Rogers' reclama that you reconsider your decision not to send Ambassador Melady back to Uganda.

Agree , Disagree , Melady may return for a few months.

Attachments:
Tab A - Memo from Secretary Rogers to President, March 9
Tab B - President's previous decision (Kissinger-President memo, March 6)
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Two More Telegrams from Ugandan President Amin

On July 3 General Amin sent telegrams to Presidents Nixon and Lon Nol which criticize in insulting terms United States policies in Cambodia and elsewhere. Although we usually simply ignore Amin's steady stream of vituperation, these are perhaps his most obnoxious messages yet involving the President and they clearly call for a firm reaction on our part.

The Department spokesman on July 5 termed Amin's messages totally unacceptable in both substance and tone. He noted that Ambassador Melady, who has been here on consultation for five months now, will not be returning to Kampala and that under present circumstances, we have no intention to nominate a new ambassador.

On July 6 the Department called in the Ugandan Charge to reject Amin's assertions which grossly distort our foreign policies, to question whether Uganda wishes to reciprocate our desire for good relations, and to inform the Charge of our decision not to appoint a new ambassador at this time. Our own Charge in Kampala has delivered a similar written and oral protest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The American presence in Uganda continues to shrink. Practically all of our AID employees have departed and our Embassy staff is down to 12 essential employees and their families plus six Marine Guards. The private American community numbers about 280.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
July 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Uganda President Amin Continues to Hold Peace Corps Volunteers

A Peace Corps contingent of 112 Volunteers traveling via East African Airways charter for duty in Zaire was detained Saturday in Uganda and continues to be held by President Amin. At 1500 Uganda time today our Embassy in Kampala was informed by an official of East African Airways that while the aircraft reportedly had been granted permission to leave, the Peace Corps Volunteers had not. Instead they were transferred from the airport to the Lake Victoria Hotel. Amin has reportedly taken personal control of the situation and stated he would give word for the release of the Volunteers at an opportune time.

There are no rational explanations for Amin's action. They are in keeping with his well known irrational behavior pattern. He is almost paranoid about mercenaries and his decision apparently was triggered by an intelligence report that there were possibly arms, ammunition, and mercenaries on board the aircraft. He may have considered it odd that they would even transit his country since we have withdrawn our Peace Corps contingent from Uganda. In fact, a transit stop in Uganda reportedly was not in the original charter but was necessitated when the projected stop (Bujumbura airport) ran out of fuel.

Amin reportedly has cabled Kinshasa, Bujumbura, Nairobi, President Gowon of Nigeria in his capacity as President of OAU, and OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa to obtain confirmation that the Volunteers were indeed on their way to Zaire where they had been invited to serve by the Government. He probably will wait until he receives responses to these cables before releasing the Volunteers.

State is making strong representations designed to insure that these responses are prompt and forceful. Thus far President Mobuto of Zaire has responded directly to Amin via cable confirming the legitimacy of the Volunteers. He also plans to send his foreign minister to Kampala tomorrow.
The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs has had two conversations with Uganda's Charge, who has telephoned his Government on the matter.

As for the Peace Corps Volunteers, our Embassy in Kampala reports that they are in good spirits and generally good health, if a little weary, and are accompanied at all times by an Embassy official.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Amin Detains 111 Peace Corps Volunteers

In the aftermath of his detention of 111 Peace Corps Volunteers ultimately destined for Zaire last weekend, President Amin called in our Charge July 10 and declared that he had wanted to assure himself that their plane flying to Burundi would not worsen the situation in that area. He offered no apologies for his action and sought to make a virtue of the fact that the Volunteers were well treated. The Department has instructed the Charge to deliver a firm oral and written protest to the Foreign Ministry and request an explanation and we already have called in the Ugandan Charge here to make a similar demarche.

While our overall problems with the Amin regime are not likely to diminish nor are our relations likely to improve, we believe that the experience of this latest incident effectively demonstrates the importance of maintaining our present minimum diplomatic presence in Uganda. Our Charge and his small staff helped ensure the welfare of the Volunteers at all times and the Embassy kept us abreast of developments, thus making it possible for the Department to give parents, journalists and Congressmen timely reassurance. While our efforts in Kampala may have had little direct effect on Amin himself, our access to Foreign Ministry, East African Airways and other officials on the spot was highly useful.

Moreover, we may well need our Embassy for such purposes again. There still are some 260 private Americans in the country, most of them missionaries whom Amin periodically accuses of being engaged in subversive activities financed by the CIA. A rupture
of relations would not reduce the amount of verbal abuse Amin showers upon us nor have any other salutary effect on our bilateral relations. On the contrary, it would deprive us of our still significant ability to aid Americans in Uganda, to exert what limited leverage we have on the Ugandan Government, and to maintain any contact with the Ugandan people, with whom we have long-established and friendly ties in many quarters. Moreover, it would be viewed even by some friendly African governments and by some elements of the American public as a petty response to outrageous remarks by an irrational demagogue.

We are continuing to advise Americans who inquire against traveling to Uganda, and have so informed a large contingent planning to attend an international YMCA conference next week in Kampala.

Kenneth Rush
Acting Secretary
SUBJECT: USG-GOU RELATIONS - MEETING WITH ETIANG

1. AF/E DIRECTOR COOTE MET WITH UGANDAN MIN STATE FOR FON AFFAIRS ETIANG AND UN PERM REP IBINGIRA OCTOBER 18 IN LATTER'S OFFICE. MEETING WAS VERY CORDIAL AND IBINGIRA COMMENTED AT END THAT HE THOUGHT DISCUSSION WAS MOST WORTHWHILE.

2. COOTE EXPLAINED TO ETIANG THAT, AS WE HAD RECENTLY TOLD UGANDAN CHARGE MWANGAGUHUNGA AND AMB IBINGIRA, USG WANTED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH GOU IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. THERE WAS BRIEF PERIOD FOLLOWING GOU RELEASE OF PLANE TRANSPORTING PCV'S TO ZAIRE WHEN WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY PRES AMIN'S SLIGHTLY POSITIVE STATEMENTS RE HIS DESIRE HAVE GOOD RELA-
TIONS WITH US. HOWEVER, HIS RECENT STATEMENTS WERE MUCH
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 208637
MORE HOSTILE, CULMINATING IN THREAT TO CHARGE KEELEY IN
PRESENCE UGANDAN PRESS AND TV REPS THAT IF USG BECAME
INVOLVED IN ME WAR, HE WOULD PUT ALL AMCITS IN UGANDA,
INCLUDING CHARGE, IN PRISON. ASSERTING THAT SUCH STATEMENT
WAS INTOLERABLE, AF/E DIRECTOR STRESSED THAT WE EXPECTED
GOU TO RESPECT DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY OF US EMBASSY PERSONNEL
AT ALL TIMES AND TO ACCORD PROTECTION TO ALL AMCITS IN
COUNTRY.
2. ETIANG SAID HE WAS PRESENT AT MEETING AT WHICH AMIN
MADE SUCH THREATENING STATEMENT. HE EXPLAINED THAT AMIN
BECAME HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ON SUBJECT OF ISRAEL, AND HIS
STATEMENT WAS EMOTIONAL, OFF-THE-CUFF REMARK IN HEAT OF
MOMENT WITHOUT PRIOR CONSIDERATION. ETIANG WAS QUITE
CERTAIN AMIN DID NOT THEN, NOR DOES HE NOW, HAVE ANY
INTENTION TO ARREST OR IMPRISON OFFICIAL OR OTHER
AMERICANS IN UGANDA. TO EMPHASIZE HIS POINT, MIN STATE
REFERRED TO SEVERAL DIRE THREATS WHICH AMIN MADE RE
ASIANS PRIOR TO THEIR EXPULSION WHICH WERE FOR PSYCHO-
LOGICAL EFFECT ONLY AND NEVER CARRIED OUT. ETIANG COULD
ASSURE US THAT "HE THOUGHT" NO AMERICANS WOULD BE
IMPRISONED BECAUSE OF U.S. ROLE IN ME CONFLICT.
4. WHILE HOPING THIS WOULD BE THE CASE, COOTE SAID THAT
USG OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT DISMISs OUT OF HAND PUBLIC THREAT
BY CHIEF OF STATE AND RESULTANT UNACCEPTABLE RISKS AMCITS
FACE IN UGANDA. WE CONTINUED TO WANT TO MAINTAIN RELA-
TIONS WITH UGANDA AND HAD NO INTENTION OF BREAKING RELA-
TIONS OR WITHDRAWING OUR DIPLOMATIC MISSION FROM UGANDA
AT THIS TIME. NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO REDUCE RISKS
(WHICH WOULD BE INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES), WE PLANNED TO
PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO REDUCE STAFF OF US MISSION FURTHER
AND TO MOVE DEPENDENTS OF OFFICIAL PERSONNEL OUT OF
UGANDA. FOR SAME REASON, WE WERE ADVISING PRIVATE AMCITS
THAT THEY SERIOUSLY CONSIDER LEAVING COUNTRY.
5. ETIANG COMMENTED THAT US EMBASSY STAFF WAS ALREADY SO
SMALL THAT THERE WOULD BE PRACTICALLY NO ONE LEFT IF WE
REDUCED IT FURTHER. HE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT WE WOULD
RECONSIDER OUR DECISION. COOTE REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 STATE 208637
STILL BE SEVERAL PEOPLE THERE, WHO WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP
IN TOUCH WITH GOU ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. FUTURE
DECISIONS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON ATTITUDE AND
ACTIONS OF GOU. AF/E DIRECTOR TOOK THIS OCCASION TO
EXPRESS TO ETIANG USG’S APPRECIATION FOR ETIANG’S WILLING-
NESS AT ALL TIMES TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS WITH CHARGE AND HIS
EFFORTS BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.
6. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO SUBJECT OF AMIN'S FORTH-
COMING VISIT TO US RE WHICH AF/E DIRECTOR AND UGANDAN
OFFICIALS DISCUSSED POTENTIAL PROBLEMS. SINCE AMIN HAS
DECIDED NOT TO MAKE TRIP, SUBSTANCE OF THIS PART OF DIS-
CUSSION WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN MEMCON RATHER THAN BY
CABLE. RUSH
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1973, 3:15 P.M.

PRESENT

The Secretary of State: HENRY A. KISSINGER

KENNETH RUSH
CURTIS TARR
JACK B. KUBISCH
WILLIAM J. CASEY
JOSEPH J. SISCO
ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.
DAVID D. NEWSOM
GEORGE S. SPRINGSTEEN
WINSTON LORD
ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY
THOMAS R. PICKERING
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Finally, we have a combination of the sublime and the ridiculous in Africa in General Amin's latest declaration. At his UN Day speech, after finishing his speech, the General picked up another piece of paper and declared that "At nine a.m. this morning, East Africa Time, which is six a.m. Greenwich Time, I had an inspiration from God." The inspiration was that there ought to be a cease-fire in the Middle East.

But more seriously, this illustrates --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's how Rush conducts his staff meetings.

MR. RUSH: By inspiration.

MR. NEWSOM: We feel increasingly that this man is totally unbalanced and poses a threat to our citizens in Uganda.
We have now reduced our Embassy to fourteen people, which is a hard core of the necessary officers for an Embassy in that country. However, we do now feel that there is really no purpose to be served by keeping our people there, and we have reached the conclusion in AF that we should get our people out -- not break off diplomatic relations, but close the Embassy, leave it to them as to whether they keep their Embassy in Washington open. But the last thing that General Amin did was to announce that any American who did not have an identity card would be arrested.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, I saw that.

MR. NEWSOM: Unless you have other feelings on this, Mr. Secretary, I think we will move in that direction.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no other feelings.

[Omitted here are portions of the discussion unrelated to Uganda.]
ACTION: POL
INFO AMB DEM
ECON POL-II CHRON

29 JAN 75 1100

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COPY

R 230003Z JAN 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFNOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9825
INFO RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4144
RUGM1/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 6932
RUSH/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1156

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652: REST
TAGS: PFOR, US, UG
SUBJECT: US-UGANDAN RELATIONS

REF: (A) BONN 877; (B) USUN 244; (C) NAIROBI 775

1. GENERAL AMIN APPEARS TO BE ACCELERATING HIS CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH U.S., AND PRESUMABLY AGAIN BECOME RECIPIENT OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. ASSISTANCE. IN ADDITION TO HIS APPROACH TO FRG AMBASSADOR REPORTED REFTEL (A), HE HAS PROPOSED DIRECTLY TO USG THROUGH HIS REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON AND NY TO SEND A SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO DISCUSS IMPROVED U.S.-UGANDAN RELATIONS; AND HE HAS HAD HIS PERM REP IN NY ISSUE PRESS RELEASE QUOTING STATEMENT BY AMIN OF INTENTION TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH U.S. (REFTEL B).

2. AS PRELIMINARY REPLY TO REFTEL (A) EMBASSY IS AUTHORIZED TO INFORM FRG OF DIRECT GOV APPROACH AND OUR RESPONSE. ON JAN. 9 UGANDAN PERMREP KINEE, ACCOMPANIED BY UGANDAN CHANCE, CALLED ON ACTING AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MULCAHY. KINEE TRANSMITTED ORAL MESSAGE FROM AMIN THAT GOV WISHED "NEW CHAPTER" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND PROPOSED THAT A SPECIAL ENVOY MUSTAPHA RAMATHAN (FORMER UGANDAN AMB. TO U.S. AND PRESENTLY MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES AND MARKETING) TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS ALL ASPECTS OF U.S.-UGANDAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING REOPENING OF AMERICAN EMBASSY IN KAMPALA.

3. ON JAN. 24 MULCAHY CONVEYED OUR RESPONSE TO CHARGE. LATTER WAS TOLD THAT A DEPT. OFFICIAL (UNSPECIFIED) WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET WITH RAMATHAN AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE IN EARLY FEBRUARY. MULCAHY MADE IT CLEAR THAT DECISION TO RECEIVE RAMATHAN DID NOT RPT NOT IN ANY WAY IMPLY THAT USG HAD REACHED ANY DECISION CONCERNING FUTURE OF ITS RELATIONS WITH UGANDA OR THAT USG INTENDED TO RE-
OPEN EMBASSY IN KAMPALA. NO DECISION, MULCAHY SAID, WOULD BE MADE UNTIL AFTER TALKS WITH EMISSARY.

4. EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE IT EQUALLY CLEAR TO FRG THAT DECISION TO RECEIVE ENVOY CARRIES NO IMPLICATIONS OF CLOSER US RELATIONS WITH GOV. VISIT WILL SIMPLY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS BILATERAL ISSUES IN DEPTH AND TO EXPRESS DIRECTLY TO HIGH-LEVEL UGANDAN OUR CONCERN OVER REPORTED VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA. RECEIPT OF ENVOY DOES INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS NOT TO REJECT OUT OF HAND AMIN'S INITIATIVE.

5. FYI ONLY: DEPT.'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT IS THAT IT IS NOT RPT NOT IN U.S. INTEREST TO MAKE EARLY RETURN TO UGANDA FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. IT IS QUITE APPARENT AMIN'S PRIME MOTIVE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS IS DESIRE FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. Owing to higher priorities elsewhere, such assistance now is not in cards. Diversion of limited aid resources to assist such an unsympathetic and erratic government cannot be justified either in terms those higher priorities or limited US interests in Uganda.

B. EFFECTIVENESS AND SECURITY OF OFFICIAL AMERICAN PERSONNEL WOULD REMAIN A PROBLEM. AMIN'S PARANOID RHETORIC WOULD BE STIMULATED RATHER THAN SOFTENED BY "UNDERFOOT" PRESENCE OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN HIS CAPITAL CITY. THEY WOULD, AS PREVIOUSLY, BE READY TARGET FOR VERBAL AND POSSIBLY OTHER ABUSE. MOREOVER, GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUING ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC, IT SEEMS QUITE UNLIKELY THAT US EMBASSY PERSONNEL WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN FRUITFUL RELATIONS WITH UGANDA CONTACTS OR ENJOY FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

C. UNQUESTIONABLY THERE HAVE BEEN WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA, INCLUDING MASS MURDER AND TORTURE. SUCH VIOLATIONS CONTINUE, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT SO EXTENSIVELY, WE WOULD BE UNNECESSARILY EXPOSING OURSELVES TO STRONG ADVERSE CRITICISM IF WE WERE TO GO BACK INTO KAMPALA NOW AND THUS GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF SUPPORTING AMIN.

THERE IS NOTHING IN AMIN'S PRESENT ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS TO GIVE USG CAUSE TO THINK THAT IT WOULD BE ABLE TO EXERT CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON AMIN.
6. THESE AND OTHER REASONS UNDERLIE CURRENT US VIEW RE DESIRABILITY OF REOPENING US EMBASSY IN KAMPALA AT THIS TIME. NEVERTHELESS, WE PLAN TO RECEIVE MINISTER, WHO IS FRIEND OF U.S., CORDIALLY, AND HAVE FRANK AND FULL DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. END FYI. KISSINGER
After welcoming Minister Ramathan and his colleagues, Ambassador Mulcahy informed the Ugandans that the messages from President Amin to President Ford had been forwarded to the White House. Referring to the invitation for the Secretary to address the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, Mr. Coote asked if the other African countries were aware of Amin's issuance of the invitation and whether similar invitations had been, or would be, extended to dignitaries from other non-member countries. The Minister responded that the decision to invite the Secretary was taken in consultation with other OAU members and that consideration was being given to inviting UN Secretary-General Waldheim and possibly some other world leaders to address the OAU Summit.

Minister Ramathan went on to explain the situation in Uganda since the military takeover in January 1971. The Government of Uganda, he explained, has faced a situation of chaos and havoc brought by enemies of the regime both internal and external.
Supporters of former President Milton Obote, who is now living in Tanzania, staged an unsuccessful attack against Uganda in 1972. In addition, disloyal elements in both the Cabinet and the Civil Service have attempted to sabotage and undermine the working of President Amin's government at all levels. Throughout this turmoil, people in Uganda "disappeared." To contain the situation, the entire administration of the country had to be reorganized. Ten new provinces with sub-districts were created replacing the four former kingdoms. There have been thousands of new appointments in the civil service, among local chiefs, and of local subdistrict commissioners.

The declaration of "economic war" in 1972 also led to enormous disruption. Some 60,000 non-Ugandans, mostly British nationals, were expelled from Uganda and their assets were seized by the Government. The shops and businesses were then distributed to Ugandans. Sources of foreign economic assistance and private investment dried up. Foreign manufacturers demanded pre-payment for exports of supplies, machinery, parts, and medicines to Uganda. As spare parts and tools necessary to operate the factories became unavailable, Ugandan manufacturers have had to slow down or cease their operations. Throughout this period Uganda has had to service her external debts, placing an additional economic burden on the country.

Minister Ramathan stated that no one was more concerned about the people who have "disappeared" than the Ugandans themselves. All available manpower is needed for the vital work of rebuilding the Ugandan economy. In addition, the adverse publicity has hurt Uganda's international image and has discouraged foreign economic assistance and private investment.

The situation in Uganda has now stabilized, the Minister said. There are no longer "disappearances" of people. The government was now operating as "one team" at all levels and local government was in harmony with the central government. He said that Uganda would welcome the return of the exiles living abroad.

Ramathan stated that Uganda fully intends to pay compensation to those whose assets were nationalized during the "economic war" after evaluating the claims. However, in order to do this, Uganda needs to rebuild a healthy economy and reha*tilate factories and industry. For this, foreign exchange is necessary.

The Minister then reviewed Uganda's relations with other countries. Uganda strongly supports the East African Community, he stated. Uganda and Tanzania have had political problems between them; primarily because of the support President Nyerere
has given to the aspirations of Milton Obote to return to power in Uganda. He stated that Ugandan relations with Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire were uniformly good.

Uganda's differences with Israel, he said, were on economic grounds.

The Minister stated that Uganda is not opposed to Jews as such, but that President Amin did urge the return of occupied territories and recognition of the P.L.O. He said that Amin welcomed the U.S. initiative for peace in the Mid-East. Regarding the UK, Ramathan stated that the British had been insincere in their dealings with Uganda but that their differences were negotiable on a bilateral basis. Uganda intends to remain in the Commonwealth and to improve relations with Great Britain with whom Uganda presently has good trade relations. He said the Ugandan line towards Rhodesia and South Africa was a matter of record. On U.S.-Ugandan relations, the Minister said that President Amin's letter frankly expressed his position. President Amin desired friendly relations with the United States and would like to see us reopen our Embassy in Kampala. Ramathan reiterated that Uganda is seeking no aid from the United States and recognizes that the decision to reopen the Embassy is for the United States alone to make.

In response, Ambassador Mulcahy commented that the circumstances which forced us to close our Embassy were regrettable and we too looked forward to an improvement in relations. He pointed out, however, that diplomatic relations between the United States and Uganda had never been broken and that we had encouraged the Ugandans to keep its Embassy in Washington open. We were pleased that they did so, and we have been keeping in touch with the Ugandan Charge.

Noting that one of the purposes of this meeting, as expressed by Mr. Sisco, was to have a frank discussion of some of the remaining problems, both real and potential, in our relations, Mr. Coote commented that the American press is likely to remain critical of General Amin as long as he persists in making some of the statements and taking some of the actions which he does. Amin has responded in the past to a bad press in both the UK and the U.S. by severely lecturing the resident diplomatic representatives of these countries. Since Amin is easily upset by the press and the bad press is bound to continue, as illustrated by the Jack Anderson column in today's Washington Post, there is no guarantee that our diplomatic personnel, were we to reopen our Embassy in Kampala, would be subjected to similar verbal lashings and embarrassment as in the past. It is important that the Ugandan leadership not confuse the views of the press with those of the U.S. Government.
Mr. Coote stated that there is evidence that President Amin continues to be highly suspicious of the United States and its motives. This was most recently revealed by the letter which Amin sent to the Chairman of the OAU, with copies to other Arab and African leaders as well as to President Ford, that U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean were there either to take over some of the Arab oil areas or to assist the South Africans. These ships, Mr. Coote added, were merely paying a friendly call at the port of Mombasa in Kenya. If Amin had taken the time to look into the matter, he could easily have discovered this. We remain concerned of Amin's strong suspicions of Americans, many of whom he believes are "Israeli spies" or "CIA agents." A U.S. Embassy in Kampala would have a very difficult time operating in an atmosphere of suspicion and repeated baseless accusations of spy activity.

Referring to the many letters which his office was continuing to receive on the subject, Mr. Coote stated that there was a strong feeling both in Congress and among the American public over the internal situation in Uganda and an apparent lack of concern for human rights. Many of these letters urged that we take stronger action against the Ugandan Government, including an economic boycott. We have resisted the latter course and still continue to purchase much of Uganda's coffee. Mr. Coote said he raised these various problems in our relationship as a friend, so that they would be understood and given careful study. It was only through such an approach that we could achieve better relations, which we all wish to see.

Ambassador Mulcahy referred to the report of the highly respected International Commission of Jurists on human rights violations in Uganda and requested the Ugandans' views on the report, adding that he felt Uganda was mistaken in refusing to admit the jurists into the country. The Ugandans responded that the report exaggerated the situation and that most of the alleged violations occurred during or as a result of defending against a foreign invasion from Tanzania. The Ugandan UN Permanent Representative stated that Uganda was undertaking its own investigation led by an Asian non-Ugandan judge of reports of human rights violations in Uganda and that following the investigation, there would be a full report. Ambassador Mulcahy inquired whether any foreign journalists were stationed in Uganda. The Minister of Information responded that there were none permanently there. Mulcahy urged the Ministers to consider how much good it would do for Uganda's image to treat journalists well and enable them to explain Uganda's policies and problems to the world.
Mr. Coote asked for an explanation of the arms build-up in East Africa. The Ugandan delegation responded that Uganda has strengthened her forces to defend against the possibility of foreign attack. They emphasized that Uganda has no intent of aggressive action.

Ambassador Mulcahy mentioned that we understand the importance of economic independence and recognized the right of countries to nationalize foreign assets. Nevertheless he wished to call to their attention our particular interest in the settlement of the claim of the International Television Sales, Ltd., the one U.S. firm in Uganda which had been nationalized. We have raised this case with the Ugandan authorities several times during the past two and a half years, but so far without success. We would hope that the Ugandan Government could act promptly in paying a reasonable compensation. The Ugandans noted this and said they would examine the problem upon their return to Kampala.

Minister Ramathan and the Ugandan delegation expressed their appreciation for the frank exchange of views. The Minister stated that the concerns of the United States had been noted and that they will be carefully studied by his Government.

In closing the discussion Ambassador Mulcahy thanked the delegation for the time and trouble they had taken to come here. It was a token of President Amin's sincere desire to restore good relations. A full report of the exchanges would be prepared and sent up for study. In due course, he said, the Department would be in touch with the Ugandan Government through diplomatic channels.
ACTION COPY

ACTION TAKEN

ACTION

RECIPIENT

R I 007Z0Z SEP 75
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2736
INFO RUQMNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0240
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0078
RUTAOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0070
RUTAVC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0159
RUQMAB/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0248
RUQM/K/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0147
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0146
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE 0052
BT

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, GW, EINV
SUBJECT: AMERICAN INTERESTS IN UGANDA

REFS: (A) STATE 205335; (B) STATE 210994;
(C) BONN 14732

SUMMARY: THE FRG AMBASSADOR IN KAMPALA STRONGLY URGES THE US TO REOPEN ITS EMBASSY IN KAMPALA TO COUNTER GROWING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE. HE SAID THAT AMIN WANTS AMERICAN DIPLOMATS BACK IN UGANDA AND THAT THEY WOULD BE SAFE. END SUMMARY.

1. EMBASSY OFFICERS MET WITH DANNENBRING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE FRG AMBASSADOR TO UGANDA, ELLERKMANN, TO TRANSMIT DEPARTMENT'S REPORTING LIST (REF A) AND TO REQUEST THE GERMANS TO INFORM UGANDAN OFFICIALS THAT DEPARTMENT BELIEVES UGANDA WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR GSP IN 1976 (REF B).

2. AMBASSADOR ELLERKMANN STRONGLY URGED THAT THE US REESTABLISH AT LEAST A minimal PRESENCE IN UGANDA. HE ARGUED THAT ONLY THE US CAN COUNTERACT GROWING RUSSIAN ACTIVITY IN UGANDA WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE APPROXIMATELY 30 DIPLOMATS AND 300 MILITARY ADVISORS. IN HIS OPINION, THE RUSSIANS HAVE NO AFFECTION FOR AMIN OR UGANDA, BUT THEY ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THE PORT OF MBOSA AND IN EAST AFRICA GENERALLY BECAUSE OF THEIR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THEY ARE ALSO PREPARING FOR THE DAY WHEN KENYATTA no longer runs KENYA. A SECOND REASON FOR AMERICAN PRESENCE IS THAT AMIN WANTS THE US BACK BECAUSE HE NEEDS AMERICAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AFTER HAVING EXPELLED THE ASIANS AND MANY QUALIFIED AFRICANS. HE IS ALSO UNEASY ABOUT RELYING COMPLETELY ON THE USSR.

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
May 4, 2006
3. ELLERKMANN SAID THAT THE PRC IS VERY ACTIVE IN UGANDA. ITS 30-40 TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS WHO ARE TEACHING THE UGANDANS RICE FARMING ARE VERY SUCCESSFUL. THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREANS WHO ARE IN UGANDA, MAINLY TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES IN THE UN, SPEND A LOT OF TIME PLAYING ONE-UPMANSHIP WITH ONE ANOTHER.

4. EMBASSY OFFICIAL SAID THAT WE SEE NO SIGN THAT AMIN HAD CHANGED, AND WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE HIM THE CHANCE TO BLACKMAIL US BY AGAIN HARRASSING US PERSONNEL.

5. ELLERKMANN REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH "RULE OF LAW" DOES NOT EXIST IN UGANDA AND THAT UGANDANS HAVE NO PROTECTION FROM AMIN'S CAPRICE, AMERICAN AND EUROPEANS ARE SAFE (ELLERKMANN LEFT HIS FAMILY IN KAMPALA WHILE VISITING THE FRG).

6. COMMENTING ON AMIN, ELLERKMANN FOUND WESTERN PRESS REPORTING ON THE DICTATOR TO BE INADEQUATE. AMIN IS UNPREDICTABLE, BUT HE IS NOT INSANE OR STUPID. AND HE SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

7. ELLERKMANN THOUGHT THAT AMIN WOULD PROBABLY REMAIN IN CONTROL FOR THE RESEABLE FUTURE. MANY UGANDANS APPROVE HIS EXPULSION OF THE ASIANS. EVEN IN THE DENNIS HILLS AFFAIR, SOME TAKE THE POSITION THAT AMIN GOI WHAT HE WANTED, A VISIT BY CALLAGHAN TO AFRICA. MORE IMPORTANTLY HE HAS KILLED, EXPELLED, JAILED OR FRIGHTENED AWAY ALL OF HIS OPPONENTS. THOSE WHO REMAIN WHO MIGHT OPPOSE HIM INCLUDE SOME STUDENTS AT MAKERERE UNIVERSITY AND POSSIBLY SOME ARMY OFFICERS, BUT THEY ARE TOO FRIGHTENED TO DO ANYTHING. HOWEVER, AMIN, AN APPARENTLY SINCERE MOSLEM, MAY BE ALIENATING SOME UGANDANS BY PUSHING ISLAM TOO HARD AND BY PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR MEMBERS OF HIS OWN TRIBE. HILLENBRAND.
1. I was called in by Mobutu's senior advisor, Bisengimana, evening 11 Nov. His pitch is: Amin has asked Mobutu to arrange a meeting with a high level USG rep when Amin visits Kinshasa during the 10th anniversary celebrations on Nov 24.

2. Bisengimana made the following points in addition to those above:
   A. Amin told Mobutu that he had irrevocably broken with the Soviets, but now found himself without major power partners.
   B. Amin wants to "explain himself" to the USG and to "arrange everything" between Uganda and the United States.
   C. Amin complained to Mobutu that following the break with the Soviets he would have no source of military assistance. Mobutu promised to share with Amin "what little he had."

3. I reminded Bisengimana that he had told me previously that no special USG representative was expected on Nov 24 and that it would thus be very difficult, if not impossible, to crank up a high level delegate at this late date. I also recalled Amin's unacceptable remarks at the UN and our strong criticism of him as

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
A RESULT, AGAIN, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, I SAID, TO CONSIDER SERIOUS CONTACTS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. BISENGIMANA ALLOWED AS HOW THE USG SHOULD TAKE A "PRAGMATIC" APPROACH TO AMIN'S REQUEST AND EMPHASIZED THAT MOBUTU COULD ASSURE THAT AMIN WOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLICIZE THE FACT THAT HE HAD MET WITH A USG REP.

4. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONTACT WITH AMIN ARE OBVIOUS AND POWERFUL: HE WILL ASK FOR A RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS, ARMS AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE—EACH OF WHICH IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SEEMS OUT OF THE QUESTION. AND, IT WOULD BE POLITICAL DYNAMITE IF THE MEETING WERE TO BECOME KNOWN. YET IT IS IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF OUR POLICY IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND OUR AIMS IN ANGOLA THAT WE KEEP AMIN ON HIS PRESENT TRACK. IT IS DUE MAINLY TO MOBUTU THAT AMIN AND THE OAU HAS TURNED AROUND ON ANGOLA AND ON ISRAELI EXPULSION. NOW MOBUTU'S PRESTIGE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN INFLUENCING AMIN ARE ON THE LINE.

5. ON BALANCE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO MOBUTU'S REQUEST TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL REP TO THE NOV 24 CELEBRATION. WE SHOULD ALSO AGREE TO HAVE OUR REP MEET WITH AMIN, BUT ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS:
   A. WE COUNT ON MOBUTU TO ASSURE THAT THERE ARE NO LEAKS AS TO THE FACT OR THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONTACT.
   B. WE COME TO LISTEN AND HAVE NO INTENTION OF RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR RE-ESTABLISHING RELATIONS OR MIL/ECON ASSISTANCE.
   C. IF, AFTER THIS FIRST CONTACT, AMIN WISHES TO PURSUE A QUIET DIALOGUE, WE WOULD EXPECT A CHANGE IN HIS PUBLIC POSTURE ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US.

THE DEPARTMENT, I AM SURE, CAN COME UP WITH MORE AND EVEN BETTER PRE-CONDITIONS IN THE EVENT WE AGREE TO THE CONTACT.

WALKER
EVEN UNTIL DIRECT

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 1 / KINSHA 10163 252110Z

62 ACTION NGS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1391 M

0 251910Z NOV 05
FM AMBASSAD KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHOCT NIACI IMMEDIATE 5399

SECRET NO765

NODIS/CHEROKEE
FROM MULCAHY
E.O. 11652 XGDS-2
TAGS: PFO, AO, UG
SUBJECT: (MULCAHY MISSION:) MEETING WITH AMIN

1. I MET WITH AMIN ON 24 NOVEMBER. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
COL. SASUNI, MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND HEAD OF THE "DEFENSE
COUNCIL." ZAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BULA WAS THERE TOO.

AMIN HAD TWO BASIC THINGS ON HIS MIND: THE NEED FOR
IMPROVEMENT IN US-UGANDAN RELATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
CONTINUED AND EVEN MORE URGENT US HELP FOR FMLA/UNITA.
ON THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM, IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT MOBUTU (THROUGH
BULA) HAS BROUGHT AMIN AROUND TO HIS WAY OF THINKING AND
THE CHANCES SEEM GOOD FOR AN OAU SUMMIT ON THIS ISSUE BY
EARLY/MID-DECEMBER. ON THE DILATERAL SIDE, AMIN DID
NOT FAIL TO REQUEST ARMS, BUT HIS MAIN INTEREST SEEMED TO
BE IN GETTING SOME AMERICAN EXPERTS TO HELP HIM ASSESS/DEVELOP
COBALT, GOLD AND OTHER MINERAL DEPOSITS.

2. US-UGANDAN RELATIONS: AMIN REFERRED TO THE "MIS-
UNDERSTANDING" BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND SAID HE WAS
SURE THAT THINGS COULD BE SORTED OUT. HE HOPED THAT
I OR OTHER US REP COULD VISIT KAMPALA SOON WHEN WE COULD
HAVE THE TIME TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION AT LENGTH. AMIN
SAID HE WAS READY TO SEND A "SENIOR MAN" TO THE US AND
HE ALLUDED TO THE ZIONISM QUESTION BY POINTING OUT THAT HE

DECLASSIFIED
PA/HO Department of State
E.O. 12958, as amended
May 4, 2006
WAS NOT PERSONALLY ANTI-ISRAELI. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN TALKING TO THE EGYPTIANS AND TO ARAFAT AND THOUGHT THAT AN "ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION" TO THE ISRAELI PROBLEM WOULD BE WORKED OUT. AMIN THEN INSISTED THAT HE WAS NOT COMMITTED TO THE SOVIETS. "THEY WANTED ME TO BECOME A SOCIALIST IN RETURN FOR TWO SQUADRONS OF MIGS, BUT I REFUSED," HE SAID.

3. IN SUM, AMIN ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS A SERIES OF ISSUES WHICH STOOD IN THE WAY OF CLOSE UGANDAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, BUT INSISTED THAT THESE COULD BE OVERCOME AND THAT HE WANTED VERY MUCH TO DO SO. I WENT THROUGH MY TALKING POINTS AS AMENDED BY THE SECRETARY AND ALLOWED AS HOW THE PROBLEMS WHICH SEPARATED THE US AND UGANDA WERE NOT OF A BILATERAL NATURE AND WERE CAPABLE OF SOLUTION. I SAID THAT I KNEW PRESIDENT FORD HAD EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT AMIN'S MESSAGE OF THANKS FOR OUR SUPPORT TO THE OAU AND THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM, I ALSO SAID WE TOO WOULD LIKE TO GET BACK INTO A MORE NORMAL POSTURE WITH UGANDA AND THAT WITH BOTH SIDES WORKING CONSCIENTIOUSLY TOWARD THIS END I WAS SURE REAL PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. I MADE NO PROMISES, BUT AMIN SEEMED PLEASED.

4. AFTER AGAIN ASSURING ME THAT AFRICA IN GENERAL AND UGANDA IN PARTICULAR ARE NOT COMMUNIST, THAT THE US NOW HAD AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS POSTION IN AFRICA, AMIN MADE A PITCH FOR ARMS, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY ONLY C-130'S, BEFORE HE COULD GET INTO THE SUBJECT TOO DEEPLY, I REHEARSED THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, AND UNDERLINED THE LONG LEAD TIME ASSOCIATED WITH FMS. AMIN THEN PASSED ON TO WHAT HE DEFINED AS HIS NEED FOR AMERICAN "EXPERTS". IT APPEARED THAT UGANDA HAD RECENTLY DISCOVERED LARGE COPPER, COAL AND OTHER MINERAL DEPOSITS AND AMIN WOULD LIKE A MISSION OF AMERICAN EXPERTS TO COME AND HELP HIM ASSESS/DEVELOP THIS POTENTIAL. HE ALSO ASKED IF THE ENTS SYSTEM WHICH ZAIRE IS PARTICIPATING IN COULD BE EXTENDED TO UGANDA. I TRIED TO KEEP MY RESPONSE TO THIS LATTER POINT, SAYING THAT I WOULD HAVE TO CHECK THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS -- BUT BULA BROUGHT ME BACK TO THE "MISSION OF EXPERTS." I REPLIED BY SAYING THAT I KNEW SEVERAL CONSULTING FIRMS EXPERT IN THE MINING FIELD AND THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AMIN, "TELL THEM TO COME TO
5. ANGOLA: AMIN BEGAN THIS SUBJECT BY SAYING THAT HE WANTED ME TO REPORT TO MY GOVERNMENT HIS AND THE OAU'S PLEASURE WITH THE STAND THE USG HAD TAKEN ON ANGOLAN RECOGNITION. UNLIKE THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS, HE SAID, THE AMERICANS WERE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ANGOLA AND THIS GREATLY HELPED THE US IMAGE IN AFRICA. AT THE SAME TIME, AMIN INSISTED THAT HE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE—AND "CONFIDENTIALLY, I WANT YOU TO CONTINUE TO HELP THE FNLAYUNITA, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT COMMUNIST." HE STRESSED THAT MORE US HELP WAS NEEDED URGENTLY IN VIEW OF THE RECENT AND EVER MORE OMNIOUS INFUSION OF SOVIET ARMS INTO ANGOLA AND CABINDA. HE SAID MEMBERS OF HIS CONCILIATION COMMISSION HAD BEEN SOVIET ADVISERS USING THE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY IN MPLA POSSESSION.

4. AMIN SAID HE SUPPORTED MOBUTU ON ANGOLA, THAT THE USG SHOULD CONTINUE TO HELP ZAIRE SO ZAIRE COULD HELP FNLA/UNITA, AND THAT UGANDA ITSELF HAD AGREED TO COME TO ZAIRE'S AID IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK. I ASSURED HIM AND BULA WHO HAD MADE A SIMILAR PLEA IN SOME DETAIL THAT WE WOULD NOT ABANDON OUR ANGOLAN FRIENDS.

5. I THEN MOVED THE CONVERSATION TO THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM. I SAID THAT ANGOLA WAS AFRICA'S MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM, RECALLED THE US POSITION, AND WONDERED WHAT AMIN THOUGHT THE OAU MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. AMIN REPLIED THAT 27 AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAD NOW IN FAVOR OF A SUMMIT ON ANGOLA AND THAT SIX FAVORED A FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING, HE INTIMATED THAT A SUMMIT WOULD BE HELD IN EARLY/MID DECEMBER. I ENCOURAGED HIM ON THIS AND THEN, SINCE HE HAD SAID THAT THE MPLA HAD TO BE EXPELLED FROM CABINDA, I ASKED WHAT THE OAU'S REACTION WOULD BE TO A FLEC INVASION/VICTORY. AMIN SAID THAT FLEC WAS A LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THUS ACCEPTABLE. IN THE SAME VENUE, ZAIRE COULD HELP FLEC AS A LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. AMIN SEEMS TO HAVE DECIDED TO FOLLOW MOBUTU DOWN THE LINE.

WALKER
SECRET
EXDIS
SECRET
PAGE 01 NAIROB 00499 171116Z
60
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
------------------------ 021224
R 170815Z JAN 76
FM AMBASSADY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7239
S E C R E T NAIROBI 0499
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR UG US
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON AMIN'S REQUEST THAT USG REOPEN EMBASSY KAMPALA
REF NAIROBI 0105
1. AS REPORTED REFTEL, PRESIDENT AMIN OF UGANDA HAS AGAIN PROPOSED REOPENING OF U.S. EMBASSY IN KAMPALA. THIS EMBASSY'S COMMENTS ON ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REOPENING IN KAMPALA, BASED PARTLY ON IMPRESSIONS AND INFORMATION GAINED BY DCM LINDSTROM DURING HIS JANUARY 4 VISIT TO KAMPALA, ARE SET FORTH IN FOLLOWING PARAS.
2. PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGES OF REOPENING EMBASSY WOULD BE (1) TO FACILITATE REGULAR DIRECT EXCHANGES BETWEEN SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF USG AND AN AFRICAN CHIEF OF STATE WHO (WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT) WILL EVENTUALLY AFTER HIS OAU CHAIRMANSHIP COMES TO AN END CONTINUE TO EXERCISE CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND (2) TO COUNTER-BALANCE INFLUENCE OF LARGE COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE
IN KAMPALA. IN ADDITION, UGANDA IS A SIZEABLE AND
POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT AFRICAN COUNTRY WITH SIGNIFICANT
TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT AMCIT PRESENCE WHICH COULD BE
BETTER PROTECTED IF EMBASSY RE-ESTABLISHED.

3. DESPITE DISCONTENT AMONG UGANDANS STEMMING FROM
CONSUMER-GOOD SHORTAGES AND HATE IN SOME QUARTERS AS
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 NAIROB 00499 171116Z
RESULT OF AMIN'S LIQUIDATION OF POTENTIAL OPPONENTS, HE
APPEARS TO BE FIRMLY ENTRENCHED IN POWER. KAMPALA BASED
DIPLOMATS FEEL THAT, AS LONG AS HE CAN KEEP MILITARY
HAPPY, THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT ANYONE WILL BE ABLE
TO TOPPLE HIM IN NEAR FUTURE. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT,
IT MAY NO LONGER BE IN USG INTEREST TO TAKE POSITION --
IMPLICITLY AT LEAST -- THAT REOPENING OF EMBASSY WHILE
AMIN IS STILL AROUND WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE.

4. DESPITE RECENT LAPSES SUCH AS HILL CASE AND UN SPEECH,
AMIN APPEARS, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS IN KAMPALA
AS WELL AS SENIOR KENYA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, TO BE LEARNING
ARTS OF STATECRAFT RATHER MORE RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY
THAN ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED ON BASIS OF HIS EARLIER BEHAVIOR.
HIS GREATLY IMPROVED ABILITY TO HANDLE ENGLISH -- REPORTEDLY
ACHIEVED AS RESULT OF HIS FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH
ELIZABETH BAGAYA -- IS A VALUABLE ASSET IN THIS REGARD.
WHILE IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO CONCLUDE THAT AMIN WILL NO
LONGER BE TROUBLESOME FIGURE ON INTERNATIONAL SCENE,
INFORMED OBSERVERS APPEAR CONVINCED THAT HE CAN AND DOES
LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE AND THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS HAS DEFINITELY IMPROVED AND WILL CONTINUE TO
IMPROVE. AMIN'S CONDUCT DURING HIS MEETING WITH
LINDSTROM TENDS TO SUPPORT THESE CONCLUSIONS.

5. IN CONTRAST WITH POOR SECURITY SITUATION TWO TO THREE YEARS AGO, AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN VISITORS AND RESIDENTS IN UGANDA NOW FEEL SAFE FROM HARASSMENT BY AUTHORITIES, ALTHOUGH AS ELSEWHERE IN EAST AFRICA ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED CRIME CONTINUES TO BE PROBLEM.

6. OUTLOOK FOR SECURITY OF AFRICANS LESS PROMISING; HOWEVER, AMIN APPEARS FOR MOMENT TO HAVE CEASED MAKING PEOPLE "DISAPPEAR". NEVERTHELESS MANY PROMINENT UGANDANS CONTINUE TO BE IMPRISONED EITHER TEMPORARILY OR INDEFINITELY. IF INDEED AMIN IS PURSUING SOMEWHAT LESS HARSH POLICY IN THIS REGARD THAN FORMERLY, IT MAY BE MAINLY BECAUSE HE NO LONGER FEELS HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT IS THREATENED. DESPITE SEEMING IMPROVEMENT IN HIS BEHAVIOR, WE WOULD HAVE TO ANTICIPATE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NAIROB 00499 171116Z

SOME CRITICISM FROM CONGRESS AND U.S. PUBLIC THAT REOPENING OF EMBASSY WOULD CONSTITUTE "ENDORSEMENT" OF USG OF AMIN'S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO GET CRITICISM ON THIS SCORE FROM AFRICAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN KAMPALA MAINLY TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMIN AND WHAT IS GOING ON IN UGANDA.

7. ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGE OF REOPENING U.S. EMBASSY WOULD BE THAT AMIN MIGHT, AS REPORTED REFTEL, EXPECT OR AT LEAST HOPE FOR U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO REPLACE OR SUPPLEMENT SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEREFORE, IF DECISION WERE MADE TO REOPEN EMBASSY, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE COMPLETELY CLEAR IN ADVANCE TO AMIN THAT
SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE FEASIBLE IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE AS USG UNABLE AT PRESENT TO MEET NEEDS IN THIS FIELD OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TO U.S.

8. AMIN WOULD AT MINIMUM PROBABLY EXPECT EARLY RESUMPTION OF SOME FORM OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BUT PERHAPS SOME HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO HELP UGANDAN PEOPLE RATHER THAN PERPETUATE HIS RULE COULD BE DEVISED WHICH WOULD AT SAME TIME BE SUPPORTIVE OF LONGER TERM U.S. INTERESTS IN UGANDA.

9. WHILE LIVING CONDITIONS FOR ANY AMERICANS ASSIGNED TO A REOPENED EMBASSY IN KAMPALA WOULD LEAVE SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED, PARTICULARLY INsofar AS CONSUMER GOODS AVAILABILITY IS CONCERNED, DIPLOMATIC CORPS NOW RESIDENT IN KAMPALA MANAGES TO OVERCOME THESE DIFFICULTIES THROUGH FREQUENT SHOPPING TRIPS TO ELDOR, KENYA, AND BY NORMAL DIPLOMATIC IMPORTATIONS. AMERICAN SCHOOL IN KAMPALA, BOTH PRIMARY AND SECONDARY, CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AND NOW HAS MORE STUDENTS (FROM UN AGENCIES MAINLY) THAN AT TIME OF CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY MORE THAN TWO YEARS AGO. VANDALIZATION OF U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE LAST APRIL WOULD NECESSITATE SOME DIFFICULT REPAIR WORK, BUT OTHER EMBASSY HOUSES WHICH ARE LEASED OUT COULD BE RETURNED TO EMBASSY IN RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. GERMAN AMBASSADOR STATED THAT U.S. EMBASSY OFFICE SPACE COULD BE MADE USEABLE WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS' TIME.

10. WHILE WE HERE IN NAIROBI ARE NOT IN POSITION TO ESTIMATE EXTENT OF POTENTIAL OPPOSITION BY U.S. CONGRESS
AND PUBLIC TO ANY PROPOSAL TO REOPEN EMBASSY IN KAMPALA,
WE ARE INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THAT -- LEAVING ASIDE THIS
FACTOR -- ADVANTAGES TO U.S. OF REOPENING EMBASSY WOULD
OUTWEIGHT DISADVANTAGES.
MARSHALL
SECRET
SUBJ: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: BILATERAL MEETING WITH UGANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SETTING:

YOU ARE MEETING LT. COL. JUMA ABDALLA ORIS, GOU FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE URGING OF LIBERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DENNIS, WHO APPROACHED YOU ON THIS SUBJECT APPARENTLY AT THE REQUEST OF UGANDAN PRESIDENT IDI AMIN. FOLLOWING A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS WITH UGANDA LAST FALL WHEN AMIN WAS PLAYING A POSITIVE ROLE ON ANGOLA (DURING WHICH TIME ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY MULCAHY MET TWICE WITH HIM), RELATIONS DETERIORATED AGAIN AFTER AMIN ABRUPTLY REVERSED HIS POSITION ON ANGOLA AND BEGAN SUPPORTING THE SOVIET LINE. SINCE THEN HE HAS VOICED VEHEMENT OPPOSITION TO U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS AFRICA, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY'S RECENT SOUTHERN AFRICAN INITIATIVE. (AMIN INITIALLY MAY HAVE FELT SLIGHTED THAT THE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 251082

DID NOT SEE HIM DURING HIS APRIL VISIT TO AFRICA, BUT HIS HIGHLY NEGATIVE COMMENTS HAVE CONTINUED UNABATED EVER SINCE.) EXCERPTS OF RECENT AMIN STATEMENTS WERE CONTAINED IN YOUR BRIEFING PAPER FOR YOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DENNIS. AMIN'S LATEST STATEMENT, REPORTED BY KAMPALA'S DOMESTIC SERVICE ON OCT. 5, CAME IN A MEETING WITH 12 VISITING BLACK AMERICAN JOURNALISTS; THE REPORT SAID AMIN TOLD THEM THAT "KISSINGER'S PURPOSE OF COMING TO AFRICA WAS NOT TO BRING PEACE TO AFRICA BUT TO RESCUE THE WHITE MINORITY IN RACIST SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA", AND THAT "KISSINGER CAME TO BLACKMAIL AFRICANS." HIS INTEREST PRESUMABLY WILL BE TO DISCUSS AN IMPROVEMENT IN US-UGANDAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE REOPENING OF OUR EMBASSY IN KAMPALA.

OUR INTEREST, GIVEN THE FACT THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET WITH HIM AND ALSO OUR CONCERN FOR THE 300-ODD AMERICANS STILL RESIDENT IN KAMPALA, WILL BE NOT TO RAISE FALSE HOPES ABOUT AN IMMINENT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS AND TO CONVEY A CLEAR BUT INOFFENSIVE EXPLANATION OF THE BARRIERS WE SEE TO SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT AT PRESENT.

2. ISSUES/TALKING POINTS:

A. IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS/REOPENING OF EMBASSY KAMPALA:

BACKGROUND: THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN CLOSED SINCE LATE 1973. WE SEE NO PROSPECT FOR OR ADVANTAGE TO AN EARLY REOPENING. SINCE THE UGANDANS REQUESTED THIS MEETING, WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LEAVE IT TO THEM TO SPEAK FIRST AND MAKE THEIR PRESENTATION ON THIS SUBJECT.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- THE U.S. DESIRES FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL AFRICAN
STATES, INCLUDING UGANDA. WE WILL CERTAINLY CONSIDER
THE MINISTER'S PRESENTATION (AND/OR MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
AMIN) ON THIS SUBJECT.
-- HOWEVER, THE MINISTER CAN PROBABLY UNDERSTAND THAT WE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 STATE 251082
HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN RELATING UGANDA'S STATED DESIRE
FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. TO PRESIDENT AMIN'S
PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE U.S. AND ITS POLICIES IN AFRICA,
AS EVIDENCED IN A NUMBER OF RECENT BROADCASTS FROM KAMPALA
INCLUDING REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS TO A GROUP
OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS JUST THIS WEEK.
-- THE MINISTER SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC AND OUR CONGRESS REACTED STRONGLY TO WHAT WAS
REGARDED AS UGANDAN COOPERATION WITH THE HIJACKERS DURING
THE ENTEBBE INCIDENT, AND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN EXPRESSIONS
OF OUTRAGE AT THE DISAPPEARANCE SHORTLY AFTER THIS INCIDENT
OF MRS. BLOCH, THE HOSTAGE WHO REMAINED BEHIND IN
KAMPALA. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY
UNDERSTANDING WHAT APPEARED TO BE UNILATERAL MOVES BY
THEIR GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UGANDA IN THE
WAKE OF THESE INCIDENTS.
B. SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY:
BACKGROUND: AMIN HAS PARROTED THE SOVIET LINE ON THE
SECRETARY'S SOUTHERN AFRICAN INITIATIVE. YOUR MEETING
WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
AN EXPLANATION OF OUR POLICIES DIRECTLY TO THE GOU, IF
ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING THE FACTS ON THE RECORD.
YOUR TALKING POINTS:
-- LET ME BRIEF YOU ON THE STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

C. ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
BACKGROUND: WE DO NOT DISCOURAGE AMERICAN FIRMS FROM DOING BUSINESS WITH UGANDA (EXCEPT FOR STRATEGIC GOODS). FROM TIME TO TIME UGANDAN DELEGATIONS HAVE VISITED THIS COUNTRY TO PURCHASE AMERICAN PRODUCTS. A DELEGATION OF THREE MINISTERS OUSTENSIBLY ON SUCH A MISSION WERE RECEIVED BY MR. SISCO AND MR. MULCAHY IN MARCH 1975 (THEY MADE AN APPROACH ON IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS TO WHICH WE MADE A NON-COMMITTAL RESPONSE). THE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 STATE 251082
UGANDAN EMBASSY HAS INFORMED US OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT A SIX-MINISTER DELEGATION WILL VISIT THE U.S. THIS FALL IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OF LOCOMOTIVES; WE HAVE AGREED THAT THIS GROUP WILL ALSO BE RECEIVED IN THE DEPARTMENT.
YOUR TALKING POINTS (IF MATTER IS RAISED BY JUMA ORIS)
-- WE DO NOT DISCOURAGE PRIVATE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN UGANDA.
-- THE UPCOMING UGANDAN MINISTERIAL MISSION WOULD BE RECEIVED IN THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD THEY VISIT WASHINGTON AND WISH TO CALL AT THE DEPARTMENT- WE ARE AWAITING FURTHER WORD ON THIS SUBJECT FROM THE UGANDAN EMBASSY.

D. PROTECTION FOR FOREIGN MINISTER JUMA ORIS IN NEW YORK: BACKGROUND: THE DAY PRIOR TO JUMA ORIS' ARRIVAL IN NEW YORK, THE UGANDANS INFORMED US OF HIS COMING AND REQUESTED FULL SECURITY PROTECTION INCLUDING A POLICE POST AT THEIR PERMREP'S RESIDENCE WHERE HE IS STAYING. SY WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE COVERAGE, THEIR ASSETS HAVING LONG SINCE BEEN
FULLY PROGRAMMED. THE NEW YORK POLICE WERE, HOWEVER, REQUESTED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE (THIS CONSISTS ESSENTIALLY OF PATROL COVERAGE OF THE MISSION AND RESIDENCE). JUMA ORIS MAY BE PERSONALLY IRRITATED OVER THIS SITUATION.

YOUR TALKING POINTS (IF MATTER IS RAISED BY JUMA ORIS):
-- WE REGRET THAT WE ONLY LEARNED OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER’S PLANNED ATTENDANCE AT THE UNGA THE DAY BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL, AND THAT OUR LIMITED STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY STAFF HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY ASSIGNED TO OTHER VISITORS BY THAT TIME. HOWEVER, WE HOPE THAT THE PROTECTION BEING PROVIDED BY THE NEW YORK POLICE IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL SECURITY AT THE UN COMPLEX IS RESPONSIVE TO THE MINISTER’S REQUIREMENTS. ROBINSON CONFIDENTIAL